Ethnic Frontiers and Peripheries

Landscapes of Development and Inequality in Israel

Edited by
Oren Yiftachel and Avinoam Meir



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Oren Yiftachel and
Avinoam Meir

Negev Center for Regional Development
Beer Sheva

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Preface

The idea for editing this book originated during an international conference titled "Regional Development: The Challenge of the Frontier," held in December 1993 at the Dead Sea and which was organized by the Negev Center for Regional Development at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. In this conference we noticed that little has been said about the impact of Israel's complex mosaic of ethnic groups on the shaping of the country's social and spatial frontiers. We have therefore endeavored to bring together a number of perspectives on the evolution of ethnic frontiers in Israel and the role they play in shaping the cultural landscape of this country. Yet we later realized that "frontier" is too limited a term, and that it may through various processes have turned into a mosaic of spatial, social, economic, and political peripheries. More specifically we attempted to present the process of frontier development as perceived by Israel's ethnic and national minorities. We therefore invited contributions from various other Israeli experts on these issues: geographers, sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists, which have now become the main body of chapters in this book. We trust that they are representative of the main dimensions of the subject.

The importance of these issues has been illustrated during recent turbulent times in which Israeli society has witnessed the initiation of a peace process with the Palestinians, the tragic events such as Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's assassination, the difficulties in the implementation of the Oslo Peace agreements, and anti-Jewish terrorist attacks. These circumstances, combined with the results of Israel's 1996 elections in which ethnic parties have significantly increased their power, demonstrate that the drama of ethnic relations in this country continues to unfold. It is our hope that this volume will contribute to a more informed discussion on these relations and to a more tolerant and democratic Israel.

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O.Y. and A.M



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Editors' Note

In most cases, we have used the following system of transliteration for the spellings of Hebrew place names.

א	'A	ל	L
ב	B	מ	M
ג	G	נ	N
ד	D	ס	S
ה	H	ע	'
ו	B	פ	P
ז	Z	פ	F
ח	H	צ	TS
ט	T	ק	K
י	Y	ר	R
כ	K	ש	SH
כ	KH	ת	T

The exceptions are as follows:

- We have retained the popular spelling of well-known place names in Israel (for example, Tiberias, Haifa, and Safed.)
- We have retained authors' original spelling of Hebrew and Arabic personal and place names.
- The common English spellings for Hebrew or Arabic words (for example, kibbutzim) have been retained.
- Arabic names were transliterated by Oren Yiftachel.



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Frontiers, Peripheries, and Ethnic Relations in Israel: An Introduction

Oren Yiftachel and Avinoam Meir

Introduction

A wave of recent studies in the social sciences has explored the issues of ethnicity, nationalism, and social conflict. While several geographical contributions have been notable (see, Jackson and Penrose, 1993; Keith and Pile, 1993; Paul and Moss, 1995; Taylor, 1994; Watson and Gibson, 1995), the spatial aspects of ethnic and national conflict, and particularly the impact of planning policy, development, settlement, and migration, are yet to be fully explored.

Our book is set within this context and pursues two main goals. First, on a theoretical level, it endeavors to explore the evolution of ethnic spaces and interactions within a modern "nation-state," focusing on the territorial, economic, cultural, and political frontiers and peripheries. Second, on an empirical level, it examines the Israeli case by placing a rotating zoom lens on the country's main ethnic and national cleavages and margins.

In this short introduction we aim to provide the reader with a conceptual and theoretical frame of reference and to comment briefly on the content of the book's chapters. Clearly, each chapter of the book presents a particular and worthy perspective on its own, so our aim here is not to replace or even supplement these perspectives, but rather to provide the reader with the main theoretical constructs as perceived by the book's editors. These revolve around the concepts and realities of frontiers and peripheries, which are critical to the understanding of ethnic interactions and relations, particularly in settler states like Israel.

Several definitions will facilitate the discussion below. "Ethnicity" is defined as a social bond based on belief in a common cultural past at a

specific place. "The state" is the agglomeration of public institutions and agencies charged with the implementation of public policies. "Nation-building" is the deliberate effort to construct an overarching collective identity based on a putative common national (most often ethnic) sentiment, culture, and heritage. "State-building" is a complementary project, aimed at forging social compliance and loyalty around state institutions, territory, and common interests. "Control policies" are the practices that aim to reinforce patterns of social, political, and economic domination and inequality. "Israel" is defined as the state in its pre-1967 borders, while the terms "Arab minority," "Arabs in Israel," "Israeli Arabs," "Palestinian-Arabs," and "Palestinians in Israel" are interchangeable—all referring to the Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel.

Concepts and Theories

Nation-building and State-building

As a point of departure, we should recognize that the transformation of traditional pre-modern expressions of cultural-ethnic affiliations into contemporary forms of political organization (nationalism and "nation-states") is not a "natural" process born out of a linear pattern of progressive modernization, as often argued by nationalists (see, Smith, 1995). That transformation should rather be conceived as a social construction that often entails the exercise of control and oppression by dominant groups over peripheral minorities. As shown by Connor (1992) and Penrose (1994), the emergence of nationalism and nation-building projects has often aroused similar consciousness among minorities, who then began to threaten the national-territorial cohesion espoused by the social center (Gurr, 1993). This in turn gave rise to a multitude of control practices and policies aimed at preserving the dominance of majorities over the state's institutions and territory (Giddens, 1985; Smith, 1986).

Levels of social control and oppression have been particularly intense when a nation-state order has been introduced into multiethnic political units where state and ethnic boundaries do not overlap (Taylor, 1994; Smith, 1995). Such multiethnic states highlight the existence of two powerful social projects: nation-building and state-building. The former usually generates a social re-imagining of inclusion, whereas the latter often creates mere administrative incorporation. Our book focuses on the boundaries and border-zones between state and ethnic groups, and particularly between included and incorporated groups in the recent nation- and state-building context of Israel.

Settler and Settling States

Among the various models of nation- and state-building projects (as aptly described by Anderson, 1991; and Hobsbawm, 1990), the cases of settler and settling states are particularly fascinating. Settler societies are based on waves of (usually European) migrants who colonize "new" lands and establish new states, for example, Australia, Argentina, and the United States. Settling states are those which deliberately resettle certain social or ethnic groups into regions of "strategic (ethnic) importance," with examples including Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Northern Ireland, as well as (pre 1991) USSR or (pre-1974) Spain. Israel—as explained below—is both a settler and settling state.

The nature of nation- and state-building policies in these societies is dictated by the dominant "core" groups. In settler societies, that group is comprised of the first ("founding") ethnic group to have colonized the area, such as Anglo-Americans or Spanish-Argentineans. In settling societies, the core group is usually composed of the dominant ethnic group within the boundaries of the modern state created in the post-colonial era, such as Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, or Javanese in Indonesia.

Nevertheless, both settler and settling societies are generally comprised of three major social groupings: a core (charter) ethnic group, indigenous peoples, and subsequent international or internal migrants. Because of their structural multiethnic nature, such societies have employed particularly forceful methods of nation-building, described by some as "social engineering" (Hobsbawm, 1990). A common public policy response to the deep divisions between the three major social groupings mentioned above (settlers, indigenous peoples, and later migrants), has been the pervasive exercise of ethnic control practices during their on-going nation- and state-building efforts. In settler and settling societies, one such practice has been the settlement of frontier regions.

Frontiers, Internal Frontiers and Peripheries

Frontier regions, which are located at the geographical, political, socioeconomic, or cultural margins of the collective, play a central role in the construction of national, ethnic, and state identities. Frontiers denote the (material or metaphoric) "twilight zones" at the edge of a collective's control; they delineate directions for expansion and growth, and provide basic symbols, legends, challenges, and myths used for the construction of national identity. In frontier regions, the collective sharpens its identity by interacting with "others" and by protecting the ethno-national centers, which are made self-evident by the existence of frontier developments (Kirby, 1993; see also, Gonen, Hasson, this volume).

In this process, internal frontiers also play a central role in nation- and state-building. These are "alien" areas within the collective's boundaries into which the core attempts to expand, penetrate, and increase its control (Yiftachel, 1997). Activities associated with internal frontiers may include the dissemination of ethno-national culture, the settlement of minority regions, the development of hostile natural environments, or the modernization of "backward" regions—all in the interest of a dominant group. The existence, "invention," and promotion of frontier regions has formed a central pillar of identity-building projects in most settler societies, such as the United States, Australia, Israel, and Canada. Likewise, in other post-colonial settling states, such as Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, and Malaysia, governments have also delineated internal frontier regions, into which they have deliberately resettled members of the ethnic majority, in an effort to enhance state control and political stability (Newman, 1989; Mikessel and Murphy, 1991).

Internal frontiers are usually delineated in regions with high concentrations of ethnic minorities, where inter-ethnic struggles occur over the control of land, power, and resources. In internal frontier regions, the majority uses the positive images and ethos of frontier development, the expansionist frontier mentality it has developed, and the power of the state apparatus to preserve the dominance of the core group. It is to this dominance that we now turn.

Internal Frontiers, Social Control, and Peripherality

The promotion and settlement of frontier regions is the means by which national 'cores' use the positive political and cultural features of frontier development to aid their nation- and state-building projects. As noted by F.J. Turner (1962), the frontier is "both a place and a process," and frontier settlement efforts therefore provide essential physical (territorial) and spiritual (symbols, challenges, myths) assets for the fledging collective. However, it must be remembered that because the settlement of frontiers is first and foremost a project orchestrated by and for the national core for its particular interests, it involves the exercise of control and domination over peripheral groups, usually through the active involvement of the state and its supporting apparatus (see also, Billig, 1995; Foucault, 1980; Mitchell, 1991; Taylor, 1994; Tilly, 1990).

The role of the state here requires some elaboration. Its involvement in the settlement process must be understood against the ethnic character of most settler and settling states. Despite the general espousal of secular, neutral, and democratic ethos, such states have developed systems of politics and culture in the (ethnic) shape of the founding charter group.

While the core culture is of course contested, the dominance of the founding ethnic group usually sets the standards for generations to come in language, social practices, law, economics, and politics (Tilly, 1990).

Subsequently, nation-building efforts are characterized by the exclusion of the groups that fall outside the ethnic definition of the nascent nation (such as indigenous peoples), and by the forceful inclusion and assimilation of others (such as subsequent migrants). The peripheral "incorporated" (indigenous) groups will usually fall outside the boundaries of the nation-building project, and thus remain marginalized on the border that separates nation and state. The chapters below demonstrate not only the powerful existence of such boundaries and divisions (see, Newman, Peled, Yiftachel, this volume), but also their political and economic fluidity in the Israeli context (see, Fenster, Hasson, Meir and Zivan, Rabinowitz, this volume).

The processes of inclusion, exclusion, and incorporation are augmented by the capitalist economy which generally develops rapidly in settler states. Under that socioeconomic regime, later migrants are usually integrated into the production system as working classes, while indigenous peoples are initially excluded, and later integrated at even lower rungs (see, Shafir, 1993; Soja, 1995 and Peled, Schnell, this volume). In the cases of both immigrants and indigenous peoples, political, economic, and social control is exercised over peripheral groups, a practice clearly evident in the settlement of frontier regions.

We can identify three central dimensions of control embedded in the frontier settlement process, and in public policies associated with that process:

1. an explicit attempt to dominate the land resources of indigenous peoples, and thereby prevent the emergence of a peripheral counter-culture;

2. a more implicit mechanism to dominate peripheral groups (such as immigrants) from within the "core collective," by removing them from the centers of authority and wealth; and

3. the manipulation and exploitation of public resources channeled into frontier areas by powerful groups (such as industrialists, land developers, or ex-urbanites) for the promotion of their own narrow interests.

The last point is often neglected in the scholarly analysis of settlement policies, and even in public debates about the issue. However, it is no less significant than the dominant majority-minority tension over the control of peripheral regions. The settlement of frontiers—in the name of the national ethnic interest—is often also an instrument for the preservation

of hierarchical class and power relations within the ethnic majority. To illustrate this point it can be noted that it was mainly poorer immigrants that settled in Australia's frontier country towns, mining areas, or agricultural stations; it was mainly Javanese peasants who were resettled in Kalimantan and Irian Jaya, during Indonesia's "transmigration program"; it was mainly landless Sinhalese farmers who were resettled in Sri Lanka's Eastern Province as part of the government's attempt to wrest control over that region from the Tamils; and it was mainly Mizrahi (poorer and less educated) Jews who settled Israel's frontiers, as shown below (see also, Lipshitz, Grinberg, this volume).

The delineation and practices of internal frontiers therefore signify an ongoing attempt to define and redefine the goals and values of settler and settling societies, and to reproduce patterns of ethnic and class dominance, disparities, and inequalities. The use of internal frontiers to reproduce and deepen uneven social relations demonstrate an important feature: internal frontiers simultaneously assume both positive and negative characteristics. They are "sold" as positive and challenging projects for the majority core population, but also "paint" certain groups who reside in these areas as peripheral (see, Abu Sa'ad, this volume). In that manner, the notions of frontier and periphery are intimately linked: the very same areas are perceived as frontiers among core populations, and as peripheries by indigenous or weak social groups who populate these regions.

Frontiers, Peripheries, and the Landscapes of Inequality

Having demonstrated the practices of control embedded in the settlement of frontier regions, we can briefly discuss their regressive socioeconomic consequences. As noted, the very notion of an internal frontier is intimately linked to the creation of social and ethnic peripheries. The resultant mosaic of peripheries, in turn, creates pervasive landscapes of inequality and conflict. It is therefore commonplace to find wide social disparities in frontier regions in most settler and settling states, with pockets of wealth, large concentrations of poor towns and localities, and occasionally an indigenous underclass.

These landscapes of inequality, enforced and sanctioned by the state, also create constant friction between ethnic groups, which often leads to the emergence of on-going social conflicts about the distribution of economic, territorial, and power resources. The frictions and inequalities also form the basis for the emergence of fragmented intraregional collective identities, reinforced and reproduced by the prevailing spatial reality of segregation and division (see, Hasson, Rabinowitz, Yiftachel, this volume).

To summarize, then, we can note a paradox embedded in the process of frontier settlement: while such settlement aims to strengthen the nation-building project and enhance state control and cohesion, it may actually sow the seeds of interregional fragmentation, conflict, and resistance. This paradox is caused, as shown above, by the spatial reproduction of landscapes of territorial, economic, and power disparities. These, in turn, fuel resistance and conflict, rather than integration and unity.

Three broad observations serve to conclude this theoretical section. First, the production of space must be understood as an integral part of the making, maintaining, reproducing and challenging of ethnic relations. Second, spatial changes in settlement in general, and frontier settlement in particular, are often part of a transformation aimed at deepening social control and inequalities over peripheral groups. And third, while the settlement of internal frontier regions is an active project of imposing national identity and state cohesion, it may give rise to oppositional collective identities and cause societal fragmentation. In our book, these observations will be explored, contextualized, and demonstrated in the specific case of Israel.

Israel: Nation Building, Ethnicity, and Frontier Settlement

As noted above, Israel is both a settler and settling state, which was occupied almost entirely by Palestinian-Arabs prior to the beginning of Jewish migration about a century ago. Jews, who maintained a religious bond to Israel in the Diaspora, migrated into the land and settled on it in a process elsewhere described as "pure settlement colonialism" (Shafir, 1993), "internal-colonialism" (Zureik, 1979), or "colonization without colonialism" (Aharonson, 1994).

While the scope of this chapter does not allow a full discussion of the nature of pre-state Jewish colonization, we suggest an "ethnic-survival" form of colonization as the most appropriate conceptualization. Accordingly, it was a particularly territorial, rather than economic form of colonization, and was highly intransigent due to the status of most colonizers as refugees literally fighting for survival. In addition, it had a specific (Central-Eastern European) ethnic character, and was set a-priori as a project of ethno-national nation- and state-building (as opposed to other colonial societies, where local nationalism developed later).

Like several other settler and settling states, however, Israeli society is marked by three dominant social groupings: a core "charter" group (chiefly Ashkenazi-European Jews), indigenous people (Palestinian-Arabs), and subsequent migrants (mainly Mizrahi Jews from Middle Eastern countries and recent ex-Soviet Jews). The current ethnic composi-

tion of Israel was largely determined during the 1948–9 war, when 80 percent of the Arab population fled or was driven out, while Jewish refugees arrived from Europe, and later from Middle Eastern countries (Morris, 1987).

Most of the Arabs living in Israel have resided in the country for centuries, while the bulk of Ashkenazi Jews arrived during the pre-state period and immediately after 1948. Most Mizrahi Jews arrived in Israel in the early 1950s, as immigrants of relatively low socioeconomic status who joined an already established state and culture (Smooha, 1993). The state's ethnic structure changed once again dramatically during the early 1990s, with the arrival of some 700,000 migrants from the former USSR. At the end of 1995, the Ashkenazi group formed 44 percent of Israel's 5.5. million citizens, the Mizrahi Jewish group 40 percent, and the Palestinian-Arabs 16 percent (CBS, 1996). It is important to note, though, that Arabs form 42 percent of the population within the traditional geographical unit of Palestine—between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.

Israeli nation-building was a project designed to establish an ethno-national-territorial identity, based on a reconstructed "imagined" Jewish past and unity (Smooha, 1990). Israeli state-building is a complementary project intended to establish territorial and institutional infrastructures for "reviving" the nation, affecting all state residents, including the marginalized Arab minority (Kimmerling 1989; 1993). Returning to the concepts developed above, the Arab minority in Israel has been incorporated into the Israeli state, while Mizrahi migrants have been included and assimilated into the Israeli nation. Thus, Israeli nation- and state-building have both been characterized by varying strategies of social control over Arab and Jewish minorities (for more on Israel's ethnic structure, see, Horowitz and Lissak, 1990; Smooha, 1993; Swirski, 1981; Waterman, 1990; Weingrod, 1995). A central practice in this strategy of social control, as shown in the book's chapters, was the settlement of the frontiers.

Jewish settlement in Israel has formed a central pillar in the construction of a new Zionist national collective identity. It performed the two classical functions of frontier settlement: providing the collective with both territorial and spiritual foundations to consolidate the new identity (Kimmerling, 1989; Kipnis, 1987). It also provided a unifying cause for Jews from different backgrounds, fostered and enhanced altruistic values such as pioneering, personal sacrifice, remoteness, and danger, created consensus and public legitimization for the allocation of massive resources for the establishment of (non-economic) new settlements, and presented a focus for world Jewry identification, essential for the financial viability of the state (Kellerman, 1993; Shafir, 1993).

However, frontier settlement has also created divisions within nation and state, most notably by constituting an instrument for the oppression of the Palestinian-Arab minority (Yiftachel, 1991), but also by working to differentiate and segregate between various Jewish groups (Ben Zadok, 1993; Gradus, 1984). The use of Jewish settlement vis-à-vis the Arabs in Israel has been premised on the notion that control over the Arab minority is the most effective means of preserving political stability. Israeli settlement and spatial policies have consequently de-territorialized the Arab minority, and retarded its political, economic, and cultural development (Kimmerling, 1983; Meir, 1988; Yiftachel, 1992; see also, Peled, Meir and Zivan, this volume).

The use of settlement and spatial policy as control mechanisms within the Jewish population was more subtle, but no less significant. That process mainly entailed the dispersal of Mizrahi Jews to development towns and moshavim at the country's northern and (particularly) southern peripheries (see, Gonen, Hasson, this volume), and the subsequent preservation of socioeconomic gaps, by development and housing policies which assisted the center at the expense of the periphery.

As noted above, however, a paradox is embedded in the process of delineating and settling internal frontiers: while such settlement aims to strengthen the nation-building project and enhance state cohesion, it sows the seeds of fragmentation and resistance. Israel's 1996 elections have clearly demonstrated the validity of this argument in that parties representing peripheral minorities strengthened dramatically, especially in Israel's internal frontier areas. Accordingly, the parties representing the Arabs in Israel increased their power from five to nine Members of Knesset (which has 120 seats). Likewise, the Shas party (representing mainly Mizrahi Jews of lower socioeconomic status) grew from six to 10 seats and received a large percentage of the vote in most of Israel's development towns. The newly created immigrant party (representing mainly immigrants from the ex-Soviet Union) won seven seats and also received a large share of the votes in development towns. Together, parties representing peripheral ethnic groups have more than doubled their Knesset representation in what can be interpreted as a backlash against the country's dominant Ashkenazi core.

The above-mentioned topics of frontier settlement, evolving ethnic relations, public policies, and group identities, and their consequences to Israeli society, are discussed and elaborated in the book's 13 chapters from a variety of angles. It is to a short description of these that we now turn.

The Book

The 13 chapters below reflect our interdisciplinary approach to the understanding of ethnic spaces and relations, by presenting contributions from social and political geography, political science, anthropology and sociology. While few of the chapters address explicitly the issues of frontier settlement, state-building and social control noted above, they nonetheless present particular and contextualized pieces which can be fitted into the overall puzzle which characterizes Israel as a multiethnic settler and settling state.

The book is organized into three parts. The first deals with the zones of Arab-Jewish relations which bring to bear ethno-national (Jewish-Palestinian, Israeli-Arab) issues, attitudes, divisions, and concerns. The second part focuses on the points of contact and interaction mainly between and among Jewish ethnic groups in Israel's frontier and peripheral areas. The third part explores ethnic encounters and dynamics which cross-cut relations both within their respective collectives and across Israeli society.

David Newman's chapter opens the first part by constructing a model of the transformation of borders and zones from a period of conflict into an era of peace and stability. His is a mainly theoretical paper, although it brings useful examples from recent changes on and around the "Green Line" and the Palestinian West bank and Gaza. In the third chapter, Oren Yiftachel further develops the notion of the internal frontier, and demonstrates the "dark side" of frontier development, which transpires into policies of land expropriation, spatial containment, and economic neglect in a Galilee Arab village.

Dan Rabinowitz then further explores the rhetoric and reality of the national frontier by examining the city of Natseret Illit. He shows how the supposedly intransigent Jewish defense of "national" territory in the city is generated from a selective social and cultural construction of the term "Zionist settlement." In the following chapter, Yoav Peled presents another angle on the translation of the national Palestinian-Jewish conflict into everyday reality, by examining the attitudes of Jews towards Arabs in Israel's development towns. He finds that the militant anti-Arab position among the mainly Mizrahi residents of development towns is best explained by the application of split labor-market theories.

The book's second part begins with a review and analysis by Shlomo Hasson of the representation of Israel's frontier and peripheral areas in local culture and discourse. Hasson shows how subtle changes in place representation have both reflected and reinforced the transformation of regions from frontiers to peripheries. Likewise, although using a different approach, Amiram Gonen examines the status of settlers in Israel's fron-

tier regions. That status, he finds, has fluctuated according to the needs and norms of a particular period, generating a social mix of strong and weak, rich and poor in Israel's remote regions.

In the following two chapters, Gabriel Lipshitz and Lev Grinberg analyze the impact of peripheral location and status on Israel's development towns. Lipshitz reveals that nearly all development towns have suffered long periods of negative internal migration due to their distance from Israel's core areas, their poor economies, and their weak socioeconomic and ethnic image. Grinberg shows how these very features can be turned into a political asset, by facilitating the rise to power of young second-generation Mizrahi Jews who used the development towns as platforms to enhance their mobility within Israeli society.

In the last chapter of this part, Tovi Fenster studies the most recent wave of Mizrahi migration to Israel—the Ethiopian Jews. She critically assesses state policies which have been largely blind to the group's unique needs and aspiration, forcing the Ethiopians Jews to positions of marginality, even within Israel's socially deprived Negev region.

Still in the Negev region, the book's third part opens with two chapters which study the Bedouin-Arabs. First, Avinoam Meir and Ze'ev Zivan trace the relationships between Negev Bedouins and Jewish settlers to the pre-state period, when coexistence apparently was quite harmonious. It is only after the establishment of the Israeli state that the Bedouins began to suffer discrimination and oppression, causing the amiable Arab-Jewish coexistence in the Negev to quickly deteriorate. Second, Ismael Abu-Sa'ad takes a different approach by examining the interaction between state and peripheral minority in the sphere of education. He documents the ubiquitous difficulties and disparities experienced by the Arabs in the Negev, and interprets the education system as a control mechanism over the minority.

The fourth chapter in this part by Hanna Herzog accounts for the interplay between gender, ethnicity, and politics in Israel. Herzog traces the political careers of Mizrahi and Arab women, exposing the many obstacles and rare successes of women who have to overcome the double barrier of ethnic and gender marginality. In the book's final chapter, Yitzhak Schnell returns us to the economy, by looking at the development of Arab industries in Israel's Galilee and Central regions. Schnell observes that the Arabs are increasingly attempting to break out of their traditional local niches into the competitive state-wide markets. However, the structured and hierarchical economic relations in Israel mean that most Arab industries are locked into monoethnic industrial peripheries.

These are the various contributions which paint—in detailed and vivid colors—the reality of ethnic frontiers and peripheries in Israel. In this

book we attempt to make a fresh contribution to the analysis of Israeli society by introducing space, territory, and place into the center of the discussion of ethnic relations. We also attempt to present a multidisciplinary understanding of the social and geographical marginality of various ethnic groups as reflecting the on-going projects of nation- and state-building in a nascent settler and settling state.

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PART ONE

The Frontiers of Ethno-National Relations



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2

Transforming Ethnic Frontiers of Conflict into Political Frontiers of Peace

David Newman

Introduction

The transition from conflict to peace is often accompanied by changes in the landscape of those spaces located along the conflict interface. The gradual easing of tensions and military confrontation in these boundary or frontier zones is an important indicator of the extent to which conflict cessation can be a catalyst for the normalization of relations between previous protagonists. The long-term stability resulting from the implementation of peace agreements may be dependent on the nature of functional relations (economic, social, cultural) which take place within these frontier zones of confrontation.

This chapter examines the changing nature of the political and ethnic frontier in Israel, in the light of the recent peace accords between Israel and Jordan, and the ongoing negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. While the immediate impact of the negotiations is to create a situation of conflict cessation, this does not automatically create a landscape of peace characterized by cross-boundary economic and social relations. The extent to which frontier zones between Israel and her neighbors become less confrontational is dependent on three factors: the degree to which mutual suspicions of threat are removed from the military landscapes, the degree to which functional boundaries are opened for the movement of people and goods, and the nature of the trans-boundary ethnic mix of peoples. These issues are discussed as part of an examination of the landscape transformation which is expected to take place as a result of the implementation of further peace agreements, and which, in

turn, can feed back into the negotiation process as a means of facilitating further political normalization.

The Political Frontier

The concept of the political frontier is closely tied up with that of boundaries (Prescott, 1987; Anderson, 1996). Political frontiers are formed around and along inter-state boundaries, the latter directly affecting patterns of development taking place in the former. The precise nature of the boundary impact varies according to the extent to which such boundaries are "closed" or "open," respectively preventing or enabling trans-frontier movement of peoples and goods. Political frontiers are more commonly associated with "closed," or even "sealed" boundaries, reflecting antagonistic and tense relationships between neighboring states (East and Prescott, 1975). In many cases, such animosity may be defined in terms of direct conflict and the presence of military and security installations along the course of the state boundary.

In his seminal work on frontier zones, House (1981; 1982) developed the notion of double peripherality. This describes the dual disadvantages experienced by regions which occupy the geographical periphery of the state, remote from the locus of political and economic power. Not only does distance from the economic core negatively affect the region and its development, but this disadvantage is doubled owing to the "frontier" location along, or in close proximity to, the boundary with neighboring states. The problems of double peripherality in the political frontier region are exacerbated in situations of conflict. The closure of boundaries and the prevention of trans-frontier social and economic contact serve to landlock a peripheral region between its own core, from which it is remote, and a neighboring region, from which it is inaccessible. An alternative political situation is one which displays "open" boundaries, allowing trans-frontier movement of goods and people. In such situations, the boundary location may serve to compensate a region for its peripheral location with respect to the economic core of its own country. This is no longer a case of double peripherality. Yet, it remains an example of a political frontier by virtue of the boundary impact, albeit one which promotes, rather than hinders, regional development.

This chapter addresses the transitional nature of boundaries and their associated frontier regions. It discusses the extent to which changes in the system of political relationships between neighboring states are, in turn, reflected in changing patterns of development within the frontier regions. Of particular interest is the transition from conflictual to peaceful relations between states. The implementation of peace does not occur overnight simply as the result of the signing of a peace accord. Rather it is a

long, drawn out process between prior protagonists aimed, in the first instance, at decreasing the extent of direct conflict and gradually increasing the level of political stability along the frontier. Many peace processes are no more than an agreed cessation of warfare and are not necessarily accompanied by economic cooperation and "normalization" of relations between states. There remains a complex interplay between security, strategic, geo-ethnic, and economic characteristics of the frontier zone. Security and strategic factors tend to be emphasized along the conflict interface. While not disappearing altogether, these give way to a focus on economic and regional development characteristics along frontiers displaying trans-boundary interactive activity. Within this transition process, boundaries and frontiers take on mutually enforcing roles (Figure 2.1).

On the one hand, the improvement in relationships between neighboring political entities may be reflected by changes in development patterns within the frontier regions. Governments may actively fund projects and invest resources in transition frontiers as an indication of their belief that a situation of peace will result in greater political stability. A situation in




FIGURE 2.1 Formal and functional characteristics of boundaries: The feedback effect (*Source:* Newman, 1994. Reprinted by permission).

which no change takes place (such as the retaining of all existing military and security infrastructures) would indicate, at the best, a situation of "cold peace" which could revert back to conflict in a very short time. On the other hand, increased levels of grass-roots trans-frontier contact and informal economic activity may, in turn, provide the impetus for governments to change the formal nature of cross-boundary political relations through the easing of restrictions, especially in situations where the political boundary cuts through a homogeneous ethnic territory.

Frontiers of Conflict

The characteristics of a political frontier region differ from place to place. The element common to all such frontiers is the fact that regional patterns of development are visibly affected by their boundary location. Where development characteristics deviate from the expected patterns of distance decay from the territorial core to the periphery, an explanation must be sought in extraneous factors, one of which is the location along, or the close proximity to, the political boundary. The existing conditions within a frontier conflict region may not only display a sharp break with those of the core, but also with characteristics in the frontier region located on the other side of the political boundary. Cross-frontier spatial differentiation often displays greater contrast than the core-periphery differences, with sharp breaks in the patterns of development taking place along the boundary and within a relatively small geographic territory.

Frontiers of conflict are mostly characterized by closed boundaries and little, if any, movement from one side to the other (Table 2.1). Totally sealed boundaries can result in the evolution of two totally different and contrasting settlement landscapes next to each other. When sealed boundaries are associated with different cultures and/or ideologies, this pattern of spatial differentiation is the most pronounced. However, even the imposition of a tightly closed boundary in what was previously a single functional and homogeneous ethnic entity can bring about spatial differentiation in a relatively short time period. The cases of West and East Germany between 1950–1990 (Wild and Jones, 1993), and the "Green Line" dividing Israel from the West Bank between 1949–1967 (Brawer, 1984; 1990; Newman, 1994; 1995) are good examples of the sudden, short-term, effect of a completely sealed boundary. New patterns of settlement, transportation, and economic foci emerged, seeking a new spatial equilibrium in which the new boundary constitutes the geographical edge beyond which development can no longer be diffused.

The influence of different political and/or ideological systems on each side of the sealed boundary can result in the formation of unique settlement patterns. In the case of Germany, economic and settlement patterns

TABLE 2.1 Boundary-frontier relationships

Political Situation	*Nature of Boundary*	*Frontier Region Characteristics*
Conflict	Sealed	No cooperation Security/military landscape Geo-ethnic separation
Conflict cessation	Closed	Limited cooperation Maintenance of security landscape Geo-ethnic separation
Peace	Open	Cooperative relations Removal of security landscape Geo-ethnic contact

on the western side were influenced by the spontaneous processes of the emerging capitalist economy, while on the eastern side patterns were reoriented according to a rigidly controlled socialist mode of development (Wild and Jones, 1993). In the case of the West Bank, Arab settlement patterns on both sides of the "Green Line" underwent significant change, the one being influenced by Israeli patterns of development, the other being largely neglected by the Jordanian administration (Brawer, 1984; 1990; Newman, 1995). In both cases, a single functional region was transformed, within the space of a generation, into two different human landscapes, despite their geographic proximity. In each case, frontiers were created in regions which had previously been part of a geographic and economic interior, in some cases the core, of a single political entity.

The following discussion focuses on three characteristics of the contentious frontier in Israel: security landscapes; geo-ethnic segregation; and government policy toward political frontier regions. These are shown to have self-enforcing effects on each other. Government policy in the political frontier region serves both to bolster up the security and defensive capability against neighboring states, while the policy within the internal, ethnic frontier is aimed at exercising full political control over ethnic minorities who are perceived as constituting another source of a threat to the state.

Security Landscapes

Frontiers of conflict are predominantly characterized by military and security landscapes (Soffer and Minghi, 1986). The relationship between the military and civilian components of a security landscape is complex. The impact of military activities on the development of civilian landscapes is not uniform. Civilian landscapes can constitute an important ideological presence within the landscape but may, at the same time, in-

terfere with the smooth functioning of the military system. In cases of extreme military tension and intermittent warfare, political frontier regions may be cleared of their civilian components as the latter are thought to get in the way of smooth and uninterrupted military behavior. In cases where the civilian landscape remains intact, the local economy may be directly influenced by the inflow of military personnel, capital, and technology. This can provide a boost for the local economy which may otherwise have been left to its peripheral geographical and economic status. Paradoxically, the "conflict" status of the region may contribute to the development of the region, at least as long as direct conflict and warfare do not erupt. In the case of the latter, the frontier region would most likely undergo mass destruction within both the civilian and military realms of developmental activity.

Security landscapes are to be found in all of Israel's political frontiers. These range from the direct presence of military forces, to settlement landscapes which are integrated into the security landscape. The development of civilian infrastructure, which has traditionally been perceived as constituting an integral part of the military defensive systems in Israel (Hasson and Gosenfeld, 1980; Kimmerling, 1983; Newman, 1989a), is exceptional in this respect. In the past, the founding of settlements in the political frontier has been perceived as contributing to the system of regional defense, although this has changed in the wake of technological advancements in warfare (Newman, 1989a; Kellerman, 1993).

The northern frontier regions, along the Lebanese and Syrian borders are good examples of the inter-mix of security and settlement activities. Civilian communities were created along the Lebanese boundary during the first decade of statehood as a means of demonstrating a physical presence in the landscape and, as was perceived at the time, of bolstering the regional defensive capacity. It is precisely these settlements which have become most vulnerable to missile attacks from across the boundary. The creation of the Israeli controlled security zone in Southern Lebanon, and the strengthening of the Israeli military presence in this region, has demonstrated the paradoxical nature of the civilian-military interface (Norton and Schwedler, 1993). Settlements, which were initially founded as a means of demonstrating control and bolstering the defensive capability of a frontier region, have now been transformed into the major landscape components which have to be protected from trans-boundary military activity.

The status of the civilian settlements in the Golan Heights has undergone a similar transformation. Established in the years immediately following the 1967 War, the settlements symbolized Israeli presence and control of this region. They also provided the basis for the economic development of a marginal region, given the limitations of the difficult

physical conditions—soils and climate. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the civilian settlements were perceived as constituting a hindrance to the attempts by the Israeli army to repulse the Syrian military advance. In the immediate aftermath of this military confrontation, it was argued by some policy makers that the policy of promoting economic development in the political frontier region endangered the long term security of the region (Newman, 1989b).

Prior to 1967, a similar security-settlement interface could be found along Israel's boundary with the Gaza Strip in the Western Negev region. Civilian settlements, many of them founded during the first decade of statehood during the 1950s, fulfilled the dual functions of agricultural pioneering communities and frontier security outposts. They were the target for many of the *fedayeen* (infiltrater) cross-boundary raids during the 1950s, causing much damage to life and property. The reimposition of the Gaza boundary, as a result of the Oslo I agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in September 1993, has recreated the boundary/frontier situation for these communities, particularly as the Gaza boundary has been delineated by a new security fence and remains largely closed to cross-boundary movement.

Geo-ethnicity

Territorial conflict at the state interface is often linked to trans-boundary patterns of geo-ethnicity. State formation processes have often resulted in the splitting up of many ethnic and national groups on different sides of a single boundary. Members of the same ethnic group become citizens of separate states within which they constitute no more than a minority. As minorities, with co-patriots across the boundary, they are often perceived by the dominant national group as posing a threat to the future territorial integrity of the state. In these situations, ethnic minority groups are subject to stringent controls. Governments may attempt to change the geo-ethnic homogeneity of the frontier regions by forcibly transferring members of the group to other more remote regions, or alternatively, by colonize the region with members of other ethnic groups in an attempt to dilute the ethnic composition of the frontier region (Gurr and Harff, 1994a).

Frontiers of conflict may be characterized by either ethno-territorial homogeneity or heterogeneity. In the former case, conflict is characterized by interstate disputes along the ethnic interface, in which the unique ethnic characteristics of each state constitute a "clean" divide between the two sides. Conflict between states becomes transformed into conflict between ethnic, national, and religious groups despite, and in some cases because of, their physical separation. In cases of ethno-territorial hetero-

geneity, in which sections of the ethnic group reside in both states, the conflict may take place between the state itself and the minority groups. These groups may aspire to some form of secession as a means of becoming reunited with their co-patriots across the boundary in a single national entity (Buchheit, 1978; Chazan, 1991; Premdas et al., 1990). Demands for secession endanger the territorial integrity of the existing state which, in turn, attempts to reinsert its authority and effective control in these frontier regions. This assertion of authority can be achieved through contrasting policies. Governments may decide to invest resources in the politico-ethnic frontier region in an attempt to integrate the minority population into the larger collective. Alternately, governments may decide to use military and other forceful means to control the ethnic frontier, particularly if they suspect that the ethnic minority do not profess loyalty to the state (Harff, 1993; Marshall, 1993).

The dilemma which faces a government is well expressed in the case of Israel. On the one hand, the government aspires to the integration of the Arab and Palestinian minority into the state system in an attempt to refocus their loyalties towards the state and away from external and regional influences. At the same time, the ethnic frontier is characterized by a dual and segregated landscape, one in which Jews and Arabs reside separately, and in which patterns of economic and social development favor the dominant group at the expense of the minority. Government policies only serve to further alienate this same minority, thus strengthening their political consciousness and awareness, and their identification with the wider Palestinian cause (Yiftachel, 1991; 1992).

Contextually, both the German and Palestinian cases related to situations in which a single ethnic or national group is divided by an arbitrary political boundary. However, while the imposition of the "iron curtain" in Germany served to divide a homogeneous ethnic territory into two distinct political units, the "Green Line" created a situation in which the Arab residents of Israel were transformed into an ethnic minority. Notwithstanding, the imposition of a "sealed" political boundary resulted in economic and spatial differentiation amongst both German and Arab-Palestinian residents located on either side of the boundary interface, despite ethnic and national homogeneity across the divide. Aspirations for the eventual reunification of the entire ethnic group into a single geo-ethnic region, one in which the political boundaries are compatible with the ethnic realities, is a constant theme in the historical condition of such groups. The eventual reunification of both Germany and Vietnam came about not only because of the demise of the cold war and the decrease in political tension, but also because of mutual aspirations for the recreation of a single national territory. Much of the "new world order" which has emerged in the wake of the demise of the Soviet Union has been accom-

panied by attempts to recreate nation states and homogeneous ethnic territories, often through means of warfare and ethnic cleansing (O'Loughlin and van der Wusten, 1993; Williams, 1993; Demko and Wood, 1994). A similar process of territorial reunification could take place in the future in Korea. In all these cases of divided nations (Waterman, 1987), core territories were initially transformed into political frontiers, with differential development taking place within each frontier. Territorial and national reunification, following the removal of the cause for political conflict and territorial division, resulted in a reversal of this process with frontiers becoming reintegrated within the state ecumene.

Probably the most blatant example of a single ethnic territory which has become transformed into a series of political frontiers is that of the Kurds (Gurr and Harff, 1994b). This national group has become peripheralized, both geographically and sociopolitically, during the twentieth century. The indigenous Kurdish region was transformed into the geographical locus of the superimposed boundaries between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The Kurdish core territory was transformed into four separate peripheral regions (a fifth region located within the Soviet Union is not geographically contiguous with the other Kurdish areas), in each of which their minority and subordinate power status determined their discrimination by the core, both politically and economically (Drysdale and Blake, 1986). Events in this region have demonstrated the importance of maintaining some form of trans-frontier contact between the separate Kurdish peripheries as a means by which a common identity and struggle for self-determination can be partially realized. Such contact has only been possible when geopolitical realities as determined by the core have enabled it to happen. During the early 1970s, Iran allowed trans-frontier movement in the Kurdish regions to take place in order to open up an additional military front in their war against Iraq. Nearly twenty years later, it is the United States that has insisted on maintaining some form of cross-frontier contact between the Kurds of Turkey and Iraq, both as a means of protecting the Kurdish haven in Northern Iraq, as well as maintaining a "back door" entry into Iraq for the allied forces. The extent to which the inhabitants of the frontier region are able to determine their own fate is limited and is subject to the changing political realities within the core. As such, the frontier takes on characteristics of both the geographic and political periphery.

Frontier-oriented Government Policy

Government policy towards a conflictual frontier may take two different approaches, largely depending on the perceived role of the frontier in the eyes of the policy makers. On the one hand, governments may decide

to bolster and promote development in a frontier region in order to make a political statement to the neighboring countries. Increasing the flow of development resources is often used as a demonstrative act of strengthening the visible presence in a disputed region, especially in situations where the conflict focuses on alternative claims to territorial control and sovereignty. In other situations, governments may take a conscious decision to pour fewer resources into the regional development of a political frontier because of the possibility that this region may become transformed into a future battlefield—in which case much of the regional infrastructure and settlement would be destroyed.

The correspondence of the conflictual frontiers with peripheral regions (be they geographic, economic, social, and/or political) results in conditions of double, or even triple, peripherality. In such conditions, the conscious decision by government not to develop the frontier brings about conditions of extreme marginality. Even the decision by the government to favor the frontier may only result in a slight improvement in the general conditions from extreme to relative marginality. Such decisions are based on government perceptions concerning the political importance of the region and the nature of political relationships with the neighboring countries, rather than as part of a rational, long-term policy of economic and infrastructural investment aimed at improving the overall regional socioeconomic conditions.

Contrasting government policies have always been evident when comparing Israel with her neighbors. Israel has implemented policies aimed at integrating military and civilian landscapes in close proximity to conflictual boundaries. The founding of new settlements, the promotion of economic development, and the active encouragement of citizens to reside in these regions is part of an ideological stance which perceives "presence" in space as constituting an important component of the claim to territory (Kimmerling, 1983). Thus the Israeli side of the "Green Line" boundary was subject to intense settlement and developmental activity as a means of creating a Jewish presence in and around contested regions. In some parts of the region, these policies resulted in the formation of new Jewish settlement landscapes along the political frontier, while in the northern parts of the region, it resulted in the formation of an ethnic mix in which new Jewish settlements were founded alongside existing Arab Palestinian villages which had remained on the Israeli side of the boundary (Brawer, 1990; Morris, 1990; Reichmann, 1990). These areas constitute the new internal frontiers of the State of Israel, frontiers which were "defended" by the creation of new ethno-spatial realities, laying claim to the land for the national collective.

The Jordanian side of the political boundary was subject to different developmental policies. Until 1967, the frontier along the Jordanian side

of the West Bank boundary was not developed for civilian purposes, but was fortified as a military cordon sanitaire (Brawer, 1984). A contrasting frontier policy has been adopted by the State of Jordan along the Jordan Valley. Since the early 1970s, the Jordanian government has promoted the transformation of this frontier region into the mainstay of the country's agricultural economy. The diversion of waters along the Ghor Canal has enabled the development of a flourishing agricultural economy. This functional attribute has resulted in the diffusion of trans-frontier limited cooperation between the agriculturalists on both sides of the boundary, making for a smoother transition from a situation of conflict to peace.

From Conflict to Peace: Engineering the Boundaries

Transforming ethnic frontiers of conflict into political frontiers of peace is dependent on the nature of the boundary engineering process which takes place as part of conflict resolution. Where a peace process is not accompanied by territorial change and boundary redemarcation, the nature of the political frontier may undergo change, for example the transformation of a military landscape into a developmental landscape. Where the peace process is accompanied by the creation of new boundaries, areas that were once part of the political frontier become more fully integrated into the core territories of the state, subject only to normal processes of core-periphery distance decay. At the same time, new political frontiers may be created in close proximity to the new boundaries; those areas, which were once part of the core territory, now become subject to the political influence of the boundary.

It is important to clearly define what is meant by "peace" within this context. By "peace process," we denote the cessation of conflict and direct trans-frontier hostility, and its replacement by conditions of political stability (Newman, 1996). This is a short-term objective of the implementation of a peace treaty. Longer term objectives, such as the "normalization" of interstate relations and the complete "opening" of the boundaries to free movement of people and goods, are more utopian in nature and are rarely attainable in the first stages of frontier transformation.

The onset of global media, telecommunications, and satellites have changed the basic conditions governing the degree to which a boundary can be sealed. The dissemination and diffusion of basic information about neighboring peoples and communities has played a major role in the breaking down of both physical and social barriers between previously conflictual states. This is as true of the political barriers between western and eastern Europe, as it is of the increased levels of cooperation—both economic and political—between the states of Western Europe. In this respect, not only are frontier regions no longer peripheral (in all but the

geographical sense), but they actually take on the important role of constituting transition zones between states, cultures, and peoples (Foucher, 1987). Geenhuizen and Nijkamp (1995) and Ratti and Reichmann (1994) note the threefold attractive features offered by border regions: their proximity to the marketplaces of more than one country, the availability of a border labor force, and the greater cultural "permeability" of the local societies. The breaking down of selective images begins within these transition zones, diffusing further afield to the respective country's economic cores and centers.

Three factors are considered crucial to the transformation process: the nature of military presence in and around the political frontier; patterns of cross-frontier geo-ethnicity; and, the extent of cross-boundary economic cooperation.

Security Landscapes

The formation of a true frontier of peace would necessitate the removal of much, if not all, of the military and security installations on both sides of the boundary. This would result in the decrease of mutual tensions and the removal of the perceived threat facing each state from the "other" side. In reality however, the transition from conflict to peace is rarely accompanied by a noticeable decrease in the military presence. As long as there remains mistrust of the intentions of the "other" side, the military landscape is unlikely to change, although it may become less conspicuous. The creation of buffer zones or the introduction of peacekeeping forces can result, paradoxically, in an increase in the level of military activity. Maintaining the peace is itself a process which often involves the presence of security forces and related installations such as early warning stations. Political frontier regions remain areas within which tensions remain high and in which any breach, however small, of a peace treaty will, in the short term, be perceived as a renewal of threat.

Given the extent of animosity between the Arab world and Israel, the formal signing and implementation of a peace agreement is unlikely to cause any immediate changes within the security and military characteristics of the political frontier (Table 2.2). The perceived nature of the existential threat (Falah and Newman, 1995) is such that the security landscapes are likely to be bolstered rather than diminished. The reintroduction of military installations and air bases into the Negev region following the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai resulted in a transformation of much of this former landscape. In the eventuality of an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights or from the security zone in South Lebanon, the new political frontiers would become transformed into security landscapes. While boundaries may be formally demarcated and peace agreements

TABLE 2.2 Trans-frontier peace scenarios along Israel's boundaries

Boundary	*Security Landscapes*	*Geo-Ethnic Patterns*	*Cooperative Projects*		
			Water	*Tourism*	*Environment*
Egypt	Buffer zones Int'l military forces	Sparse population	-	+	-
Jordan	Reduction of military forces	Ethnic separation	+	+	+
Syria	Demilitarization	Ethnic separation	+	-	-
Lebanon	New security frontier	Ethnic separation	-	+	+
Palestinian State	New security frontier	Trans-frontier Geo-ethnicity	+	+	+

signed and implemented, the nature of the frontier would not necessarily reflect this transformation in the short-term. This is especially the case in regions which no longer constitute a political frontier, such as along the "Green Line" boundary between the West Bank and Israel, but which may revert to their former boundary status (Newman, 1995).

The crystallization of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as separate political territories partially resulted from the creation of a "ghetto" state during the Intifada years between 1987–1993 (McColl and Newman, 1992). The boundaries of these areas were closed to prevent the unhindered movement of Palestinian workers who are perceived as constituting a security threat. Paradoxically, the move towards peace has also been accompanied by a short-term increase in the security threat, as Palestinian extremist movements opposed to the peace process have undertaken a suicide bombing campaign within Israel itself. This, in turn, has resulted in the implementation of policies aimed at physically separating the two populations from each other and restricting the Palestinian population to its own self-government areas. Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has been accompanied by the erection of a security fence and border patrols along the length of the new boundary. Despite the proximity, settlements on the Israeli side of the fence no longer employ Palestinian workers, they prefer to import cheap labor from abroad. This new political frontier serves to demarcate a de facto boundary, despite the fact that the final line separating respective Israeli and Palestinian political territories has not yet been demarcated.

Geo-Ethnicity Along the Conflict Interface

The transition from a frontier of conflict to a frontier of peace requires due consideration of geo-ethnic patterns. In a new world order which has reasserted the supremacy of the nation-state idea, we could assume that, where possible, boundaries should be realigned in order to create territories which are as ethnically homogeneous territories as possible. In this way, the aspirations of ethnic and national groups for political self determination and sovereignty would be met, thus reducing intrastate tensions and cross-boundary conflicts. However, the preservation of the territorial integrity of existing state structures does not allow for the redemarcation of boundaries, except for cases where territorial exchange takes place as a means of spatial compensation. States prefer to continue to exercise their control over the minority ethnic groups, using force where necessary, or alternatively to carry out some form of spatial ethnic cleansing whereby the population is forced to leave, but the territory remains within the sovereign domain of the state (Harris, 1993). The function of territorial boundaries remains important inasmuch as they continue to separate ethnic groups and their respective territories. The territorial realities of the ethnic conflicts of the new regional orders in both Eastern Europe and the Middle East stand in stark contrast to postmodern ideas about territorial deconstruction, the removal of state boundaries, and the promotion of shared spaces and multi-identities (Eva, 1994; Galtung, 1994; Paasi, 1994; Taylor, 1996).

The relationship between boundary location and geo-ethnic patterns, and the related demographic-territorial ratios, is central to an understanding of the transition from conflict to peace in both Israeli and Palestinian frontier regions (Table 2.2). Had Israel ever formally annexed the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Jewish-Arab demographic ratios within the sovereign territory would have changed from 83:17 in favor of the Jewish population to 65:35 respectively. Given the continued differential rates of natural growth between the two populations, this could have resulted in parity within thirty to forty years. The absence of a Jewish majority within the Jewish state would have undermined the raison d'être of the state's existence. Such a scenario has always been unacceptable to Israeli governments of all political persuasions. The desire to maintain a Jewish majority explains why the Occupied Territories were never formally annexed by Israel (with the exception of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights in which civilian law was formally extended to these regions by the Israeli parliament in 1967 and 1982 respectively) and remained subject to the laws of a non-sovereign military administration. The promoters of the current peace process in Israel use this argument as a major part of their peace discourse, namely the need to ensure a long-term Jewish majority within the State of Israel.

The lack of congruence between political boundaries and ethnicity has had an impact on the Arabs in Israel and in the territories. The political struggle for Palestinian rights has diffused from the Occupied Territories into Israel itself, encompassing the younger generation of Israeli Arab citizens, such that many of them have increasingly identified themselves as Palestinian, rather than as Arab citizens of Israel (Rouhana, 1990). Such political identification crosses boundaries and frontiers and lays the seeds for potential conflict or cooperation across future boundaries to be demarcated as part of the peace process. The "Green Line" which came into being following the Armistice agreements of 1949 created geo-ethnic dislocation for the indigenous Arab population. Part of them became citizens of Israel, while others became Jordanian citizens in the West bank which was administered and controlled by Jordan, but never legally annexed. Some resided in the West Bank, while their fields and economic livelihood were on the Israeli side of the boundary (Brawer, 1984; 1990; Newman, 1995). No future boundary, however redemarcated, could devise a territorial arrangement in which there was complete separation between the two national groups, assuming that population transfers (of Israeli Arabs into the West Bank, or Israeli settlers back into Israel) are considered to be unacceptable solutions (Falah and Newman, 1995).

Even if a Palestinian state were established, there remains the issue of the Arab citizens of Israel who constitute nearly twenty percent of the national population (Soffer, 1983; Yiftachel, 1992). Two contrasting scenarios present themselves. Beyond their geographic peripherality and political marginality, the latter group would undergo a reassessment of their territorial and geo-ethnic positions in relation to the "state" on their doorstep. The location of much of the Israeli Arab population is such that they would occupy the new political frontiers along much of the future boundary. Patterns of development within such frontier regions are likely to be more culturally similar to those beyond the "boundary" rather than those within the core of the state to which they belong. One can visualize scenarios in which demands for secession are made by this group, thus threatening the territorial integrity of the sovereign state of Israel.

As such, the implementation of a peace agreement, consisting of territorial separation between Israelis and Palestinians, would simply create new frontiers of conflict. These frontiers would not be as overtly military as the existing ones, but would focus on the geo-ethnic component of the trans-frontier regions. This hostility reflects the essential nature of the conflict between the peoples, both of whom desire to control the whole of the territory, without any line of partition. Military confrontation is no more than the tangible means by which the conflict is contested, but is no more than a means to an end, that is, ensuring the continued control by one of the ethnic groups in the face of the perceived threat of the "other".

The alternative scenario is that, given the context of conflict cessation and the removal of the real/perceived existential threat, Israel's Arab citizens would no longer be perceived as part of that threat. As such, they could be more fully integrated into Israeli political and social life as equals, including senior positions of political and administrative power. As such, ethno-homogeneous regions could become the focus for cross-boundary frontiers of economic cooperation—true frontiers of peace.

Trans-frontier Economic Development

The extent to which new geo-ethnic frontiers can contribute towards peace and political stability, or alternatively, simply refocus the conflict from one sphere of activity to another, is largely dependent on the type of trans-frontier interaction which takes place. International agencies perceive the implementation of policies promoting regional cooperation and management as an important step on the path to political normalization between countries. This cooperation has both economic and political dimensions. Economic logic suggests that in regions of scarce natural resources, such as water, which have been used inefficiently owing to the conflict situation, it is important to promote cooperative management schemes, if only because there is an economies of scale dimension which will benefit the inhabitants of each political territory. A spatial feedback effect may take place through which the desire for continued economic investment and development becomes spontaneous, rather than directed by government, resulting in an even greater "opening" of boundaries. Thus the political and the socioeconomic are closely linked in a mutually enforcing process, bringing about the transformation of a peripheral and/or frontier region from conditions of marginality to conditions of development and even economic boom.

The implementation of such policies creates situations of trans-frontier interdependency. This is perceived as a factor which may prevent the renewed outbreak of conflict between the neighboring countries, should political relations revert to their previous conflictual situation. It may be precisely for this same reason that governments prefer to undertake unilateral development of critical scarce resources (such as water), so their hands will not be tied under changing political scenarios. Countries facing renewed conflict, but at the same time caught up in a web of regional interdependencies of key economic resources, have to think twice before destroying—to the detriment of all the inhabitants of the region—the infrastructural network which was created under conditions of peace.

In the wake of the signing of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization in Washington in September 1993, and between Israel and Jordan in 1994, there have been

numerous proposals aimed at implementing future economic development and cooperation between Israel and her neighbors. In particular, mention should be made of three critical cross-boundary resources: water, tourism, and environment (Newman and Falah, 1995) (Table 2.2).

Water Resources. The water issue highlights the way in which a particular resource can constitute the focus for either conflict or peace, depending on the extent to which the respective governments decide to undertake unilateral or multilateral development policies. It has been argued that water, not oil or religious fundamentalism, could serve as the backdrop for future military conflagrations within the Middle East (Allan, 1992; Kliot, 1994; Moore, 1994). Water has long been a subject of mutual contention between Israel and her neighbors. The scarcity of this valuable resource, the increased demand for water by growing populations, and their increased levels of domestic consumption, coupled with the inimical nature of relations, all serve to highlight the potential for conflict, as well as the need for some form of trans-frontier cooperative management of the water supply (Kliot, 1994; Assaf et al., 1993). Since it is such a scarce resource, governments in the region will prefer to maintain unilateral and independent control over the water sources. This enables the government to use as much of the resource as it desires, with little, if any, recourse to the demands of neighboring states. Cooperative management of regional water resources will, it is assumed, enable the more efficient consumption of water based on regional demand, rather than the duplication of separate state demands.

The benefits to Israel, Jordan, and the West Bank from cooperative regional water management are substantial. Joint management of the Jordan headwaters could greatly improve the volume of water available to the countries involved. The water aquifer underlying both Israel and the West Bank can, given a changed political situation, become the focus of either conflict or cooperation between separate states. Probably the single largest project which could affect the development of a frontier region would be the construction of the "Red-Dead" canal, bringing water from the Red Sea to the Dead sea along the Arava Valley. Such a project could only be implemented given full coordination and cooperation between both Israel and Jordan along the course of their joint boundary. It would also require major international investment which would be forthcoming only under conditions of wider regional stability including an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. This project has taken the place of the much discussed Med-Dead Canal which would have brought water from the Mediterranean Sea to the Dead Sea by means of a canal crossing Israel and parts of the West Bank in a west-east direction. This too, had it ever been implemented, would have had significant consequences for the development of part of the Israel-Jordan frontier interface. The peace agree-

ment between Israel and Jordan devotes much of its text to a comprehensive discussion of water resources and the possibilities for future cooperation within this sector.

Tourism. While the Middle East in general, and Israel in particular, have long been a destination for international tourism, the unstable political situation in the region has prevented any of the regions' countries from fully exploiting their true potential. Regional cooperation within this sphere is perceived as one area within which mutual benefit will accrue to all the partners. The combination of holy places, historical and archaeological sites, and the winter sun of the Red Sea, combine to create ideal tourism packages (Israel, Ministry of Tourism, 1993; Housen-Couriel, 1994). Under such conditions of regional cooperation, frontier regions may serve as no more than transit zones for travelers. Given the small size of the country and the relatively short time it takes a tourist to travel from the center of the country (Tel Aviv or Jerusalem) into one of the neighboring states, the political boundary may lose its' frontier characteristic. Travelers would have no need to stop in these areas as they cross from Jerusalem to Amman. A successful implementation of the peace agreement in this particular frontier region would, paradoxically, not necessarily result in economic development of the political frontier. If such a scenario were to materialize, there would be a situation of political boundaries without political frontiers.

While political stability may bring increased tourism in its wake, experience with Egypt has shown that this mostly consists of "outsiders" who visit the Middle East and benefit from the opportunities of visiting more than one state. For tourism to contribute significantly to peace, it requires greater exchange travel between the citizens of the neighboring states themselves. This can contribute to a gradual breaking down of stereotypes and images that each side hold of the "other" (Newman, 1991), and, as such, move the process one step from conflict cessation to peaceful normalization.

Environmental Protection. Ecological and environmental awareness have only recently been brought to the fore of public debate in the Middle East. The desert has been the victim of much environmental degradation. The location of Israel's major mineral and phosphate industries, the establishment of national refuse disposal sites, and the reputed leakages of nuclear waste have caused much irretrievable damage to the region. The lack of regional cooperation in maintaining the ecological balance, coupled with instances of environmental spillover in the form of international externalities, have exacerbated the problem of a region which is perceived by many as being no more than the country's backyard.

Much of the current peace process has been accompanied by grandiose plans and blueprints for regional development, not only within Israel, but

along and across the new political boundaries and frontiers (Peres, 1994). These plans take little account of the environmental implications of rapid economic and infrastructural development. For the protection of this region it is essential for Israel to enter into cooperative programs of environmental management with Jordan, the Palestinians, and Egypt. This would be all the more essential if economic development were to be promoted through enhanced tourism and other projects. As in many other regions, rapid economic development in the wake of a changed political situation is often accompanied by environmental degradation. Uncontrolled development of a "Red-Dead" canal and/or the creation of tourist infrastructure along the course of the Arava Valley could destroy the ecological balance within this region. Thus, conservation programs need to be dealt with at the same time, and as an integral part of, any form of regional economic development.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the complexity of the relationships between a political frontier and an international boundary. Development within these regions often takes on its own separate form, not least because of the differential government policy towards a region which is viewed, first and foremost, in political and military rather than developmental terms. But there is no direct correlation between the nature of development and the boundary location. Within frontiers of conflict, development may be hindered owing to a lack of investment in a region which is perceived as being strategically vulnerable, while a similar frontier elsewhere may benefit from increased investment resulting from governmental decision to bolster up their presence in a region under conflict. Similarly, within peace frontier regions, development which had previously been hindered may now become transformed into regional growth and prosperity as a direct result of the implementation of a peace process, while in similar frontiers elsewhere, a situation of "cold" peace will dictate the continued presence of security landscapes as the dominant type of frontier activity.

Progress in the implementation of "peace," from a situation of conflict cessation to a more developed stage of "normalization," is a long and drawn out process. However, we would expect such a transition to be reflected in significant changes taking place within the frontier landscapes, most notably the replacement of military and security activities with social and economic development. This Western European model of frontier change took forty years to develop, and is as much an outcome of spontaneous cross-boundary development, as it is a direct result of government policies. Similar long-term frontier changes along the Jewish-Arab conflict interface will signify a transition, not simply from conflict to

peace treaty and conflict cessation, but also from peace treaty to some form of trans-frontier normalization.

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3

The Internal Frontier: Territorial Control and Ethnic Relations in Israel[1]

Oren Yiftachel

Introduction

The settlement and development of frontier regions have long been the subject of geographical, planning, and social science research. However, the study of these topics has mainly concentrated on majority populations, often neglecting to account for the impact of frontier development on indigenous groups. In ethnically diverse states, and particularly in settler societies, the existence of indigenous groups in peripheral regions has often brought about the development of "internal frontiers." To date, however, this phenomenon has remained neglected by social scientists in general, and geographers in particular.

This chapter will focus on this neglected issue by aiming to: (a) explore some theoretical aspects of the emergence and development of internal frontier regions, and propose a framework for the understanding of this phenomenon; (b) evaluate the role of spatial and territorial state policies in facilitating the control of internal frontiers; and (c) examine the case of an urbanizing Arab village situated in Israel's Galilee region, which, for a long time, has been treated by the authorities as an internal frontier. In Israel, especially regarding settler societies, most research into frontier settlement and regional development has focused on the endeavors and aspirations of the Jewish majority, paying scant regard to the indigenous Arab-Palestinian population living in regions of expanding Jewish settlement. The emphasis in the latter part of the chapter will be on the documentation and analysis of the methods of controlling minority populations in regions perceived by the majority to be internal frontiers. The chapter can therefore be viewed as an empirical exploration, with an attempt to generalize and conceptualize the internal frontier phenome-

non. It is thus expected that the general observations made below be treated as propositions to be further examined by later research projects in comparable case studies.

Data for the study were collected from a variety of sources, most notably the archives of the Majd al-Krum local authority and the Northern District branch of Israel's Ministry of the Interior; an extensive search of local and national newspapers; interviews with local Arab leaders and decision makers in government and public authorities; aerial photographs; and field surveys.

While recognizing that the meaning of the term "frontier" in different societies has been subject to continuous debate, it is defined here as an evolving cultural, political, and geographical entity. In the early colonizing stages of settler societies, the frontier denotes an underdeveloped area just beyond the edge of known territory into which the collective attempts to expand. This creates a dynamic process of expansion with little regard to previous demarcations or boundaries (Boal and Livingstone, 1983).

However, once a new state is created, usually with stable boundaries, the "frontiers" of the new society gradually shift into internal regions and matters. The frontier then assumes the different meaning of a more static and fixed area, where the majority community and/or state administration attempt to increase their domination and control. In such settings, frontiers are also used as metaphors, connoting the ethos and "mentality" of spiritual and material growth, development, and expansion, typical to most modern-capitalist societies. In other words, internal frontiers denote zones (physical or mental) within the spatial boundaries of existing states or cultures, into which the expansion of the core society is sought. These assertions and observations will be further discussed, explained, and refined in the following sections.

"Spatial policy" is defined as the formulation, content, and implementation of land and land-use policies. Spatial policy is thus concerned with the place of activities, facilities, and restrictions. "Territorial policies and strategies" are specific cases of spatial policies, characterized by a particular focus on the control of land. That control is enhanced through the governing of presence, ownership, and administrative boundaries of a given tract of land. The more general term of "control" or "social control" means the regulation of development and distribution of resources imposed "from above," with the aim of reinforcing patterns of social, political, and economic domination and inequality. "Ethnic territory" denotes land under real, desired or contested group control. The term "Israel" refers to the country within its pre-1967 borders. "Palestine" is the pre-1948 geographical unit between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.

Towards a Theory of Internal Frontiers: Nation-building, State-building and the Control of Ethnic Minorities

In order to understand the impact of frontier development on indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities, and the subsequent creation of internal frontiers, it is necessary to account for several key factors. These include the nature of nation-building and state-building projects in settler societies, the evolving majority-minority contact in such societies, and the nature of spatial policies implemented by their governments. The following sections explore these issues in trying to construct a (preliminary) framework for the understanding of internal frontiers.

Frontiers, Nation-building and State-building Projects

It may be useful to begin by conceptualizing the internal frontier as being created in two main phases, which broadly correspond with the duration of nation-building and state-building processes. In the first phase, a settler society, through the process of colonization, settlement, and nation-building, delineates clear external frontiers into which the collective (and the emerging nation) attempt to expand and penetrate. The "taming" of these external frontiers is sought in order to secure a territorial base and the subsequent construction of a new national culture for the colonizing group. Territory and culture are thus perceived as essential corner-stones in the nation-building project. In turn, under the existing "world-order," the construction of a "convincing" national identity is more than just an internal matter, being a prerequisite for internationally recognized self-determination and statehood (Jackson and Penrose, 1993; Taylor, 1994).

As already noted by Turner in 1894 (1962), an essential component in this nation-building process is the settlement of frontier regions, where the new society combines the material creation of necessary living space with the spiritual aspiration to create a new culture free of the problems and obstacles experienced in the settlers' country of origin (Boal and Livingstone, 1983). While frontier regions in most settler societies attract only small populations, their importance has been based on the creation of symbols, challenges, and threats, around which the emerging culture rallies and strengthens its identity and cohesion. Therefore, as Kellerman (1993: 29) observes, "it is not space alone, but rather society and space together that activate frontiers," causing frontiers to denote "both a place and a process" (Meinig, 1960:12).

The second phase in the creation of internal frontiers occurs during the process of state-building. Despite a loose linkage to previous nation-building efforts, state and ethnic boundaries rarely overlap, giving rise to

the creation of numerous multiethnic (and multinational) states. When the colonizing settler society (now a nascent nation-state) has stabilized into a recognized and relatively stable polity, the cultural and political "frontier mentality" and the expansionist practices associated with colonizing external frontiers, are combined to generate pressures of penetration into "hostile" or "alien" areas within the new state. Pre-state frontier practices are thus carried on into internal frontiers which often replace the previous function of external frontiers, regardless of the changing geographical-political context.

It should not be concluded, however, that the nation- and state-building projects are mutually exclusive. Quite the opposite: nation-building efforts usually continue after the creation of territorial states, with the added dimension of coercive powers now available to the "national" institutions. The delineation of internal frontiers and the efforts of the state to control these areas are linked to the concurrent nature of these two projects. The creation of internal frontiers, and the subsequent control and oppression of peripheral minorities (who are often not "included" in the dominant core culture), are the "mirror image" of continuing efforts to galvanize loosely linked groups into a homogeneous national culture.

Given the mutual dependence of the state- and nation-building projects, it is not surprising that the internal frontiers also appear in non-settler societies. In such cases, states re-invoke frontier images from a distant past (as has been the case in Sri Lanka) or construct such images anew (as in the cases of Indonesia and Turkey). Because human migration and resettlement are physically easier in modern times, and because the delineation and control of internal frontiers form a powerful vehicle for the imposition of state control over peripheral regions, internal frontier strategies have become commonplace in multiethnic societies (see, Keating, 1988).

The creation of internal frontiers should therefore be understood in the context of both nation- and state-building projects which have framed the development of many modern nation-states. While the links between nation-and state-building are of intrinsic interest and subject to lively academic debate (see, Connor, 1993; Anderson, 1991; Smith, 1986; 1992), the aim of this chapter is to shed light on one particular aspect of this process: the use of "frontier practices" for the territorial control of peripheral ethnic groups.

Israel—the main society analyzed in this study—is a settler society, where the reestablishment of Jewish life during the last century has been based on waves of immigration, colonization, and settlement. Subsequently, the process of Israeli (Jewish) nation-building has resembled the molding of societies which took place in other settler societies, such as the United States, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, or Latin America

(Gradus, 1984; Gradus and Lithwick, 1996; Kellerman, 1993; Shafir, 1993). This nation-building process has embodied problematic contacts with the country's indigenous population—the Palestinian-Arabs (Kimmerling, 1983; Portugali, 1993). It is to the nature of that contact that we now turn.

Frontiers and Indigenous Groups

Much of the role of frontier regions in nation- and culture-building has relied on the "official" notion that these are empty regions to be conquered or "tamed" by the expanding settler society. Even where indigenous groups have been encountered, majority populations would develop mechanisms to inhibit their disrupting the role of the frontier in the process of nation-building. Needless to say, frontier regions are rarely uninhabited, meaning that expanding settler societies have inevitably come into friction with indigenous cultures (Kimmerling, 1983). The impact of this friction on an indigenous village is the central topic of this chapter.

In the most common cases, where frontier regions were already occupied by indigenous populations, the friction between settlers and local (in the settlers' eyes usually "inferior") groups assisted in reinforcing the emerging identity of the settler society by sharpening the differences between the two groups. The settler society generally develops notions of superiority over local populations, often justifying its colonization of indigenous land by the spiritual motive of the "dissemination" of an advanced culture, and assisting the transition of the locals from "primitivism to modernity" (See, Turner, 1962).

As observed by Kimmerling (1983), strategies to deal with indigenous populations in frontier regions ranged between two extremes: (a) ignoring their existence, or treating them as a marginal nuisance (usually in the case of weak minorities); or (b) treating them as an integral part of the hostile frontier environment to be tamed (generally in the case of strong minorities able to challenge the dominance of the colonizing group).

To illustrate the first approach, Aborigines in Australia were, for a long time, virtually ignored (or wiped out) by whites. They received the right to vote only in 1967, after 180 years of white settlement. Furthermore, on land matters, the concept of Terra Nullius (which regards British occupation of Australia as a peaceful settlement of an empty land) ruled the country's land legislation until 1992, when it was canceled by the Federal High Court. Similar legal practices have persisted for long periods in the United States, Canada, and South Africa (see, Mercer, 1993).

Examples of the second approach—of treating the indigenous groups as part of a hostile environment—exist in all parts of the world. Examples

of the application of this approach (which later will be shown to be the one adopted in Israel) can be found in ethnically controlled states like Malaysia, Germany, Spain, Italy, Indonesia or Sri Lanka. The emphasis in all these cases has been placed on restricting ethnic minorities from posing a serious challenge to the control of the state by one ethnic group. A combination of economic, political, and territorial means has been commonly used by the six states to that end. Of particular interest in the present chapter, however, are the territorial efforts of these states to encourage the migration of members of the ethnic majority into peripheral regions dominated by ethnic minorities (see, Murphy, 1989; Newman, 1989; Shafir, 1993). Needless to say, this process has had a major, and usually adverse, impact on indigenous groups, usually by placing them within newly created internal frontiers.

Internal Frontiers and the Settlement of Indigenous Regions

Given the perceived "eternal" link between place, land, and nation (Penrose, 1994), and the explicitly territorial characteristics of the modern nation-state (Taylor, 1994), both nation- and state-building projects are embedded in a very specific spatial context. The issues of territory and land therefore assume immense importance as most state administrations attempt to manage, control, and develop their political units. Territorial control over the full extent of the state is usually perceived as the legitimate prerogative of state administrations, even if these represent only sections of the state's population.

It is here that the phenomenon of internal frontiers emerges. Building on the ethos, mentality, and practices developed by the settler society for external frontiers, governments of ethnically mixed societies target internal regions as frontiers to be "contained, controlled, and submitted." This is most frequently the case where conflicts over land control between colonized and colonizer have persisted over long periods. The image of a frontier is deliberately maintained in the majority's culture, mainly in cases where ethnic minorities are perceived as potentially hostile, and when they dominate regions highly valued by the majority. The use of internal frontier strategies are put into practice mainly when minority dominance of key regions threatens the territorial integrity of the state, and subsequently the effectiveness of its state-building project. Given the above, we can now define the internal frontier more precisely as a region within a state where an ethnic minority constitutes a majority, and where the state attempts to expand its control over territory and inhabitants.

Given the ethnic basis of the phenomenon described here, internal frontiers are generally created on the basis of competing ethnic (and not

simply locational, regional, or ideological) demands for spatial control. This usually entails attempts by majority populations to physically colonize and settle regions dominated by ethnic minorities, rather than attempt to control these regions by economic or political means only. Therefore, internal frontiers usually become ethnically (or racially) mixed, and are often characterized by an uneven distribution of resources and power, and a high level of segregation between colonizer and colonized. As Gradus (1983; 1984) and Mikessel and Murphy (1991) demonstrate, public policies can also have the effect of turning frontier minority regions into peripheries, thereby exacerbating power and wealth disparities between weak minorities and powerful majorities.

Ethnic competition over land control and, subsequently, majority expansion into minority enclaves do occur on all geographical levels. The present paper focuses on the regional context, chiefly because it is mainly on such a level that a real (or at least a perceived real) threat can be posed to the territorial integrity of the state. This results in the mobilization of significant state resources to secure majority control in certain regions, thereby creating a conspicuous political-geographical change. Such a process may also occur in certain urban areas, usually of high national or religious significance.

The internal frontier phenomenon has been noted in the literature before (see, for example Kipnis, 1987; Prescott, 1987), but usually only as a by-product of the main (majority-centered) frontier settlement process and under a variety of names and definitions. Friedmann (1996: 11–14) defines it as the on-going "settlement frontier" which he differentiates from "extractive frontiers." Prescott (1987) and Kellerman (1993) refer to the phenomenon as a "secondary frontier." However, beyond short descriptions of the existence of such regions, very little systematic analysis in these studies (or in previous studies they quote) focused on the impact of frontier development on indigenous minorities.

As already noted, examples of such regions are found in a range of multiethnic states, both in the developing and developed parts of the world (Gill, 1993). Two examples of countries mentioned earlier will illustrate the main territorial thrust of internal frontier strategies. In Indonesia, Javanese-controlled governments have attempted, during the last few decades, to "transmigrate" Javanese farmers to Kalimantan and Irian Jaya, whose non-Javanese inhabitants have always been treated with suspicion by the country's rulers (Demaine, 1984). Likewise, the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka is perceived by the majority Sinhalese population as an internal frontier. The Sri Lankan state has poured considerable resources into programs to encourage Sinhalese migration into this disputed region, which has been continuously portrayed by the government as a region "to be brought back to its rightful Sinhalese character"

(Shastri, 1990). China, India, Malaysia, and Turkey are other notable examples where majority groups were induced to migrate to regions dominated by ethnic minorities in the name of the "public good" or the "building of one nation" (Friedmann, 1996). We now turn to the policy and institutional settings which shape the internal frontier.

Internal Frontiers, Public Policies, and Ethnic Control

A central role in enforcing the domination of majority (or colonizing) groups over internal frontiers has been played by spatial (urban and regional) planning policies. Spatial planning authorities, which form an integral arm of the state apparatus, formulate policies which affect the use and control of land, which, as previously mentioned, constitutes a key resource in settler societies, especially where territorial conflicts persist between majorities and minorities (Fenster, 1993; Friedmann, 1996).

In ethnically mixed frontier regions, the most common aim of spatial planning policies has been to control minority populations and prevent them from disrupting the process of frontier settlement or the territorial integrity of the state. Because majority populations control the state apparatus in most settler societies, they have been able to formulate and implement policies which reinforce their control over land, regional resources, and minority populations. Such policies are often "marketed" as part of a plan to create more rational and economically efficient development geared to public needs. It is argued here that behind this benign veil often lies the motive of majority domination, implemented through public spatial policies (see, Gill, 1993; Gurr, 1993; Williams, 1985). The potential of these policies to act as a mechanism of minority control is further explored in the next sections.

Two additional aspects of state control over peripheral regions and their populations should be mentioned here. These emanate from recent theoretical discussions in the social sciences on the role of the state in modern-capitalist societies, and the evolving nature of racial and ethnic relations within that context (see, Jackson and Penrose, 1994; Lawless, 1986; Rex and Mason, 1986). While the present paper deals mainly with territorial control of minorities against the background of an ethnic struggle over land control, it must be remembered that such territorial struggle is embedded within the operation of a certain (capitalist) economic system and its supporting political institutions.

Accordingly, the control exerted over peripheral "ethnic" regions can be perceived as an attempt by the central state to optimize conditions for economic growth and capital accumulation. The very creation of modern "nation-states" and their state-building processes are intimately tied with the emergence of the capitalist mode of production, which requires a far

more comprehensive apparatus of economic and social control than previous political-economic systems (Clark and Dear, 1984). The state therefore serves the economic (as well as the cultural and political) interests of the majority, which usually controls the state's economy. But as shown by Lawless (1986), and Kirby (1993), the central state is also in constant conflict with local states (especially peripheral ones), which often resist the attempts to subject their areas and populations to locational decisions based on the interests of the economic "center." As Saunders (1983) and Kirby (1993) further show, the local state can constitute a structural obstacle to the dominance of centrally controlled economic interests, and can—through the control of local politics—impede (if not totally overcome) the attempts for central control.

The intersection of economic, geographical, and ethnic interests links the present discussion to the development of theories of ethnic and racial oppression within capitalist post-colonial economies. To briefly illustrate several points from that rich theoretical discussion, it is useful to explore Rex's (1986) work. Rex, using a neo-Weberian approach, demonstrates how the cultural and ethnic "bond" holding groups together under agrarian or "booty capitalist" conditions, has been translated into ethno-class identity and consciousness under the combined forces of colonialism and capitalism. Rejecting both the fundamental Marxist explanations of pure economic determinism as shaping ethnic and racial relations (see, Wolpe, 1986), and the biosocial interpretations of the likes Van den Berghe (1981), Rex (1986: 74) concludes that:

> While the economy and the polity provide the dynamics for inter-group relations, actual bonding of the groups internally depends upon cultural factors. The multifaceted class struggle between the groups is also an ethnic struggle... however, I would still want to keep in focus the economy (and the polity) which is the determinant in the last instance.

In that context we should perceive internal frontiers also as regions where economic and political relations between ethnic groups are determined, and where the territorial control explained above is complemented by patterns of class oppression. Here the physical location of an ethnically dominated region, and the development of such a region, which is often determined by capital and interests imported from outside, combine to shape majority-minority relations, and usually sharpen the distinction between majority and minority, colonizer and colonized, dominant and subordinate. While the case study documented below will focus explicitly on territorial control, it should be remembered that economic and political factors also play a key role in framing the attempts to control the internal frontier.

In general, the theoretical observations presented above lead to the understanding of internal frontiers as regions of ethnic struggle over land control and resources within established states. These have been created by a two-stage process, where the frontier ethos and mentality of settler societies combined with the "threatening" existence of ethnic minorities in peripheral regions. In such regions, the majority usually uses the positive images and ethos of frontier development to impose territorial control over the minority. This usually results in the creation of ethnically mixed regions which generally exhibit pronounced ethnic inequalities. The specific role of planning policies and authorities in that process warrants further elaboration.

The Role of Spatial Policies and Planning Authorities

As part of the state apparatus, authorities which devise spatial policies (planning authorities) are often used as key instruments to further governmental goals, especially with regard to the use, control and development of land. In multiethnic states, and particularly where ethnic conflicts exist, spatial policies are often used to exert territorial control over internal frontier regions. This is reflected in both the "official" content of state planning and land use policies, and in "unofficial" practices and norms.

Spatial policies (as distinct, for example, from economic, educational, or welfare policies) are often used in internal frontier regions because of their clear potential to control the use of the most cherished resource in such regions—land. The territorial dimension of state activity includes policies affecting land ownership and control, as well as the location of settlements, neighborhoods, industries, communal and social facilities, infrastructure services, and employment centers. Territorial policies also include the demarcation of administrative and planning boundaries, according to which land use, development, and the provision of facilities and services are usually determined.

Spatial policies can be used as a most powerful tool to exert territorial control over minorities, particularly in mixed frontier regions, where ethnic minorities often reside in "their own" homeland areas. Spatial policies can be used in these regions to contain the territorial expression of such minorities, typically by imposing restrictions on minority land ownership, restricting the expansion of minority settlements, and settling members of the majority group within the minority region for control and surveillance. This is believed to impede the emergence of a powerful, regionally based, counter-culture, which may challenge the social and political order espoused by the central (majority-controlled) state (Mikessel and Murphy, 1991; Williams, 1985).

On an urban scale, too, majority-controlled authorities can exercise (more subtle) forms of spatial control, through land use and housing poli-

cies, with the effect of creating segregation between social groups, usually according to class, race, and/or ethnicity (Eyles, 1990; Smith, 1989). The imposition of complex, inconsistent, and unstable administrative boundaries can also function as a powerful tool of control, as ordinary citizens may encounter difficulties in dealing with such systems, which are usually more familiar to the wealthy and the powerful.

Finally, it should be noted that while this chapter focuses on the territorial dimension of ethnic control, spatial planning policies can exert control over minority populations in other dimensions of the policy process. Two such dimensions of control, which can be linked to the comments on ethnicity and class made above, and which are commonly noted in the literature, are procedural and socioeconomic control. Procedural policies and practices can exclude and marginalize certain groups, and thereby weaken them in the policy-making process (see, Forester, 1989; Friedmann, 1992). Similarly, socioeconomic policies can deprive specific groups of development, facilities, and services, make them dependent on the state, and thereby reduce their ability to challenge the existing social and political order (Harvey, 1992; Huxley, 1994).

In general, spatial policy represents an arm of the state apparatus with a clear potential for controlling subordinate groups. This is often the case in ethnically mixed internal frontier regions, where the settler group (supported by the state) utilizes spatial planning policies to maximize its territorial control over the frontier region and its indigenous population. This will be now be demonstrated in a detailed case study.

Controlling the Internal Frontier: The Case of an Urbanizing Arab Village in the Galilee

In this part of the chapter, I examine the spatial planning of Majd al-Krum—a large urbanizing Arab village in the Galilee region—in order to illustrate the use of spatial policy as a mechanism of controlling the development of a minority village located in an internal frontier region. The selection of Majd al-Krum as a case study was based on several characteristics typical of Arab villages in the country: it is Muslim, average in size, growing rapidly, located in a relatively remote region, and close to several new Jewish settlements (Figure 3.1). Majd al-Krum can therefore be regarded as a representative example of an Arab village in Israel.

Background

The Palestinian-Arabs in Israel. In late 1994, some 850,000 Palestinian-Arabs resided in Israel, constituting 16 percent of the country's population within its pre-1967 borders. The Arabs have lived in the country for




FIGURE 3.1 Madj al-Krum and other settlements in and around Beit Hakerem (Shagur) Valley.

centuries, and are currently concentrated in three main regions: the Galilee, the "Triangle," and the Negev. Forty seven percent of them live in the Galilee region, where they constitute 75 percent of the population (CBS, 1995). As noted earlier, Israel is a state created by waves of Jewish immigration, colonization and settlement. Initially, the Jews attempted to ignore the existence of the large Arab population in Palestine. This was exemplified by the early Zionist slogan of "a people without a land returning to a land without a people." It was impossible, however, to continue to ignore their existence, because their population was quite dense, and because they were developing their Palestinian national identity during the very years of Jewish settlement in the country (Portugali, 1993). Instead, the alternative approach became prominent (usually implicitly) in Jewish policy and practice: the indigenous Arab population in Palestine is an integral part of the hostile frontier, which needs to be controlled in the quest for gaining control over the Jewish homeland and building a Jewish nation in Palestine.

This approach was understandably dominant during the pre-state era, when Jews where attempting to establish a foothold in the land they thought could provide them with the necessary basis for their nation-building project. However, as shown below, it persisted after Israel gained independence in 1948, when internal frontiers replaced external ones as foci for the Jewish nation- and state-building efforts.

Arabs and Jews in Israel are non-assimilating groups, divided along national, religious, linguistic, cultural, and social lines. The Arabs in Israel

are full citizens of the state and are entitled to the formal legal and political rights given to Jews, under Israel's formal democratic system. Living in Israel, they have benefited from rapid modernization and rising living and educational standards (al Haj, 1988; Smooha, 1992), but they have also been subject to a range of discriminatory public policies in the areas of education, welfare, and economic development (Benziman and Mansur, 1992; Lustick, 1980; Zureik, 1993). As a result, the Arabs have recently increased their struggle for civil equality in Israel, led by the National Committee of Heads of Arab Local Councils (the National Committee) and several other voluntary movements, parties and organizations (al Haj and Rosenfeld, 1990).

The historical and political background to Arab-Jewish relations in Israel is covered extensively elsewhere (see, Benziman and Mansur, 1992; al Haj, 1988; Peled, 1993; Smooha, 1990). For the present chapter it should be briefly noted that the evolution of these majority-minority relations has been strongly influenced by the Middle Eastern conflict in general, and the Jewish-Palestinian struggle for control over Palestine/Israel in particular. Palestinian-Arabs who remained in Israel (on their own historical land) following the 1948 war, were therefore considered by many Jews to be a "hostile minority" in a context of on-going political and military tension between Arabs and Jews.

The Galilee as an Internal Frontier. As mentioned, the Galilee region accommodates the main regional concentration of Palestinian-Arabs within (pre-1967) Israel. The region was allocated to the Arab portion of Palestine in the 1947 UN partition plan. As such, it has been continuously perceived by the Israeli public and policy-makers as a region where Jewish control and sovereignty are still in some doubt. For that reason, Israeli governments have attempted, since independence, to encourage Jewish migration to the region, within the framework of what is commonly known as the "Judaization of Galilee" strategy (Carmon et al, 1991; Kipnis, 1987).

It should be noted that despite Israel's efforts, the Arabs have continued, since Israel's independence, to form a decisive demographic majority in the Galilee region. Data from the end of 1994 show their share of the region's population to be 74 percent. To avoid confusion, however, it should be remembered that the Arabs form a relatively small minority in the state of Israel. The present paper will therefore continue to refer to them as "the Arab minority," while the Jewish community will be referred to as the "Jewish majority."

In the many government policies and publications available on the "Judaization of the Galilee" strategy, Jewish migration to this remote region is portrayed as an act of altruism and contribution to the common (Jewish) goal of protecting state land from Arab use. The Israeli state has

also financially rewarded Jewish settlers and investors in the region, and generally conveyed the message that Jewish settlement in the region is of extreme national importance (see, Carmon et al., 1991). While it is clear that the material need to control the region was uppermost in the government's mind, the images of pioneering and frontier settlement were also used to promote the spirit of altruism needed to maintain the Zionist project in hostile international circumstances (Peled, 1993).

As in most other settler societies, the existence of frontiers (albeit internal) was critical to the strengthening of a national and territorial Jewish identity in a young society reliant on a continuous influx of immigrants (Kellerman, 1993; Troen, 1988). The fact that a large Arab population resided in the Galilee did not detract from the perception of the region as a frontier. On the contrary, by treating the Arabs as a threat to Jewish land and as part of a hostile environment, it brought into focus the differences between Arabs and Jews (Bishara, 1993). This helped to sharpen and strengthen the fledging Jewish-Israeli national identity. In short, the Galilee region, which lies within the internationally recognized and sanctioned borders of Israel, has been perceived, used, and treated for 47 years by Israeli (Jewish) authorities as an internal frontier.

Finally, in terms of the two-stage evolution of internal frontiers noted earlier, the Galilee case demonstrates well the transition between the two phases. In the pre-state phase of Jewish settlement, a small number of Jewish settlers attempted to create both an initial national territory and cultural foundations for a new Zionist-Hebrew culture. They usually settled in areas where contact with their Arab neighbors would be minimal (Kipnis, 1987). As noted above however, during the second state-building stage, the nation-building efforts have been combined with continuous attempts to control and dominate the Arab population of the region, and settle large number of Jews in the newly defined internal frontier (Yiftachel, 1992b). The case of Majd al-Krum illustrates the impact of spatial policies, guided by the internal-frontier mentality typical of the second state-building phase, on an indigenous village.

Israel's Spatial Planning System. Spatial policy in Israel is mainly determined through the country's planning system. The Israeli planning system is highly centralized and powerful. Its authorities are endowed with broad powers of regulation, implementation and development (Alterman and Hill, 1986). The system has two principal arms: developmental and regulatory (Gertel and Law Yone, 1991). Developmental planning authorities are mainly public bodies with a mandate to develop land across the country, including: the Ministry of Housing, the Jewish Agency (JA), and the Jewish National Fund (JNF). Regulatory planning authorities are charged with approving urban and regional development. They operate mainly under the auspices of Israel's Ministry of the Interior

and according to Israel's Planning and Building Law of 1965. The statutory system is composed of three hierarchical tiers: a National Planning Board, six District Committees, and 121 Local Planning Committees. Local and District Committees are responsible for the preparation of statutory outline (land use) plans for all settlements. Development in settlements without approved outline plans is illegal without the consent of the District Planning Committee. Most Arab villages belong to local planning committees which are responsible for the planning of a large number of villages and are therefore "regional" in practice. These local committees are staffed by regional bureaucrats and some local representatives. Quite often, when local communities do not prepare plans on their own accord, government-appointed local committees initiate and control the formulation of spatial outline plans for individual settlements. This has been the case in most Arab villages (Khameissi, 1992).

Local Historical Context. Majd al-Krum lies at the heart of Israel's northern region—the Galilee. The village is situated at the north-western end of the fertile Beit Hakerem (or Shagur) valley (Figure 3.1), and was founded centuries ago by Muslim Arabs. Land surrounding the village has traditionally been cultivated for olives, grapes, figs, tobacco, and cereals. In 1948, Majd al-Krum reached a population of 1,400. Like most Arab villages in what is now Israel, it experienced tremendous upheavals during the 1948–49 War, when about half of its population fled or was forced to leave to Lebanon, while some 300 refugees from other (destroyed) Arab villages settled in the village.

The village received municipal status in 1963. Since then, a local council has been elected in regular elections and has taken control over basic municipal services, such as public health, water supply, and education. Local planning however, has remained the responsibility of a local planning committee appointed by the central government. In recent years, the village has experienced many marked changes. These include rapid spatial expansion and urbanization, a sectoral shift in employment from agriculture to manual and self-employed labor, a marked rise in educational and health standards, and a steady (if slow) rise in average household incomes (Haidar, 1990). At the end of 1992, the village had a population of 8,200, and a built-up area eight times larger than in 1948. Although Majd al-Krum can be classified as a town, I continue to use the term "village," mainly because that term is still used by most of its residents.

Local Planning Context. As noted above, planning in and around Majd al-Krum has reflected the Galilee's status as an internal (Jewish) frontier, attempting, first and foremost, to facilitate Jewish settlement in the region. This aim is manifested in a range of governmental spatial policies, programs and activities. These include the enactment of new land statutes, the building of Jewish settlements, the expansion of Jewish

agriculture, the development of infrastructure, and the establishment of regional industrial centers. The thrust of Israel's planning policies in the region has been to maximize Jewish control over land and regional resources and weaken Arab attempts to challenge Jewish domination.

Israel's policies in the area are documented in detail elsewhere (see Carmon et al, 1991; Falah, 1989; Yiftachel, 1992b). In brief, the area around the village has been subjected to continuous government efforts to develop the region's economy and infrastructure, especially industrial estates and roads (Figure 3.2). However, the positive impact of the latter has been undermined by a range of more control-oriented spatial policies, including: (a) large scale expropriation of private Arab land, mainly during the 1950s; (b) the establishment of four new Jewish "development towns" during the 1950s and 1960s; and (c) the establishment of 60 small "urban" Jewish settlements during the late 1970s and early 1980s (Figure 3.1). It should be stressed that since 1966, following the cessation of military rule in the Galilee, Israeli policies have not restricted, in any way, the movement, employment, or place of residence of Arabs in the region.

The regulatory spatial planning process began in Majd al-Krum during 1964, when the Northern District Planning Committee demarcated a "blue line" around the village, denoting the permitted building zone. In




FIGURE 3.2 Majd al-Krum administrative boundaries and outline plans.

1978, the Local Planning and Building Committee appointed a Haifa-based (Jewish) planner to prepare an outline plan for the village. The plan-approval process, as detailed below, was replete with delays, conflicts, and problems. As a result, the plan for the village did not receive preliminary approval ("deposit") until January 1986, and was not gazetted until July 1991, some 27 years after the statutory process had begun.

It should be stressed that due to the structure of the Israeli spatial planning system, and the fact that the outline plan for the village was initiated and formulated by the Local Planning Committee (that is, an Israeli government authority), the elected village council of Majd al-Krum has had only a very limited amount of formal influence over planning in and around the village. The planning of Majd al-Krum has been carried out almost entirely by the Israeli government (in the guise of its various provincial authorities and branches). Hence, in many respects, the case below represents a classical example of "policy from above."

Territorial Control in the Internal Frontier: Containment, Surveillance and Segregation

Throughout the history of spatial planning in and around Majd al-Krum, the territorial dimension of spatial policies implemented by government authorities has been characterized by strong elements of control over the village residents, with little attempt to improve their physical living circumstances. In general, these policies have worked persistently to erode the village's land resources, to contain its residential expansion, to encircle the village with Jewish settlements, to impose surveillance over the life of its residents, and to divide and manipulate the village's administrative spaces. It is clear that Israel's policies have not allowed the development of the village to disrupt the process of (Jewish) frontier settlement which has been taking place around it. I will illustrate the use of "territorial control" by focusing on several examples of government policies which dramatically affected the nature of land ownership, settlement patterns, and planning and administrative boundaries.

Land Ownership

Land Seizure by the State. The first, and most blatant, instrument of territorial control has been the expropriation of village land by the state, mainly during the first three decades of Israel's independence, when Majd al-Krum lost 13,865 of the 20,065 dunams owned by village resi-

dents prior to 1948 (1 dunam equals 1,000 square meters). This represents a loss of 69 percent of village land, which was transferred to the state as a result of a range of rules and regulations described elsewhere as effecting a process of "de-arrogation" of land in Israel. This process has naturally been most pronounced in internal frontier regions, such as the Galilee and the Negev in particular (Benziman and Mansur, 1992; Kimmerling, 1983; see also Lustick, 1980).

Most land loss was due to the state seizing ownership over land belonging to refugees who fled from the village during the 1948 war. This land was officially transferred to a state organ named the Development Authority which is controlled by the Israeli Land Authority. Other land losses were due to state confiscation of land for "public purposes," or assuming ownership of land for which no formal title existed (mainly those lands which were classified as "communal village land" under the previous Ottoman land tenure system). During the 1960s and 1970s, Majd al-Krum lost most of its land due to expropriation (some 5,100 dunams in total) to enable the Israeli government to build and expand the town of Karmi'el (Figure 3.1).

This considerable loss of land occurred both in the areas surrounding the village and within the village itself. It resulted in a marked decline of the reserves of both agricultural and potential building land. In addition, the existence of state land within the village boundaries (a consequence of the seizure of refugee land) resulted in a high degree of land fragmentation, which in itself became an effective mechanism of control. This occurred because many building and infrastructure developments needed to occupy state land, thereby requiring the consent of its authorities. State land was also often leased back to village residents, resulting in another obvious dimension of state control over land uses and associated activities.

Land Exchange. A more subtle form of territorial control has been the practice of land exchange. Under the control of the Israeli Land Authority (ILA), which manages all state land in the country, land expropriated from refugees who fled the village in 1948–9 has often been offered back to families who need land for residential purposes. However, because Israel's 1960 Land Act prohibits the sale of state land, the only way for an Arab household to acquire a building lot within a permitted residential zone is to exchange land with the ILA. Because many Arab households own land in areas classified as "agricultural" (usually rocky uncultivated hills around the village where the construction of housing is prohibited), the ILA has offered to exchange that land with refugee land previously expropriated within the village.

The crux of this practice has been the territorial (rather than financial) rate of land exchange between 1965 and 1980 (for which data were avail-

able), that rate stood at 1:5.3, with village residents exchanging 158.6 dunams of agricultural land for 30.1 dunams of land within the village building zone (Yiftachel, 1993). Recent interviews with both villagers and officials have shown that during the early 1990s the ratio has been raised to 1:10 and even 1:15 in some cases. The ILA can now "achieve" these higher rates because of the growing shortage of residential land for newly formed households. The situation has been observed to be similar in many other Arab villages (Khameissi, 1992).

Significantly, even after land exchange, the ILA normally retains a small joint ownership of the land parcel within the village (ranging from 10 to 25 percent). This joint ownership means that the entire lot is jointly owned, thereby ensuring continued ILA control over building activity in the village. Interviews with village and ILA officials revealed that this practice has been taking place for some 30 years and has continued (albeit at a slower pace) since 1980. It is not difficult to see how it has caused a major shift of land resources from Arab households, starved for residential land, to the Israeli Land Authority.

According to interviews, this process has suited the ILA and the Israeli government, whose main objective has been to maximize Jewish control over land in Israel (see also, Kimmerling, 1983; Carmon et al, 1991). Accordingly, large tracts of agricultural land have been more valuable for the authorities than small, fragmented pieces of residential land. The fragmentation of residential land within the village has also had a particularly degrading human aspect. Several families have had to exchange land to gain control over residential lots previously belonging to a family member, often a father or an uncle. As noted, the exchange practice (which is common in most Muslim Arab villages in the Galilee) is still continuing at present, and is likely to continue for some time because large tracts of land in and around the village are still owned by the ILA.

Jewish Settlement Programs

The third main method of territorial control has been the establishment of Jewish settlements near Majd al-Krum. Here residents of Majd al-Krum have been exposed to the most conspicuous and publicized attempt by Jewish authorities to populate the internal frontier of the Galilee. Jewish settlement programs (known usually under the umbrella name of "Judaization of the Galilee") have assumed different forms since Israel's independence, but have always pursued the goal of containing the spatial development of Arab villages (Kipnis, 1984; 1987). A notable expression of this policy in the 1960s was the town of Karmi'el which was built on agricultural land expropriated from several villages, including Majd al-Krum (Figure 3.1).

An explicit aim of controlling the village expansion was embodied in the settlement programs of the late 1970s and early 1980s, when 60 small Jewish settlements (often called "mitspim") were built in strategic sites around the Galilee. These sites were selected to create wedges between clusters of Arab villages and to physically observe Arab building and agricultural activity in the region (Carmon et al., 1991; Newman, 1984). This policy recreated the images of pre-independence Jewish frontier settlement of peripherality, risk and pioneering, and received wide support among Israel's Jewish population. Even if, in reality, many of the new Jewish settlements became comfortable middle-class suburbs, their establishment should also be understood as part of a state effort to maintain an internal frontier environment and process, which helped crystallize and protect the Jewish nation in Israel. This is clear from policy documents which typically claim that the new settlement program would "save State (i.e. Jewish) land from Arab invaders" (Jewish Agency, 1978: 3), thereby giving the new settlement process a status of extreme national importance, as it acted against threats to the Jewish collective. Accordingly, massive public resources were allocated to the settlement efforts (Carmon et al., 1991).

As Figure 3.1 shows, four new Jewish settlements—Lavon, Tuval, Gilon, and Tsurit—were built in order to encircle and contain Majd al-Krum. The first two settlements are also topographically located on hillsides immediately above the village. Yet, ninety-two percent of Jewish settlers moved to the new settlements for reasons other than assisting the Jewish control of state land (Carmon et al., 1991). Despite this fact, interviews conducted by the present author with 53 Arab leaders and 48 Jewish decision-makers in the Galilee during 1991–2 revealed that the presence of settlers in small settlements around the village has had the marked psychological effect of continuous observation and surveillance of everyday Arab life.

Administrative Boundaries

Another powerful means of territorial control has been the manipulation of administrative boundaries. As can be noted from Figure 3.2, village residents have had to deal with a maze of boundaries, which have continued to change according to incremental decision-making by a range of Israeli authorities. This may sound like a normal case of administrative inefficiency, but in the case at hand, it has been repeatedly used by the authorities as an additional avenue to impose bureaucratic control over the village residents. Here, two types of boundaries stand out as effective tools of minority control: the extent of the village's permitted building zone and the municipal boundary of the adjacent Jewish settlements.

The village's permitted building zone is demarcated by what is often known as "the blue line," beyond which housing construction is illegal, and no state infrastructure is provided. In 1964 the Northern District Planning Committee approved what was then thought to be a "temporary blue line," to remain in force until a statutory outline plan was prepared. However, it took much longer than expected for the village outline plan to be initiated by the government appointed Local Planning Committee. Meanwhile, due to the fast rate of natural increase of the village population (3.5–4.0 percent per annum), and unacceptable levels of household densities (at times reaching 20–25 people per dwelling), pressures were mounting to allow the construction of new dwellings beyond the temporary building line. With official approval processes suffering lengthy bureaucratic delays, some Arab families decided to build new dwellings (usually on their own land) outside the permitted zone, thereby creating the sizable problem of "illegal" housing in the village. Usually, the authorities would eventually expand the village's building zone several years after illegal construction had begun.

This cycle of events repeated itself several times in Majd al-Krum, with extensions of the permitted building zone in 1972, 1976, 1986, and 1991, with the result that at any particular point in time many houses were classified as "illegal." The village's outline plan was finally gazetted in 1991 (27 years after the statutory planning process had begun) but, needless to say, it is now seriously outdated. What is important for the present discussion is the use of this cyclical sequence of events for control purposes by the authorities: quite often, demolition orders would be issued for unauthorized dwellings, fines for "illegal construction" imposed, and in some (rare) cases, houses demolished. Coupled with the associated hardship of living without basic infrastructure (which would not be provided by the state without a building permit), the constant existence of unauthorized dwellings in the village has allowed the district (mainly Jewish) planning authorities to exert a continuous level of control over the village's residents. The basic function of constructing family homes on private land had become a risky and uncertain venture, due to the constant fear of demolition and lack of services.

This problem was amplified by continuing uncertainty over the permitted building line along the main Akko-Safed road which bisects the village (Figure 3.2). Here too, several changes were made over the years to the easement required along the road, which varied between 50 and 100 meters, with policy changes occurring in 1962, 1964, 1967, 1972, 1979, and 1982. These changes caused many homes to be classified as "illegal," even if their owners had built them in a zone originally approved for housing. The road issue also involved a host of state and regional transport authorities which, together with the statutory planning authorities in-

volved in the preparation of the outline plan, created "a maze of spatial planning authorities and personalities, with the effect of confusing the villagers, often to the point of resignation" (interviews with village mayor, 1992). Beyond local events, it is important for the present analysis to note the use of boundaries and spatial regulations to control, contain, and restrict the process of village expansion and dwelling construction.[2]

An additional example of control through the imposition of administrative boundaries was the boundary selected for the Misgav Regional Council. This council was created in 1983 to provide municipal services for the new Jewish settlements established in central Galilee during the last wave of Jewish settlement discussed above. As shown elsewhere (Yiftachel, 1991), Misgav was given a highly irregular geographical shape, in order to include most Jewish settlements and exclude most Arab villages. This has reinforced patterns of functional and social segregation in the region, where nearly all services are provided on an ethnic basis. While in certain areas—such as education—this ethnic separation is desired by the Arabs, their exclusion from Misgav has also denied them access to the many social services and recreational facilities now available to Jews in the region. The creation of Misgav and the location of its boundaries have thus worked to segregate Arabs from Jews in the region, as part of an overall effort to control the Arab population in a region perceived as an internal frontier.

Planning Boundaries

A final aspect of territorial control to be illustrated here is the imposition of planning boundaries. In Israel, local planning committees (especially in the Arab sector) are appointed by the government and are often different from the elected local governments. The boundaries of local planning authorities do not always correspond with local government boundaries, thereby creating another layer of intense local-central interaction, and opportunities for control over peripheral areas.

The village of Majd al-Krum lies within the boundaries of the Central Galilee Local Planning Committee which decides on most local planning matters, such as applications for concessions, building permits, land use change, and the like. Until 1991, this committee included 23 Arab villages and six Jewish settlements in the Galilee. In 1988 the Committee was responsible for the spatial planning matters of some 133,000 people, making it the largest non-urban Local Planning Committee in Israel. In comparison, other Local Committees in the Galilee, such as Misgav and Mateh Asher, are responsible for only 5,000 or 7,500 people, respectively. Needless to say, the accessibility of residents from Majd al-Krum to services offered by the Committee, as revealed from interviews conducted

during 1988–1992, has been difficult, and their potential influence on its decisions negligible.[3]

The issue of a smaller and more accessible Local Planning Committee has been a subject of continued struggle by leaders of Arab villages in the Galilee, including Majd al-Krum. The five large villages in Beit Hakerem valley—Rame, Nahef, Dier-el-Asad, Baena, and Majd al-Krum (Figure 3.1)—were most active in this campaign and were led by the Majd al-Krum mayor. In a letter to the Minister of the Interior, dated 4.1.1979, the mayors of the five Councils stated:

> We wish to raise the problem of planning in the Arab sector in general and in our region in particular... As the population of our five villages totals 23,000 people, a Local Committee is appropriate and will streamline the process of applying for building permits by our residents, which is currently lengthy and frustrating. It will also enable the five councils to better control development in our villages. Despite being turned down in previous meetings and correspondence we have great hope that your honor will agree to the establishment of a local planning and building committee in our region.

This request was referred to the Northern District Committee, which decided in its April 1980 meeting to refuse, using the pretext that the request was "unrealistic." The issue, which aggrieved many other Galilee villages in a situation similar to Majd al-Krum, continued to appear in Arab publications and press releases throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. The issue was prominently included in the official manifesto of the Arab National Committee (which amounts to a long-term political agenda of Israeli Arabs) adopted in 1987, which called for the creation of Arab-managed local building committees for groups of villages totaling 10,000 people or more.

Finally, in 1991, the authorities responded to the problem by creating a new Local Planning Committee in the northern portion of the Central Galilee area. However, the new Mevo'ot Naftali Committee includes six Druze and two Jewish settlements which belong to sectors traditionally favored by the authorities ahead of Muslim groups. The division therefore leaves Central Galilee as a large and cumbersome committee, still responsible for 15 large urbanized (and predominantly Muslim) Arab villages, and a total population of 118,000. Interviews reveal that the improvement in the operation of this overloaded committee has been minimal. Majd al-Krum actually benefited from the changes more than other villages, as its mayor was appointed as a member of the revamped Central Galilee Committee, but the position is a rotating one, and the long-term problem of exclusion of the villagers from decision making is likely to remain. This is particularly significant because the local planning

committee is the spatial planning authority supposed to be the most accessible to local residents.

Conclusions

This chapter has presented a theoretical framework to assist the understanding of an often neglected phenomenon—the emergence of internal frontiers in settler societies. Internal frontiers are created in regions within established states, where high concentrations of ethnic minorities generate interethnic struggles over land control. They normally evolve in two phases which broadly correspond to the nation-building and state-building stages characteristic of most settler societies. In internal frontier regions, the majority usually uses the positive images and ethos of frontier development, the expansionist frontier mentality it has developed, and the power of the state apparatus, to impose territorial control over the minority and its settlements.

The detailed case study outlined in the chapter has illustrated many of the theoretical propositions. It was shown that the location of an Arab village within a region perceived as a Jewish internal frontier has had significant, and generally adverse, influence on that village. The lingering image of the (predominantly Arab) Galilee as a frontier region for Jews, into which Jewish settlements attempt to penetrate, using vast public resources, has meant that public policies in the region have generally attempted to control the development of the village and its population. This policy approach derives from the treatment of the Arabs in the Galilee as part of a hostile frontier environment to be "tamed" by the Jewish settler society during its nation-building process.

More specifically, the case study has shown how Israeli territorial policies have worked to appropriate large parts of the village's land resources, to contain its residential expansion, to encircle it with Jewish settlements and impose surveillance over the life of its residents, and to manipulate the village's administrative and planning boundaries. In other words, Israel's policies have attempted to "keep the lid" on the village of Majd al-Krum, while using the images of the internal frontier for ongoing nation-building and state-building projects. In addition, the territorial control of the village has well served the goal of maintaining Jewish domination in Israel, by making Arab economic and political development far more difficult. As already noted, this type of policy has occurred in many (probably most) Arab villages in Israel (see, Haidar, 1991; Khameissi, 1992).

It should be noted in this context that the use of frontier images and ideology for the purpose of controlling social groups has not been limited to the Arab minority in Israel. As shown by Gradus (1983) and Hasson (in

this volume), Israel's highly centralized system of public institutions has often imposed settlement policies "from above" on groups of weak Jewish populations and new immigrants. The images of Israel's frontier regions were used as a powerful force for granting social legitimacy for the dispersal of many of these groups into the country's periphery. The long-term results, however, were that distant Jewish peripheral towns and agricultural settlements became highly dependent on the state's political and economic centers. This created conditions for effective political, economic, and cultural control. Nevertheless, the control exerted over Arab settlements in frontier regions has been far more direct.

Significantly, however, majority domination practices as the one documented above seldom remain unchallenged. Oppressed minorities around the world have started to mobilize effective opposition against discriminatory policies during the last two decades, particularly in open regimes (Gurr, 1993). While the scope of this paper precludes a discussion on local protest and resistance, I have shown elsewhere (Yiftachel, 1992a; 1995) that Israel's policies in the Galilee have spawned repeated and intensifying waves of regional protest and resistance, in an open challenge to government strategies and practices. This has resulted in some (albeit minor) policy concessions, which may herald a period of decline in the level of state control exerted on the Arabs.

This sequence of events demonstrates the inherent contradiction in the continuing use of frontier images, mentality, and policies for regions already inhabited by ethnic minorities. The forces of modernization and political mobilization, brought about by the development of these regions, coupled with a global wave of "ethnic revival" and the opportunities afforded in democratic systems, are likely to intensify conflicts between colonizer and colonized. The promotion of a region as an internal frontiers to be settled and controlled (at the expense of peripheral minorities) can therefore backfire in the long-term, by aggravating relations between ethnic groups to the point of destabilizing the state system. Paradoxically, this process can threaten the entire state-building project which provided the basic rationale for the internal frontier strategies described in this chapter (as in Sri Lanka, for example). Given the above, the challenge to spatial policies in "internal frontier" regions is clear: we must aspire to dismantle the perception of regions as internal frontiers, and create areas of inclusive spatial policy, free of territorial expansionism and ethnic domination.

Finally, the theoretical propositions made earlier in the chapter, and their illustration in the case of Majd al-Krum are but a first step in the conceptualization and theorization of the internal frontier phenomenon. This initial effort should now be supplemented by research into comparable case studies which may confirm, refute, or revise those propositions.

Notes

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2. Notably, the authorities have only rarely exercised the option of demolition, but the threat has constantly existed for large numbers of homes. In 1988, for example, 64 dwellings existed without permission, and even in 1991, when the outline plan was finally gazetted, 22 dwellings remained "illegal". It should also be noted that the problem of unauthorized dwelling construction in Arab villages is extremely complex and is covered in detail elsewhere (see Khameissi, 1992; Yiftachel, 1991). Suffice it to say here, that the problem is not only linked to the policies of Israeli authorities, but also to factors such as Arab lawlessness; a rigid land market within Arab villages; cultural gaps between governmental planning and Arab traditional methods of development; and a degree of political manipulation.

3. Significantly, Majd al-Krum's servicing problems are not related to the council inefficiencies and improper conduct, which have plagued many other Arab local authorities. In 1991, the local council received "the efficiency prize" from Israel's Ministry of the Interior.)

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4

The Frontiers of Urban Mix: Palestinians, Israelis, and Settlement Space

Dan Rabinowitz

Introduction

Hityashvut—Hebrew for "pioneering settlement"—is identified as a key factor articulating and engendering the Israeli quest for territorial exclusivity. Only environments which have been actively transformed by agents of Zionism qualify as genuine *hityashvut*, and are hence perceived as loci to be defended from foreign presence. This chapter examines the symbolic role of environmental transformation, in theory and practice, in the contention over space in Natseret Illit, a mixed development town in the Galilee. The Israeli inhabitants, who comprise approximately 90 percent of the local population, see the Palestinian minority as detrimental to the town. A differentiation emerges, however, among reactions to Palestinian presence in various parts of town, highlighting the importance of cultural constructs of social space and the centrality of settlement as one such construct. The territorial mass of Israel emerges as less cognitively uniform than hitherto assumed. It should be qualified at this point that both groups mentioned in this article are of course, citizens of Israel. This notwithstanding, I prefer to limit the use of the term Israelis to the Jewish citizens of Israel who, I argue, are the only ones for whom the term Israeli is meaningful idiom of identity and affiliation. Likewise, "Palestinian citizens of Israel" is preferred to the more frequently used Israeli Arabs or Arabs in Israel. The use of "Arabs" in this case, I argue (Rabinowitz, 1993), tends to gloss over the rootedness of the Palestinians—including those who are the citizens of Israel—in a territory they call Falastin.

Settlement and Nation-building

Williams and Smith interpret nation-building as a symbol-laden sphere of human action,

> ...without which the nationalist dream must remain a mere blueprint, but whose acquisition allows the nationalist to translate his utopia into practical realities. The 'land' allows him to realize his goals of sovereignty, fraternity, identity and regeneration—in practical works of construction. It is, after all, 'the land' that can be renewed, regenerated, rebuilt; and through that act of rebuilding, people can be changed, their outlook revolutionized, their capacities enlarged (Williams and Smith, 1983: 510).

Elsewhere Smith points out that work on the land, which creates the infrastructure of the nation, helps form a homogenous group out of an unrelated conglomerate of individuals (Smith, 1981). E. Weber notes that nation-building helps state structures and agencies replace intermediate and regional institutions (Weber, 1976).

Acquisition of land, identification, mobilization, and homogenization of the people, and the transformation of the natural environment into a political territory through physical construction, thus emerge as elements which single out legitimate participation in the nation-building effort. In the case of Zionism, these three elements are perfectly enshrined in the concept of *hityashvut*. Technically speaking, the term denotes "settling." In the Zionist vocabulary, however, it has assumed the meaning of a generic noun for the entire sphere of settlement. This includes politically defined federations of settlements (also referred to as "movements" or "streams"), such as the three federations of kibbutzim and two federations of moshavim; the institutions and bureaucracies affiliated with the federations; all physical entities on the ground; and their personnel, the settlers. The use of the term *hityashvut* herewith will be interchangeable with "Settlement."

Settlement and settlements have specific, tangible manifestations on maps and census. In the case of Israel, they are thus an integral part of the collective effort to imagine the new nation—a cognitive and emotional practice rightly implied by Anderson (1983) to be more important than physical construction on the ground.

Hityashvut, more than any other sphere of life in Israel, is and has always been, exclusively Jewish. Land acquisition, the mobilization and recruitment of people through immigration (*aliya*), and the transformation of the environment through construction and development form the raison d'être (and basic structure) of the World Zionist movement's bureaucracy, and have forcefully penetrated the state machinery since 1948. These elements of nation-building have dictated the Zionist agenda for almost a century. The very nature of Zionism as Jewish nationalism

implies by definition that ownership of land, *aliya*, and *hityashvut*, must remain exclusively Jewish (thus Israeli), or lose their very meaning as key elements of Zionism.

A Jewish Town

Natseret Illit was established as part of the third stage in Israel's drive to the Galilee,[1] policy initially endorsed by the Israeli cabinet in March 1949 (Kipnis, 1983). The Palestinian population, while drastically reduced during the 1948 war which brought Israel its independence, still formed an overwhelming majority in Lower Galilee. Not surprisingly, the hills of Nazareth became a prime target for the state's judaization policy, which according to Yiftachel (1994), was by no means unique to Israel. Multi-ethnic states elsewhere, he demonstrates, tend "either to disperse the minority throughout the state or penetrate minority regions with settlement of other ethnic groups" (Yiftachel, 1994: 43; Sibley, 1987).

Israeli residents of Natseret Illit often refer to David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, as the figure whose ideological legacy determined the town's future role in the quest for Israeli dominance in the Galilee. A letter written by Ben-Gurion in 1957, proudly reproduced in an official publication issued for Natseret Illit's 30th anniversary, states that:

> ...the new settlement must be a Jewish town that will assert a Jewish presence in the area. Not a suburb of Arab Nazareth, but a separate town in its vicinity (Natseret Illit, 1987).

The nature of this project, whereby the minority or ethnic borderland (Anzaldua, 1987; Rosaldo, 1988) becomes the dominant group's own frontier, has been successfully disguised in Israel by the concept of "development town" *(ir pituah)*. One view,[2] sees "development towns" as part and parcel of the inevitable and historically moral process of settling the old-new Jewish homeland. A more critical view has been suggested by a number of researchers, including Swirsky (1985; 1989), and, in a less emphatic tone, Segev (1984). Their analyses highlight this type of settlement as a Eurocentric project which mobilized immigrants—mostly oriental Jews—to settle less attractive peripheral tracts, including borderlands.

Natseret Illit, where immigrants from Eastern Europe were and still are the majority (see, Garbuz, 1973), is not the prototypical case of Israeli new towns. The fact remains, however, that most immigrants who settled in the town had limited effective choice in the matter.[3] Many of them were brought to the Galilee upon their arrival in Israel, often directly from the harbor or the airport. The concept of being drafted by the core to settle the periphery, while not necessarily supporting the view of Euro-

pean domination over Oriental Jews (Shohat, 1988), is certainly as valid in Natseret Illit as it is elsewhere in Israel. Natseret Illit was thus designed by the hegemonic forces of Israel, carried out primarily by immigrants, and came at the expense of Palestinians.

A Mixed Town

The Israeli vision for Natseret Illit—a purely Jewish new town amidst the Palestinian heartland in the Galilee—was eroded in the 1970s and 1980s with the gradual arrival of immigrants of another variety. The land and housing shortage in adjacent Nazareth encouraged Palestinian residents of Nazareth, typically newlyweds and families in the earlier stages of their developmental cycle, to rent, buy, or build properties in the Israeli town. By 1988, when I began fieldwork in Natseret Illit, the town had approximately 3,500 Palestinian residents—almost an eighth of the town's population. Ironically, the town, established to exclude Palestinians effectively for their ancestral agricultural land, was now re-entered by their urban middle class compatriots (Bar-Gal, 1986).

Israel has a number of well-established mixed towns, where Palestinians and Israelis have lived side by side for decades, and, in some cases, even longer. These include Haifa (Haifa in Hebrew; Haifa in Arabic), Acre (Akko; 'Acca), Jaffa (Yafo; Yafa), Ramla (Ramla; al-Ramla) and Lod (Lidda; Lidd[4]). From the advent of Zionism, and especially after 1948, these mixed towns saw the Jewish newcomers as penetrating predominantly Palestinian turf. The arrivals either replaced the Palestinians altogether or settled side by side with them. After 1948, and well into the 1970s, this process of replacement spread to rural areas too, through the establishment of Israeli settlements on land expropriated from its Palestinian owners. The residual Palestinian community—a subdued, reluctant, and largely helpless group—was reduced to a shadow of its pre-1948 past.

Natseret Illit, however, is quite irregular in this respect. While in the early stages, Israeli settlers took hold of Palestinian land—largely unpopulated, though more productive than many Israeli residents would like now to recognize—recently there has been large-scale penetration of Palestinians into an essentially Israeli community. Most Israeli residents of Natseret Illit see the Palestinian presence in the town as, at best, an unfortunate hiccup in an otherwise healthy master plan to Judaize the Galilee. At worst they see it as a dreaded and highly-orchestrated Palestinian onslaught—a conspiracy by Palestinian nationalists to take over the town, merge it into adjacent Nazareth and, by extension, incorporate it into a distant, threatening Arab entity. A widespread sentiment amongst Israeli residents throughout the 1980s was that the Palestinian presence is the

single most demeaning aspect of Natseret Illit, and that it alone accounts for the consistent failure of the town to attract desirable immigration from more prestigious parts of Israel. Large-scale immigration from the crumbling Soviet Union in the early 1990s, which signaled a substantial addition to the Israeli population of Natseret Illit, somewhat modified the sense of Palestinian threat. The basic sentiment, however, has not disappeared.

A typical representation of the local Israeli view of the Palestinian presence in Natseret Illit is found in the words of Elie Azoulay, a Jewish resident of about 35, who has lived in the town since childhood. Pointing to a make-shift map of the town he drew on a restaurant napkin, he commented:

> You see? They are taking over *(mishtaltim al)* the town's main arteries. They are slowly encircling it *(makifim)*. They come from all directions... They began with ground-floor flats in Rasko, and then used it as a base to penetrate from. Now they are everywhere... They are even eyeing Ventura, where people once vowed they will never let Arabs in.

The geo-political history of Natseret Illit in the Lower Galilee can thus be likened to that of Israel in the Middle East. An Israeli island in an Arab ocean, reluctantly hosting a Palestinian contingent it perceives as a potentially disloyal, even dangerous, fifth-column.

A Palestinian Town

When the municipal boundaries of Natseret Illit were about to be finalized in the 1970s, the Ministry of the Interior was persuaded by the municipality to include within the town a number of tracts of land hitherto outside the town's jurisdiction. One such area is the north-western slope of the northern ridge, which carries the Arabic name of Ku~ru~m Raina—orchards of Raina—or simply al Ku-ru-m—the orchards (Figure 4.1).

Plots on al-Ku-ru-m were owned by Palestinian residents of the neighboring villages of Raina and of Nazareth. Unlike the practices of 1957, when the founding of Natseret Illit was done partly through expropriating Palestinian land, the practice at this time was that land designated to be incorporated to Natseret Illit was not expropriated from its Palestinian holders. The 1970s transfer of jurisdiction over to Natseret Illit involved no change of ownership[5] and it triggered a change of land-use status from agricultural to urban. The change in status in turn facilitated considerable simplifications of planning procedure for residential purposes, and Palestinian owners immediately began to build on or to sell their land to other Palestinians who were inclined to build.




FIGURE 4.1 Natzerat Illit and its surroundings. (*Source:* Adapted from Rabinowitz, 1997.)

Thus the 1980s saw the gradual growth of a well-rooted Palestinian neighborhood in al-Ku-ru-m—a spontaneous development which took the Israeli leaders of Natseret Illit rather by surprise. By 1989, between 200 and 250 Palestinian families (up to 1,200 persons) were living in private houses and small apartment blocks on the slope. Al-Ku-ru-m, which has no Israeli residents, now represents approximately one third of the Palestinian population of the town, and a true Palestinian stronghold within Natseret Illit.

The issue of al-Ku-ru-m was a conspicuous one in my contact with Elie Azoulay, who became one of my regular informants on real estate and other matters in Natseret Illit. With time, I noticed that virtually all instances he cited to lend support to his laments over "the problem of the Arab onslaught" in Natseret Illit concerned properties that had been sold or let to Palestinians in the mixed compounds. Al-Ku-ru-m, the exclusively Palestinian neighborhood, remained conspicuously absent from his discourse of "the problem." In practical terms, this silence is understandable. Deals over land and properties in al-Ku-ru-m were cut exclusively between Palestinians, who seldom use the services of estate agents.[6] The area was thus outside Elie's—or any other estate agent's—domain of activity and information.

Al-Ku-ru-m and the rest of the north-western corner of Natseret Illit, comprising over 250 private homes of Palestinians, still represents approximately one-third of the Palestinian residency in Natseret Illit. Moreover, since most houses in al-Ku-ru-m are built on land privately owned by Palestinians, most residents have no intentions whatsoever of moving out—this is in marked contrast to Palestinian residents of mixed residential areas "inside" Natseret Illit. Al-Ku-ru-m was Elie's worst scenario materialized; it was a recent assertion of Palestinian presence within a predominantly Israeli town, and a perfect example of Palestinian momentum acquired at the expense of Israeli control.

Elie's tendency to overlook al-Ku-ru-m was not an exception. The most impassioned accounts given by other Israeli residents of the existential dangers associated with the Palestinian presence in Natseret Illit made no reference to the exclusively Palestinian neighborhood. In fact, when asked to trace the town's perimeter, many Israelis omitted al-Ku-ru-m altogether. When challenged, one man explained that al-Ku-ru-m was "not really Natseret Illit." Another said it was "more like a part of Nazareth." Not surprisingly, acts of Israeli intimidation of Palestinian residents or prospective residents—an occurrence known in virtually all other parts of Natseret Illit—have never been attempted in al-Ku-ru-m.

This uncharacteristically relaxed attitude of Israeli residents was mirrored in the policy of the council vis-à-vis Palestinian presence and development in al-Ku-ru-m. In the early 1970s, the council of Natseret Illit collaborated with that of Nazareth (both councils were controlled by the

Labor Party at the time), to initiate and construct a housing estate for Palestinian civil servants and Labor Party activists from Nazareth. The result was a compound with 48 apartments, built at the top of the slope which later came to be occupied by al-Ku-ru-m, and known as Shikun al-Akhdar: a mixture of Hebrew and Arabic for the "green housing estate," after the green plastic shutters fixed in the front which overlooks Nazareth. This project was built; little did anyone anticipate that the estate would form a nucleus of development and construction by Palestinians and for them. Additionally, Natseret Illit's council has since been generous in granting planning permission to Palestinians wishing to buy build on the slope—a policy which proved conducive to further development by Palestinians.

Two decades later, many Israeli residents of Natseret Illit openly declared their willingness to relinquish al-Ku-ru-m altogether. During the municipal election campaign of early 1989, when a new local Palestinian list of candidates emerged, Natseret Illit's Labor branch correctly anticipated a collapse in the traditional support for Labor amongst the Palestinian residents. This realization pushed Labor officers to contemplate gerrymandering, specifically the surrendering of al-Ku-ru-m to the jurisdiction of neighboring Raina. Although the notion never surfaced as part of the official campaign, it evidently was, and probably still is, on the agendas of most Zionist parties in Natseret Illit.

A tendency to give up territory hitherto assigned to one's control is unusual under the most relaxed of circumstances; it is particularly perplexing in a place like Israel, where land reclaimed from the Palestinians or the wilderness features strongly in the national pantheon of symbols. It becomes a paradox in Natseret Illit, where "Judaizing the Galilee" is the Israeli raison d'être. Clearly, some Palestinian moves into what Israelis perceive as their own territory invoke deep fears in the latter. Other moves, including ones of large territorial scale and significance such as al-Ku-ru-m, fail to attract attention and concern.

Mixed Towns

Observations from elsewhere in Israel suggest that differentiated attitudes to Palestinian presence in various parts is not unique to Natseret Illit. Ben-Artzi and Shoshani's account of the recent history of Palestinian presence in Haifa (Ben-Artzi and Shoshani, 1986) indicates that prior to 1948, the northern town had some 45,000 Palestinian residents, living mainly in the lower part of the town, nearer to the port. During the 1948 hostilities, the majority of Palestinians were forced to leave their homes (see, Morris, 1987). The 3,000 or so Palestinians who remained, predominantly Christians, were transferred by the Israeli authorities into a well-delineated enclave at Wadi Nisnas in the older inner city. Most properties

which had belonged to refugees or displaced Palestinians were taken over by the state and given to new immigrants arriving in Israel in 1949 and the early 1950s.

Between 1949 and 1986 the Palestinian population of Haifa multiplied fivefold. This growth is accounted for mainly by Palestinian immigrants from villages in the Galilee during the 1970s (Ben-Artzi and Shoshani, 1986). By this time, many of the new immigrants who had settled in the old Palestinian properties had already improved their economic situation, and were moving away to newer, more prestigious parts of Haifa. To facilitate the move, they sold or rented their old residences, often to Palestinians. The 1970s and 1980s thus saw many parts of Haifa, which had been predominantly Palestinian prior to 1948, regaining their previous demographic composition, with Palestinians rapidly becoming quantitatively prominent.

A similar process, albeit on a smaller scale, took place in Jaffa, another major Palestinian town whose population was greatly reduced in 1948. Jewish immigrants, mainly from the Balkans, were settled in empty Palestinian properties in the early 1950s. Later, when many moved to newer neighborhoods elsewhere in the Tel Aviv metropolis, Palestinians resumed renting and buying properties in Jaffa. This process, which continued steadily throughout the 1970s and 1980s, has made a significant mark on Jaffa's public life (see, Shokeid, 1982). The phenomenon of slow, but substantial, Palestinian return is known also in the old cores of Lod (pre-1948 Palestinian Lidd) and Ramla (previously al-Ramlah), where large numbers of Palestinian newcomers from a variety of origins, including Negev Bedouin, have been taking up residence since the 1950s (for a detailed account see, Kressel, 1976). Significantly, these moves, however full of territorial ramifications, hardly became foci of attention—let alone anxiety—for Israelis. Locally, as well as nationally, they have largely remained as non-events.

The Palestinian tendency to build relatively few residential units per unit area brought about substantial physical expansion of most Palestinian rural communities in Israel, often at the expense of previously agricultural land (Sofer, 1989). The Israeli public is generally aware of this development and is critical of it, but does not display any real signs of apprehension over the matter. Public reaction is generally weak, and seems to revolve around what many Israelis see as blatant disregard on the part of Palestinians towards planning procedures. And while extreme right-wing political parties periodically criticize the willingness of the administration to put up with the situation, the territorial ramifications of the process have never stirred a widespread emotional response within the Israeli public.

There are, on the other hand, cases of Palestinian presence in predominantly Israeli areas which do trigger powerful reactions. In October 1989,

the (Jewish) New-Year edition of Israel's best-selling newspaper, *Yediot Aharonot*, featured a story (Ringel-Hofman, 1989) concerning 160 or so Palestinian families who live in Karmi'el—a development town established in 1964 in the heart of a densely populated Palestinian area in central Galilee. The story reflects deep apprehensions on the part of many of Karmi'el's 22,000 Israeli residents regarding the Palestinian presence. A right-wing Likud council member summed up prevailing local emotions by saying:

> The process began in the early 1980s. First, they (the Palestinians, D.R) find work in the town. Later they open a little business. Then they rent a flat and bring the family to live in town. Eventually they buy the property. Around Karmi'el there are some 100,000 Arabs. It is enough that 5 percent of them decide to migrate to Karm'iel, to make 5,000—a quarter of the town's population (Ringel-Hofman, 1989).

Such remarks are occasionally echoed in other peripheral new towns across the country. Examples include Safed (Safad) and Hatsor in Upper Galilee, two development towns where a number of Palestinian families have recently bought properties; Akko, where Palestinians have been moving away from the old city into blocks of flats in the new suburbs; and the southern towns of Be'er Sheva and Arad, where a number of local Bedouin families, as well as Palestinians from the north of Israel, have taken up residence in recent years. Similarly, new Israeli suburbs built around Jerusalem in the 1970s on previously Jordanian rural land—Neveh Ya'acov and French Hill for example—have been the scene of Israeli apprehensions vis-à-vis Palestinians buying and renting. On several occasions in the 1980s, this led to attacks on apartments occupied by Palestinians and fire bombs against Palestinian residents' motorcars.

Finally, negative reaction to the notion of Palestinian presence is an unmistakable feature of kibbutzim and moshavim.[7] In both settlement forms, the general assembly of each settlement has the final say on membership admittance. So far, virtually all attempts by Palestinians to become members have been denied. This veto, often based explicitly on the applicant's ethnic affiliation, stands in blatant contradiction to the ostensibly socialist and universalistic ideology to which the kibbutzim and (to a lesser extent) the moshavim movements ostensibly subscribe. This double standard is a source of tension and embarrassment within individual settlements, as well as in the movements generally. This notwithstanding, exceptions or a change of policy are yet to occur. Some Palestinian citizens of Israel—Bedouin, Druze, Christians, and more recently a handful of other Muslims—serve in Israel's defense forces. The fact that Palestinian candidates for membership in kibbutzim and moshavim have included ex-servicemen has had no bearing on decisions by

general assemblies regarding candidates. The barrier against Palestinian participation in kibbutzim and moshavim is even more rigid than the notion of Israeli exclusivity in the sacred realm of national defense.

Town and Country

Kimmerling's analyses of the place of territory in Zionism and in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Kimmerling, 1977; 1983) specifies presence, ownership, and sovereignty as the three components of territorial control. The three components form the basis for his conceptualization of the conflict: an ongoing struggle in which both sides attempt to gain as much control over as much territory as possible. This framework goes to great lengths to account for the variations in Israeli reactions to the Palestinian presence. Al-ku-ru-m, it could be argued, differs from other parts of Natseret Illit in the extent and nature of Israeli control. All parts of Natseret Illit are part of the sovereign state of Israel, and fall within the municipal jurisdiction of a town perceived by everyone as Israeli. Sovereignty over the territory is thus indisputably Israeli. As for ownership and presence, al-Ku-ru-m stands out from all other parts of Natseret Illit. Its land and property is privately owned by Palestinians (i.e. full Palestinian ownership). Palestinians also make up the entire residency (i.e. overwhelming Palestinian presence).

Al-Ku-ru-m displays a pattern of control whereby Israeli sovereignty is not accompanied by ownership and presence—a situation characterized by Kimmerling as pattern E (1983). Elsewhere in Natseret Illit, where Israeli sovereignty is matched with Israeli collective ownership of land and individual ownership of property, as well as by a decisive majority of Israeli residents, Israeli control is total. The combination of sovereignty, ownership and presence, creates, in Kimmerling's terminology, a pattern of complete control—pattern H (Kimmerling, 1983).

This variance in control over territory, the argument states, can account for the diverse Israeli reactions to the Palestinian presence. In the predominantly Israeli parts of town, where Israeli control is virtually complete, the arrival of the Palestinians is viewed with fear and apprehension. In al-Ku-ru-m, where Israeli control is only nominal anyway, the Palestinian presence meets milder Israeli sentiments. Kimmerling alludes to the morbid Israeli fear of the reversibility of territorial processes. In his study of the public debate in Israel in the 1970s and 1980s regarding the potential return of evacuated Palestinian villagers to their homes and land at the villages of Ikrit and Bir'im near the Lebanese border, he cites the arguments put forward against such a return by politicians representing mainstream Zionism. A leading member of the Labor party is quoted as telling the press that "The problem does not only relate to the Galilee

or the Negev, but to other places as well: Tel Aviv too" (Kimmerling, 1977: 165).

The quote, by no means a freak utterance, reflects a tendency within mainstream Zionism to evaluate its own territorial advent as tentative and fragile. Decades after the establishment of the state of Israel and the systematic seizure of most Palestinian land within its boundaries, Zionism continues to hold itself susceptible to counter-measures by the weakened Palestinians. This point is crucial for a fuller understanding of the Israeli attitude to land and, by implication, to territorial compromise. In this respect, once again, the peculiarities of a trapped minority, particularly the ambiguous status of borders and boundaries between it and its father ethnos, play a significant part.

Kimmerling asserts that such expressions on the part of Israelis are anchored in a broader ideological context. Israeli spokesmen, he argues, tend to link each local territorial dispute—the one over the two remote and tiny villages of Ikrit and Bir'im in the north is but one lucid example—to the entire history and suffering of the Israeli people, including the trauma of the Holocaust.

This trend is evident to date. For example, right-wing Israeli ideologists consistently portrayed the Intifada (the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories during the 1987–1994 period) as an all out war for the whole of the country, not just the territories—explicitly using the term *milhama* (war) for it. This approach reflects a genuine belief in the intent and capability of Palestinians to export the uprising across the 1967 borders into Israel proper. The implication is that giving way to Palestinians in one part necessarily invites total collapse all over.

During the Gulf War in early 1991, prominent Israeli public figures appealed to the citizens of Tel Aviv to stay put at the height of Iraqi missile attacks. One of the many statements made by Shlomo Lahat, Mayor of Tel Aviv, reads as follows:

> We must stay put. If our contribution to the state is to get hit by Scuds, then that is what we must do... People must not act just to save their own individual skins. Today people leave Tel-Aviv, tomorrow they will leave Jerusalem. Next they would leave Israel all together. This is what Sadam wants (*Ha'aretz*, 1991:a4).

Such "domino effect" visions, and their reification in public debates during the Gulf War, reflect a deep anxiety that every individual incident involving Israeli presence in a given territorial segment carries enormous historical and ideological consequences regardless of context and conjuncture. Shlomo Lahat, formerly a general of the Israeli army, used this line of argument and did not distinguish between military effectiveness (which had nothing to do with staying put in Tel Aviv under threat of Scuds), and the resilience which saved the day for the Israeli collective in

previous wars. This resilience was particularly vital in 1948 when presence really mattered for gaining control over disputed territory and holding on to it.

In 1994 and 1995, the campaign staged by the Israeli Right against the return of the Golan Heights to Syria is once more phrased in existential terms, predicting the imminent annihilation of Israel without the Golan. This discourse is careful to suspend projected features of future warfare, conveniently overlooking the reduced salience of territorial bases.

The case of Ikrit and Bir'im presents a mirror image to that of Natseret Illit. In both cases, newly-acquired Israeli sovereignty stands against what Israelis perceive as a Palestinian onslaught. The move of Nazarene urbanites to Natseret Illit becomes equivalent to the attempts of villagers from Ikrit and Bir'im to return to their demolished villages. In both cases, Zionism, ever-conscious of the wider ramifications of letting the Palestinians in (or back), closes ranks to keep the Palestinians out.[8] In Natseret Illit, where Israeli individuals yield to market forces and are tempted to sell to Palestinians for a handsome price, Zionist ideology caves in. The argument linking each individual case to the grand vision of a precarious history—a claim which carried so much weight in the debate regarding Ikrit and Bir'im—is found in Natseret Illit only in the proselytizing laments of the aftermath.

To sum up this line of inquiry, Zionism emerges as inherently insecure regarding the durability of its territorial achievements. Israelis are particularly apprehensive regarding Palestinian advances in territories where state control has been safely established through sovereignty, ownership, and presence. Palestinian expansion in places such as al-Ku-ru-m, where Israeli control is tenuous anyway, seem to attract far less Israeli attention. And yet, plausible as this argument may be, its explanation of the situation in Natseret Illit is incomplete. In the 1950s and 1960s, Israeli ownership and presence in the old parts of Haifa, Jaffa, Lod, and Ramla signified what Kimmerling typifies as full Israeli control. This notwithstanding, the substantial return of Palestinians, so clearly present in the cases of Haifa and Ramla, turned the situation on its head. If, as the argument would imply, the key to Israeli reactions is the threat of reversed control through depletion of Israeli ownership and presence, then how can we account for the dispassionate Israeli response to the costs in terms of hegemony in those other urban examples? Kimmerling's model must be augmented if these peculiarities are to be accommodated. This, I argue, is where the symbolic role of *hityashvut* could be applicable as the missing link.

The Frontier of Settlement

Al-Ku-ru-m is fundamentally different from the mixed compounds which make up the rest of Natseret Illit. Municipal affiliation does not

define national territory. It is *hityashvut*—settlement in its specific Zionist connotation—which engenders the final judaization of terrestrial space. Al-Ku-ru-m, like Palestinian villages and towns elsewhere in Israel, is a territory which has not been subject to environmental transformation by the Zionist apparatus. The terrain may have been somewhat improved, but has never been reconstructed by any agency of Zionism. Likewise, locations in the old quarters of Haifa, Jaffa, Lod or other towns which became mixed may have been settled by Israelis at some stage. However, temporary Israeli ownership, presence, and even sovereignty are not enough to qualify these sites as genuine components of national redemption. Israeli presence and ownership in downtown Haifa and Jaffa could thus be reversed without evoking an emotional response on the part of Israelis. The cultural meaning and powerful symbolism of *hityashvut* simply do not apply there.

Visible environmental transformation, while obvious to Palestinians too, carries a powerful symbolic load for Israelis. Beyond providing housing, loci of industry, services, commerce, and recreation, new development is expected to erase old landscape chapters and their attendant cultural content. The environmental transformation associated with Zionist settlement thus marks the sanctification of land as national social space, initiating it into the realm of Israeli nation-building.

The terrestrial space of "The Israeli state" is thus less uniform than hitherto assumed. While the legal sovereignty of the state could be perceived—by Israelis at least—to denote uniform Israeli dominance, the diverse patterns of control over territory, supplemented by the superimposition of *hityashvut*, creates a complex jigsaw. Only those parts which have or are being transformed through *hityashvut* are affectively (and hence effectively) perceived as "Israeli" territory. Once qualified, such places become core sites of the new mythology, usurping specific figurative loads. As perceived incarnations of progress and redemption, they carry the imperative to be protected at all costs from intrusion by non-members. Mixed settlement on such sites becomes abominable for Israelis as it signifies the ultimate evil they dread so deeply: the deterioration of collective achievements through rapid dissolution of control over the territory.

These sentiments are supplemented by an inherently orientalist outlook, so prevalent in Israel, which portrays the outpost, in fact the entire Zionist project including *hityashvut*, as a singularly positive, if not redemptive element in an otherwise wild and primitive Middle East (Rabinowitz, 1997). This becomes doubly powerful in a confrontational frontier such as the hills of Nazareth, where ostensibly evil attempts to erode Israeli exclusionism, identity, and eventually, presence seem to Israeli actors all the more apparent and threatening.

Notes

1. The first stage consisted of having Israelis settle in properties in old Palestinian towns such as Baisan, Akko, Tiberias, or Safed; the second stage saw the construction of transition camps *(ma'abarot)* for Jewish new immigrants in areas where cheap labor was needed for intensive agriculture and unskilled jobs in industry; the third stage was the establishment of three new towns—Natseret Illit, Karmi'el, and Ma'alot in three areas which remained predominantly Palestinian despite the 1948 war and the Palestinian exodus.

2. See for example Matras 1973, Weintraub and Kraus, 1982 and Ben-Zadok and Goldberg, 1984.

3. Only approximately 15 percent of the current population are Israeli born, a figure which was even lower at 6.7 percent in 1983 (CBS, 1985).

4. I do not consider Jerusalem, where Jewish and Palestinian residency has been mixed for centuries, on par with the other mixed towns in Israel. Its present demographic proportions, while reminiscent of the situation prior to the war of 1948, is nevertheless a result of the 1967 war, whereby the Eastern city, inhabited by Palestinians only, was taken from the Jordanians by the Israeli army to be annexed to the western (Israeli) city. The future of this area is yet to be determined in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.

5. Representing less than 5 percent of the total area of the town, al-Ku-ru-m remains the only part of Natseret Illit where land is privately owned. Land elsewhere in town, as in upward of 90 percent of Israel at large, is owned by the Jewish National Fund and administered by the Israel Land Administration.

6. Nazareth, for example, has very few estate agents. Palestinians I spoke with were often suspicious, not only of practitioners, but also of those who turn to them as clients. The implication was that proper transactions should take place between people who know each other well, preferably between kin

7. Moshavim are rural settlements which resemble villages, with individuals owning at least some of the means of production. Using publicly owned land, however, they are by definition part of the national settlement effort. They broadly fall in two categories—*moshavim shitufiyim* where means of production are held as common property, and *moshavei olim*, where only marketing and purchases are done collectively

8. During 1996, the Israeli (Labor-led) government proposed a partial return of the villagers of Ikrit and Bir'im to their original village sites with a range of regulative and spatial restrictions. This limited offer was received with mixed emotions by the villagers. At this time it is not clear whether the recently elected Likud government. will uphold this offer.

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Mizrahi Jews and Palestinian Arabs: Exclusionist Attitudes in Development Towns

Yoav Peled

Introduction

In this chapter I examine the attitudes of *Mizrahim*, especially those of peripheral geographic and socioeconomic status, towards the Palestinians, both citizens of Israel and non-citizens residing in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It is commonly thought that the cleavage between Mizrahim and *Ashkenazim*[1] strongly correlates with a political division: that Mizrahim disproportionately support right-wing political parties and "hawkish" positions towards the Arabs, while the Ashkenazim tend to favor the political center and to be more flexible in their approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Indeed, the rise to power of the Likud in 1977 is universally attributed to its popularity among Mizrahi voters (Peretz and Smooha, 1981; Peres and Shemer, 1984; Shamir, 1986; Shapiro, 1989). Conversely, Labor's victory in 1992 is partially accounted for by its ability to attract about 100,000 formerly Likud voters, 65,000 of whom were Mizrahim (Arian and Shamir, 1995).

The most common explanations of the Mizrahim's right wing (that is, anti-Arab) tendencies have pointed to primordial cultural factors. Other explanations have stressed the relative deprivation suffered by Mizrahim in Israel, arguing that deprivation has led to "scapegoating" of the Arabs. With one notable exception, to be discussed below, no effort has been made to examine the Mizrahim's attitudes towards the Palestinians in the context of labor market relations between the two groups.

I would like to examine precisely this issue, through the analytical lens of split labor market theory, and compare the explanatory powers of that

theory with those of the explanations that have been offered before. To do that, I propose to (1) critically review the conventional explanations, (2) present the key arguments of split labor market theory as they pertain to Mizrahi-Palestinian relations in Israel, and (3) use individual-level data gathered in 1988 in a number of development towns to test the claims of the various theories. The fact that my data was collected in 1988 means that it reflects political attitudes as they were before the upheavals brought about by the Intifada, the massive immigration from the former Soviet Union, the return of Labor to power, the Oslo Accords, and the establishment of Palestinian autonomy in the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank. Since these events, the participation of Palestinians from the (formerly) occupied territories in the Israeli labor market has drastically declined, and, according to split labor market theory, this should have affected the attitude of Mizrahim towards them. However, the discussion of the present (mid-1990s) political attitudes of Mizrahim in terms of split labor market theory must await further empirical study.

Theoretical Perspectives

Conventional analyses of the tendency of Mizrahim to support Likud and hold non-conciliatory views on the Arab-Israeli conflict have relied on a number of theoretical perspectives, all of which utilize cultural and psychological factors to explain political behavior. The *minority-majority* explanation focuses on the hardships suffered by Jews in Muslim countries and their desire to "get even" with the Arabs, now that Jews are in the majority and Arabs are in the minority. However, this explanation suffers from two weaknesses: It tends to exaggerate the severity of the Jews' suffering in the lands of Islam which, according to the general scholarly consensus, was not as severe as the Jews' experience in Europe, and it neglects the fact that the shift to the right occurred first among Israeli-born Mizrahim, that is, among people who had never lived in Muslim countries. (Israeli-born Mizrahim shifted to the right, it might be noted, together with their entire age cohort; but the change was not as marked among young people of Ashkenazi origin) (Peretz and Smooha, 1981; Shamir, 1986; Katz, 1988).

Two other explanations, based on political culture and on religiosity, emphasize traditional elements in the Mizrahim's culture as responsible for their affinity for the right. The *political culture* explanation views the Mizrahim's right-wing tendencies as stemming from their experience in traditional, non-democratic societies where authoritarian rule, strong communal identification, and non-universal norms typified the dominant political culture. This argument, just like the minority-majority argument,

is weakened by the fact that the significant move to the right occurred first among second-generation Mizrahim, whose political socialization took place in Israel rather than in an Arab country. Moreover, in an empirical test of this hypothesis, only a weak correlation was found between political culture and vote for either of the two major parties (Shamir and Arian, 1982).

The *second cultural explanation*, based on religiosity, rests on a more solid foundation, as religiosity is known to be very strongly correlated in Israel to attitudes regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and to party vote (Shamir and Arian, 1982). Moreover, since 1967, and especially since 1973, religious arguments have been widely used by opponents of compromise with the Arabs, especially when such compromise was viewed as entailing territorial concessions on Israel's part. On the other hand, it has also been argued that Mizrahi religiosity is more a matter of respect for traditional customs than the militant messianic faith which motivates those Jews who settled in the occupied territories. Indeed, it has been pointed out, that the proportion of Mizrahi Jews is very low among the cadres of movements such as the ultra-nationalist Gush Emunim (Roumani, 1988).

The three explanations described so far have focused on what may be termed the primordial qualities of Israelis of Asian-African origin, that is, on cultural traits that were rooted in their pre-immigration experience, or in that of their parents. The two other explanations draw our attention to the effects of the immigration experience itself, and of Israeli reality in general, on the political attitudes of Mizrahi Jews.

The *marking off* explanation takes as its starting point the fact that Arab culture, and Arabs in general, are held in low esteem and regarded with a great deal of hostility in Israeli society. This is due to the prolonged conflict between Jews and Arabs, and because the Arabs are perceived to be a backward people relative to the Jews. Those Jews who came from Arab countries, and whose culture was essentially Arab, were treated with contempt by the Ashkenazi majority at the time of their arrival, and were placed close to the bottom of the social ladder, that is, close to the position occupied by Palestinians. It is this very closeness, both cultural and socioeconomic, which made Mizrahim adopt harsh anti-Arab attitudes in order to mark themselves off from that despised and suspected out-group. This explanation is seemingly bolstered by the fact that hostility towards the Arabs, and "hawkish" views on the Arab-Israeli conflict, are more common among Mizrahim who score poorly on the socioeconomic scale (Peres and Shemer, 1984).

Adherents to the *relative deprivation* argument also claim that Mizrahi immigrants were relegated to an inferior position in Israeli society, and that the gap between them and Israelis of European-American origin is

not closing, but rather widening, at least in certain respects. This claim is not really in dispute among students of Israel's ethnic problems (P.S. Cohen, 1983; Shavit, 1990; Nahon, 1993a; 1993b; Smooha, 1993), but the explanations offered for it have fallen into three categories. The first type of explanation, based on a modernization perspective, argues that the Mizrahim's lack of familiarity with the social and cultural practices of a modern society affected their ability to compete with Ashkenazi immigrants for higher status occupations at the outset and for greater social mobility later on. The second explanation, based on a power perspective, asserts that the dominance of the Ashkenazim in the pre-state Jewish community in Palestine loaded the dice in favor of later Ashkenazi immigrants who could find their way more easily than Mizrahim in the corridors of power and influence. The third explanation, which may be termed political-economic, argues, in the wake of dependency theory, that putting the question in terms of the "absorption" of the Mizrahi immigrants by a fully-formed Israeli society is a serious mistake. The correct way of viewing the experience of Mizrahi immigrants, and of their second- and third-generation descendants, would be in terms of their position as cheap labor-power, for those who wield economic and political power in the society. The evolution of Israel into a modern society did not occur prior to the Mizrahim's arrival, but was achieved, rather, through their efforts and at their expense (Bernstein and Swirski, 1982; P.S. Cohen, 1983; Swirski, 1984).

Regardless of the reasons advanced to explain the Mizrahim's sense of deprivation, it is generally agreed among supporters of this line of thinking, that these feelings are responsible for their shift to the right. The link between relative deprivation and anti-Arab sentiments is explained in one of two ways. One explanation focuses on the Mizrahim's resentment of the Labor party which they blame for their inferior status in society. This resentment, it is argued, led the Mizrahim, primarily of the second generation, to vote Likud as a protest vote, and then adopt that party's intransigent positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict (P.S. Cohen, 1983). The other explanation rests on the psychological mechanism of "scapegoating." Since Mizrahim feel, and are, relatively deprived in Jewish society, and are too weak to fight this deprivation effectively, they direct their anger and frustration at the one group which is weaker then they are—the Arabs (Seliktar, 1984).

The key difference between the conventional analyses of the political attitudes of Mizrahi Jews and the one based on *split labor market theory* has to do with an assumption of rationality. Underlying the conventional analyses, of both the primordial and the relative deprivation varieties, is an assumption that Mizrahi Jews have no real, objective reasons to be more antagonistic towards Palestinians than Ashkenazi Jews, and that

their anti-Arab sentiments are an emotional, irrational reaction to other problems. Split labor market theory, on the other hand, assumes that ethnic antagonism is rooted in an objective conflict of interest between the various groups of workers. And while antagonism and hatred are not the most rational responses to conflict, they stem from a realistic, if limited, understanding of the situation.

According to split labor market theory, relatively costly workers of one ethnic background may react to the intrusion of lower-priced, ethnically distinct competitors into "their" labor market by insisting either on their segregation in inferior sections of that market ("caste"), or on their outright expulsion from the country ("exclusion"). In trying to mobilize state power in support of their goals, highly-priced workers would naturally rely on sentiments and ideologies of ethnic superiority, xenophobia, and racism in order to overcome the opposition not only of the lower-priced workers, but, more importantly, of employers who benefit from the exploitation of cheaper labor (Bonacich, 1972; 1979; Peled, 1989).

While the conditions under which either "caste" or "exclusion" will be adopted as the high-priced workers' strategy are not specified in split labor market theory, it would stand to reason that the severity of the measures called for would depend on the expensive workers' own sense of economic and employment security: The less secure they feel in their own positions, the more radical would be their demands vis-à-vis the cheaper workers (Burawoy, 1981; Peled and Shafir, 1986; Lewin-Epstein, 1989).

Empirical studies in a number of western countries have shown that the labor market is only one of several arenas where resource competition between ethnic groups might take place. Other possible venues for interethnic competition could be the housing market, the "market" for social services, and so forth (Husbands, 1979; 1983). In the Israeli context, however, residential segregation between Jews and Arabs is almost total, and the preferential treatment accorded to Jews in the distribution of social benefits is obvious to everybody (Lustick, 1980; Makhoul, 1982; Smooha, 1989/92; Kretzmer, 1990). Thus, real competition between individual Jews and Palestinians occurs only in the labor market, and it is there that a resource competition approach would lead one to look for the source of Jewish antagonism towards Palestinians.

Ethnic Relations in the Israeli Labor Market

Until the early 1990s the Israeli labor market was composed of four hierarchically ordered ethnic groups: Ashkenazi Jews, Mizrahi Jews, Palestinians who have lived in Israel since 1948 and are Israeli citizens

(also referred to as "Israeli Arabs"), and non-citizen Palestinians who were commuting daily from the occupied territories. Following the Oslo Accords, the latter group was largely barred from entering Israel and replaced by "guest workers" from other parts of the world. The two Palestinian groups formed a separate caste at the bottom of the labor market (Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein, 1987; Khalidi, 1988). It may be added that women constitute a secondary, relatively deprived sub-group within each of these ethnic categories (Azmon and Izraeli, 1993.)

The introduction of non-citizen Palestinians into the Israeli labor market in 1967 has affected the economic fortunes of Mizrahi Jews in three different ways. On the one hand, all three ethnic groups which had been previously involved in that labor market (Ashkenazi Jews, Mizrahi Jews and citizen Palestinians) experienced upward mobility, although in different degrees. As a result, the occupational gap between Ashkenazi and Mizrahi Jews was maintained, although at higher occupational levels, while the gap between Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel has widened. This development was predicated, however, on a full employment situation. In periods of economic contraction, Mizrahi Jews, many of whom occupy the bottom sections of the occupational scale, find themselves increasingly in competition with cheaper Palestinian workers. This has led to the third effect of the employment of non-citizen Palestinian labor on Mizrahi workers: A lowering of the pay scale in industries where the former are represented in significant numbers (such as construction, textiles, agriculture, and food services) (Makhoul, 1982; Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein, 1987; Khalidi, 1988; Portugali, 1989; Semyonov and Cohen, 1990).

The effects of this complex situation on the attitudes of Mizrahi workers towards the Arabs are not easily discernible, and have only lately begun to be studied in a systematic manner. Lewin-Epstein (1989), in a secondary analysis of data gathered in a nation-wide survey in 1985, has analyzed the attitudes towards Arabs of 400 employed Jewish men and related them to both their ethnic origins and their labor market positions. Lewin-Epstein's conclusion was that hostility towards Arabs, and the desire to exclude them from the labor market was indeed closely related to respondents' labor market positions, especially as measured by the industrial sector where they were employed. This finding was an indication that interethnic antagonism was indeed influenced, in this case, by the extent to which respondents were in competition with Palestinian workers. At the same time, however, this factor could not, by itself, explain the entire difference between the attitudes of Mizrahim and Ashkenazim towards the Arabs, so that ethnic origin (seen by Lewin-Epstein as a power resource, rather than a cluster of cultural attributes) did seem to retain some measure of independent influence on these attitudes.

"Transfer" as a Political Strategy

The historical conflict between Jews and Palestinians in Palestine/Israel has evolved around two major resources: land and labor. Different, sometimes conflicting, strategies were devised by the Zionist movement at different times in order to gain control of these two resources (Shafir, 1989). After 1967 the potential for conflict between land-oriented and labor-oriented strategies and groups was magnified by demographic realities: Palestinians constituted about 40 percent of the population in Israeli controlled territory between 1967 and 1993. Retaining the West Bank and Gaza Strip with their 1.7 million Palestinian inhabitants would have had grave labor market and demographic implications; relinquishing them to Arab control would contradict the historical territorial goals of Zionism. One possible solution to this dilemma—the exclusion or "transfer" of the Palestinians—gained rather high popularity among Israeli Jews around the mid-1980s (Sprinzak, 1991; Arian, 1995). In 1993, however, following the Intifada, the Israeli government adopted the counter—Zionist solution—relinquishing control over at least most of these territories to the Palestinians.[2]

The idea of expelling, or "transferring" Palestinians out of Jewish-controlled areas of Palestine has had a long and varied career, dating back at least to the deliberations of the Royal Commission for Palestine (the Peel Commission) in 1936–37. During the war of 1947–48, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were displaced from their homes in the areas on which the State of Israel was to be established (Morris, 1987). In the 1980s, the idea of "transfer" was rekindled with the election to the Knesset in 1984 of Rabbi Meir Kahane, who had made the expulsion of the Palestinians the key element of his platform.[3]

Kahane was elected to the Knesset with almost 26,000 votes, or 1.2 percent of the national total. The bulk of his support came from economically depressed areas, heavily populated with Mizrahim. Geographically, these areas fell into three peripheral categories: poor neighborhoods of major cities, development towns—small urban settlements located mostly in outlying areas of the country, and small farming villages (moshavim). Kahane's best showing inside of Israel's pre-1967 borders was in development towns, where he received 3.3 percent of the votes cast, or close to 25 percent of his own electoral support. He received 6 percent of the votes cast in Jewish settlements on the West Bank, but this provided him with only 500 votes (Shafir and Peled, 1986).

Following Kahane's election, the Knesset amended Israel's election law so that a political party advocating racism or opposed to Israel being either a democracy or a Jewish state could be excluded from national elections. On the basis of this amendment, Israel's Supreme Court dis-

qualified Rabbi Kahane's party, Kach, from participating in the national elections of 1988. That decision, however, was handed down only on 18 October 1988, less than two weeks before the elections. So for most of the election campaign period of 1988 Kahane was an active candidate and was expected, in fact, to at least triple his electoral strength. Moreover, three additional parties of the extreme right—Tehiya, Tsomet, and Moledet—also advocated "transfer" and were not barred form contesting the elections (Sprinzak 1991). These three parties together had seven members in the 12th Knesset. In the 13th Knesset, elected in 1992, Tsomet and Moledet had eight and three members, respectively.

The key difference between the three "transfer" parties that were allowed to participate in the elections and Kahane's, was that the former advocated "transferring" only the Palestinian residents of the occupied territories, who are not Israeli citizens, while Kahane adamantly demanded that all Palestinians, regardless of citizenship, be expelled (Kach n.d., [1988]; Tsomet n.d., [1988]; Moledet, n.d. [1988]; *Ha'aretz*, 1988a; 1988b; Sprinzak, 1991; Peled, 1992). Thus, during the spring and summer of 1988, not one, but two versions of "exclusion" were offered to the Israeli public: A land-oriented version, in which exclusion was to apply only to the territories not yet formally incorporated into Israel, and Kahane's labor-oriented version which would exclude all Palestinians. This presented a unique opportunity to examine the correlations between voters' labor market positions and their exclusionary sentiments, thus testing one of the key claims of split labor market theory.[4]

Development Towns

To test the hypotheses derived from split labor market theory, I turned to development towns, a sector of Israeli society where support for Kahane in the 1984 elections was the strongest; where Mizrahim are highly overrepresented in the population (about 80 percent of development town residents); and where socioeconomic conditions are among the poorest of all Jewish sectors of the society.

Development towns (henceforward DTs) are small urban settlements, located mostly in outlying areas of the country, which were established in the 1950s and 1960s and populated largely with Mizrahi immigrants (Berler, 1970; Goldberg, 1984; Swirski and Shoushan, 1986; Efrat, 1987; Ben-Zadok, 1993). Both geographically and socioeconomically, they constitute a peripheral segment of Israeli society. In 1987 the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), a government agency, computed a Socioeconomic Status (SES) score for every urban locality in the country, based on information gathered in the 1983 national census. On a scale running

from –2 to +2 (with only a few Arab communities scoring below –2), the average score for all DTs was –0.40. This score placed DTs between the 5th and 6th SES clusters, out of 20, or below 70 percent of the entire population (CBS, 1987a). Obviously, their relative placing would have been much lower had the calculation been made for the Jewish population only (see, Khalidi, 1988).

The economic marginality of DTs is reflected in a labor market typified by relatively high concentration of laggard, low-paying industries. In 1983 the percentage of the labor force employed in laggard, or "traditional" industries in DTs was 53 percent, compared to 43 percent in the country as a whole (including both Jewish and Palestinian workers) (Borukhov, 1988).[5] In that same year, over 27 percent of the labor force in DTs was employed, in the lowest paying of all industries—textiles—compared to only 15 percent of the entire Jewish labor force. As a result, in 1992, the average wage in DTs was about 75 percent of the national average (*Yediot Aharonot*, 1993).

Widespread unemployment has been an endemic problem in DTs since the early 1970s, with rates sometimes as high as twice the national average. In 1986, the unemployment rate in DTs was 11 percent, compared to a national average of about 6.5 percent. In August, 1988, the ratio was 1:2.3, or 16 percent in DTs to 7 percent nationally. In December, 1989, with the national unemployment rate at about 10 percent, unemployment in several DTs reached the 20 percent mark. Moreover, many more people in DTs than in the rest of the country leave the labor force permanently, so that they are no longer counted among the unemployed (Lavy, 1988).

The secondary nature of the labor market in DTs was manifested in the survey in a heightened sense of economic insecurity and malaise, and especially of employment insecurity. As seen in Table 5.1, close to 60 percent of DT respondents were concerned that their economic situation would worsen in the course of the coming year, compared to only 44 percent who expressed this concern in the national sample; 28 percent were not sure they would have a job in three months, compared to 19 percent in the national sample (the unemployment rate indeed rose by 40 percent in DTs within three months of the time the survey was taken); and a staggering 86 percent felt that the economic burden was not distributed equitably by the government between the different social strata.

Labor market competition between Jewish and Palestinian workers is relatively intense in DTs. The average Palestinian participation in the DT labor force stood at about 20 percent in 1985, compared to a national average of about 15 percent (including the roughly 50 percent of the citizen Palestinian workforce employed in the Palestinian sector itself). The intensity of ethnic competition in the labor market is indicated also by the

TABLE 5.1 Selected characteristics of respondents in development towns and national samples, April 1988 (in percentages)

Respondents Characteristics	*Development Towns Sample* (n=832)	*National Sample* (n=1152)
Mizrahi	79.5	43.5
Unemployed	7.0	2.9
Own economic situation will worsen in 1 year	59.1	44.3
Fear unemployment in three months	28.3	19.0
Economic burden unfairly divided	86.0	na
Arab workers cause unemployment	50.4	na
Citizen Palestinians take jobs away from Jews	64.0	na
Non-citizen Palestinians take jobs away from Jews	70.0	na
Citizen Palestinians lower Jewish wages	75.0	na
Non-citizen Palestinians lower Jewish wages	80.0	na
Oppose employment of citizen Palestinians	43.0	na
Oppose employment of non-citizen Palestinians	65.0	na
Support "transfer"	65.7	41.3

Source: Survey by author (see below).

occupational distribution in DTs, with two-thirds of all respondents in our sample employed in the four industrial sectors with the highest participation of Palestinian workers (manufacturing, commerce and transportation, construction, and agriculture), compared to less than half of the Jewish labor force nationally in 1983 (CBS, 1987b). Not surprisingly, these industries lead the rest of the DT labor force in their unemployment rates (Lavy, 1988).

A strong feeling of being threatened by Palestinian workers, both citizens and non-citizens, was evident among DT respondents. Fifty percent of them believed Palestinian workers to be responsible for (Jewish) unemployment. Seventy percent of the respondents believed that non-citizen and citizen Palestinian workers took jobs away from Jews, as opposed to 64 percent who favored that answer in the national sample. Sixty-five 65 percent and 43 percent, respectively, believed these two groups of work-

ers should not be employed in "Jewish" workplaces. Sixty-six percent of DT respondents were in favor of "transfer," compared to 41 percent who favored that policy in the national sample.Before the massive immigration of Soviet Jews in the early 1990s, between 15 and 20 percent of Israel's population lived in DTs (DTs are defined differently for different official purposes). This made DTs the home of between one quarter and one third of the country's Mizrahi Jews (Ben-Zadok, 1993). Moreover, the social and economic conditions characteristic of DTs were similar, by and large, to those prevailing in other Mizrahi concentrations—the poor neighborhoods of large and medium-sized cities and immigrant moshavim. This similarity was reflected in the results of the 1984 elections: Kahane received around 3 percent of the votes in these three sectors, compared to 1.2 percent nationally (Shafir and Peled, 1986). Thus, focusing the study on DTs, which was convenient because of their small size and relative social homogeneity, is justified by their being representative of the socioeconomic conditions of a large portion of the Mizrahi population as a whole.

The Research Design

My purpose in this study was to try and disentangle two independent variables—ethnicity and socioeconomic status—in order to ascertain the merits of the respective claims of split labor market theory and the culture-based theories regarding the anti-Palestinian attitudes of Mizrahim. I have attempted to do this by constructing an "exclusionism scale" and testing the correlations between respondents' level of exclusionism, their ethnic background, and their socioeconomic and labor market positions. If the cultural explanations are valid, exclusionism should be independently related to ethnicity; if the claims of split labor market theory are valid, socioeconomic status and labor market position should affect the level of exclusionism independently of ethnic background. The results, to be presented below, tend to support split labor market theory, although not in an unproblematic manner, and to refute the cultural arguments, with the exception of the one based on religiosity.

The survey was conducted in April, 1988 in eight middle-sized development towns (population 8,000–25,000) located in the three main geographical regions of the country, north, center, and south, all within Israel's pre-1967 borders.[6] In each town a representative sample of about 100 adults (18 and over) was selected, for a total of 832. The respondents were approached in their homes and asked to fill out a questionnaire consisting mostly of close-ended questions. For comparative purposes, a smaller questionnaire was administered at the same time to 1,152 Jewish adults in a representative national sample.

Variable Construction

Exclusionism. The exclusionism scale was constructed with the aim of discriminating between respondents holding three different positions on the question of "transfer": those who do not favor "transfer" in any form, and can be assumed, therefore, to support the "caste" arrangements currently prevailing in the Israeli labor market; those who support "transfer," but have no sympathy for Kahane, and can be assumed to support the "transfer" of non-citizen Palestinians only; and those who are sympathetic to Kahane and can be assumed to support his call for the exclusion of all Palestinians. As seen in Table 5.2, this division resulted in three roughly equal groups, ranked not only in terms of the strength of their exclusionary sentiments, but in terms of their socioeconomic status and employment insecurity as well.[7]

Socioeconomic Status (SES). Respondents' SES was measured on an indexed scale constructed from their standardized scores on the following items: educational level, household income, housing density, apartment ownership, having use of a car, and ownership of a VCR. For cross-tabulation with the exclusionism scale, the SES scale was condensed into an eleven-rung ladder.

Employment Insecurity. To measure employment insecurity, an eight-rung scale was constructed, incorporating current and past unemployment, as well as fear of unemployment in the future.[8]

Findings

Analysis of the survey data tended to confirm the hypothesis derived from split labor market theory, namely that labor market competition, employment insecurity, and low socioeconomic status has a direct and independent influence on exclusionary sentiments. At the same time, ethnicity, in the sense of continent of origin, was shown not to have any independent influence on the dependent variable, while religiosity proved to be the only cultural variable having such influence.

TABLE 5.2 Exclusionism, SES, and employment insecurity scores

	SES			*Employment Insecurity*		
Insecurity Exclusionism	*N*	*Mean*	*SD*	*N*	*Mean*	*SD*
"Caste"[a]	227	1.21	2.98	266	0.73	1.83
Non-citizens only[b]	265	–0.16	3.17	306	1.18	2.14
All Arabs[c]	226	–1.01	3.17	260	1.43	2.34

[a] No support for 'transfer' at all.
[b] Support 'transfer' but not Kahane.
[c] Support for Kahane.
*Significant at. 001

Simple crosstabulation between the exclusionism scale and those of SES and employment insecurity demonstrated a strong and significant correlation between the dependent variable and each of the independent ones (Table 5.2). Thus SES was shown to be inversely related to the strength of exclusionary feelings, while employment insecurity was positively related to it.

To test the effect of labor market competition with Palestinian workers, all respondents reporting branch of employment were grouped in two categories: Those working in the four industrial sectors with high Palestinian participation, as opposed to those working in the four sectors with low Palestinian participation.[9] Crosstabulation of the exclusionism and SES scales for each of these two groups separately (not shown) revealed that SES was much more strongly correlated with exclusionism in industries with low Palestinian participation than in those with high Palestinian participation. Thus, in the former group of industries, only 13 percent of the people in the top five SES categories were found in the highest category of the exclusionism scale, while in the latter group, the equivalent figure was 50 percent. Evidently, close proximity to Palestinian workers in the workplace has the effect of mitigating the calming effects of a relatively comfortable socioeconomic status.

Multivariate Analysis

Multivariate regression analyses were performed separately for three dependent variables: Personal sympathy for Kahane (the "weakest" variable qualifying a respondent for inclusion in the most exclusionary category of the exclusionism scale), "social distance" from "Israeli Arabs," and "hawkishness" (the latter two regressions are not shown here). The independent variables tested were ethnic origin, age, religiosity, SES, employment insecurity, and intensity of interaction with "Israeli Arabs." The results of all three tests were essentially the same: only SES, religiosity, and age were found to be significantly related to the dependent variables; low SES, high religiosity, and young age were the best predictors of personal sympathy for Kahane, social distance from "Israeli Arabs," and unwillingness to concede territories for peace (Table 5.3).

Ethnic origin, the most widely discussed variable in analyses of Israeli politics, proved to have no influence at all on the dependent variables, when age and SES were controlled for. When both these variables were removed from the equation, ethnic origin did show significant, though weak influence on personal sympathy for Kahane (beta=.11, sig.F=.011). The removal of the third variable with significant independent influence on personal sympathy for Kahane, religiosity (after SES and age had already been removed), had no appreciable effect on the influence of ethnic

origin. What this would seem to indicate is not only that ethnic origin is not in itself an independently influential factor, but, moreover, that as a "vessel" for other variables it does not represent cultural characteristics, but rather for the young age and low SES of Mizrahi respondents.

Employment insecurity showed no significant influence on personal sympathy for Kahane when SES was present in the equation as an independent variable, but did attain significant, though rather weak influence when SES was removed (beta=.09, sig.F=.037). The influence of employment insecurity on the intensity of exclusionary sentiments is overshadowed, then, by the strong correlation between that variable and SES.

Two different variables were designed to measure the degree of competition with Palestinian workers: Extent of interaction with "Arabs" at the workplace, as reported by the respondents themselves, and employment in industrial sectors, ranked according to the percentage of Palestinian workers employed in them. Both variables failed to show significant influence on the dependent variables when included in the regression analyses. However, when the regression was performed separately for respondents employed in industries with high Palestinian participation and for those employed in industries with low Palestinian participation, the results of the crosstabulation between the exclusionism

TABLE 5.3 Results of regression analysis dependent variable: Personal sympathy for Kahane

	Total Sample[a]		*High PP*[b]		*Low PP*[c]	
Independent variables	*B*	*Beta*	*B*	*Beta*	*B*	*Beta*
Ethnic origin	–.38*	–.06*	–.47*	–.07*	–.27*	–.04*
Interaction with Israeli Arabs	–.09*	–.03	–.47*	–.01*	–.20*	–.07*
SES	–.14	–.20	–.93	–.12	–.23	–.33
Age	–.03	–.17	–.03	–.20	–.01*	–.08*
Religiosity	.33	.13	.32	.13	.33	.13
Employment Insecurity	.04*	.03*	.02*	.02*	.10*	.06*
R^2	.11		.09		.19	
N	718		475		243	

[a] Those indicating branch of employment or previous employment only.

[b] Industrial sectors with high Palestinian participation.

[c] Industrial sectors with low Palestinian participation.

* Not significant at the .05 level.

and SES scales for these two groups were reaffirmed. The influence of SES was much stronger on personal sympathy for Kahane in sectors with low Palestinian participation than it was in sectors with high Palestinian participation (Table 5.3). Again, close proximity to Palestinian workers in the labor market seems to reduce the variance in exclusionism due to different SES. Evidently, this is because more intense competition with Palestinians partially compensates for the SES differential.

Discussion

If the conventional explanations of the Mizrahim's political attitudes were correct, a Mizrahi and an Ashkenazi who are similar in every respect should still have different attitudes towards Arabs. While individual cases of this kind can undoubtedly be found, our data have indicated that they do not constitute a statistically significant phenomenon among development town residents. This finding is consonant with the results of the ecological analysis of the 1984 elections done by Shafir and Peled (1986), as well as those of the political tolerance study done by Shamir and Sullivan (1983; 1985). It is also largely compatible with the conclusion reached by Lewin-Epstein (1989), although in his case ethnic origin was found to have certain independent influence on hostility towards Arabs.

On the other hand, the prediction of split labor market theory, namely, that economic and labor market related factors would significantly influence ethnic animosity, was proven by this study. True, a general measure of socioeconomic status was shown to have greater and clearer influence on exclusionary sentiments than employment insecurity or the extent of labor market interaction with Palestinians. However, a person's SES is itself an outcome of a particular labor market position. Moreover, both the objective complexity of the Israeli labor market as well as certain methodological problems, may have contributed to the fact that the SES turned out to be a better indicator of a person's labor market position than other measurements.

Different groups of Mizrahi workers were affected differently by the introduction of non-citizen Palestinians into the Israeli labor market: Some were "pushed upwards" while others were displaced or marginalized. Among those who experienced upward mobility, exclusionary sentiments would naturally not be related to their interaction with Palestinian workers, but would be related to their SES. A precise breakdown of our respondents into these two groups could not be made within the scope of this study.

Other methodological problems resulted from the fact that the total residential segregation between Palestinians and Jews in Israel makes it

impossible to identify the locality of employment of a Palestinian worker through his or her place of residence (Makhoul, 1982). Furthermore, statistical data are collected and published separately for citizen and noncitizen Palestinians, and combining the two sometimes proves difficult or even impossible. Lastly, since many development town residents do not work in their home town, using aggregate data to identify local labor markets and the extent of ethnic competition within each one was an impossible task. The other method, that of asking respondents themselves to describe their workplace interaction with Arabs, proved to be highly unreliable. We were thus left with the less than completely satisfactory method of measuring labor market competition by sector of employment (see, Lewin-Epstein, 1989).

Yet, even with these problems, our data provide convincing evidence in support of split labor market theory. Moreover, in small, closely knit communities such as development towns, contextual factors may play an important role in diffusing exclusionary attitudes beyond the individual members who find themselves in direct competition with minority workers (see, Weatherford, 1983; Books and Prysby, 1988, on contextual effects; Rosenhaft, 1987, on the effects of unemployment on political mobilization in neighborhoods in the Weimar Republic). This, of course, will tend to obscure the relationship between labor market position and political attitudes.

Two other variables, in addition to SES and employment insecurity, were shown to have significant influence on respondents' attitude towards Kahane: Religiosity and young age. As shown by the multivariate analysis, the effect of religiosity was independent of both ethnic origin and socioeconomic status. It may have been a result of the highly religious content of Kahane's platform. Thus Kahane, like the other religious parties, advocated replacing Israel's democratic (unwritten) constitution with a Jewish theocracy (the so-called "halacha state"). In fact, more of Kahane's "voters" (that is, respondents who said they would vote for his party in the next general elections) were committed to that position than supporters of the other religious parties (32 percent to 23.5 percent, respectively). Possibly, Kahane's openly anti-democratic views made his advocacy of a "halacha state" more credible to some voters than the conventional politics of the other religious parties. In a more general sense, since Judaism as a religion emphasizes Jewish ethnic exclusivity, it stands to reason that religiosity would be positively correlated with ethnocentric political attitudes.

As far as age is concerned, its influence may be attributed to the general tendency of younger people in Israel (and not only in Israel) to adopt extremist political positions (Katz, 1988; Falter and Schumann, 1988; Arian and Shamir, 1995).

Conclusion

The most important political implication of split labor market theory is that ethnic antagonism is not an inevitable outcome of ethnic differences. If ethnic animosity is not rooted in primordial, cultural, extra-rational factors, but rather in specific social relations, once these relations are changed, the hostility may disappear. (This, in turn, may lead to assimilation and the disappearance of the ethnic differences themselves, but this highly contentious claim does not form an essential part of the theory.) Edna Bonacich, formulator of split labor market theory, has suggested that a joint struggle of all workers for equalization of pay was the only rational, that is, non-zero-sum solution to the problem of undercutting of expensive workers by less expensive ones. She was, however, quite pessimistic about the prospects for the adoption of this strategy, let alone its successful implementation, by highly-priced workers (Bonacich, 1972; 1979).

In Israel, paradoxically, the institutional conditions for joint Jewish-Palestinian struggle for equalization of pay had been excellent. Israeli workers, and Jewish workers in Palestine before them, were organized in a comprehensive and very powerful trade union federation (the *Histadrut*) that encompassed practically all employees who are citizens of Israel. Until 1977, leadership of this organization was in the hands of the same political party that controlled the state—the Labor party. Moreover, the Histadrut directly owned about one quarter of the country's productive capacity and was the largest industrial employer. If it chose to do so, the Histadrut could certainly muster the necessary resources and organizational capabilities for jointly organizing Jewish and Palestinian workers, particularly in the post-1948 period.

The reality, of course, has been quite different. As Shalev has pointed out:

> Throughout its history the Histadrut has eschewed binational class solidarity between Jewish and Palestinian workers... [It] responded to the phenomenon of a cost-split labor market first by a strategy of exclusion, and later by active complicity in a regime of segmentation. In the presovereignty period the Histadrut struggled to reserve jobs for Jewish workers... Today... [it] sanctions an often rigid boundary between work fit for Arabs and work fit for Jews (Shalev, 1989: 120).

The reasons for this behavior are not hard to find:

> Despite the Histadrut's points of divergence from conventional "economistic" trade unionism—its profound commitment to [Jewish] national and political priorities and its enormous role as an investor and an em-

> ployer—... [it] behaved throughout its history with great sensitivity to the narrowly instrumental interests of Jewish workers and to the economic choices poised by a cost-split labor market (Shalev, 1989: 121).

The policies of the Histadrut have contributed, moreover, not only to a Jewish-Arab split, but also to an Ashkenazi-Mizrahi one. Since the earliest phases of Zionist settlement in Palestine, Ashkenazi workers have thought of themselves as "civilized" and of Mizrahim as "natural" (that is, low priced) workers. When the massive immigration of Mizrahim occurred in the 1950s and 1960s, the Histadrut contributed its share to their placement at the bottom of the occupational and socioeconomic scale (Swirski, 1981; Shafir, 1989; Shalev, 1989). When Palestinians began to enter the Israeli labor market in large numbers, it was Mizrahi workers who were on the front line of competition with them. Most Ashkenazi workers, as well as the Histadrut as an employer, have benefited from this encounter.

The Mizrahim's resentment at their social and economic deprivation was directed not only towards Arabs, but also towards Ashkenazim, the Histadrut, and the Labor party. Their hostility brought down the Labor government in 1977, a political upheaval with serious implications for the Arab-Israeli conflict as well. The combination of socioeconomic deprivation, ethnic animosity, and a protracted national conflict may still lead to serious challenges to the democratic arrangements currently prevailing in Israel (see, Smooha 1993). Kach, the only openly anti-democratic party ever to appear on the Israeli political scene, was disqualified from competing in future Knesset elections and was subsequently declared an illegal organization. Furthermore, the assassination of its charismatic leader, Meir Kahane, resulted in the disintegration of the party. Still, the forces responsible for Kach's popularity are very much at work in society. These forces may express themselves through the mainstream right-wing party, Likud, through the extreme right-wing parties that have advocated the "transfer" of non-citizen Palestinians "only," or, most likely, through religious parties that seek to establish a Jewish theocracy.

In the 1988 elections, following Kach's disqualification, ultra-orthodox *(haredi)* parties more than tripled their support in development towns, from 5 percent in 1984 to 18 percent (compared to a doubling of their strength nationally), while Likud fell from 46 percent to 41, and the extreme right-wing parties failed to register significant gains (Don-Yehiya, 1990; Ben-Zadok, 1993; the numbers may vary slightly due to the different definitions of development towns used by different authors).[10]

By 1992, the demographic composition of development towns had undergone drastic change: Their population was increased by 25 to 50 percent due to the influx of immigrants from the former Soviet Union (CBS,

1994; Carmon and Yiftachel, 1993). Support for religious parties was virtually non-existent among these new voters (Fein, 1995), and indeed the religious parties' share of the vote declined in development towns by close to 30 percent (from 21 percent in 1988 to 15 in 1992) (CBS, 1993). This would seem to indicate, however, that the level of support for religious parties among veteran voters in development towns remained more or less the same in 1992 as it was in 1988.

What accounts for the popularity of religious, and especially haredi parties among Mizrahim in development towns? From the perspective of split labor market theory it could be argued that these parties provide, symbolically, what Kahane promised to deliver practically—the exclusion of Palestinian workers.

Segregated from the Ashkenazi mainstream of Israeli society residentially, economically, culturally, and educationally, Mizrahim have, by and large, "failed... to become satisfactorily 'absorbed'" or embrace the "universalistic component of the Zionist ideology" (E. Cohen, 1983: 117, 120). To emphasize their connection to the dominant Ashkenazi majority, they have clung, rather, to the Jewish component of Zionism, reviving, in many cases, some of their own religious traditions which had already been eroded. Their claim, as against the modernizing Israeli establishment, was that

> ...mere Jewishness, rather than the internalization of any particular Zionist or 'Israeli' values, attitudes and patterns of behavior, [should be] sufficient for participation ["in the center of Israeli society"].... Thus Jewish religion, in all its particular manifestations, [has gained] in importance as a unifying bond (E. Cohen, 1983: 121).

As long as Mizrahim were dependent on Labor-controlled structures, such as the state and the Histadrut, for employment and social services, the bulk of their vote was secure for that party. In the late 1960s, as those structures began to decline, and as many Mizrahim became increasingly independent, the majority, especially of the second generation, shifted their support to the main opposition party, Likud. Likud still commands the allegiance of the majority of Mizrahi voters, but it has begun to lose support in the most deprived periphery of the Mizrahi community, particularly in development towns (where in 1992 its share of the vote further declined, from 40.6 to 35 percent).

Mizrahim who still support Likud are likely to be among those who had benefited materially from the economic integration between Israel and the occupied territories, and who would like to see this integration maintained (or, after the Oslo Accords, restored). Those who feel threatened by this integration, primarily because of labor market competition from cheaper Palestinian workers, are looking for a reassertion of their

Jewishness, their only claim to privilege in Israeli society. Understandably, they do not turn to the Gush Emunim-type parties, who are to the right of Likud territorially, but rather to the parties who are to the right of Likud ethnically—first Kach and now the haredi parties. Here they find a highly developed ideological construct in the form of Jewish religio-ethno-nationalism, which not only excludes non-Jews but stands in fundamental opposition to the modernist Zionist credo of the Labor movement they hold responsible for their oppression (see Don-Yehiya, 1990; Levy, 1995; for an alternative analysis, see, Horkin, 1993).

Notes

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1. Mizrahi (also known as Oriental or Sephardic) Jews are those whose origins are in the Muslim countries of the Middle East. Those who are from Europe or America are called Ashkenazi (pl. Ashkenazim). In the survey data presented below respondents' continent of origin was determined by their father's birthplace, with second-generation Israeli born (both respondent and father born in Israel) included in the Ashkenazi group. For the origins of the names of the two groups, and an historical overview of their relations, see Swirksi, 1984.

2. For an analysis of this important transformation see Peled and Shafir, 1996.

3. For Kahane's ideology see Shafir and Peled 1986; Kahane, 1987; Sprinzak, 1991. "Transfer is the functional equivalent of "repatriation' in the European context " (see, Miles and Phizacklea, 1984). It entails, that is, physical removal from the country, not just exclusion from the labor market.

4. I owe the insight about the difference between land-oriented and labor-oriented 'transfer' to Gershon Shafir. This difference may explain why Kahane's party has done particularly well in socio-economically disadvantaged areas of Israel, while support for the other extreme right-wing parties has come mostly from more affluent voters (see, Shafir and Peled 1986).

5. For a somewhat differently organized study, updated to 1992, that provides a similar picture, see Heimberg (Shitrit) and Dor, 1994.

6. In the same attitude survey, Mizrahim constituted 52% of the respondents who said they would vote for the two non-Kahanist parties of the extreme right-wing parties at the time, Tehiya and Tsomet.

7. Respondents were considered sympathetic to Kahane if they indicated an intention of voting for his party as their first or second choice or expressed per-

sonal sympathy with Kahane himself. Using support for Kahane as the criterion for distinguishing between the two levels of exclusionism was necessitated by the fact that this distinction was not made directly in the questionnaire. However, Kahane supporters stood out among all respondents in their lack of differentiation between citizen and non-citizen Palestinians on all questions in which this distinction was made, while supporters of the other extreme right-wing parties, which advocate the "transfer" of non-citizens only, stood out as the most discriminating between the two groups of Palestinians. Support for the latter parties was not taken as a measure of adhering to the "softer" version of "transfer" because these parties together were supported by only 8% of the sample population, while "transfer" was supported by 66%.

8. The employment insecurity scale was made up of the following exclusive categories:

1. Currently employed, showing no employment insecurity (68.3% of DT respondents);
2. Currently employed, concerned about not being employed in three months (8.4%);
3. Currently employed, very concerned about not being employed in three months (7.5%);
4. Currently employed, had been unemployed up to one month in the past (2.0%);
5. Currently employed, had been unemployed up to six months in the past (3.2%);
6. Currently employed, had been unemployed up to a year in the past (2.4%);
7. Currently employed, had been unemployed for more than a year in the past (3.1%);
8. Currently unemployed for less than a year (1.4%);
9. Currently unemployed for more than a year (3.6%).

9. Industrial sectors with high Arab participation were, in declining order: Construction, agriculture, manufacturing, and commerce and transportation; those with low Arab participation were public services, personal services, business and finance, and public utilities. This classification differs slightly from the one used in the Israel Statistical Yearbook (1987) from which the data were taken.

10. Of the 53 Kahane "voters" identified in our DT survey, 25 were interviewed by telephone after the elections. Thirteen reported they had voted Likud, 7 voted for religious parties, one each for Tsomet and Labor, two did not vote and one refused to answer.

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PART TWO

Frontiers, Peripheries, and Jewish Ethnicities



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6

From Frontier to Periphery in Israel: Cultural Representations in Narratives and Counter-Narratives[1]

Shlomo Hasson

Introduction

This chapter aims to provide an overview of the landscape symbols central to contested definitions of Israeli society, polity, and economy since the first modern consideration of Jewish statehood. It focuses on representations and images formed around the country's frontiers and peripheries, because these border landscapes served as principal sources in the creation of Israel's national iconography. The literature on frontier and periphery has often tended to overlook the symbolic meaning of these landscapes, and to focus on their political, economic, and social functions. The frontier has thus been conceived as a zone (either at the state's limits or within the state) formed through settlement expansion, exploitation of natural resources, and exchange with and subjugation of native groups (Prescott, 1987). The periphery has been viewed as a marginal area in social, economic, and political terms, produced by processes of uneven development and unequal exchange (Harvey, 1973). Neither of these conceptions conveys the cultural essence of these areas insofar as they do not address the issue of their symbolic meaning, whether as national icons, or as sources for moral values, emotional identification, and self-identity (Cohen, 1976; Kimmerling, 1983).

This chapter will focus on the symbolic representations of Israel's frontier and periphery as they appear in narratives and counter-narratives (the stories that national and social groups tell themselves about themselves). In focusing on images, representations and narratives, I have no intention of following Tuan, who argues—in obviously neo-Kantian terms—that any landscape is known not in and for itself, but rather

through the way in which it is perceived (Tuan, 1977). Rather, I shall be considering another question, namely, how landscapes are imagined and conceptualized by different groups and what purposes these images and concepts serve.

Landscape Representations in Narratives

Recent studies in cultural geography have shed some light on these questions from an intriguing angle. It has been argued that landscape representations and narratives structured by elite, dominant groups play an ideological and political role by providing legitimation and by consolidating control over another group or area (Duncan and Ley, 1993). The aim of such narratives is not to provide an accurate description of an historical or geographical reality, but to evoke feelings and emotions and to justify and legitimize cultural-political systems by weaving together historical facts and fiction. Narratives structured around the landscape may thus be used to nurture values and arguments concerning the "true" nature of a particular society and its desired mode of organization (Polkinghorne, 1992). In this way, certain values are transformed into something "natural," naive, and inseparable from the landscape (Barthes, 1986; Duncan and Duncan, 1988).

In this context, F. J. Turner's thesis ([1884] 1966) concerning the Western frontier's influence on American democracy and nationalism may be viewed not necessarily as an objective depiction of historical reality, but rather as an attempt to transform the settlement in the West into a national symbol and myth—the source of the American spirit, values, and codes of behavior. The forceful challenge mounted against Turner's thesis by several historians might be viewed as a manifestation of a deep political-cultural struggle between regional elites and social groups concerning authority and hegemony. Billington, for instance, argues that Turner exaggerated the role of the frontier as a breeding-ground for democratic theory and practice. Contrary to Turner, he ascribes American democracy and sense of nationalism to traditions associated with the cities of the East and the American revolution (Billington, 1966; 1973). Limerick argues that Turner's conceptualization of the frontier excluded more than it contained. Turner, she writes,

> ...was ethnocentric and nationalistic. English-speaking white men were the stars of his story; Indians, Hispanics, French-Canadians, and Asians were at best supporting actors and, at worst, invisible. Nearly as invisible were women, of all ethnicities (Limerick, 1987: 21).

Landscape representation is unstable, since the very same representation may be decoded and interpreted in various ways by different social

groups (Eco, 1987; Barnes and Duncan, 1992). Hegemonic national symbols, structured by elite groups around the center or the frontier, might be challenged by counter-narratives voiced by hitherto marginalized communities. Indeed, at the national level, hitherto subjugated and marginal groups (ethnic communities, women, and youth groups) have been increasingly involved in unmasking nation-wide myths and symbols produced by local elites, confronting them with particularistic symbols and concepts of self-identification and self-government. At the international level, "Eurocentric elitisms gave way to postcolonial pluralisms" (Pratt, 1992: 4). In the course of this process, the definition of places as periphery or center has become blurred, insofar as the periphery turned into a "site of hybridity," an "in-between space" where the meanings of cultural and political authority are negotiated, resisted, and imbued with new meanings (Bhabha, 1990; Minh-ha, 1992). As Hutcheson remarks: "The periphery is also the frontier, the place of possibility" (Hutcheson, 1988: 2)

Relying on these insights, I wish to advance the following arguments:

1. The national iconography of Israeli society abounds in landscape representations constructed around the nation's frontier. The purpose of these representations is not to provide a detailed and accurate description of a historical or geographical reality, but to legitimize and justify the visions and aspirations of and the claims made by dominant social groups vis-à-vis Palestinian-Arabs and peripheral Jewish social groups. As such, these representations are political means of attaining legitimacy and consolidating claims to hegemony and control;
2. Over time, the narratives of the dominant groups in Israeli society have been challenged and deconstructed by Palestinian and peripheral Jewish groups. The counter-narratives have contested the hegemonic national symbols developed by the elite by creating particular symbols of self-identity;
3. In reviewing the landscape images developed around the frontier and periphery in Israel, it is not my intention to decipher the underlying reality. I simply wish to franchise the other, to allow different groups to represent themselves through their own symbolic landscapes. This suggests the wisdom of treating symbolic representations as texts which are relational and partial (Clifford, 1986). Such an approach, as I will try to demonstrate towards the end of this chapter, may help foster mutual understanding, and perhaps facilitate political dialogue between subjects hitherto separated by geographical-cum-mythical boundaries.

This chapter, which covers a period of about one hundred years, follows the social construction and evolution of two principal narratives and counter-narratives in Palestine/Israel. One recounts the encounter between Jewish settlers and Palestinian Arabs; the other recounts the relations between different sociopolitical groups within Jewish society. The chapter does not attempt a comprehensive review of symbolic landscapes, nor is it intended to show how they work in political struggles. Rather, it aims to show how symbolic landscapes have been important in defining modern Israel.

Palestine as the Colonial Frontier

In the writings of the founding fathers of Zionism, Jewish settlement in Palestine was represented by two radically different voices. One voice described Palestine as a shelter—"a night shelter" in Herzl's words—whose purpose was to save the Jewish "other" from anti-Semitism and persecution by creating a homeland in the Jewish ancestral land (Herzl, [1902] 1961). As Chaim Arlosoroff (Head of the Jewish Agency's political bureau) wrote: 'It is not a motherland that seeks to create a colony, but rather a multitude of uprooted and persecuted people who wish to create a motherland' (Arlosoroff, 1937: 59–60). The other voice was, in sharp contrast, associated with values and images fostered by European colonialism. It represented Palestine as an integral part of the worldwide, non-European frontier. Although the image of Palestine/Israel as a shelter remained in the background of Israel's iconography, the foreground and dominant Israeli image was that of a civilized colonization enterprise carried out by an advanced European society.

This is the way Palestine is represented in Herzl's utopian novel, *Altneuland* (An Old-New Land), in which one of the Jewish settlers tells his guests, who are on a visit to Palestine: "We Jews, have brought civilization to these parts." And Rashid Bey, the Arab friend of David Litvak, head of the new Jewish company established in Palestine, acknowledges that:

> Thanks to the accelerated technological development introduced by the Jews and thanks to the close commercial ties of the Jews with Europe ... our revenues have increased considerably ... now that we have effective lines of communication with the rest of the world. Everything has increased in value here because of the arrival of Jews (Herzl, [1902] 1961: 102–103).

Another prominent Zionist, Max Nordau, proclaimed:

> We shall make every effort to model our actions in the Near East after those of the English in India. We intend to go to Palestine as the emissaries

> of civilization and to extend the traditional boundaries of Europe to the banks of the Euphrates River (Nordau cited by Gorny, 1985: 16).

Within the cultural context, in which colonization had become equated with moral and social progress, it was natural to present Palestine as part of the worldwide frontier, and the Jewish settlers as the agents of social and moral progress.

And this is precisely how David Ben-Gurion defined Zionist settlement in Palestine in the early years of the twentieth century. In a lecture delivered in 1915 at a conference of the Poalei Zion (Labor Zionist) organization in Cleveland, Ohio, Ben-Gurion contended:

> Palestine will be built up through the efforts of an industrious people, rich in both material and spiritual terms, who arrived there due to historical necessity in order to create its own homeland. Armed with the tools of modern science and technology, this group of people is prepared to pay any price in order to turn the desolate and parched land into a flowering oasis, fruitful in terms of agricultural and industrial production, culturally developed and intensively inhabited. The model for these efforts will be the achievements of the English settlers in North America and the achievements of the Dutch settlers in South Africa. We can already see this model in action when we look at what the Jews have already begun to bring about in Palestine (Ben-Gurion, 1955/56: 36).

In another context, during the same year, Ben-Gurion made the following statement:

> Current Jewish colonization in Palestine is not intended to impair in any way whatsoever the condition of the Arab community in that land. Quite the contrary, it is intended to rescue the Arab community of Palestine from its material poverty, to elevate that community from its state of social decline, and to save it from the prospect of bio-physical and moral degeneration. Our national revival in Palestine will be effected through the revival of Palestine, especially through the revival of the local Arab community (Ben-Gurion, 1955/56: 19).

The Zionist narrative, which represented Jewish settlement in terms of social and moral progress, met with a certain amount of opposition and criticism. Several Palestinian leaders and organizations challenged it. For example, The Arab-Palestinian press—*Al-Karmil* (founded in 1908) and *Filastin* (founded in 1911)—criticized Zionist immigration, land purchases, and Jewish exclusiveness (Smith, 1992). However, a coherent and all-encompassing Palestinian literary counter-narrative did not appear until much later. As Doumani, a Palestinian scholar, writes:

> Palestinians were the last to begin writing on the history of Palestine. ... The publication of historical monographs began in earnest in the early 1930s. ... What is interesting in their treatment of the Ottoman period is that their frame of reference is basically the same as that formulated by their adversaries in terms of causality, periodization, and the Ottoman legacy. As with the Europeans and the Zionists, the interpretation centers on the idea of Ottoman decline and views local history as stagnant and inconsequential until the arrival of the Europeans (Doumani, 1992: 9–10).

Palestinian historiography written between the 1930s and the 1960s, "presents the Zionist movement as the dynamic actor, and portrays Palestinian resistance as inevitable, self-explanatory, and passive, with the possible exception of the 1929 uprising and the 1936–1939 rebellion" (Doumani, 1992: 9–10). This is a typical example of "transculturation" where, as Pratt suggests, "subordinated or marginal groups select or invent from materials transmitted to them by a dominant or metropolitan culture" (Pratt, 1992: 6).

A Palestinian counter-narrative which sought to radically challenge and demystify the Zionist rhetoric, images, and symbols appeared only in the 1970s, and has been associated with the anti-Orientalist, postcolonial literature, especially with the writings of Edward Said. As Said argues, Zionist settlement and Western imperialism and colonialism have shared a common discourse. The actual problems of dealing with empires, Said maintains:

> ... made it possible 'scientifically' to show that some cultures were advanced and civilized, others backward and uncivilized; these ideas made axiomatic by the middle of the nineteenth century that Europeans always ought to rule non-Europeans (Said, 1979: 37).

This doctrine, Said remarks, informed Zionism, and had direct bearing on Zionist attitudes toward land: "A civilized man, it was believed, could cultivate the land because it meant something to him; on it, he accomplished, he built. For an uncivilized people, land was either farmed badly ... or it was left to rot" (Said, 1979: 37). The shared discourse of Western colonialism and Zionist settlement, Said remarks, served as a form of domination, suppressing the "other" and legitimizing the process of colonization in Palestine:

> There is hegemony not by mere domination but by consent, acquiescence ... The identification of Zionism and Liberalism in the West meant that, insofar as he had been displaced and dispossessed in Palestine, the Arab had become a nonperson as much because the Zionist had himself become the only person in Palestine as because the Arab's negative personality (Oriental, decadent, inferior) had intensified (Said, 1979: 37–8).

For Said, the representation of colonial settlement as a meeting between civilized and uncivilized cultures is both the cause and justification of imperialism and colonialism.

Criticism arose within the Zionist camp itself. In his article, "The Truth from Palestine," written in 1891, the Jewish essayist Aha'd Ha'am condemned the displacement, expropriation, and degradation of the Arabs that had been generated by the course of Jewish settlement in Palestine. "The agents of civilization, progress, and justice," wrote Ahad Ha'am sarcastically, "are treating the Arabs with ... cruelty and animosity, and are guilty of the sin of trespassing, which is expressly forbidden in the Biblical verse 'You shall not trespass ... ' This is not the way things should be done!" Aha'd Ha'am warned, adding, "We shall probably never reach our central goal. Instead of finding an integral and satisfactory solution to the question of the Jewish future, we shall only transplant the Jewish problem to yet another place on the face of the earth—to Palestine, the land of our ancestors" (Ahad Ha'am, 1890/91). The myth of an advanced settler society helping the native residents to improve their own situation has been contested continuously by certain groups within Jewish society: Brit Shalom, Hashomer Hatza'ir and, currently, Peace Now.

Ironically, however, the basic principles of the "frontier civilization" myth have been deeply internalized by the majority of Israeli society, and becoming part and parcel of Israel's policy. This policy, as represented by national and local politicians such as Moshe Dayan or Teddy Kollek, assumed that economic development initiated by Israel would contribute to the well-being of the Arab population, ultimately leading to Arab prosperity and the acceptance of Israel's authority (Kollek, 1977).

The Farmer's Frontier and the Laborer's Frontier

In pre-1948 Palestine, two representations of the frontier developed: the farmer's frontier—the moshava (the colony) and the laborer's frontier—the kvutza, the kibbutz, and the moshav. The moshava, the first type of rural settlement founded by Zionist settlers, was based on privately owned and individually operated farms. Over the years, though, many of the moshavot, especially those located at the country's center, have turned into towns and cities. The kvutza and the kibbutz are collective settlements, where the means of production belong to the community as a whole. The founders of the kvutza, the prototype of collective settlement, pursued the ideal of a small rural settlement based on intensive communal life. The founders of the kibbutz, on the other hand, sought to create a relatively large collective settlement, based upon agriculture and industry. The moshav is a smallholders' cooperative village.

The farmer's and the laborers frontier signified, to a specific social group, a symbol of something that went beyond the settlements' morphological, economic, or social structure. Essentially, they represented two distinct sets of values and beliefs concerning the proper way in which society should organize itself. The farmer's frontier, especially the moshava, symbolized the national revival of the Jewish people through private entrepreneurship based on capitalist principles. Jabotinsky (a prominent leader of the right-wing camp) was very impressed by Turner's theory of the American frontier insofar as it was based on the individualist entrepreneur, and sought to transfer this model to the land of Palestine. Jabotinsky thus wrote:

> Private initiative is the backbone of all colonization activity. Just as America was settled by private entrepreneurs, so will Palestine be rebuilt and renewed through the efforts of thousands of settlers who will rely entirely on their own personal efforts (Jabotinsky cited by Shavit, 1983: 162).

Although the majority of Jewish settlers chose the individualistic way of life, the Zionist-socialist camp, that eventually won the political battle with the right-wing camp, elevated the laborers frontier, particularly the kvutza and the kibbutz, to a central national symbol. As Martin Buber remarked, the kvutza and the kibbutz symbolized the possibility of national revival and social renewal through a resuscitation of the fabric of society's cells (Buber, 1983). Ben-Gurion described this model as follows:

> Whoever judges the kvutza and the kibbutz only in terms of their social content deprives them of their rights. In its existence and goals, the kvutza contains, in concise form, all of the content of salvation; it merges the needs of our present period with the prophetic vision of the messianic age, the End of Days. The kvutza is the harbinger of redemption for the individual, for the nation, for all humanity (Ben-Gurion, 1953: 235).

This representation reflects, in the terminology of Gershom Scholem, "the feeling of absolute sanctity within the context of absolute secularism ...," a sanctity in which the "substantiation of mystical experience still echoes and retains its potency" (Scholem, 1982: 82). The first moshava, Petah Tikva, and the first kvutza, Degania, have acquired over the years a "secular sanctity," and serve as major, albeit rival, symbols in the iconography of the Zionist settlement (Figure 6.1). In terms borrowed from Mircea Eliade, each of these forms of frontier was perceived as a "cosmos" in itself—the ideal, utopian world—while its counterpart was depicted as the epitome of "chaos" (Eliade, 1959).

For many years, the farmer's frontier was described in somber tones and was vehemently criticized. In his article, "The truth from Palestine,"




FIGURE 6.1 Location map.

Ahad Ha'am described how the moshavot turned into backward colonial outposts, while Arthur Ruppin (Head of the Palestine Bureau of the Zionist movement which was responsible for the settlement of Palestine) described the moshavot as being on the brink of moral and economic bankruptcy. However, the harshest criticism naturally came from the Zionist-socialist camp. Berl Katzenelson, the leading ideologist of Labor-Zionism, likened the moshava to "a new form of ghetto," wherein "the evil from which we sought to escape has returned to plague us." The original idea of national revival through the establishment of settlements had been replaced, he claimed, by the ancient, depressing features of Diaspora life: "the idle person and the petit bourgeois small merchant" (Katznelson, 1945: 9). The description of the moshava as a ghetto, as a degrading cheap labor market, as a locale of moral decay, degeneration, and disintegration, is repeated time and again in the literature of the second and third Zionist immigration waves (which arrived in the years 1904–1914 and 1909–1924). This image of the moshava can also be encountered in contemporary Israeli literature (Govrin, 1981).

In contrast to the ghetto, home of the idler and the small merchant, the kvutza and the kibbutz were associated with the central ethos and myths of Zionism. Within the confines of the kibbutz and the kvutza, A.D. Gordon (a spiritual leader of socialist Zionism) developed his "religion of labor," which for Gershon Scholem represented the epitome of secular mysticism (Scholem, 1982). A central protagonist of this type of frontier settlement was the Zionist pioneer, represented as a dreamer and conqueror, who pursued an ascetic lifestyle. These symbols were vehemently criticized and demystified by the leaders of the farmer's frontier, who strongly opposed what they conceived as the squandering of public funds on socialist experiments. Representatives of the farmer's frontier depicted the socialist settlements as a bottomless barrel, and called for a redirection of national resources to fund free-enterprise projects that had already proved their worth.

For both practical (read security) and ideological reasons, the Zionist movement preferred Degania (established in 1909), the first kvutza of the laborers frontier, to Petah Tikva (established in 1877), the first of the farmers' frontier colonies. Through the cultural-political supremacy of the Zionist-socialist parties—manifested in political control over the national institutions and the cultural system—the values of the laborers frontier have penetrated the national cultural center (Hasson, 1981). These values were institutionalized in the education system, and in Israel's representation abroad, and were the dominant national values until 1977, when the right-wing Likud party formed Israel's first non-socialist government.

It would be wrong, however, to assume that the rivalry between the two types of frontier has ended. With certain modifications, this rivalry has become a permanent part of the ongoing national debate in Israel. Essentially, the debate centers not only on a difference in lifestyle, but also on a political-cultural hegemony, symbolically augmented through association with specific places. In the course of time, place has become a prominent representation of ideology and, due to its contribution to the building-up of the nation, and to the development of the state, claims to political hegemony are made. It is within the context of this cultural-political rivalry that one should view the establishment of a large number of settlement museums in the moshavot since 1977, and the virtual flood of publications on the moshavot and on private land-acquisition companies. These museums and publications, which are erroneously considered to be part of a wave of nostalgia, represent a deliberate attempt to amend what has been interpreted as a distortion in the representation of the farmer's frontier, and to assign this frontier its rightful place in Zionist history and iconography.

Boundaries, Internal Frontier, and Periphery

Boundaries

With the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, some of the frontier myths migrated from the kibbutz and the moshava in the direction of the boundary. This shift had begun in the pre-state period, particularly between 1936 and 1939, when, in anticipation of the partition of Palestine by the United Nations, 52 Jewish settlements were established in a deliberate attempt to shape future boundaries. Beyond their geo-political value, these new settlements have become landmarks and symbols in the history of Zionist settlement. The transfer of symbols and myths from the frontier to the boundary was accelerated by the 1948 war. The fortified lookout post on the border, Yizhar Smilansky's wooden house, the place where "the stars served in place of ceiling lamps," became symbols of basic values: courage, persistence, soul-searching, dedication, friendship, the victory of life over death, and moral purity (Smilansky, 1958). In 1989, some thirty years after the publication of Smilansky's novel, *The Days of Ziklag*, Amos Oz wrote:

> If the Ziklag of the novel is not the Biblical Ziklag, but rather some foul-smelling, half destroyed outpost, and if the outpost's defenders are not the heroes who served with David but rather just a bunch of mixed-up kids who fought with not much more than their bare hands, then perhaps we can be daring enough to sum up the situation and simply say: 'This is all that we have, and, without this heritage, we have absolutely nothing' (Oz, 1989).

In a restrained undertone, Oz conveys a pontifical-ideological message: on the rocky land of Ziklag, some basic values of the new State were formed. This was all we had then, and perhaps it was appropriate that these should have been our only values.

In the course of time, some of Israeli society's basic values have centered around the concept of the boundary. In many of Israel's popular tunes, the boundary was likened to a wall separating good from evil, "us" from "them." The enemy was metaphorically described as a "vulture" or a "threatening mountain," while what stood against that enemy were "outpost-like settlements, peopled by laborers and warriors."

However, the boundaries have had quite a different meaning for the Palestinian Arab, whether living inside or outside Palestine-Israel. The 1948 war and Israel's boundaries have become associated with eviction across the borders, aggression, dispossession, humiliation, confinement, and the emergence of a Palestinian Diaspora which wishes, much like Diaspora Jewry in the past, to return to its historic homeland (Said, 1992). Emile Habibi, an Israeli-Palestinian writer, recounts these feelings in his novel *The Secret Life of Saeed, the Ill-fated Pessoptimist.* The writer provides penetrating insight into the experiences, feelings, and emotions of the Palestinians by recounting the meeting between Saeed and the Palestinians who found shelter in the Al Jazzar Mosque in Acre during the 1948 war:

> We're from Kwaykaat. They demolished it and evicted every-one ... I am from al-Manshiyya. There's not a stone left standing there except tombs ... We are from Amqa. They plowed all its houses under and spilled its oil onto the ground ... We over here are from Berwah. They forced us out and obliterated it ... We are from Ruwais. We are from al-Hadatha. We are from el-Damun ... (Habiby, 1982: 21).

The voices of the Palestinians abound, narrating a story of dispossession, humiliation, fear, and uncertainty. Habiby thus tells the story of Palestinian exile, a story of people who maintained and nurtured the eternal hope of return.

For the two groups, the borders have come to represent not only a physical demarcation line, and a legal-juridical entity sanctioned by law and power, but also a cognitive rift line, that confined and excluded, to use Foucault's terms, the "other." On both sides of the border, these representations declare, there are different human groups with different value and reference systems: sympathy for the one group implies demonization of the other.

Even before the impact of such a rift-line on collective behavior had been clarified, one point seemed to be obvious: the cognitive boundary, as distinguished from the legal-juridical one, remained in the collective

consciousness after the boundaries were physically crossed in 1967. Crossing the boundary did not bring about any profound familiarity among either the Israelis or the Palestinians. The 1967 meeting was deeply interwoven with the specific history of the two groups. A profound insight into the nature of this meeting is provided by Ghassan Kanafani, a Palestinian writer and the spokesman of the Palestinian Popular Front in the 1970s. In the story *Return to Haifa*, Kanafani recounts the meeting between Said and Safia who were forced to leave their house in Haifa in 1948, and Evrat and Miriam Kushen, who survived the Nazis' persecution in Europe, and who, upon their arrival in Israel, were housed by the Israeli authorities in Said and Safia's home. In the following monologue, Said addresses his son, who was left behind in Haifa, raised as an Israeli-Jew by the Kushen family and now serves in the Israeli army:

> As you see, she (Safia) freely admits that we are cowards, and here you are right. But this does not absolve you of anything, and two wrongs don't make a right. If that's how things are, then what happened to Evrat and Miriam at Auschwitz was right. But when you no longer respect the weakness of others and their mistakes, who is there to protect your own rights? (Kanafani, 1984: 136).

These words go far beyond the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, insofar as they incisively address a universal human problem. As Kanafani writes:

> You will understand that the greatest crime any man, whoever he is, can commit is to think, even for a moment, that the weakness of others and their mistakes give him the right to exist at their expense and that this absolves him of all his own mistakes and crimes ... (Kanafani, 1984: 136).

Internal Frontier

Within the boundary of the pre-1967 Green Line, a new, internal frontier has opened: the Negev areas, the desert. A central Israeli vision has been attached to the new frontier: the vision of "making the desert bloom," an idea that has been presented to the world as an exciting mission. Like many other young nations, the State of Israel has begun to cultivate a belief that the riches of a country are to be found at the boundary, in the open and less populated regions. This was the position held by Jefferson, by Brazilian president Kubichek and by Israel's first prime minister Ben-Gurion. Jefferson foresaw the division of lands between the Appalachian mountain ranges and the Mississippi basin and envisaged the ideal of the landowning farmer. According to Kubichek, Brazil's inner wealth was to be found deep inside the South American continent, and he, therefore, turned his gaze towards Brasilia. Ben-Gurion turned to the

Negev and gave concrete expression to his belief with his decision to take up residence in Sde Boker (a kibbutz in the central Negev). Underpinning Ben-Gurion's vision was the concept of the frontier: a war between the seed planter and the desert, reminiscent of his earlier frontier perception with its corollary civilizing mission. In Ben-Gurion's vision, the Negev would be transformed through the influx of skilled individuals, the application of advanced technologies, the creation of information and industrial centers, and the founding of a university that would help contribute to industrial growth. (Even higher education was perceived in instrumental terms, as a tool for technological development and for the "conquest of the desert.")

The vision of "making the desert bloom" did not attract tens of thousands of Israelis to the Negev's broad expanses. Ben-Gurion's move to Sde Boker remained nothing more than a symbolic and isolated act. The vision of conquering the desert was pursued through the establishment of a few rural settlements for recently arrived immigrants, and through the founding of a number of new towns, also settled mainly by new immigrants. However, it would be a gross mistake to rely on these empirical facts, when evaluating the symbolic system developed around the Negev settlements. The vision of "making the desert bloom" set up an ideal of crucial national significance, created new symbols that encouraged identification with national goals, and set up a value system for the education of an entire generation. In this way, a national iconography was created around the landscape. Much like the "New England Village," the "Middle West Mainstreet," and "Southern California Suburbia," in Meinig's depiction of American symbolic landscapes, (Meinig, 1979) Israel's symbolic landscapes played a critical role in creating the national culture. The idealization of Israel's frontier settlements encouraged the creation of a unique social and moral identity, mobilized support, and served as a vital tool for nation building (Gottman, 1951).

For an overseas audience, a set of symbols was created of a young, dynamic state fighting against the harsh conditions of nature, yet, at the same time, absorbing immigrants from the four corners of the earth and developing villages and rural settlements along hostile borders. This narrative of national revival through frontier settlement excited the imagination and aroused considerable sympathy.

The Periphery

The Israeli national iconography, formed around the landscape, was developed by veteran Israelis who, with few exceptions, lived in the central part of the country. The hardships experienced by Israeli-Arabs, associated with confinement, land confiscation, and structural discrimination, did not crystallize into a counter-narrative until much later. Even new

immigrants to Israel of North African and Middle Eastern origin, who had been relegated to the development towns in the peripheral areas of the country during the 1950s and 1960s, failed to develop images and symbols of their own. The residents of communities like Yeroham, Tselafon and Hatsor have not developed any symbols that even remotely resemble those developed by the late 19th—and early 20th—century settlements of Petah Tikva, Degania, Kinneret, and Bitania. However, in a series of scientific and popular publications, the dominant European-born elite in Israel has presented the new periphery in terms of a pioneering frontier, although this image was quite alien to the mentality of the new Oriental immigrants. The captive residents of the new towns and rural settlements, who had been highly dependent on state jobs, housing, subsidies, and services, were described in terms drawn from the pre-state period: pioneering Zionist spirit *(halutziut)*, land development and making the desert bloom. Their settlement process was transformed into a model of national and regional development for other countries, especially in Africa and South-East Asia. Incorporating statehood and the new periphery's experiences into the pre-statehood, frontier narrative implied a universalization of the ethos formed by the European-born, Israeli elite. In this way, the cultural-political hegemony of the European-born Israeli elite was secured and even strengthened, turning into a national symbol. On the other hand, the new periphery's particular experiences with regard to immigration, settlement, and the authentic nature of place remained largely hidden.

From the 1970s onwards, the mystified representation of the periphery as a frontier has met with increasing criticism by Oriental Jews. The images of pioneering, progress, and development—values that had been "naturalized" because of their close association with frontier landscapes—have been put under constant scrutiny and have been subjected to frequent criticism. The ideals and symbols presented for external, especially overseas, public relations, have been exposed as incomplete, and as masking socioeconomic distress, neglect, apathy, and conflict (Hasson, 1981).

Alongside the demystification of the frontier myth, the residents of the periphery have begun to develop their own representations and narratives. An interesting example concerns the sanctification of local sites—residential apartments, graves, and synagogues—and their transformation into pilgrimage shrines (Bilu, 1989). Another example of the transformation of territory into symbol, if not myth, is associated with places in which Israeli protest movements have sprung up. Socioeconomically distressed and predominantly Oriental neighborhoods such as Musrara, Katamonim and Ir Ganim in Jerusalem have turned into counter-culture ethnic symbols, representing moral and social critique, protest, and a

drive for change. As one activist in the Katamonim neighborhood maintained, "they (the authorities in charge of immigrant absorption) never believed that this ghetto could turn into a source of power." The leader of a protest movement in Ir Ganim noted: "We were trying to prove that this neighborhood could become a place where an intelligentsia could spring up, where the members of the second generation could develop and try to solve their own problems without outside help" (Hasson, 1993; Hasson and Ley, 1994).

In an attempt at achieving legitimation, some of these places have become pilgrimage shrines for politicians. By paying homage to local traditions, the politicians demonstrate, at the aesthetic level, their acceptance of and respect for the counter-culture. It is not surprising, therefore, to find secular politicians visiting "holy graves" and shrines in development towns settled by Moroccan Jews, apparently with the hope of attaining popularity, legitimation, and eventually political support.

The building up of myths around neighborhoods of low socio-economic status and immigrant towns is not limited to popular culture, and is to be found in highbrow culture as well. Interpreting the writings of Oriental Jewish novelists and poets, Benyamini pointed out that these writers invariably raise the status of their country of origin, while lowering the status of the absorbing country (Benyamini, 1987). "Paris has its Arch of Triumph, and, here in Musrara, we have the Arch of Dashed Hopes" writes the poet Tuviah Sulami (cited by Benyamini, 1987). This kind of representation, in which place is symbolically altered, elevated, or degraded, and turned into something else, is characteristic as well of some social scientists writing about Israel's periphery. The sociologists Swirsky and Shushan, for example, describe the residents of the development towns as a "cheap labor force, employed on assembly lines" exploited by "either private entrepreneurs or public bodies located outside the municipal boundaries of the development towns." Moreover, "the school system trains the sons and daughters of the town's residents so that these children can eventually replace their parents on the assembly line" (Swirsky and Shushan, 1983: 10, 21). These narratives are intended to provide the development towns with an image of a third world enclave, surrounded by a modern, capitalist, and exploiting Israeli society. In this image, which seems to echo the influence of Marxist texts such as those of Santos and Fanon, one can detect a number of characteristic features: the oppressed Oriental Jew, who lives in the periphery, versus the oppressor, the Ashkenazi Jew, who lives in the central part of the country. The relationship between center and periphery is founded on exploitation and cultural oppression, an epitome of internal colonialism. And finally, the role of the intellectual-liberator, who in demystifying false notions and images, sets the stage for social transformation.

The popular and highbrow narratives formed around the periphery seem to reinforce each other. They create a similar social and ideological climate by "canonizing" certain forms of discourse, by cultivating local myths, and by building up the ethos of local heroes, namely rabbis, social leaders, and intellectuals of the periphery.

In contrast with the strengthening of the periphery in Israel, one can note a continuous weakening of the center. From the early 1960s onward, values such as settling the land, creating new forms of settlement, absorbing immigrants, including the recent wave of Russian immigrants, have steadily faded. It seems that the Zionist-socialist camp had exhausted its frontier value system by the late 1960s, leaving the door open to a new and more radical narrative associated with the occupation and settlement of the newly-conquered territories.

The New Frontier

According to a declaration published by the Eretz Israel Hashlema (the Greater Land of Israel) Movement on September 22, 1967—two and a half months after the war—and signed by writers (including Nobel Prize-winning novelist S.Y. Agnon, and other writers such as Nathan Alterman, Haim Hazaz, and Uri Zvi Greenberg), academics, military commanders, and public figures: "Just as we have no moral authority whatsoever to undermine the existence of the State of Israel, we are commanded to maintain and protect what we have received from the hands of the State of Israel, namely the Land of Israel in its entirety" (Miron, 1988: 10–11). The twenty-year "State of Israel era," that preceded the outbreak of the war, served as a sort of "dark corridor," as Dan Miron sarcastically commented, to the new period in Jewish history: the "Land of Israel period" (Miron, 1988: 10–11). As indicated in the movement's declaration, the Land of Israel in its entirety had a higher status than did the State of Israel: "no Israeli government is authorized to detract from the integrity of the Land of Israel" (Miron, 1988: 10–11). In this way, the territory, with the associated history and memories of the Jewish nation, was elevated over and above the State of Israel and its sovereignty.

This kind of signification, which established the priority of the Land of Israel over the State of Israel, characterizes the values and symbols developed during the initial stages of Gush Emunim's settlement activities on the West Bank (Newman, 1985). Members of Gush Emunim, who settled in the West Bank, sometimes through outright violation of State laws, have elevated a religious-territorial precept (performance of the religious precepts relating to the Land of Israel) over and above the civilian-legal precept. The leaders of Gush Emunim hoped to forge a new national consciousness through the establishment of new frontier settlements in the

West Bank, and thus to renew the ideals and principles that had guided Zionist thought in its early days. It was this settlement activity that incited the imagination of tens of thousands of Israelis at the time, and mobilized large public support behind Gush Emunim (Sprinzak, 1985).

According to the new unfolding myth, the frontier of the Land of Israel, like the frontier of America in the nineteenth century, represented the true wealth of the nation. This was not wealth in the material sense, meaning forests, rivers, a vast expanse of land, or mineral deposits, but in the metaphysical sense—the tombs of Biblical Patriarchs and Matriarchs, the ancestral lands of the Twelve Tribes, the capitals of the kingdoms of Judah and Israel, the villages of the prophets, and the ruins of the Hasmonean fortress. In an information sheet on Samaria issued by the Israel Defence Forces' Chief Education Officer, one can read, for example, that "the new West Bank city of Ariel is situated close to the Arab village Haress, which is identified, according to Jewish tradition, with Timnat Heress, where Joshua Ben Nun and Caleb Ben Yefuneh are buried" (Israel Defense Forces, n.d.). The information sheet also tells the reader that the new West Bank settlement of Shavei Shomron is situated "close to Sebastia and south of the ruins of ancient Samaria, the capital of the Biblical kingdom of Israel." With regard to Elon Moreh (one of the first Gush Emunim settlements in the West Bank), notes the text, "we can only conjecture that, in the valley to the south of this settlement, our forefather Jacob set up his tent and purchased fields on his return from Aram (Upper Mesopotamia)" (Israel Defense Forces, n.d.).

This type of writing, which conjures up tombs, lost capitals, fortresses, and campsites, ignores the presence of indigenous people and, instead, creates a narrative of continuous Jewish settlement in the West Bank. Thus, the new settlements are presented as a natural continuation of biblical settlements. In line with this narrative, each new settlement has a rich and unique ancestry and cannot be considered to be part of a wholesale invasion of another nation's territory. According to such an approach, the post-1967 settlements do not represent the violation of the rights of the Palestinians, but rather are to be seen, much like their predecessors, the kibbutz and the moshava, as a return to the old homeland, to the ancestral lands of the tribes of Menasseh, Ephraim, and Benjamin.

These representations have encountered a considerable measure of opposition and criticism. Describing post-1967 settlement activity among the hills of the West Bank, David Amiran, the founder of the Geography Department at the Hebrew University, writes in the Atlas of Israel:

> The declared goal of both Gush Emunim and the other nationalist organizations is to create facts so that the West Bank would become an integral part not just of the Land of Israel, but of the State of Israel. Therefore, many West Bank settlements have been created in the midst of Arab communi-

> ties in order to prevent a territorial and political severing of the region in the future ... Gush Emunim's political-religious ideology has painted on its banner the vision of a Greater Israel, whose creation will inevitably lead to a bi-national Jewish-Arab state. On the other hand, the goal of traditional Zionist ideology has always been a Jewish state with a clearly Jewish character and with a Jewish majority, and has always been open to the prospect of territorial compromise (Amiran, 1985: 16).

Amiran's approach signifies an attempt to demystify the argument raised by Gush Emunim, an argument that became the official Israeli policy during the Likud government (1977–1992). It is no surprise then, that the Likud government's reaction to Amiran's text was scathing criticism of the ideological slant in his writing. Another geographer—this time, one, who in the Government's view was "impartial," and who would represent the reality of the new West Bank settlement activity "in its true light,"—was therefore commissioned to take over from Amiran. The polarization of opinion concerning the new frontier—the administered territories—reflects the existence of two radically different political orientations that have been fueling debate in Israel to this very day.

At the present time, with the Palestinian civil uprising and the signing of the interim accord between Israel and the PLO, the leaders of the new frontier find it extremely difficult to mobilize support and to recruit new adherents. As one of the founders of Gush Emunim admitted: "Once there were only a few settlements but thousands of enthusiasts attending our demonstrations; however, today we have many settlements but only a few hundred supporters" (Melamed, 1988: 10–11).

Israel as an Archipelago of Peripheries

Israel is increasingly being seen as an archipelago of peripheries, among whose components a bitter controversy is raging with regard to cultural and political hegemony. Each of the peripheries has developed its own set of symbols and representations and is therefore demanding widespread social recognition for its culture and for its political claims. From the northern periphery, the Galilee region, voices are accusing the Israeli government of having neglected the project of Jewish settlement in the area. The members of the northern periphery complain of a dramatic growth in the Arab population in contrast to the meager increase in Jewish population, and warn against the danger of a regional demographic imbalance (Sofer, 1988). As far as the southern periphery, the Negev region, is concerned, Gradus claims that the area is being ignored, and that Ben-Gurion's vision of the Negev's development is being seriously undermined (Gradus, 1984).

Jewish settlements on the West Bank are presented by the newspaper *Nekuda* ("published by the Jewish settlements of Judea, Samaria and Gaza") as being under social, economic, and terrorist siege (Melamed, 1988). Even what would appear to be, at first glance, the center of the country is presented as being part of the periphery. For example, as Dan Miron sees it, "Tel Aviv is a bastion of sane Israelis, who, in the main, continue to think as they did before 1967" (Miron, 1987). According to Miron, this bastion has been pushed to the periphery of Israeli society and is standing in the very shadow of the dark threat that looms over the entire country: the threat, in Miron's words, "of grandomania, colonialism and fascism." And, notes Miron, Jerusalem is, to a great extent, a metonym of these sinister forces. In a country that is almost entirely ravaged by this cultural-political plague, Tel Aviv stands alone, as an impregnable island: "Tel Aviv is gradually becoming what Jerusalem's ultra-orthodox Meah She'arim quarter once was, namely a social and historical enclave." (Miron, 1987: 145) Serving as the last fortress in the battle to maintain the thinking and behavior patterns that were characteristic of the Ben-Gurion and Levi Eshkol periods, Tel Aviv is the antidote to Jerusalem. Eventually, the role of Tel Aviv is to bring about the spiritual reform—*tikkun*—of Jerusalem. The *tikkun*, Miron remarks, will come from Tel Aviv's culture, as expressed in contemporary Hebrew literature, which has managed to maintain its sanity (in the sense of sane avant-garde) behind the symbolic fortress walls of Tel Aviv (Miron, 1987.)

Even the kibbutz has occasionally been likened to a stifling cultural periphery. Contemporary Israeli novels portray the kibbutz as a culturally impoverished place, spawning children who will become dull adults, as for example, in Amos Oz's novel *Menucha Nechona* (Just Repose). Cultural impoverishment is not confined to the kibbutz; it has spread to the entire country, which, therefore, is in desperate need of Foigelman, the protagonist of Aharon Meged's novel: a Diaspora Jew who might be able to restore to Israeli society some of the Jewish wisdom, canniness, and humor it has lost.

The Israeli Arab literature mourns the old, glorious days of the "Arab period" in pre-1948 Palestine. As Emil Habibi recalls his childhood in Haifa:

> Abas street was not very far from the sea. The world at that time seemed so very wide. The Carmel was ours exclusively and so was the sea. Everything belonged to us—the valleys and the hills, the sea and the land, including Al Mu'ares, that is, those areas that have since become Kiryat Eliezer ... the world of yesterday no longer exists ... A volcano has erupted totally destroying our world, especially Haifa and the other cities' (Habiby, 1989: 115,117).

What is characteristic of all these places—the north, the south, the West Bank, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, the kibbutz, and Arab Haifa—is their representation as secluded islands, deeply trapped in their isolation and misery. The common message conveyed by these descriptions is twofold: criticism of the neglect and deprivation of these cities, and a demand for the recognition of their unique status and contribution to Israeli society. This message forms a fascinating cultural web in which complaints of being disadvantaged are inextricably interwoven with claims to cultural-political hegemony. Finally, no longer depicted as a model example of frontier society, Israel is increasingly being seen as an impoverished, unenlightened, backwater periphery.

Theoretical Discussion and Conclusion

In this chapter I have tried to indicate how cultural-political ideologies search for places where the cultural essence of the entire society, apparently, seems to be exposed. The symbolic meaning of these places is not immediately given but, as Duncan and Ley suggest, is formed through a complex process of negotiation between empirical facts and historical subjects (Duncan and Ley, 1993). In this manner, the very nature of these places is altered. They are detached from their specific, historical context and are charged with new ideological content, which either augments, contracts, or even remakes the meaning of these places. From this point onwards, the geographic landscapes will serve as a metonym of the political-cultural ideology and the desired social order.

Through the study of the representations, symbols and myths that have been created around the frontier or the periphery, it is possible to probe the mentality of a certain social group and to expose that group's central hidden values, hopes, fears, and feelings of pride and injury. It has been shown how the frontier image was associated with the major processes of nation-building: national revival through return to the motherland, cultivation of the land, and the creation of an exemplary society based upon progressive, collective ideas. This image has become part of Israel's national iconography and civil religion, and for a long time served as a powerful force in uniting the disparate parts of Israeli society.

There have been, however, alternative voices, originating from among Palestinians and Israelis, that resisted and challenged the dominant image, developing their own counter-representations and symbols. Ruined Arab villages, poor Arab and immigrant towns, and poor neighborhoods have been transformed into central icons in the counter-narratives, being associated with exile, displacement, discrimination, and neglect. The encounter between the different narratives has exposed what Bhabha calls,

albeit in a different context, the "Janus face" and "hybridity of the national narrative" (Bhabha, 1990: 4–5).

In the wake of such a study, one could argue that the symbolic landscape should be demystified and denaturalized (Duncan and Duncan, 1988). Or in other words, one could assert that regions, places, and sites should be redeemed from the myths and quasi-natural values weaved around them. Once this process of demystification has been completed, the Palestine of the early twentieth century may be viewed as a remote, under-developed province colonized by persecuted European Jews. The kvutza and the kibbutz may be viewed as social experiments set up by unemployed, seemingly confused persons, who had no connection whatsoever with the goals of national salvation and spiritual redemption. Only after the process of demystification and denaturalization has been completed, can one detach the boundary from its ideological and value-charged baggage. Only then can one see apartments not as holy shrines, but simply as places of residence, perceive graves not as sanctified sites, but as the final resting place of human beings, and regard Tel Aviv not as spiritual base for the *tikkun* of Jerusalem, but as a pale imitation of New York or Los Angeles.

Demystification, however, is quite complex. The crucial question is whether "reading degree zero," as suggested by Barthes, is at all possible (Barthes, 1986). Will a "non-ideological" reading of these places not, in fact, lead the critical reader to create new myths to replace the old? Is not a "non-ideological" re-reading of these places part of the text that such a reading is trying to replace? And will the critical reader not find her or himself trapped in a new textual labyrinth? Beyond the issue of cultural criticism, there lies the problem of political criticism. The demystification of places, much like their mystification, is a political strategy, employed to justify the re-allocation of economic resources, to mobilize political support, and to consolidate hegemony. From this standpoint, one may argue that there is no difference between frontier narratives produced by colonial, elite groups and peripheral counter-narratives arising from among the dominated groups. Both serve as vehicles for the allocation of resources and for the consolidation of control. Cultural criticism and demystification are thus translated immediately into political criticism, even if the critic is not aware of this translation process. One may argue therefore that demystification is another form of political activity, whose practical status is identical with the strategy of mystification.

Does all of this lead to extreme relativism? Attempts to answer this or similar questions have triggered a heated debate among those involved in social and cultural studies. At the center of the debate is the epistemological, ethical, and political-practical status of interpretative approaches. At the epistemological level, one may argue that perhaps there is no point

in trying to find a complete, universal, objective truth that can transcend the subjectivity of specific interest groups who live in specific places. What exist, then, are "partial truths" expressed in a myriad of versions of local voices (Clifford, 1986). The role of the researcher, as this approach seems to suggest, is to construct and communicate what and who constructs meaning, to identify the social groups standing behind these representations, to expose their sociology of knowledge, to study the symbolic structuration of place, and to expose the relationship between the world of symbols and the political claims of such social groups (Cosgrove and Domosh, 1993). If it is impossible to find a single, abstract, impartial truth, then perhaps we can try to salvage for ourselves some small measure of humility, some small measure of forgiveness, and perhaps a dash of irony along the path to understanding.

There are many merits to such an open-ended approach insofar as it may expand existing knowledge, broaden cultural understanding of, and enhance sensitivity to local forms of imagination and interpretation. Politically, however, it seems to have very little to offer towards coping with the political dilemma discussed in this essay, namely, how to grapple with conflicting political claims for resources and political hegemony. Extended from the epistemological to the political-practical realm, an open-ended interpretation might run the risk of ethical relativism and intellectual escapism, in spite of strong claims to the contrary. On the basis of a pessoptimist world-view of Habibi's hero, I would like to suggest the possibility of another approach, one that searches for places wherein border monologues and dialogues can take place, and can be listened to and recognized. The scene takes place on the beach of Tantura, where Saeed occasionally goes to talk to his son, who was lost at the sea while rebelling-up against Israel's control. As he talks to the sea, a Jewish boy surprises him with a question:

> In what language are you speaking, Uncle? In Arabic. With whom? With the fish. Do the fish understand only Arabic? Yes, the old fish, the ones that were here when the Arabs were. And the young fish, do they understand Hebrew? They understand Hebrew, Arabic, and all languages. The seas are wide and flow together. They have no borders and have room enough for all fish. Wow! (Habiby, 1982: 114).

Notes

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7

Who to the Frontier? Changing Policies in the Peopling of Israel's Frontier

Amiram Gonen

Introduction

In certain periods in the history of many nations, the peopling of their frontier regions was an important issue and a national task related to the efforts to secure the margins of their territory or to expand them. By settling people on the frontier, nations strove to build a substantial enough population that would aid in the region's defense or expansion. However, such an effort has frequently posed a dilemma concerning the composition of the population destined to live there. The frontier, being peripheral to a nation's core, is characterized in its initial stages by a relatively undeveloped economy, often accompanied by unstable social conditions, and plagued by insecurity and even perennial belligerency with a neighboring nation contesting the same frontier. It is not, therefore, an attractive proposition to those who seek the relative prosperity and security of living in a nation's established core. As a result, a nation is often required to make a concentrated effort to ensure the movement of population to the frontier.

One way to populate the frontier is to turn to society's have-nots and promise them, at the price of immediate hardship, an economic future they cannot expect in the nation's established core. Sometimes a nation directs its weaker ethnic minorities to the frontier. Germans, Jews, and Cossacks were settled in the frontiers by the Polish kingdom and the Russian Czarist empire. At other times, a nation uses impoverished members of other nations, whose economic conditions in their own country induce them to emigrate to other another nation's frontier in an attempt to

profit from the promised future. For several centuries, the poor of Europe have been a major population source for the expanding and shifting of frontiers in North and South America, away from their already established cores. Immigration and the frontier are, then, often associated with each other, at times bringing about an evolving frontier with a social and ethnic composition different from that of the core.

Repatriation and population exchange are also forms of immigration occasionally associated with efforts of settling the frontier. In Greece, for instance, as a result of the population exchange between Turkey and Greece in 1922–23, the government made a great effort to direct a substantial part of the Greek population, coming in large numbers from Turkey, to the frontier regions of northern Greece along the new, and still sensitive, boundaries with Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Turkey. The Greek repatriates were thrown into a difficult economic situation as a result of the uprooting, and many of them were forced to go along with that settlement policy. In the early stages of the re-settlement process, they formed their own new separate villages, distinguished from the established Greek society by their Asia-Minor culture, akin to the Turkish one, and by their impoverished economic status. It took several decades for these differences to be erased.

Another way to people a nation's frontier is to appeal to the national sentiment and ideologies of prospective settlers. Nationalism is one such sentiment, often associated with the effort to recruit willing candidates to the hard task of settling on the frontier, even from the non-impoverished population. This task is publicly presented as an important national goal to be fulfilled by those who grow up sharing nationalist ideologies associated with territory. In other cases, socioreligious motives are often employed among particular groups, who look to break away from the established urbanized core of a country for a niche that will enable them to build their own way of life in a more remote and isolated environment.

In light of these methods of settling the frontier, a general research question can be formulated: What is the societal or historical context in which one way of peopling the frontier was practiced more intensively than the other? In other words, what were the circumstances that led to reliance on the weaker components of society settling the frontier for lack of a better choice in the core, and when did the frontier serve as the destination for people who came there out of some kind of ideological motivation? Such a research question has its ethnic dimensions. The difference between the two kinds of people living in the frontier can be seen not only in terms of social stratification, but also in terms of ethnic composition. Recruiting the needy can bring to the frontier ethnic groups quite different from those settled in the core of a country. Conversely, using the ideologically committed population for such a purpose can lure to the

frontier those ethnic groups that form the elite or the more empowered elements of society. This chapter attempts to examine the proposed research question in the Israeli context, regarding the experience of Israel's Jewish population in dealing with the task of peopling the frontier.

Among Jews in Israel, developing the frontier was, and to some extent, still is part of the main ethos of nation-building, serving as an important element in long-standing territorial, and therefore, economic policies. In the framework of this ethos, the frontier was the place where the conflict between Jews and Arabs over land was to take place, where the country's evolving boundaries were to be shaped and molded, and where the country's security was to be ascertained. Therefore, the frontier justified, according to this ethos, a policy of allocating relatively abundant, public economic resources for establishing new settlements and infrastructure in areas designated as frontier, as well as for the upkeep of existing settlements in such areas. It is argued that the need for such a policy lies in the basic fact that Israel, though small in size, is characterized by a rather concentrated geographical pattern of settlement, the majority of its population living in the central coastal plain around the city of Tel Aviv-Jaffa. This concentrated pattern was already evident in the early 1920s. Since then, efforts were made by Jewish institutions, and since 1948 mainly by the Israeli government, to direct or attract Jews away from the center of the country and have them settle in areas considered to be part of the evolving frontier. These efforts were considered necessary because the overwhelming majority of the Jewish population preferred to reside in the large urban centers, where economies and amenities of aggregation existed, and where problems of security were not part of everyday experience. In Israel, settling the frontier was therefore less of a spontaneous process, whereby people, in a self-selecting pattern, endeavored to take part in the economic prospects lying in newly-settled areas. Rather, it was a policy-directed process, undertaken by public institutions and governmental organizations, encouraging and supporting the dispersal of population from the country's core to its outlying regions—the frontier.

Over the years, the nature of the population dispersed to the frontier has changed, as have the circumstances under which the dispersal policy was carried out. The main thrust of this chapter is the search for some generalizations about this aspect of Israel's experience in settling its frontier. It is proposed that, in the long run, those recruited to the task were drawn largely from the more ideologically-motivated and the "stronger" elements of Jewish society. In the Israeli context this meant a relatively high proportion of the European-origin Ashkenazi population, which for a long time commanded a much higher representation among the Jewish middle classes than did the Oriental population, originating in North Africa and the Middle East.

Before 1948, the settlers in the frontier were drawn from members of national youth movements that educated and prepared their members for the national task of frontier settlement. In later decades, with the decline in the role of the national "pioneering" youth movements, the new residents of the frontier regions came from middle classes and shared the residential ideology, increasingly prevalent in Israel, which values suburban and ex-urban environmental amenities. It was only in times of large population influx into the country and a looming housing crisis, that the weaker elements of Jewish society were considered as the major source of supply for peopling the frontier. For example, in the 1950s, years of mass immigration from Eastern Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East, many of the Oriental immigrants were directed to the frontier. The result has been a dramatic shift in the composition of the Jewish population in the frontier regions in the north and the south of the country. In the 1990s, as a response to the mass immigration of Jews from the former Soviet Union, efforts were made to direct many of the recent immigrants to the frontier, this time generating a new kind of ethnic diversity within frontier towns. The changing nature of peopling the frontier in Israel is delineated in the course of this chapter

Well-prepared Pioneers

The role of the outlying areas in nation-and territory-building was clearly defined in the early 1920s, as a result of growing Jewish immigration into British Palestine and increasing efforts on the part of the Jewish population to ensure the establishment of a "Jewish national home." The creation of a home for the Jewish people had been proclaimed by the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the mandate over Palestine was given by the League of Nations to the British government. Since then, the building of a territory settled by Jews has become a central and bitter issue in the emerging territorial conflict between Arabs and Jews in the country. Areas lying outside the major clusters of Jewish settlements were designated by Jewish national institutions as a frontier *(sefar)*, to be secured for the future Jewish national home through a concerted effort to establish new Jewish settlements there. One of the earliest areas to emerge as a frontier of settlement, immediately after the British occupation of Palestine in 1918, was the Hula Valley region in the northern tip of the country. In the 1920s, it was the Mid-Jordan Valley, south of the Sea of Galilee and Emek Yizra'el, south-east of Haifa, that ranked high in the emerging map of settlement frontier (Figure 7.1). In the 1930s, as Arab resistance to Jewish immigration mounted, culminating in armed rebellion during 1936–1939, the settling of the Beit She'an Valley on the Jordan River, as well as the far Upper Galilee on the Lebanese border, were added to the




FIGURE 7.1 Pioneer settlements, 1914–1947.

top of the Jewish frontier map (Figure 7.1). In that decade, many of the new Jewish settlements on the frontier were established as "Stockade and Tower" *(homa umigdal)* settlements to add to their para-military efficacy in the intensifying conflict with the Arab population (Oren, 1978). The northern Negev, in the south of the country, was a main area of frontier settlement activity in the 1940s (Figure 7.1), when the partition of the country between an Arab and a Jewish state was impending; the Jewish national institutions made a concerted effort to include this southern region in the future Jewish state (Kark, 1974). The Jewish frontier in British Palestine ran along a conflict zone existing between Arabs and Jews, where new Jewish settlements were established and maintained by their national institutions, who strove to expand the Jewish presence. For that purpose an effort was made to mobilize the necessary population to settle the frontier.

It was commonly accepted among the Jewish national institutions that only persons who were "strong" enough, well-prepared, and well-organized should be given the demanding task of settling the frontier with Jews. Such persons were called "pioneers" *(halutzim)*. They were recruited from ideological-political organizations, known as pioneer movements, in which the pioneers were educated, indoctrinated, trained, and socially-integrated so as to qualify for the task. While preparing for settlement in the frontier, the would-be pioneers were members of a pre-settlement group called a *gar'in* ("kernel"), in the case of a kibbutz (commune settlement), or *irgun* ("organization") when the aim was to settle in a moshav (a cooperative settlement). Only after several years of "preparation" *(hakhshara)*, and actual working experience in existing settlements in the core of the country, was a preparatory group of pioneers given the opportunity to start an agricultural settlement on the frontier. For these pioneers, settling on the frontier was considered the "realization" *(hagshama)* of a long process of ideological education and vocational training.

For several decades, a pioneer settling the frontier was regarded as part of the Jewish national elite. Many of the young Jews in the country were ready to forego alternative professional or business careers in order to participate in the task of building the Jewish frontier. Moreover, fierce competition evolved between pre-settlement groups over available sites, since land for Jewish settlement was scarce during the British Mandate years, due to Arab opposition to land purchases by Jews and to British government restrictions on such purchases in outlying areas. The rivalry centered around the question of which groups were more able to perform the task of settling the frontier effectively. Groups preparing to settle as a kibbutz considered themselves to be better prepared ideologically and more socially equipped, because of their communal structure, to with-

stand the hardships of frontier settlement, than the ones aiming at building a moshav (Oren, 1989).

For some time, the policy of directing pioneers to the frontier was carried out by the Jewish population and became, in time, an established practice that included not only the act of peopling the frontier, but also the development of a series of politically-identified settlement movements. Each of the latter had its own youth movement for recruiting potential pioneers who would eventually be directed to the frontier. Moreover, once established, each frontier settlement of a particular movement was supported by a complex system of financing, land allocation, marketing, and agricultural extension services. This support also included political representation in the Zionist national institutions, where public resources were allocated (Horowitz and Lissak, 1977).

The circumstances under which the Jewish frontier was settled during the years of the British Mandate in Palestine had implications for the ethnic composition of the frontier population. The majority of the Jewish population in the country was of European origin and was part of the Ashkenazi ethnic category of Jews. Oriental Jews, originating in Middle Eastern and North African countries, were hardly represented in the pioneering effort to settle the Jewish frontier in British Palestine. This particular ethnic composition in the pre-state Jewish frontier evolved for two reasons. European Jews contributed the lion's share of Jewish migration to British Palestine. It was among them that the modern Jewish national movement—Zionism—had originated and initially spread. Moreover, in those years, the Ashkenazi Jews formed the overwhelming majority of highly politicized segments of the Jewish population in the country and of Jewish communities abroad. The result was a Jewish pioneering frontier of a particular ethnic character.

Many of the pre-settlement groups were formed in their country, region, or city of origin abroad and underwent part of their preparatory training there before immigration. Once they arrived in British Palestine to continue preparing for settlement, they, and the settlement they established or joined, were often identified according to their place of origin. Indeed, many frontier settlements of those days consisted of communities of a specific ethnic composition. Thus, for instance, there were kibbutzim of immigrants from southern Poland, from Romania, or from Slovakia. This quite specific ethnic composition of immigrant settlements on the frontier is a common phenomenon. In some of the early European settlements of frontier regions in North America the founding population was characterized by a specific ethnic composition. However, the ethnic character of Jewish pioneer settlements in British Palestine was not a celebrated fact. These settlements were known to the outside world, as they still are to this day, more by their political affiliation and organizational

structure than by their ethnic composition. Ethnicity was significant in the internal social structure of these settlements for some time, particularly among the first-generation cohorts.

Some of the pre-settlement groups were formed in the country itself, either among recent immigrants, or among young people who were brought up in the country and had been educated and trained for the pioneering task of settling the frontier through the well developed network of youth movements. Every major Zionist political party which took part in Jewish efforts to settle the frontier, fostered a youth movement which prepared the younger generation for that task. The overwhelming majority of the members of these settlement-oriented youth movements were from the Ashkenazi component of the Jewish population in British Palestine. They also formed the pre-settlement groups which eventually found their way to the frontier when land was made available for the task.

The practice of directing the well-prepared, "strong" pioneers to the frontier continued during the first few years after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. Pioneer settlement groups were immediately formed by veterans of the Arab-Jewish War of 1948 and settled in the outlying areas now under the control of the Jewish state. In the course of the 1940s, numerous pioneer groups were formed, gradually preparing for the task of settling the frontier. Many of these groups were part of the *Palmach,* a Jewish military brigade formed in the early 1940s. Members of the Palmach, rooted in the pioneering youth movements and based in older kibbutz settlements, followed the tradition of settling on the frontier and established their own kibbutzim in areas of the Galilee, the Negev, and the Jerusalem mountains, which constituted the new frontiers for Jewish settlement (Figure 7.2). They were joined by members of the youth movements and by the second generation of older frontier settlements. During the first year and a half, between May 1948 and December 1949, while the war between Arabs and Jews raged, and immediately following the cessation of hostilities by the spring of 1949, the various pioneer movements were able to establish about 100 settlements, most of them in the frontier regions of the country (Bein, 1982). Two-thirds of these pioneering settlements were kibbutzim, the more favored type of frontier settlement at the time. These efforts were often coordinated with the military authorities so as to serve the strategic needs of the embattled state (Graicer and Gonen, forthcoming), though the settlers had their own agricultural criteria for selecting the appropriate sites (Kartin, 1995). The map of new settlements followed the changing map of the battle-front. As new sections of former British Palestine were added to the area controlled by the Israeli military forces, new sites were designated for settlement with a military and a territorial function in mind. The trained and moti-




FIGURE 7.2 Pioneer settlements, 1948–1955.

vated pioneer-type settlers were still considered the most appropriate people to perform these functions. They were regarded not only as well-prepared agricultural settlers, but also as well-trained defenders of the new state's expanding Jewish frontier, and thus served the dual purpose of frontier settlement in those days: enlarging the Jewish frontier and defending it. As a result, these pioneer groups were directed to settle in the Galilee, in the expanding margins of Emek Yizra'el, in the strategically important Jerusalem Corridor, and in the southern coastal plain and the Negev, all regions where previously only a handful of Jewish settlements existed (Figure 7.2).

New Immigrants as Reluctant Pioneers

For less than a year after the establishment of the State of Israel on May 15, 1948, the halutzim continued to play a prominent role in securing the new frontiers for the young state. Though many of the would-be pioneers were still serving in the army and were engaged in the war raging in the country, some of their "kernels" serving in the Palmach brigades were released from active military service, as a result of the pressure put on the army by various organizations involved in managing Jewish settlement efforts on the frontier. These veterans of the Palmach were regarded as the main source of able candidates for settling the frontier areas as the latter evolved during the war and immediately after it.

However, the new frontier regions were too large for the existing pioneer groups. They could not cope with all the new tasks of territory building. As a result, a policy shift took place, though somewhat reluctantly. Policy-makers turned their attention to the new immigrants, arriving in the country in large numbers in those crucial months of Jewish territory-building. The new immigrants settled mostly in the core of the country, many of them in the urban areas vacated by the Arab population as a result of warfare, in the vicinity of Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem. Many others were congregated in makeshift immigrant camps. The newly-arrived immigrants, particularly those coming from Middle Eastern and North African countries, known collectively as Oriental Jews, were initially considered unsuitable for frontier settlement. However, their growing numbers in the immigrant camps, and the misery and potential unrest involved in such a large concentration of people under difficult residential and economic conditions, motivated the government and other agencies responsible for their absorption to find immediate alternative solutions. At the same time, the Israeli government was hard pressed to deal with the many vacant Arab villages and towns across the country and particularly in frontier regions near the armistice lines. The Israeli government was interested in preventing Arab refugees from returning to these villages, especially in strategically sensitive areas. Moreover, in

the Galilee, there were some vacant Arab villages, whose former inhabitants were, by then, living in neighboring Arab villages as internal refugees, harboring a hope of returning to their homes (Al-Haj, 1986). Israeli policy-makers combined two tasks, immigrant absorption and territorial consolidation through frontier settlement, and decided to direct many of the recent immigrants to the vacant Arab villages across the country. The origin of this idea stemmed from the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency then headed by Levi Eshkol. He saw it as a way to tap the huge reservoir of increased human resources for expanding the agricultural base of the new Israeli economy and society (Eshkol, 1958). Ben Gurion, the Prime Minister at the time, formulated this idea into a strategic policy for the next four years, foreseeing "...the settling of 150,000 persons in five hundred new settlements" and "the establishment of a belt of frontier settlement that will serve a decisive role in the security system" (Gevati, 1981: 28–9). Such an effort also had to include the recent immigrants as possible candidates for the settlement of the new frontiers.

During the years 1948–1953, about two thirds of the rural settlements established across the country were *moshavei olim* (immigrant moshavim). The bulk of the "pioneering" settlements were established in the first two years. From then on, the immigrant moshavim were the most active participants in frontier settlement. Immigrant moshavim were founded in many of the vacant Arab villages across the mountainous Galilee region in northern Israel. Others were spread along the lowlands of the southern coastal plain and the northern Negev (Figure 7.3). They were also assigned to fill the Jerusalem Corridor, linking the core regions of Israel with the then-partitioned city of Jerusalem (Figure 7.3). All these regions were regarded as part of the Israeli frontier in terms of strategy considerations as well as their physical conditions. They were mountainous or semiarid, on the margins of the country, and hardly contained any Jewish settlements.

But unlike the "true pioneers," the new immigrants were sent to settle on the frontier with no appropriate preparation and with little enthusiasm. They went to the frontier as "reluctant pioneers" (Weingrod, 1966). Many of them soon returned to the cities of the core regions to join those immigrants who were not sent to settle the frontier, and found their way either to new housing projects built for immigrants or to the old deteriorating neighborhoods. Those remaining in the immigrant moshavim confronted extreme economic hardship, using their limited skills and the meager resources at their disposal to try to make a living. For years, many of these settlements were at a severe disadvantage compared to the nearby kibbutzim and moshavim established by the pioneer-type of frontier settlers. A large proportion of the immigrant moshavim were also




Figure 7.3 Immigrant agricultural settlements, 1948–1955.

ethnically differentiated from the pioneer settlements and they were populated by Oriental immigrants, particularly those settlements in frontier regions in the north and south of the country.

In the 1950s, new immigrants were peopling Israeli frontier regions not only in the form of agricultural villages, but also by settling in newly established towns. Early in the 1950s the Israeli government included a series of new towns—to be populated primarily by recent immigrants—in its plans for settling the frontier regions (Sharon, 1951; Sharon, 1952/3). The planners provided a rationale for the need to build a hierarchy of urban areas to fill the "missing links" between the large cities and the tier of rural settlements (Brutzkus, 1956; Shachar, 1971). The first of these urban localities to be established, for example Kiryat Shmona in the Hula Valley, Beit She'an near the Jordan River, and Ashkelon on the southern coast near the Gaza strip, replaced small Arab towns, which were, by this time, empty of their original inhabitants (Figure 7.4). Others, such as Yeroham and Dimona in the Negev, were completely new towns (Figure 7.4). All these towns were populated by recent immigrants, mostly Oriental Jews, with only a trickle of veterans joining in as the new administrative and professional staff. These new immigrant towns soon became a prevalent type of settlement in the Israeli frontier during the late 1950s.

The new towns established in the frontier regions (Figure 7.4) were also largely populated by Oriental immigrants. As reflected in the 1961 Census, some of these new towns had an overwhelming proportion of immigrants from Asia and Africa (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1966, Table 6): Beit She'an (85.2 percent), Hatsor (97.0), Ma'alot (97.2), Kiryat Shmona (78.7) and Shlomi (98.5) in the north of the country, and in the south of the country, Dimona (84.6) Netivot (99.0), Ofakim (97.1), Kiryat Malakhi (94.3), Sderot (95.0), and Yeroham (81.7). In two new towns of the southern frontier the proportion of immigrants coming from the main countries of Asia and Africa was somewhat lower than in the rest of the towns: Be'er Sheva (66.7) and Kiryat Gat (67.3). Be'er Sheva, the main city in the south, had already begun to attract veteran residents of the country, as well as new immigrants from European countries in 1948. Kiryat Gat was settled in the late 1950s when planners and policy-makers became aware of the marked ethnic segregation merging in the new towns and acted to reduce it. The effects of this policy were much more evident in the new city of Natseret Illit, established at the end of the 1950s, and immediately populated largely with recent immigrants from European countries, as well as with veterans also mostly of Ashkenazi origin. Thus, in 1961, only 8.1 percent of the town's residents were born in Asia or Africa. The case of Natseret Illit heralded the beginning of a shift in the policy of populating the Israeli frontier, a shift that will be discussed later in this chapter.




FIGURE 7.4 New immigrant towns in the frontier.

The rapid shift in 1949 to a policy of sending new immigrants to populate Israel's frontier had its immediate massive impact in terms of the population distribution and composition. In September 1953, a special, as yet unpublished, survey conducted by B.Z. Gil, found that while the northern and the southern districts together held 8.9 percent of the Jewish immigrants who had arrived in the country before 1948, the proportion of residents who had immigrated between 1950–1953 was 23.3 percent (Gil, 1957: Table 4.1). Moreover, while new immigrants who arrived between January 1950 and September 1953 made up 22.5 percent of the Country's Jewish population, the comparable figures for the northern and the southern districts were 31.5 percent and 45.4 percent respectively (Gil, 1957: Table 4.1). The impact on the ethnic composition of the Jewish population was even more pronounced. In September 1953, the proportion of Asian and North African born among the pre-1948 immigrants in the northern and southern districts was 6.9 percent and 6.2 percent respectively. However, the proportion of those born in Asia and North Africa who had arrived in the country up to September 1953 rose to 43.1 and 62.2 percent (Gil, 1957: Table 4.2).

The immigrants who had arrived between 1948 and 1953 from North African countries (Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria) were the most "dispersed" group, that is settled in the frontier. In September 1953, recent immigration from North Africa comprised 44.5 percent of the population of the two peripheral districts. (Gil, 1957: Table 4.7). In these districts, the population distribution by country of origin was as follows: Rumania (23.0 percent), Yemen and Aden (21.1), Iraq (20.6), Turkey (14.3), Poland and the Soviet Union (11.7) and Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia (11.0) (Gil, 1957). Out of the European Jews, the Rumanian group was the most "dispersed." Its members were among the founding cohorts of some of the new towns. Many immigrant moshavim in the peripheral regions were also founded by recent immigrants from Rumania. The Polish and Soviet group represented the smallest group living in the frontier; it tended to concentrate in the Tel Aviv District where it constituted 37.9 percent of the recent immigrants in September, 1953. The Yemenite group, as well as the Kurdish one, the latter included in the Iraqi category, were also highly dispersed groups. Many of them were sent to settle on immigrant moshavim in the northern mountains and in the southern semi-arid plains.

The policy of populating the outlying areas with new immigrants, though it achieved some territorial aims, did harm the prospects of integrating those immigrants into the mainstream of Israeli society. In the first decades of the State, integration of the various ethnic groups was formulated as one of the major social goals. The dispersal of population for territorial reasons was defined as another societal goal. The dispersal

of the new immigrants, most of whom were of Oriental origin and far removed from "mainstream" Israeli society, proved that policy makers favored the goal of territorial dispersion over that of sociocultural integration (Cohen, 1969). In the frontier regions themselves, recent immigrants were settled largely in their own separate settlements, set apart from the earlier pioneer settlements. In some instances, the boundaries of rural regional councils were delineated in a way that separated pioneers from recent immigrants. As a result, the ethnic composition of the Jewish population in regional councils was quite varied (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1966: Table 5). Those with a majority of pioneer settlements were largely composed of an Ashkenazi population. Those with a predominant representation of immigrant moshavim were overwhelmingly Oriental in their ethnic composition. The neighboring new towns, inhabited almost exclusively by new immigrants, were islands of Oriental ethnicity. The Israeli frontier turned into a mosaic of Jewish ethnicity and social class, as a result of the shift in settlement policy, becoming more diverse than the mosaic produced by the juxtaposition of Arab and Jewish settlements which characterized peripheral regions in Israel.

By the mid-1950s, the recent immigrants were considered the principal population source for the settlement of those new frontiers added to the Jewish state at the end of the war in mid-1949. This new trend was followed by a rapid reduction in the number of new "pioneer" type frontier settlements. Within a short time, the "strong" pioneers were outnumbered by the "weak" immigrants in the outlying areas of the country, resulting in a change in their social character. These areas, once characterized as a "frontier of pioneers," came to be regarded as a "periphery of new immigrants" (Hasson, 1991). In just a few years, the state institutions, in their decision to direct large numbers of newly arrived immigrants to the outlying areas, contributed to the creation of a weak periphery, one which had not previously existed among the Jewish population of the country. Formerly, the special circumstances of Jewish settlement in the pre-state years had created a rather singular situation, whereby geographically marginal areas were part of the social, economic, and political core of the Jewish population (Shachar, 1971). In many other countries there is a correlation between being in the geographical margins and being marginal in social, economic, and political terms. In Israel such a correlation emerged for the Jewish population, albeit not to a full extent, only during the 1950s, as result of the massive settlement of the outlying areas by new immigrants (Shachar, 1970).

The major policy instrument which facilitated the directing of new immigrants to the new frontier was the public provision of housing. At that time the substantial concentration of economic resources in the hands of central government (Halevi and Klinov-Malul, 1968) made it

relatively easy to divert those resources to the construction of housing, a one-time investment in outlying areas, for those new immigrants who had not yet found homes for themselves. Indeed, a relatively large proportion of the construction of state-sponsored housing in the 1950s and early 1960s took place in the country's peripheral regions. The inexpensive housing provided in the peripheral regions at the time of a severe housing shortage was a decisive factor which motivated the new immigrants to comply with the government's practice of "housing dispersal."

However, while the provision of housing was a task rather easily achieved, the provision of employment and services was not (Zilberberg, 1973). This disparity between the ability to disperse housing and the ability to provide employment was a factor underlying the evolution of Israel's new periphery. Frontier areas have to this day been characterized by high levels of unemployment, low levels of income, and low employment status. As a result, residents of the periphery seeking upward socioeconomic mobility and more amenities, left for the country's core (Shachar and Lipshitz, 1980; Lipshitz 1984). This pattern was followed by many immigrants who had reluctantly settled in the outlying areas; with time, they migrated to the country's core. They were replaced by newer immigrants who were "dispersible" (and indispensable), during their early years in the country.

It is important to elaborate on this concept of "dispensability." Indeed the efficacy of the dispersal policy, implemented by settling new immigrants in the periphery, was generally dependent upon fluctuations in the number of new arrivals to the country. Each wave of immigration provided a new supply of "dispersible" persons (Shachar, 1970). The internal migrants from outlying to inner areas of the country were ethnically differentiated in the 1950s. Many people migrating from the periphery of the country to its core were Ashkenazi Jews originating mainly in Europe. With their departure, the periphery became increasingly Oriental in composition. In Israel of the 1950s, this trend generated a periphery of ethnically segregated towns and villages, in which Oriental ethnicity was highly associated with low socioeconomic status.

Explaining the Shift from Pioneers to Immigrants

Several factors caused the change in the kind of population settling outlying areas of the country, all of which coincided in the crucial first few years following the establishment of the State of Israel. One such factor prompted the decision taken by the Israeli government in 1949 to pursue a policy of population dispersal for the purpose of "a swift and balanced peopling of the country's poorly populated areas" (State of

Israel, 1949/50). The "poorly populated areas" were largely those vacated under duress by their former Arab inhabitants in the course of the 1948 war. The war-time exodus of the Arab population presented the new Israeli government with huge empty spaces that could not be populated using the rather selective earlier practices that directed only well-prepared pioneers to the frontier.

Statehood gave the Jewish population the powers of sovereignty that enabled it to implement the task of settling the frontier with considerably less difficulty than under pre-state conditions. Ample land, now controlled by the state could be allocated and planned for such a task. Security and defense could be provided by the appropriate organs of the new Jewish state and were no longer almost entirely dependent on the abilities of a carefully selected and well-prepared population. In short, the new settlers in the frontier could rely more on the state for their protection, as well as for their supply of resources, than the pioneers of the pre-state years.

In addition to the vacant areas and sovereign powers which were factors enabling settlement, there was the huge reservoir of rather helpless new Jewish immigrants, arriving in the country immediately after the establishment of the state. In mid-1948, there were about 650,000 Jewish inhabitants in Israel. By the end of 1951, a similar number of Jewish immigrants had arrived, many of them refugees lacking economic means (Sicron, 1957). The new immigrants were largely dependent on public resources for the provision of housing and many took shelter in temporary accommodation. The private construction industry was not in a position to meet the challenge of housing poor immigrants, and the government was called upon to provide housing for the newcomers. The huge number of persons waiting in immigrant camps and other temporary shelters tempted the government, hard-pressed to settle the outlying areas of the state, to use these immigrants to secure its hold on these areas in light of the unstable political and military situation. Indeed, policy-makers decided to exploit this "opportunity" and launched a massive peopling of the new frontiers using the huge reservoir of new immigrants.

The dispersal of the rather weak immigrants to the frontier was aided by the general climate created by a combination of a sense of emergency and a centralist ideology. The sense of emergency was fed by the circumstances which ensued after the state's inception: a bitter military conflict; post-war political instability regarding Israel's existence within its newly-gained borders; as well as an economic crisis caused by the demographic upheaval of mass immigration. This sense of emergency lent added importance and urgency to the task of directing people to the politically volatile outlying areas, close to the still insecure borders of the new state. It also offered political justification to the heavy social and economic bur-

den involved in directing the "weak" immigrants towards the country's periphery.

The early years of statehood witnessed the culmination of the centralist ideology which had developed in Jewish society, particularly with its socialist-labor element (Horowitz and Lissak, 1977). Such ideology was especially common among leaders of Mapai (later the Israeli Labor Party), who headed several Israeli governments and major public agencies in the early 1950s. They held a considerable amount of power in their hands, frequently wielding it for purposes they considered important for the political security of the country. Settling the frontier was one such immediate goal. They set about achieving it in spite of the considerable coercion and human misery it involved.

The change of approach towards the outlying areas of the country, transforming them from a heroic frontier to a disadvantaged periphery, took place in the 1950s. This change of approach occurred not only among policy-makers in their decision to direct new immigrants there, but also among the veteran population from whose ranks the pioneer settlers were drawn. A substantial part of this population was attracted to the new tasks and opportunities developing in the center of the country as a result of the growing body of political, economic, and bureaucratic institutions of the new state. For them, the newly defined frontier was no longer on the margins of the country, but in its heartland where individual socioeconomic upward mobility was much more probable. There was a substantial supply of land for housing in the core of the country due to the Arab exodus and the transfer of state land from the British Mandate government to that of Israel. Altogether, the local population had many practical reasons to stay in the central regions of the country, especially since the pioneering fervor had abated in the sphere of agricultural settlement, and new spheres of pioneering activity, including military service, emerged. This change left the government with very few candidates for settling the frontier from the population of earlier immigrants and the native born Israelis. Operation "from the city to the village," launched in the early 1950s to rekindle the interest in the frontier among the local population, was rather limited in scope. The attempt by Prime Minister Ben Gurion to draw veteran Israelis to the Negev by setting an example and retiring there in the early 1950s, was rather unsuccessful (Hasson, 1991). Instead, many of the pioneers already settled in the Negev and other outlying areas, left to participate in the accelerated development of the economy and the governmental system in the more populated regions of the country's core. Only the educationally and socioeconomically "weaker" new immigrants remained to settle the frontier; these were dependent on government for housing, livelihood, and services (Horowitz and Lissak, 1977)

Seekers of Environmental Quality of Life

In the early 1960s, when socioeconomic deprivation and the extent of ethnic segregation in peripheral immigrant towns became evident, the question of who was to be dispersed was raised. The former approach which viewed the settling of outlying areas as the pioneering task of populating a frontier, also regarded it as something to be undertaken by the "strong" and not by recently arrived immigrants. The new towns of Karmi'el and Natseret Illit in the Galilee and the new town of Arad in the northeastern Negev, were established in the late 1950s and the early 1960s under a more selective policy regarding their prospective residents (Figure 7.4). Counting on veteran Israelis and not new immigrants, and choosing the first settlers through a "screening committee," heralded a change of approach to populating the newer towns of Israel's periphery. The concept of a somewhat elitist frontier was reintroduced to the periphery and was no longer based on social and territorial ideologies, but on an emerging life-style of people seeking such amenities as residential privacy, spacious dwelling, adjoining private gardens, and proximity to open space and the natural environment.

This new trend in residential lifestyle, particularly among the Jewish middle-class, generated a series of new settlements during the 1970s and 1980s, some known as *yeshuvim kehilati'im* (community localities), which are neither agricultural villages, nor towns open to any new resident, but rather closely-knit communities of households sharing a quest for residential quality in an ex-urban situation. They put much effort into building spacious and architecturally stylized homes of their own and into tending private gardens. They became an ex-urban variety of the suburban lifestyle expanding on the margins of Israeli cities, and moved even further towards the country's outlying areas, simultaneously establishing the presence of Jewish settlements there. Such ex-urban settlements, mostly small in size, were established in the central areas of the Galilee region in the north of the country (Figure 7.5). These areas were, at that time, densely populated by Arab villages and towns and still sparsely settled by Jews. Until then, and particularly in the early 1950s, the main efforts of Israeli policy-makers were primarily concerned with the establishment of new Jewish settlements close to the Lebanese border. The new ex-urban variety of settlements were intended to increase Jewish presence in areas where it was considered lacking. Indeed, some of these settlements were known as *mitspim*—"observation points" in Hebrew—thus implying their territorial function.

Many of the new settlers in ex-urban settlements in the central Galilee commute to the metropolitan region of Haifa for work, and their income levels are not dependent on relatively limited local employment opportunities. Their ex-urban settlements are chiefly used for residential pur-

poses—"bedroom exurbs"—and not as places of employment. However, high-tech industries have been initiated by some residents attempting to turn their settlements into a high-tech industrial frontier, instead of the agricultural one which existed in the outlying regions of northern Israel a few decades ago. A noted example is the small town of Kfar Veradim adjoining the new Tefen industrial park (Figure 7.5).

Similar ex-urban settlements have been established east of the coastal plains in the foothills and deep in the mountains of the West Bank—Samaria and Judea—on both sides of the 1949 Armistice Line, known as the Green Line (Figure 7.5). The mountains of Samaria and Judea, as well as the Jordan Valley, were gradually added to the Israeli frontier after the 1967 war. The first to settle there were territorially-motivated pioneering agriculturists, following the pre-state tradition of pioneer settlement in frontier regions, who were directed to settle in the Jordan valley (Figure 7.5). Similar efforts took place in the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip (Figure 7.5), as well as on the northeastern edge of the Sinai Peninsula, which was eventually evacuated as a result of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. However, in the 1980s, Samaria and Judea became the prime locus regions for new settlements of the ex-urban type, where residential quality of life was the principal motivation in the settling of areas defined by the Israeli government as the new frontier. In Samaria, the major towns established in the region are Ari'el, Elkana, Karnei Shomron and Alfei Menasheh (Figure 7.5). Added to them were many small community localities, all geographically oriented towards the Tel Aviv metropolitan region. In Judea, many of the new Jewish settlements were built around Jerusalem, where they largely served as the city suburbs (Figure 7.5). Some of these localities, such as Efrat, were formed as Jewish middle-class communities, others, such as Ma'ale Adumim, catered to a variety of social groups.

Similar settlements of the suburban and ex-urban types were established immediately west of the Green Line where, in the early 1950s, pioneer settlements—kibbutzim and moshavim—were usually established (Figures 7.2 and 7.3). East of the Tel Aviv metropolitan region are the communities of Kokhav Ya'ir and Makkabim-Re'ut (Figure 7.5). Lehavim and Meitar were established on the northern margins of the Negev, near the mountains of Hebron (Figure 7.5). They largely relate to the city of Be'er Sheva as their urban focus. All these places are within the internal Israeli frontier and they are largely populated by the Jewish middle-classes.

Though the new pioneers and the ex-urbanites of the 1970s and 1980s had different motives for settling in outlying areas, they shared a common social status. They were generally "strong" households coming to the outlying areas willingly, unlike the immigrants of the 1950s and the




FIGURE 7.5 New communal localities and exburban settlements.

1960s. They were neither from the bottom rungs of the socioeconomic ladder, nor divorced from the mainstream of Israeli society. They shared a capacity for upper mobility and a desire to improve the quality of their residential life. Their settlements look quite similar; the "pioneering" type aspire to the ubiquitous villa and garden much as the ex-urbanites do. Their social and cultural consumption patterns are quite similar to those of the pioneers and the new immigrants in the 1950s and 1960s. As more and more new ex-urbanite settlements spread across the country's outlying areas, these areas gradually lost their former negative image as mainly a "periphery of the weak" and regained their original positive image as part of an enterprising and prospering frontier, where social experimentation, innovative entrepreneurship, and environmental upgrading are likely to reoccur. This newly-assumed image of a "strong frontier" coexists with the image of the frontier as a "weak periphery," still lingering on from a few decades ago as a result of massive outward direction of "weak" immigrants.

New Immigrants Once Again

When large scale immigration was renewed in the early 1990s, and hundreds of thousands of Jews came from the disintegrating Soviet Union, the question of who was to continue to people the frontier was raised again. The immigrant dispersal policy of the 1950s was reapplied with much vigor, albeit not without fierce public debate. This time there were two opposing approaches in the government. One, spearheaded by the Ministry of Housing, viewed the new massive wave of immigration as an "opportunity" and urged the revival of a vigorous policy of immigrant dispersal. The opposing approach, headed by the Ministry of Finance, supported the contention that the best method of immigrant absorption is to follow market forces and allow immigrants to search for employment and housing wherever available. The Ministry of Housing embarked on an ambitious project to build numerous housing units in many peripheral towns, mostly in the south of the country and a few in the north. The Ministry of Finance provided subsistence grants that allowed new immigrants to rent dwellings wherever they wished, and enabled most of them to settle initially in the expanding core of the country. Other new immigrants were gradually moving to take advantage of the less expensive housing opportunities in the periphery. Such a trend developed as more housing units built in peripheral locations were completed, and as increasing numbers of recent immigrants were purchasing dwellings rather than renting them, making use of the heavily subsidized mortgages provided by the government. For many of the new immigrants, the less expensive housing in peripheral towns was an important motivation in their deci-

sion to migrate from the country's core. Others found their way to these more remote towns directly from their country of origin as more and more of their relatives and friends formed initial nuclei of ex-Soviet immigrants there. A gradual spread of new immigrants into the country's periphery has been observed since the beginning of the massive immigration in 1989. The housing authorities were again instrumental, to some extent, in luring new immigrants to the frontier by shaping the geography of housing production at a time of large scale immigration. However, the immigrants of the early 1990s were given much more freedom to choose their place of residence than those of the early decades of statehood.

The main attraction of the outlying towns for the recent immigrants is heavily subsidized housing. Of a cohort of immigrants who arrived from the Soviet Union in the last three months of 1990, 41.0 percent owned their own dwelling after being in the country three years (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1995a: Table 6). The figures for the peripheral northern and southern districts were 45.3 and 60.3 percent respectively (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1995a: Table 6). These two Districts are noted for the relatively large supply of publicly-owned rental housing, usually assigned to households in the lowest socioeconomic brackets, that accumulated there during the previous wave of large-scale immigration. Among the cohort of recent immigrants under study, the overall proportion of households residing in public rental housing was rather negligible—2.9 percent. However, in the peripheral regions, public rental housing among the immigrant households was rather high—23.6 percent in the Northern District and 17.5 percent in the Southern one Central Bureau of Statistics, 1995a: Table 6). The renting of public housing in other districts was almost non-existent. This disparity between the two districts in the use of public housing rentals is an indication of the socioeconomic status of immigrants and their motives for settling in the periphery, in contrast to those immigrants who elected to stay in the core. Indeed, in recent years local officials in some of the outlying towns, particularly in the south, have expressed concern that the new immigrants become a burden on their town's meager local resources, thus intensifying their problematic social situation. This concern is, however, mixed with satisfaction at the benefits provided by some of the more professionally-experienced recent immigrants to the towns.

The question arises whether the new immigrants are drawn to the periphery out of their relative inability to secure employment or purchase housing in the country's core, thus moving to the periphery by default, as did many of the immigrants of the 1950s and 1960s. In mid-1996 it is still hard to formulate a well-documented answer to this question. Insufficient time has elapsed to distinguish the selective migration back to the country's core of the "stronger" elements among the recent immigrants, leav-

ing behind the "weaker" elements, as happened in earlier decades. Nevertheless, there are some indications that more of the "weaker" elements, (in terms of age, health, skills, and family structure), tend to choose peripheral towns as havens of inexpensive housing, thus reinforcing social and economic problems prevalent in these towns since their establishment during earlier immigration waves. In general, however, the new immigrants, with their high proportion of well educated people, also provide the old immigrant towns on the periphery with an ample supply of teachers, engineers, musicians, physicians, and other professionals which, for a long time, were underrepresented in these towns, their services provided by out-of town residents. In this respect, new immigrants come, not to a territorial frontier, but to a social one, where they act as pioneers, albeit inadvertently. They do so not in vacant territory, but among a population that is often ethno-culturally separate and somewhat wary of newcomers and potential competitors. The recent immigrants, unlike those of the early years of state, were not called upon to take part in developing newly-established frontier towns; rather, they were directed to reinforce existing ones.

Not all of the towns in the Israeli frontier/periphery were equally popular with the new immigrants. They tended to minimize their presence in the two extreme ends of the socioeconomic scale. Very few moved to settle in small, middle-class settlements established across the margins of the country since the early 1970s, because of the high costs of housing. They could not afford the detached and semi-detached houses prevalent in these places. Conversely, they were not eager to join the most remote and the least successful towns built for the immigrants of the 1950s. The town of Beit She'an (Figure 7.4) is one of the outstanding examples, with ex-Soviet immigrants coming to Israel since January 1990 accounting for only 4.6 percent of its inhabitants at the end of 1994 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1995b). However, new immigrants did favor those frontier towns established in the second phase of new town building, dating from the end of the 1950s, when considerations of social and environmental quality were employed in the planning and peopling of the towns (Figure 7.4). Indeed, by the end of 1994, the proportion of new immigrants from the former Soviet Union in Israel, since the beginning of 1990, in the northern towns of Natseret Illit, Ma'alot, and Karmi'el was 33.4, 31.5 and 28.2 percent respectively. In Arad and Kiryat Gat, two such southern towns, the proportion of "recent Russians" (as they are commonly known in Israel) was 24.9 and 25.6 percent respectively (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1995b). The town of Sderot in the northwestern Negev, one of a series of new immigrant towns in the country's south, recorded the highest percentage of recent "Russian" immigrants out of all urban settlements in Israel—36.4 percent (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1995b). It

benefited from a large quantity of housing units built by the Housing Ministry, as well as from proximity to the heartland of Israel. The heartland has long been the focus of population, services, and economic development that have been a reference point for the country's periphery. Towns outside the heartland were perennially at a disadvantage, their resident population ending up in lower socioeconomic brackets.

But the Israeli heartland does not have fixed boundaries. It continues to grow and expand to include in its sphere of direct influence an ever-increasing area. Sderot of the mid-1990s has almost the largest relative concentration of jobs and services in the country. It is thus well positioned to attract a sizable number of new immigrants who still have to rely to a large extent on a supply of relatively inexpensive housing. For new immigrants coming from countries where urban regions extend over huge areas, the distance of about 50 kilometers to the core of the country is not significant. For them, Sderot is but a satellite of Israel's heartland. So are Kiryat Gat and even the more remote Be'er Sheva in the south of the country, and Karmi'el and Natseret Illit in the north. The new immigrants, then, more so than the veteran Israelis, are gradually bringing about the constriction of the country's frontier by extending its heartland.

The central question in the mid-1990s is the issue of permanence in the frontier. In the 1950s and 1960s there had been a constant out-migration from peripheral areas to the country's core of those in search of better job opportunities and more ample services. Many immigrants "assigned" to the task of peopling the frontier declined to do so for a long time, at the expense of their own well being. It was often those of higher upward social mobility who dared take up the challenge of forgoing the more promising, but more competitive environment of the country's core. This out-migration has been, in part, the process which has quickly turned the peripheral immigrant towns into clusters of a socially-disadvantaged population. At this point in time (mid-1996), it is still too early to predict whether such out-migration will take place among the recent immigrants who have settled in the periphery. Nevertheless, there are some indications that in the more remote sub-districts of the periphery, namely the Safed and Kinneret sub-districts in the north and the Be'er Sheva sub-district in the south, there were in 1994 negative migration balances for the immigrant population arriving in the country since the beginning of 1990 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1995b: Table 5).

A Mosaic in the Frontier

The changing nature of the process of peopling the frontier had, with time, an impact on the composition of its population and the variety of settlements in terms of their ethnic character and social stratification. In

close proximity are localities from different phases of frontier settlement and therefore of a different socioeconomic and ethnic composition. The northern Negev region, for example, consists of a mosaic of all types of settlements. Arab Bedouin villages and encampments still striving to modernize, are found next to well-planned kibbutzim, who are beginning to incorporate in their economy new kinds of industry and services beyond the agricultural base which characterized their early pioneering phase. Right next to them are immigrant moshavim, established in the early 1950s by newcomers originating from the Middle East or North Africa. They are still struggling to become part of the mainstream of Israeli society but experiencing only limited success. They were brought to the frontier to be agriculturists but are now struggling to find a place in the various sectors of the regional economy, even commuting to the major cities in neighboring regions. The same is true for the overwhelmingly Oriental residents of the nearby "new" or "development" towns that were also established in the 1950s, when many immigrants were directed to the frontier. Some of these towns are still regarded as problem areas in Israel and need a lot of support from the central government. They live quite separately from the neighboring kibbutzim in the region, which keep to themselves. Only in recent years has the population of these towns grown appreciably as a result of the settling of "Russian" immigrants who tend, at least in the first years, to live together, particularly in the new housing projects sponsored by the government. Scattered in the northern Negev are a few middle-class communities, characterized by a higher environmental quality of life and various indicators of affluence. They consist of newcomers to the frontier as well as upwardly mobile households from neighboring towns and villages, all searching for the currently spreading mode of residence—the detached house in a small community. They bring back to the frontier the "stronger" elements of Israeli society, but at the same time serve to emphasize social and ethnic disparities in the frontier, as they do in other parts of the older Israeli frontier, especially in the Galilee in the north. By the mid-1990s, this kind of communities constituted the overwhelming majority of Jewish settlements of the "new frontier" beyond the Green Line, but there they formed a rather hostile mosaic with Palestinian villages and towns.

The wide socioeconomic differences that exist between the various layers of settlement accumulated in the frontier over time. They are partially revealed in comparing their socioeconomic indices for 1992, calculated through a factor analysis based on a series of social and economic variables pertaining to the residential population of these localities (Heimberg-Shitrit and Dor, 1994). All the immigrant towns established during the 1950s in the northern and southern frontier were below the 20 percentile point of the composite index. On the other hand, most of the

smaller, new middle-class ex-urbanite settlements on these frontiers, as well as on the eastern one (near the Green Line and beyond), are over the 70 percentile point. Some reach higher than the 90 percentile point, such as Kokhav Ya'ir and Makkabim-Re'ut along the eastern foothills, and Lehavim and Meitar in the south (Figure 7.5). In between are many of the larger new towns that have been established since the 1960s, such as Arad in the Negev and Karmi'el in the Galilee (Figure 7.4). They all represent the changing strategies applied to peopling Israel's frontier. The strategies have changed over time, but they have had a lasting impact on the character of the residential population of settlements in the frontier.

In Retrospect

In the broader historical context of peopling Israel's frontier, there is a case for characterizing the massive dispersal of the "weak" newly-arrived immigrants of the 1950s and early 1960s as an episode, notwithstanding the long-term impact it had on the spatial patterns of economy and society. There were only about a dozen years of "dispersing the weak" among the seven decades of harnessing the Jewish population to the task of settling the frontier, since the early 1920s. Mostly, it was the "stronger" elements of Jewish society that were the highly-organized and largely agricultural "pioneers." Later, the industrious, amenity-seeking ex-urbanites joined the ranks of frontier settlers. The episode of the 1950s was not fully repeated in the early 1990s, despite attempts to use the "opportunity" of massive immigration to force the recently-arrived immigrants to settle in outlying areas. Moreover, many of the outlying towns, where large numbers of the 1990s immigrants have settled, were no longer the new localities planted in a crude environment faced by the immigrants of the 1950s. These towns are not as far away from the main metropolitan regions of the country as they used to be when they were set up in the 1950s. The towns themselves are not as small and as devoid of services and amenities as they had been when the first wave of immigrants had been directed to them.

The view, then, of the peopling of the Israeli frontier as a long-range task to be undertaken by the "strong," even though they are not numerous in any point in time, characterizes more appropriately the history of Jewish settlement in Israel, in both theory and in practice, than an emphasis on the episodic use of "weak" immigrants as "reluctant pioneers."

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8

Spatial Patterns of Internal Migration to and from Development Towns in Israel

Gabriel Lipshitz

Introduction

The purpose of the present chapter is to describe the differences in population growth patterns and migration trends among development towns in Israel. The chapter is made up of five parts: the first part is a brief survey of studies on migration and development in Israel and abroad. As this survey demonstrates, most of these studies look at migration trends as "large" geographical units and do not address differences among the towns within these units. These differences among towns are the topic of the present chapter.

The second part describes development towns in Israel. Most of the development towns, which are the research units for the present study, were founded in the 1950s, when approximately one million immigrants arrived in Israel, most of them from North Africa and Asia.

The third part describes the differences among development towns in population growth patterns, and the fourth part describes these differences with respect to migration trends. The fifth part, the conclusion, shows that, when examining the differences among the towns that make up large geographical units, there is good reason to switch from an overall development policy for peripheral regions to a differential policy.

Research Background

Most studies published in recent years on the relationship between migration and regional and peripheral development have dealt mainly with "large" geographic units (Lipshitz, 1991a; Shachar and Lipshitz, 1981;

Tabuchi, 1988). Many of them examined migration patterns within a broad core-periphery structure. One such study by Vining and Palone examines changes over time in net migration in the core and peripheral areas of 22 countries. This study shows that in developed countries the positive net migration in core areas declines, and negative net migration from peripheral areas decreases (Vining and Palone, 1982). Vining and Palone show that the trend is different in developing countries; positive net migration in the core increases and negative migration in the periphery increases. Cochrane and Vining show that in the late 1980s, net migration trends changed from those found by Vining and Palone. They indicate that in some developed countries, positive net migration in core areas has increased and, accordingly, that the negative net migration trend in peripheral areas, which until the mid-1980s had been decreasing, has changed and is increasing (Cochrane and Vining, 1988).

Mera's research on Japan (Mera, 1988) corroborates this change in the trend of net migration. Mera explains that the strong attraction of core areas (especially in developed countries) in recent years is chiefly the result of structural changes in the world economic structure and of the economic structure of the developed countries themselves. The increased importance of the financial and business sectors and of high-tech industry has caused the renewed growth of metropolitan areas and their surroundings (the core areas).

Other researchers regard the development of positive net migration in the core areas of developed countries as a process that has strengthened not the peripheries of the countries, but, mainly, the peripheries of the core areas (Champion, 1988; Frey, 1988). In their opinion, most of those leaving the core areas migrate to areas on the periphery of the core and are part of the "counterurbanization" process experienced by core areas.

When discussing the contribution of migration to regional development it is not enough to simply examine the migration patterns and net migration in terms of numbers of migrants. It must also, and some think principally, discuss the qualitative attributes of the migrants, that is, their socioeconomic characteristics (Brown and Lawson, 1989). Peripheral areas are not only troubled by their characteristic negative net migration balance, but also by the fact that negative balances are especially typical among the young, the well-educated, and those with the potential to develop the area economically.

Most Israeli researchers who studied the relationship between migration and regional development did so in the context of "large" geographic units: districts, subdistricts, and "natural regions" (Sicron, 1982; Lipshitz 1991b; Shachar and Lipshitz, 1980[1]). The main finding of these studies is that positive net migration in the core area of Tel Aviv has decreased, and has even become negative, over time (starting in the late 1960s), while

positive net migration to the Tel Aviv periphery has significantly increased. Net migration in the core area of Haifa became negative in the 1970s, after that of Tel Aviv. Net migration in the Jerusalem core area became positive in the 1970s due to massive government support of development in that city. It turned negative in the 1980s following the development of a chain of suburban neighborhoods surrounding the city (including some in Judea and Samaria). In the Negev region (the southern periphery of the country), net migration became negative in the early 1970s and remains so to this day. In the Galilee (the northern periphery), net migration has been negative in recent times, with the exception of the 1978–1985 period, when scores of small community settlements ("mitspim") were set up there, attracting about 2,000 new families.

Do these trends also characterize all the urban localities in the Galilee and the Negev known in Israel as development towns? In other words, are there differences in migration patterns among these towns? Furthermore, are the migration patterns of the development towns in the Galilee and the Negev similar to those of the development towns in the center of the country? What are the socioeconomic characteristics of those entering and leaving the development towns? The theoretical question of the study is: Does the change in net migration in peripheries, (or in core areas) described in the aforementioned studies, apply to all the geographical units (i.e., localities) that comprise these areas? If not, what does this tell us about regional and peripheral development?

Israel's Development Towns

All Israeli governments, past and present, have espoused a policy of population dispersion, generally signifying an intent to distribute the population, economic activity, and welfare services uniformly throughout the country. They have not allowed the "invisible hand" to narrow the demographic, social, and economic disparities between the central and the peripheral parts of the country. The need for such a policy is a consequence of the polarized spatial distribution of the Jewish population in the late 1940s. At that time, approximately 80 percent of the country's Jewish population lived in the central regions (Tel Aviv, Haifa, and the areas between them), 7.5 percent in the northern region, and 10 percent in the Jerusalem area. The southern region was practically devoid of Jewish population.

This polarized population distribution is a spatial result of two pre-independence (pre-1948) settlement processes that gave the country's settlement layout its pattern: spatial policy ("planning from above") and spontaneous processes ("planning from below"). Spatial policy focused on rural settlements, to which most of the national capital in pre-state

times was directed. The urban system was left to "market forces" meaning spontaneous processes. The result was a geographic periphery with a large number of small, rural settlements, and a geographic center with a small number of urban centers in which the majority of Israeli Jews made their homes. In this fashion, spontaneous settlement "outperformed" planned settlement with respect to the number of inhabitants, thus polarizing population distribution between center and periphery. Upon the establishment of Israel, this situation presented the country with a grave geo-political and security problem. Thus early Israeli governments viewed population distribution as a national goal of the highest priority, to be attained by the mass waves of immigration in the 1950s (Shachar, 1971; Kipnis, 1984). Approximately one million immigrants came to the country during that decade, mostly from North African and Asian countries. Some 700,000 immigrants arrived in 1948–1953 alone, doubling Israel's population in five years. To accommodate them, some 90 kibbutzim, 200 moshavim, and 40 urban localities—some defined as "development towns"—were built.[2] Most of the development towns were established on the geographic periphery of the country: the Galilee in the north and the Negev in the south. (Figure 8.1) It was relatively easy for the government to direct the immigrants to these areas because most of the newcomers had reached Israel with no resources of their own, and were at the mercy of the government and the institutions responsible for immigrant absorption and settlement. Due to the low socioeconomic status of the Oriental immigrants (those from North Africa and Asia), the Israeli geographic periphery (the Galilee and the Negev) became a socioeconomic periphery too.

Apartments (of similar sizes and shapes) were built for the immigrants in the development towns before jobs were created. The job creation process, based largely on the industrialization of the development towns, began later and took place mainly in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Most industrialization was carried out in labor-intensive industries such as food, textiles, and quarrying. Consequently, all the development towns developed similar industrial profiles in the 1960s, with little industrial variety (Gradus and Krakover, 1977).

The similarity among the development towns in the 1950s and 1960s was not limited to housing and industrial labor; it also manifested itself in the ethnic, social, cultural, economic, and political spheres. As noted, most of the development town population—up to 90 percent in some towns in the early 1960s—originated in North Africa and Asia. Most of the immigrants from North Africa and Asia had a low socioeconomic status both in absolute terms and in relation to long-time residents. Halevy and Klinov note that most of the immigrants who arrived before 1948 were fairly well-educated in their countries of origin, whereas most




FIGURE 8.1 Research localities in development towns in Israel.

of those who came in the 1950s were destitute and had little education (Halevy and Klinov, 1975). Patenkin notes that the average income of longtime residents was higher than that of immigrants, and people of European or American extraction had a higher average income than people of Asian or African extraction. Because those born in Asia and Africa had larger families on average than European families, the difference in per-capita income was even greater (Patenkin, 1959). In his comprehensive study of income inequality, Hanoch notes that the immigrants of the 1950s (compared to the non-immigrant population) were poorly educated and lacked the technical background needed to fully integrate into a relatively modern economy. As a result, Hanoch says, there were substantial differences in income between people of Asian-African extraction and people of European-American extraction (Hanoch, 1961).

In social affairs, too, the level of the "Oriental" ethnic groups (those of Asian-African extraction) is low. Bar-Yosef and Padan (1976) demonstrate substantial disparities in education and literacy between the immigrants of the 1950s (from Asia and Africa) and the rest of the population (those of European and American extraction).

Because of the geo-ethnic concentrations—immigrants who arrived in the 1950s populated a large portion of the development towns—the social and economic level of most of the development towns was low in the 1950s. Consequently, as we shall see below, net migration in some of them was negative for many years, and their growth was slow. The ethnic factor had a direct and indirect effect on other variables and was a prime factor in the high outmigration from the development towns, especially by the second generation.

Notably, one may identify correlations between the similarities of the development towns in the 1950s and 1960s by looking at their various features. Thus, for example, the similarity in population composition is related to the similarity in the employment situation, because in the 1960s the development town population was perceived as the important factor in shaping spatial distribution with respect to industry.

It was found that the socioeconomic uniformity among the development towns is diminishing and socioeconomic dissimilarities are increasing. The remainder of this chapter examines the extent of similarity or dissimilarity in the patterns of migration and population growth of Israel's development towns.

The Process of Population Growth

Research on differences in population growth and migration patterns among various Israeli "development towns" is of spatial and socioeconomic significance to Israel for several reasons:

1. The development of outlying localities, as manifested inter alia in an increase in the population of each of the development towns, is one of the primary objectives of the country's population dispersal policy;
2. A given locality's population-growth process has a direct effect on its socioeconomic level. It suffices to note that the growth of a development town's population raises the entry threshold of that locality in population terms, thus increasing the number of commercial and service entities operating there. These important changes may trigger a cumulative causation process (to borrow a phrase coined by economist Gunnar Myrdal (1957), who describes this process as beginning with an increase in the number of residents in a locality), manifested in the attraction of factories, population, and additional services. This process is capable of giving the town a "positive shock," redefining its image and leading it on a path to growth and prosperity;
3. In development towns, unlike other forms of settlement, differences in population growth and migration balances are important indicators of socioeconomic level. All development towns in Israel have reserves of land zoned for building, most are eligible for substantial housing benefits, and most are categorized as having "national preference" in the referral of new immigrants. A development town characterized by population growth is therefore an "attractive town," which retains its residents and lures the "floating reserve" of migrating Israelis to choose it as a destination. This attractiveness is chiefly a manifestation of the town's socioeconomic level. By contrast, a town characterized by sluggish or negligible economic growth expands, if at all, as a result of natural increase alone. In fact, trends in population growth and migration balance in development towns over time reflect the history of the economic and social development of these towns.

Examining the changes in the population of the development towns since they were founded, we find three major patterns (Figure 8.2):

Pattern 1: A spurt of growth, protracted stagnation, and, in some of the localities in recent years, an absolute decrease in population. The progression of population growth which fits into this pattern is characterized by three major stages: high growth rates (hundreds of percent) over a brief period coinciding with the wave of immigration in the 1950s; a dramatic short-term plunge in the growth rate lasting about five years; and a stabilization of growth at 0.2–2.0 percent per annum over a lengthy period of time. In other words, population growth caused by natural increase, in-




FIGURE 8.2 Patterns of population growth in development towns, 1950–1990.

migration, and immigration is largely offset by out-migration. Some of the towns that conform to this pattern have actually had negative growth rates in recent years. Examples of localities which fit into this pattern are Kiryat Shmona, Dimona, Yeroham, Rosh Ha'ayin, Or Akiva, and Tirat HaKarmel;

Pattern 2: Short-term growth, protracted stagnation, and recent signs of growth. The process of population growth in localities categorized by this pattern may be divided into three stages: growth rates of hundreds of percent in a brief period in the 1950s; a dramatic short-term plunge in growth rates, and lengthy stabilization at 0.5–1.5 percent; a rise in growth rates to 5–10 percent per annum. Some of the localities which fit into this pattern are Yehud, Yavneh, and Ma'alot;

Pattern 3: Positive population growth since the establishment of the locality. There are three principal stages of such growth: growth rates in hundreds of percent for several years in the 1950s; a dramatic drop in growth rates and stabilization at 6–10 percent annually for ten years; a decline in growth rates and stabilization at 3–4 percent per annum. The localities of this type are Arad, Karmi'el, Eilat, and Ashdod.

These patterns are the direct outcomes of three processes: immigration, internal migration, and natural increase. The mass immigration during the 1950s, channeled primarily to the development towns, was the major factor in the brief rapid growth of these towns.

The decline in immigration (until 1989) should be viewed as the primary cause of the dramatic decrease in the localities' growth rates. Natural increase in the development towns, which exceeded the national average in the 1950s and 1960s, also contributed to their rapid population growth. With the eclipse of mass immigration, internal migration became the primary factor in the increase or decrease of the population in the development towns. The end of mass immigration had a more significant impact on the development towns than did the decrease in rates of natural increase there. The two effects transformed internal migration in development towns into a particularly prominent feature in shaping the various patterns of population growth. Since the migration balance is the most important of the migration variables affecting population growth, it is discussed at length below.

Migration Patterns

Examination of the variations in internal migration balances between 1962 and 1986 (Figure 8.3) shows that the development towns are not uniform. The study points to four major patterns of internal migration balance:




FIGURE 8.3 Patterns of migration balance in development towns, 1962–1990.

Pattern 1: Negative migration balance throughout the period studied or an alternating positive and negative balance. Localities belonging to this pattern are Hatsor Haglilit, Or Akiva, Ashkelon, Safed, Beit She'an, Sderot, Kiryat Gat, Rosh Ha'ayin, Yeroham, Beit Shemesh, Upper Nazareth, and Akko;

Pattern 2: A shift from a positive to a negative migration balance. Localities conforming to this pattern are Lod, Dimona, Karmi'el, Ashdod, and Arad;

Pattern 3: A shift from a negative to a positive migration balance. Relevant localities are Yavneh, Ma'alot, and Afula;

Pattern 4: A positive migration balance throughout the period studied. The localities conforming to this pattern are, Eilat and Yehud.

Notably, there is a strong correlation between the ranking of the localities appearing in the above internal-migration patterns and their ranking in the foregoing population-growth patterns. The Spearman coefficient between the population growth rate and the migration balance in each locality level, at various points in time, fluctuates between 0.75 and 0.90. Most localities belonging to Internal Migration Pattern 1, "Negative Migration Balance since the Early 1960s," also belong to Population Growth Pattern 1, "Stagnation since the early 1960s." Also included in Pattern 1 are localities belonging to Internal Migration Pattern 2, "Shift from Positive to Negative Migration Balance." In most of the latter localities, the stagnation in population growth roughly concurred with the shift from a positive to a negative migration balance during the 1970s. Most of the localities belonging to Internal Migration Patterns 3 and 4 belong to Population Growth Patterns 2 and 3, respectively. It is therefore clear that since the early 1960s, when the magnitude of immigration declined considerably, internal migration has been the major mechanism shaping the population growth patterns; the internal migration patterns are affected mainly by the social and economic patterns.

Regression analysis shows that the reliability coefficients, r^2, between the variance of internal migration rates among different localities and the variance in motorization levels, per-capita income, and unemployment rates, stand at 0.68, 0.65, and 0.70, respectively. It would be interesting to observe in what way the current wave of immigration will affect the population growth rates in the development towns. The "direct absorption" strategy will evidently swell the populations of the major cities and their suburbs but will not trigger substantial growth in the most of the development towns. Without a thorough inquiry, it appears that the development towns that stand to absorb a sizable proportion of the new immigrants are Be'er Sheva and the towns within commuting distance of Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem.

An analysis of migration balance rates over time (Table 8.1) adds four important findings that may be compared with the analysis of migration balance in terms of absolute numbers: 1. Most of the development towns, especially those in the northern and southern districts, do not have stable migration balance levels. The negative rates range, in most of these towns, from values three to sixty per thousand; 2. Most of the towns were characterized by high positive migration levels in their first 3–6 years. After this period, the positive rates plunged dramatically, falling into the negative range; 3. Individual towns such as Eilat, Yavneh, Karmi'el, and Ma'alot have had high rates of positive balance throughout; 4. For local reasons, certain towns are characterized by particularly high values for a relatively brief period after which they return to "normal" values. Yavneh is an example.

These findings show that internal migration patterns in development towns cause shocks to occur in their population growth process. There are periods when migration balance levels are negative at low values relative to the number of residents. At times, the values become more negative, and the towns undergo a "temporary crisis" of population exodus in addition to the "ongoing crisis" generally characterized by negative rates at low values. Rare are the towns whose migration patterns represent a "positive shock." The positive shock in these towns usually coincides with a certain wave of incoming population that strikes the town in the form of a "Build Your Own Home" scheme or the like. With the passage of the wave, these towns shift to low values in migration balance levels—in some cases negative, in others positive.

An analysis of sources of population growth according to its major components—natural increase, internal migration balance, and arrival of immigrants—indicates that the internal migration balance in development towns with population growth rates approaching zero (Pattern 1) is similar in magnitude to natural increase and the arrivals of immigrants. In those towns with growth rates approaching zero, not more than a few individuals have relocated. For example, in 1988, eight people immigrated to Kiryat Shmona, three to Rosh Ha'ayin, fourteen to Or Akiva, seven to Hatsor Haglilit, and nine to Yeroham. In view of the small number of immigrants relocating to these localities, it can safely be stated that the "contribution" of natural increase to these localities is offset by internal migration.

Thus, for example, natural increase in Kiryat Shmona was 1,078 and internal migration was –927 between 1980 and 1982, and 307 and –399, respectively in 1988. In Or Akiva, natural increase was 451 and internal migration –474 in 1980–1982, and 94 and –267, respectively in 1988. In Dimona, natural increase was 1,708 and internal migration –1,381 in 1981–1982 and 397 and –837, respectively in 1988. Notably, these towns

TABLE 8.1 Migration balance rates (per 1,000) in development towns, for selected years

Town	*1962*	*1965*	*1970*	*1972*	*1975*	*1980*	*1985*
Or Akiva[2]	64.0	-29.5	-13.3	-19.3	-34.5	-28.8	-30.8
Eilat[3]	57.1	40.7	58.9	3.8	12.4	0.2	52.6
Ofakim[3]	15.7	-23.9	-19.5	0.0	-29.9	-14.8	-8.9
Ashdod[3]	219.3	38.0	21.1	2.0	14.0	0.8	-3.1
Ashkelon[3]	13.5	-3.7	5.7	-2.6	-3.6	-12.6	-20.7
Be'er Sheva[3]	31.0	4.6	0.2	-5.8	-0.7	-5.4	-12.9
Beit She'an[1]	-38.6	-59.0	-52.3	3.3	-15.0	-13.0	-24.5
Beit Shemesh[2]	-11.5	-33.2	-15.8	-20.6	-31.8	-11.3	-17.1
Dimona[3]	32.8	2.7	-16.3	-28.3	-32.5	-20.0	-30.3
Hatsor[1]	-52.3	-38.6	-29.4	-12.8	-11.2	-5.8	-92.5
Tiberias[1]	-19.0	-37.2	-13.2	-10.9	-12.9	-16.5	-0.4
Yavneh[2]	17.5	8.3	-11.4	-18.1	-12.0	-18.5	33.3
Yehud[2]	-7.0	10.0	3.3	3.6	9.4	4.0	15.6
Yeroham[3]	35.2	-46.3	-2.7	-0.3	-20.0	-23.8	-37.8
Karmi'el[1]	–	–	61.0	5.5	54.6	50.9	58.8
Lod[2]	25.2	7.4	-2.5	5.6	-1.0	-7.8	-18.9
Migdal HaEmek[1]	5.9	-13.5	-0.9	-3.3	5.0	-0.2	1.4
Ma'alot[1]	-18.7	-22.7	-21.0	-18.0	-43.2	36.7	59.7
Upper Nazareth[1]	39.8	-21.6	-10.4	-46.0	-30.0	-3.8	-20.0
Netivot[3]	33.3	7.0	3.7	17.2	-14.7	-12.3	-2.3
Afula[1]	4.6	-25.4	-16.9	-19.6	-21.3	-8.3	-32.9
Arad[3]	–	1.4	1.5	54.2	18.8	-3.1	-26.4
Safed[1]	-4.6	-25.4	-16.9	-22.8	-21.3	-15.7	-32.9
Kiryat Gat[3]	5.7	-20.3	-7.2	-7.1	-6.7	-1.0	-8.9
Kiryat Malakhi[3]	18.1	-4.1	-5.0	-25.8	-7.0	11.4	0.1
Kiryat Shmona[1]	16.8	-29.4	-55.4	-14.4	-45.4	-13.6	-17.8
Rosh Ha'ayin[2]	–	1.5	-5.2	-1.9	-15.0	-12.7	-11.1
Sderot[1]	33.3	-35.0	3.4	-28.5	-15.1	-11.1	-12.0

[1] Northern town. [2] Central town. [3] Southern town.

Sources: Computations from migration data files (computer printouts) of the Central Bureau of Statistics. Some of the research locations in the study do not appear in this table for lack of data.

have rates of natural increase that approach the highest in the country (17 per 1,000 in 1988) and, despite the current downtrend, remain immeasurably higher than the rates found in established localities in the center of the country (8 per 1,000). Therefore, the populations of Central District towns such as Rishon Lezion and Kfar Sava increased at the expense of the development towns by virtue of out-migration from the latter. We take this opportunity to note that 70 percent of immigrants arriving in the 1980s settled in the center of the country. In 1988, for example, 9,000 of 12,000 newly arrived immigrants settled in cities or city outskirts. So did 26,000 of the 38,000 immigrants who reached the country in 1981–1983.

In towns of the third type, those whose populations grew during the period studied, the increase was due to positive values in all the variables contributing to population growth: natural increase, net migration, and the arrival of new immigrants. Thus, for example, natural increase in 1980–1982 was 1,292 in Eilat, 3,417 in Ashdod, and 399 in Karmi'el. Accordingly, development towns that are flourishing in socioeconomic terms are also characterized by net positive internal migration, and are among the few towns that attracted some of the immigrants of the 1980s.

It should be noted that most of the few immigrants of the 1980s who chose to settle in development towns opted for the large ones, such as Be'er Sheva and Ashkelon. This, however, was not enough to cause a dramatic turnaround in population, in view of the net negative migration balance that has plagued these towns, especially Be'er Sheva, for 1978–1988. In 1988, 628 immigrants settled in Be'er Sheva (the largest number of immigrants to settle in a development town that year), against a net migration balance of –3,235. It seems that whenever a large number of immigrants chooses to settle in a given development town, the town's negative migration balance increases, or the positive migration decreases shortly thereafter (see, Lipshitz, 1986). It is reasonable to assume that some of the immigrants join non-immigrant residents in relocating to the center of the country. This finding may attest to an initial incompatibility of the immigrants with the town, or to the immigrants' rapid adoption of the attributes of Israel's spatial-economic structure.

An analysis of net migration according to traits of the migrants (based on the 1983 Population and Housing Census) reveals a relatively high degree of similarity among development towns. Most of the towns are characterized by the negative net migration of "strong population." In all but six towns—Karmi'el, Yavneh, Arad, Yehud, Be'er Sheva, and Migdal HaEmek—the net migration of development town residents with higher education is negative. In all but three—Karmi'el, Yavneh, and Yehud—the development towns have a negative net migration among persons with "prestigious" (i.e., academic and scientific) occupations. In all but five towns—Karmi'el, Yavneh, Yehud, Eilat (ages 15–24), and Beit She-

mesh (ages 15–24 and 25–34)—the development towns have a negative net migration of young people.

Thus the vast majority of development towns suffer from negative net migration among population groups with potential for general and socioeconomic development. This detracts from the community's human resources, and prevents an influx of high-tech and technological industries in which highly educated and trained labor is the main production factor. The economic growth of development towns is thus arrested and the out-migration process aggravated. A proper spatial policy for the economic development of the development towns must therefore be inclusive. It must include housing-development strategies meant to attract and prevent the out-migration of "strong" population groups, the development and improvement of the school system, vocational training programs, and the development of diverse employment opportunities, especially those suited to a population on a high socioeconomic level.

Conclusions

Most scholars who have explored the change in regional patterns of net internal migration in developed and developing countries have observed "large" geographical units. Many of them investigated the long-term change of net migration in a regional core-periphery structure. They did not attempt to investigate this change within a more detailed regional structure, such as main core area, periphery of main core area, secondary core areas, and national periphery. What all these studies have in common is the assumption—either explicit or implicit—that change in regional migration patterns is similar in all localities which comprise the "large" regions (for example, core and periphery).

The significance of this assumption for regional development policy is that the policy warranted for large regions is a unified one. In other words, there has to be a certain policy for the development of a peripheral area in order to mitigate the region's problems.

The findings of this study, however, show that this assumption is insufficiently based and suggests the possibility that regional migration patterns—regional net migration patterns in the present study—differ from one peripheral locality to the next. The study also shows that this difference stems from socioeconomic differences between localities.

The significance of this finding is twofold: in methodological terms, the findings support the approaches that call for increased sensitivity in the selection of geographical research units when studying migration in the context of regional development. In the theoretical domain of strategic coalescence of regional development, the findings should provoke thought in the direction of designing a differential development policy for

peripheries, in accordance with differences found to exist in the migration patterns and socioeconomic characteristics of the localities that constitute these areas.

The findings of the study show that some "development towns" have a positive overall net migration rate even though net migration by traits of the migrants (e.g., higher education) is negative. This supports the approach that stresses studying long-term changes in net migration in a regional-development context, in terms of not only the quantity of migrants, but of their quality as well.

Notes

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1. Israel is divided into six districts, 14 subdistricts, and 40 "natural regions."
2. "Development town" is the customary term in Israel for urban localities in the Galilee (the country's northern periphery) and the Negev (the country's southern periphery). Some urban localities established in the center of the country in the 1950s, and several localities established before 1948, but settled during the 1950s by tens of thousands of immigrants from Asia and North Africa, have at times also been designated as "development towns."

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9

Planning for Ethiopian Jews in the Negev: Issues of Ethnicity and Citizen Identity

Tovi Fenster

Introduction

Ethiopian Jewish immigrants in Israel have undergone dramatic social change as a result of their acclimatization and integration process. Israeli government has been deeply involved in this process of change, trying to direct it by means of regional and urban planning, particularly in frontier areas such as the Negev.

The Negev desert is the largest frontier area in Israel. It is located in the southern part of Israel (Figure 9.1) and comprises approximately 60 percent of the state's area (12,835 km^2), but only 7.4 percent of its population, namely 396,900 out of 5,327,600 in 1993 (Negev Center for Regional Development, 1994). The population in the Negev is characterized by a high level of heterogeneity. It consists of both Jews and Muslim Bedouin, which lead different lifestyles. The Jews, former immigrants and Israeli-born second and third generation, live in development towns, new satellite villages, or rural settlements such as kibbutzim and moshavim, and the indigenous Bedouin, former nomads, live in newly built towns or in traditional agricultural villages (Fenster, 1993). As with many other frontier inhabitants around the world, the Negev population, compared with central areas in Israel, suffers from significant deficiencies in the development of services, especially health and education (Negev Center for Regional Development, 1994). This situation is especially noticeable among ethnic minorities such as the Bedouin and the Ethiopian Jews.

This chapter addresses some basic questions in the search for appropriate planning and development approaches for societies in transition—




FIGURE 9.1 The location of the Ethiopians in the Negev, 1994. (*Source*: Data were obtained from the Ministry of Absorption.)

the ethnic voices of the margins (Sandercock, 1995)—in this case, the Ethiopian Jews. It examines the processes of change which the Ethiopians have undergone by analyzing the relationship between ethnicity and citizen identity, and suggests models of analysis to assist planners in developing more effective and ethnically sensitive approaches to minority integration

The Process of Social Change Among the Ethiopians

Ethnicity in Israeli Society

Israel is made up of a highly varied ethnic mosaic. Since 1948, it has absorbed millions of Jewish refugees, survivors of the Holocaust as well as a large Afro-Asian population, who came to a "promised land" already populated by its Palestinian Arab inhabitants. This meeting of ethnic groups created a highly complex mix of ethnic and citizen identities, the echoes of which still resonate today.

Being predominantly Jewish, the identification of the majority of Israeli society is with a Jewish state. Therefore to some extent, issues of ethnicity and citizenship have necessarily been given less importance in immigration policy, since the primary sense of ethnicity is defined by the Jewish religion and an overriding emotional experience of return from

two thousand years of exile. As the state came into being, this emotional factor, it was envisioned, would ideologically unite each new wave of immigrants. Indeed this is inherent in some of the state's legislation, particularly the Law of Return.[1] However, even with this consensus mentality reigning supreme, the path of integration of each new Jewish ethnic group has been far from smooth. Conflicting identities came to the fore among Israel's Jews, and not just between the Jewish majority and the non-Jewish minority. In the 1970s, poor living conditions and lack of political representation among the underprivileged Oriental Jews from Afro-Asian countries, and a paternalistic attitude on the part of Ashkenazi Jews, who had drawn up the state's ideologies and legislation and formed a ruling class, led to long periods of serious social unrest. Although beyond the scope of this chapter, this gradual awakening of ethnic tensions in Israel was a phenomenon for which policy-makers were unprepared, but it must be pointed out that, as the state matured, the consensus approach to ethnic issues became outmoded, and a new awareness needed to be nurtured. The government was finally forced to face the problems of the Oriental population (i.e. migrating from North African and Middle Eastern Countries), and some major changes have since taken place to improve their lot. However, this may largely have been the result of political expedience, and was mostly concerned with Jewish citizen needs. We shall see that this new regard for ethnic differences may not necessarily guarantee future policies that show greater respect for the ethnic needs of further waves of Jewish immigrant minority groups such as the Ethiopians (not to mention the ethnic and citizen needs of Muslim Arab Israelis).

The Ethiopian Jews

About fifty three thousand black rural-oriented Ethiopian Jews (also known as *Beta Israel*) now live in Israel. They arrived mainly in two waves: the first in 1984 and the second in 1991. In both cases they suffered such great hardships on their journey to Israel that some suggested categorizing them as refugees rather than immigrants (Gindin, 1994). Upon arrival in Israel, they experienced dramatic changes in all aspects of their life. Being farmers, masons, blacksmiths, and potters (Salamon, 1993; Pankhurst, 1995), having lived in an extended family structure (Doleve-Gandelman, 1990), and having followed unique religious traditions, they had to come to terms with totally unfamiliar social, economic, and religious norms and values in Israel. For the majority, the process of change has been difficult.[2] For many, ethnic needs are still causing conflict. Different norms regarding work habits (Doleve-Gandelman, 1990) and family structures, especially sex roles and gender relations (Ben Zvi, 1989;

Elias, 1989), have been especially hard for them to adopt. The difficulties experienced by Ethiopian Jews have, above all, been caused by differing religious customs: their Jewish religious identity has been questioned and their leadership stifled. The Ethiopians are officially recognized as Jews following the decision of the Chief Rabbinate (the supreme Jewish religious authority in Israel), but, in spite of this, they had to undergo until the mid-1980s special conversion procedures in order to be registered on their identity cards as Jews (Corinaldi, 1988). They are permitted to marry under Jewish law only after undergoing ritual immersion (Rosen, 1987). This harmed relations between the Ethiopians and Israeli society at a critical, initial juncture of encounter (Holt, 1995). A further, and contrasting, explanation for the Ethiopian difficulties in Israel was the "religious shock" that the new immigrants experienced when realizing that the majority of Jewish Israelis are secular, and the laws of the Torah are not universally practiced in the "promised land" (Rosen, 1987).

The Ethiopians in the Negev

Approximately 9,500 Ethiopians live in the Negev desert. Their numbers and location are presented in Table 9.1 and Figure 9.1. As shown in the table, the majority live in Be'er Sheva, the capital of the Negev, but the larger number in proportion to total population live in Netivot and Kiryat Gat. Both development towns are populated mostly by former immigrants, arriving from various Western and Afro-Asian countries, and their children, second and third generation Israeli-born. What is very significant in these figures is the low proportion of Ethiopians out of all the immigrants arriving in recent years in each of these towns. This is partly a result of a deliberate policy of the Ministry of Absorption to avoid the concentration of large numbers of Ethiopians in few locations—a measure designed to speed and enhance their integration into the total population. The Ministry's Master Plan (Ministry of Absorption, 1985) thus indicated several guidelines for the dispersion of Ethiopians in Israel: it was recommended that in each location the number of Ethiopians should not exceed 2–4 percent of the total population, and that they should be sent only to specific locations which were defined in the plan as medium level according to welfare and poverty indicators. Only locations such as these, it was assumed, could successfully absorb the Ethiopians and provide employment, education, and social services. In the Negev these locations included Be'er Sheva, Kiryat Gat, Arad, Ashdod, but in fact Ethiopians live in other towns as well. The figures in Table 9.1 show that the percentage of Ethiopians in fact exceeds the recommendations in four locations (Be'er Sheva, Arad, Dimona, and Sderot), while in the others the proportions are higher, but still very low as compared to other immigrants.

TABLE 9.1 The number and location of Ethiopians in the Negev region

Location	*Number of Ethiopians*[a]	*Total Population (/000)*[b]	*Ethiopians as % of Total Population*	*All Immigrants as % of Total Population*[c]
Be'er Sheva	3,900	141.4	2.7	19.0
Arad	400	18.3	2.1	23.6
Kiryat Gat	200	38.3	5.2	–
Netivot	750–800	13.6	5.6	22.5
Ofakim	900–1,200	18.8	5.8	18.4
Dimona	50	30.3	0.2	18.1
Sderot	90	14.6	0.6	23.0
Caravans (temporary sites)	900	–	–	–
Total	9,000–9,400			

Sources: [a]Ministry of Absorption, 1995; [b]Statistical Yearbook of the Negev, 1994, p. 34; [c]Statistical Yearbook of the Negev 1994, p. 111.

The Process of Social Change: Housing, Employment, Language Acquisition, and Cultural Identity

The Ethiopians in Israel have suffered difficulties in almost every aspect of life. Regarding housing, the majority of Ethiopians are from large families and are used to living within an extended family structure. Upon arrival in Israel they have had to adapt to living in small apartments in a higher level of density than the average Israeli (1.47 per room in temporary houses as compared to 1.1 per room for the general population, although it should be noted that 2 per room is the acceptable average in Western society). They also had to adjust to the idea of living in a nuclear family system and often far from relatives. While the Master Plan indicated a minimum of 25 Ethiopian families in each neighborhood or location, the limit on the proportion of the general population meant that relatives were often separated, and it was especially difficult for those arriving in later periods to be re-united with their families. The desire for a communal lifestyle is still common as revealed in the results of a census survey carried out in three cities, Natanya, Afula, and Kiryat Gat (Benita et al., 1993). Even among veteran immigrants (who came in 1984), there remained a natural tendency for the proximity to relatives to be the main reason for choosing a place to live (48 percent). Sixty percent of the Ethiopians in Kiryat Gat said that it is important for them that other Ethiopians should live in the same neighborhood, and 57 percent indi-

cated that it is important for them that others be in the same apartment building. However, these figures are lower among veterans than among the recent arrivals from the 1991 wave, suggesting an adjustment over time.

The recommendations of the Master Plan, allocating only 2–4 percent of Ethiopians in each neighborhood, created many mixed neighborhoods which are called in the jargon "integrative neighborhoods": Ethiopians live together with Russian immigrants and Israeli-born families. The experience of integration is not easy. There are reports of many conflicts over cultural and lifestyle differences. In such neighborhoods there is a need for intensive community work in order to facilitate coexistence.

Another spatial aspect of the Ethiopians' former life which has had to be abandoned, exacerbating an already difficult situation, is the separation of their women in special dwellings, preferably located near rivers, during menstruation and after childbirth. This cultural/religious custom has been particularly hard for them to relinquish, since it denoted their Judaism in villages where there were mixed Jewish and non-Jewish populations (Salamon, 1993). The discontinuation of this custom, because no equivalent quarters could be arranged in modern building units, has led to increased tension among family members. Women who felt exposed and ashamed were forced to resort to using replacements such as balconies, hotel corridors or even a closet (Zehavi, 1989; Halper, 1987).

Dramatic changes have also been endured in patterns of employment. Only 46 percent of the Ethiopians aged 22–64 are employed, while in Ethiopia almost all had worked, the reason being the type of employment available. The majority are now employed in industry (66 percent), or public services (24 percent), and only 6 percent are employed in agriculture, construction, and commerce. In Ethiopia, the great majority (72 percent) were farmers, the rest blacksmiths or soldiers (Benita et al., 1993). These figures are from the town of Kiryat Gat but very much represent the situation in other locations. Only 53 percent of Ethiopians express work satisfaction, compared to 77 percent among the Jewish-Israeli born population. Sixty percent of the respondents said that their income was not sufficient for family expenses.

Language is another indicator of integration. Although 75 percent of those surveyed in Kiryat Gat attended *ulpan* (a Hebrew language school) (85 percent male and 66 percent female), only 58 percent are able to speak fluent Hebrew, only 37 percent are able to write a simple letter and 43 percent able to read a simple letter.

Perhaps the two most significant indicators reflecting the traumatic transition and the still fragile situation of the Ethiopians in Israel are the relatively high number of suicides in their communities, and the rapid spread of Pentecostalism among them. A survey carried out in 1992

among Ethiopians (Arieli et al., 1994) which compared peripheral areas to central areas in Israel, indicates levels of suicide 137–667 percent above the average suicide rate in Israel, depending on the area. Most of the suicides were men in their early twenties to late thirties. These rates are particularly high even when compared to the rates amongst other immigrants in Israel, or to the rates of other immigrants groups in the U.S.A., Canada and France. The reasons for the suicide according to this research are to do with the "acculturation stress" that they undergo compared to central areas in Israel (Arieli et al., 1994).

The quiet spread of Pentecostalism is another indication of their vulnerability. This missionary movement has gained great popularity around the world amongst uprooted people and is based on a new form of returning to Christianity (Rosen, 1995). The spread and success of the movement among Ethiopians in Israel indicate the sense of detachment and the severe economic problems that the Ethiopian Jews face. The exact figures of this phenomenon are not yet known, but it is estimated by the Ministry of Absorption that approximately twenty such centers exist in locations with relatively large Ethiopian populations (Rosen, 1995).

These brief illustrations show that the transition for these people has proved traumatic. The main question is how can planning policies be more sensitive to these processes of change in a community returning to its "homeland" in order to ensure smoother and less traumatic integration.

Later in the chapter, several models of social change are suggested to address the complexity and fragility of the process, and to facilitate the translation of a new, more open view of minority needs into planning and development. But first, the two dominant identities in the process of social change—citizen and ethnic—must be identified.

Definition of Terms—Ethnic and Citizen Identities and Their Translation into Planning Terms

Ethnic and Citizen Identities

Each individual possesses a number of identities, pertaining to his/her sex, age, class, ethnicity, religion, political orientation, etc. A process of social change means, among other things, changes in the relationship between and within these identities. The focus in this chapter is on two sets of identities: ethnic and citizen identities. Why these two identities in particular? It is suggested here that an analysis of the dynamics between the two is required in order to illustrate the main difficulties of social change encountered by ethnic minorities and immigrants. This involves the tension between ethnic identities, which tends to highlight differentia-

tion between groups in a society, and citizen rights, which collectively define these groups and their members as equal. This tension, as we shall see, gives rise to complex contradictions in planning and development.[3]

Some may argue that to make a distinction between ethnic and citizen identities is to take a paternalistic approach, since respect for ethnic identities should be an inherent part of a delineation of human or citizen rights. However, realities in multiethnic societies, and indeed in most planning systems, highlight the need to respect this distinction. As stated by Smith (1981), collective planning usually carries with it a tendency to think in terms of the needs of the state as a whole rather than of its constituent parts, and hence overlooks special identities, particularly when these fall within the cultural and socio-psychological realm. Taking this into consideration, the approach presented in this chapter defines ethnicity as a separate entity, separate from social or economic definitions, and not as part of citizen identity, because of the "danger of the insensitivity to less amenable and perhaps more subtle cultural needs" (Smith, 1981) which arises in development planning. Ideally, ethnic rights should be seen to form an integral part of citizen rights.

Ethnic and Citizen Identities in Planning Terms

Planning theories usually distinguish between two categories: procedural planning and progressive planning. The former emphasizes a rational comprehensive approach to plan-making, involving a formal, top down process, rather than addressing more deeply unique social and cultural aspects. The later represents a more open view of social structures and relations. In Israel, the procedural approach has invariably been favored precisely because of the multiethnic nature of its society, and the over-riding need to foster a national consensus ideology in a young state. This approach relies on functionalist modernist thinking to achieve its goals. Progressive planning, however, approaches the planning process not merely as a formal top-down exercise, but more as an on-going dialogue between institutions and groups of beneficiaries. This type includes: advocacy planning, negotiated planning, whereby plan-making is regarded as a mutual learning process between planners and the target groups, critical planning, and radical planning (Alterman, 1994). All these types attempt to broaden the vision of planners by opening up the official process to groups whose views and interests had not previously been served, in the hope that it might create a more representative form of urban and regional planning projected at the "have-nots" irrespective of their origin. Participation of target populations in planning and development is now beginning to gain interest among planners and practitioners as a tool to identify and facilitate the understanding of needs (Paul, 1987;

Moser, 1989a), but there has, so far, been little specific attention given to distinguishing between ethnic and citizen identities.

Moreover, despite the general shift from the "melting pot" view and assimilation theories of the 1960s towards accepting ethnicity as a recurrent feature of cultural and social organization (Horowitz, 1985; Smith, 1981; 1992), there has been no parallel shift in the common planning process, and progressive planning is not commonly in use. An attempt is made here to advocate the incorporation of a new awareness of ethnic and citizen identities in planning, in terms of both an understanding of context and the creation of the new methodologies. The Ethiopian experience serves to illustrate the necessity for this new focus.

Identifying and defining identity interests within ethnic groups is clearly the highest priority. Then it will be possible to translate them into planning needs which, according to Moser (1989b), are the means by which these concerns may be addressed in formulating policies and planning frameworks. In turn, distinguishing citizen and ethnic identities in planning terms allows for a deepening in understanding of citizen and ethnic needs.

Citizen needs call for a given group to be treated as equal citizens. This definition has, of course, many implications for the political power of ethnic groups and their equal integration into the economic, political, and social life of the society at large. In development planning, this may include assuring equality in development components, such as providing the basic infrastructure services in new neighborhoods, equal employment opportunities, unhindered access to services including education and health, and ensuring the ongoing implementation of plans. These, in fact, are seen as basic needs which should be provided by the state to all its citizens impartially.

Ethnic needs concern the cultural and religious identities of people in society. These may be expressed in distinct values, social norms, traditions, and customs, and in the preservation of language, unique clothing, and different diet. In spatial terms, these identities may be expressed in preserving separate social, religious, educational, and cultural institutions, and perhaps even different types of housing systems or settlement patterns, to suit the different life-style of a group. The latter is particularly relevant to the Ethiopians, in the adaptation of the existing housing system or education system to their specific and unique needs.

A planning procedure which aims to take into consideration both sets of needs, citizen and ethnic, must have the flexibility to provide appropriate solutions agreeable to minority groups, while at the same time preserving standards of development similar to those enjoyed by the majority. It means providing the same level of services with a different "content." Such a planning procedure must regard negotiation as a basis of its

agenda and therefore cannot include only the "neutral" approach of existing procedural planning. The latter has traditionally concerned itself with emphasis on consensus, approaching target populations with a uniform, modernist outlook that invariably looks at citizenship from a perspective of assimilation, deliberately avoiding the differentiating, more complex issues of ethnicity.

In order to provide a foundation to deal with these delicate and important matters, it is suggested that we analyze social change in terms of ethnicity versus citizenship, and then translate our findings into planning practice. This allows planners with progressive planning approaches to evaluate first a community's position, and then define, in planning terms, its unique needs. Before discussing the analytical tools to be used, however, a brief review of the current literature on ethnicity and citizenship is required.

Ethnicity and Citizenship in Current Literature

Ethnicity and integration have become prominent worldwide issues in the last four or five decades. Among the many publications on ethnicity, we encounter works on ethnic survival in the modern world (Smith, 1981), ethnic revival of distinctive groups from ancient history until today (Smith, 1992), the analysis of ethnic conflicts (Gellner, 1990a; Horowitz, 1985), the creation of ethnicity (Roosens, 1989), and the relationship between race and ethnicity (Van den Berge, 1970).

Ethnicity is defined by Horowitz as "the feeling of belonging to, and of solidarity with, cultural units wider than families" (1985). It has engendered as wide a spectrum of research as the many spheres of human life it affects. To name but a few: education (Backer, 1990; Safran, 1991; Semons, 1991; Yeo, 1991); linguistic expression (Bromley, 1990; Cliffe, 1989; Hall, 1991; Khawaja and Foster, 1989); politics, ethnicity in developing countries and Eastern Europe (Andersen and Silver, 1990; Cliffe, 1989; Davies, 1989; Flere, 1991; Gellner, 1990b; Krymkowski and Hall, 1990; Mombeshora, 1990; Sheth, 1989; Walker and Andzenge, 1989); household expenditure (Keil and Usui, 1988; Wagner, 1990); agriculture (Khawaja and Foster, 1989); immigration (Bald, 1991; Feuerverger, 1989; Lambert et al., 1990); state and nation (Riggs, 1991); health (Stolp et al., 1989; Wolinsky et al., 1989; Wyatt, 1991); gender (Cox, 1990; Ellis, 1991; Gill and Zimmerman, 1990; Lapidus, 1991; Van der Veer, 1991). Ethnicity also forms the basis for many a political movement (Smith, 1992). Ethnicity or ethnic identity is usually connected to a specific place, either real territories or mythical ones.

Citizenship as a full membership in a community (Marshall, 1950; 1975; 1981), has also been interpreted in various ways in the current literature. For example, Turner (1990) has formulated four types of citizenship

using two variables of passive/active citizenship in public/private sectors. Yuval-Davis (1991) argues that the problem with this model is that it is relevant only to the Western world and it ignores the complexity of relating citizenship to a situation of multi-culturalism.

Why has the subject of ethnicity become so important in the literature? Various causes for ethnic revival have been suggested: imperialism, regional deprivation, internal colonialism, under-development, uneven development, and also the awakening of "historicism" which attracted so many secular intellectuals, going back as far as the 18th century (Smith, 1981). Ethnic movements are also considered a reaction to imperialism in third world countries (Horowitz, 1985). Others take the view that the rise of ethnicity as an issue is also a response to social and economic interests. That is, people change their ethnic identity if they can profit by doing so, which means that ethnicity is something to be played with or to be used for manipulation (Roosens, 1989). In other words, the perception of ethnicity may rise and fall in intensity according to relevant circumstances.

In spite of the increasing use of this terminology of ethnicity and citizenship, much ambiguity remains, especially when it comes to defining ethnicity (Riggs, 1991). Thus, while a survey carried out a few years ago in a high school in the U.S.A. suggests that ethnic articulation varies with the individual's perception of ritual, conflict, interests, and values (Semons, 1991), others consider ethnicity to be a social identity characterized by fictive kinship (Stolp et al., 1989), or view it as a composite of three general dimensions: culture, group membership, and identity (Keefe, 1992). It has also been suggested that the suppression of ethnic identity can itself cause a growth in ethnic political movements (Semons, 1991).

How strong is the case for ethnicity? The results of a recent U.S. survey on attitudes towards societal multi-culturalism versus assimilation gave rise to widespread support for the idea of maintaining heritage cultures, not only amongst immigrant minorities, but also in most majority groups (Lambert et al., 1990). Such intense perceptions of ethnicity, together with the spread of norms of equality, have made ethnic subordination unacceptable and spurred ethnic groups everywhere to compare their standing in society with that of societies at large (Horowitz, 1985).

In the following section, we will present models of social change, with a view to understanding the needs of societies in transition like the Ethiopians in Israel.

Models of Social Change: The Relationships Between Ethnicity and Citizenship

Do "substitute relations" between ethnicity and citizenship exist? This is the major question which the models below attempt to address. Each of

them represents a different viewpoint of the relationships between the two in the process of social change.

The General Model of Social Change

This model assumes that substitute relations between ethnicity and citizenship depend significantly on the class to which an individual belongs, and the circumstances that may cause issues of ethnicity to arise. The model distinguishes three groups which place differing emphasis on the importance of ethnicity. For those individuals belonging to the dominant group in a society (which may be formed by either the majority or minority), the substitute relation between ethnicity and citizenship is of lesser consequence: for them ethnicity is inherent in their citizen identity, simply because they determine the cultural environment. All the same, even in the dominant group, the commutative relationship is not absolutely constant, as changing circumstances may bring about a rise or fall in the importance of ethnic identity. Alternatively, there may be a situation where both ethnicity and citizenship are equally emphasized, such as when an ethnic group expresses a desire for autonomy within a federal state. Finally, where there are poor immigrants, societies in transition, or a large under-privileged group of second class citizens, the commutative relation between ethnicity and citizenship comes to the fore, the rise in ethnicity being triggered by discrimination against them. The remaining models build on this general model.

The Assimilationist Model

The assimilationist model is also known as the consensus model. It assumes that assimilation is a desired and natural process of social change for ethnic and immigrant groups. It derives from the functionalist modernist view which was prominent from the 1940s to the 1960s. This model assumes a replacement of traditional or ethnic values as part of the process of modernization. Therefore the balance between ethnic and citizen needs depends only on whether political, economic, and social discrimination on the part of the society at large against ethnic groups or immigrants exists, or whether, conversely, they have the opportunity to become easily assimilated (Riggs, 1988; Weingrod, 1985). This approach represents the early American sociological perception of ethnicity from the perspective of assimilation and modernization (Smith, 1981). It assumes that it can predict typical immigrant behavior, especially in the U.S.A., where new immigrants strove to become American in every sense of the word, even though they remained "foreigners" (Peterson, 1979).

This approach represents the policies of integration for the immigrant in Israel including the Ethiopians.

To put it simplistically, from the assimilationist point of view, it is assumed that social change is based on the dynamic of substitute relations between ethnic and citizen needs. In other words, the two sets of needs become integrated, and then: E + C = 1, where E = ethnic needs, and C = citizen needs. This equation is illustrated in Figure 9.2. Each point on the line represents a different stage in the process of transition or social change as follows:

Point 1: Ethnic needs predominate over citizen needs (e > c). This constitutes the initial transitional majority/minority contact period. This stage refers to immigrants who have just arrived in their country of destination, as people under these circumstances are wont to remain close to their own community. This first stage may be either short or prolonged, depending on the individual's openness, social experience, self-confidence, assertiveness, etc. In general, this stage represents the situation of the majority of the Ethiopians on their arrival in Israel, and to a large extent even nowadays, the older generation (above age 40) who are called, alluding to the Biblical story of the Exodus, "the generation of the desert" (Holt, 1995). However, there may be a contrasting dynamic, wherein the immigrants' first reaction is a desire for total assimilation, to become "more local than the locals";

Point 2: Ethnic needs and citizen needs are equal (e = c). In this middle stage the past and present play an equal role in society's life and culture. The most obvious example is when two languages are used simultaneously, the mother tongue and the language of the new country;




FIGURE 9.2 Social change: Integration/assimilation.

Point 3: Ethnic needs are less dominant than citizen needs (e < c). This constitutes the phase of assimilation in a society where the unique identity of an immigrant community is not given special importance in planning and policy-making, either because the community is treated as equal to the already established society and does not need to use its ethnicity to counteract discrimination, or because of a great desire within the community to assimilate completely. This stage may represent the younger generation in an immigrant society. Young Ethiopians may also be put in this category, as their exposure to the society at large is wider than that of their elders, and they tend to adapt quickly to the norms and values of the majority.

As already noted, the modernist view of planning, which adapts procedural planning traditions, usually looks at citizenship from the sole perspective of citizen equality, assuming that the disappearance of the "different" is a matter of time, and eventually modern communities will all have the same sets of needs. In Israel, however, for groups such as the Ethiopian Jews and others, (see, Fenster, 1996) this model of assimilation is clearly not applicable, at least not in the first years after their arrival. Some would also argue (Holt, 1995) that the Ethiopians require a much longer period of adjustment because of entrenched racial differences not unlike those experienced by African-Americans. Here we see the basic weakness of the assimilationist model: it is only applicable when ethnic differences between majority and minority do not threaten each other. So, to address this deficiency, another model is suggested, namely the pluralist model.

The Pluralist Model

A pluralist view of societies has gained more attention in recent years. It has become clear that some groups jealously guard their ethnic identity, not necessarily as a tool against discrimination, but through ideology and deep sentiment regarding their ethnic roots or religious beliefs—what Smith (1992) calls "the myth of ethnic election." It is also becoming evident that the adaptation of ethnic groups to the surrounding dominant culture varies, often being bound up with religious tradition. Poignant examples of this in America are the Jews (Portugali, 1993), the Amish, the Catholic Poles, and the Irish, all of whom retained their ethnic identity, irrespective of their degree of adaptation to the conditions in their host society. In such communities ethnic organizations flourish. The same may apply to middle and upper class immigrants, for whom issues of economic discrimination do not arise (Jongkind, 1992). Portugali (1993) analyses human development as a furcative form of change. An example is the rise and fall of the Soviet Union. Although the 1917 Communist

revolution suppressed religious, nationalistic, and ethnic aspirations, these did not die but rather became integrated into the implicate order, later to revive and become entities of the explicate domain.

Thus, in light of these experiences, the pluralist model of social change (Figure 9.3) assumes that the level of ethnic and citizen needs depends on a variety of components, such as social standing, political integration, sense of belonging, cultural values, religion, and history, all of which are liable to change. The curves express the relationship between ethnicity and citizenship throughout the process of social change for different groups. This model does not necessarily assume the disappearance of ethnicity at any stage, as in the assimilation model. Ethnicity and citizenship are complementary and not substitutive. This means that, although the immigrants have moved some distance towards acculturation, they may also have developed new interest and pride in their ethnic past (Peterson, 1979; Portugali, 1993; Riggs, 1988). This of course depends on the ethnic group's character, in that one group may wish to maintain traditions, while another may seek radical transformation (Riggs, 1988). It also may be that in some aspects of life there will be a process of assimilation while in others, preserving uniqueness is desired. In certain situations, ethnic feelings may be so strong as to lead to a demand for total autonomy or home rule within the structure of a federal state (line A in Figure 9.3). In this context one should note the remarkable fact of the double loyalty of ethnic groups to their ethnic community and to the state (line D), which exists in ethnic revival movements in Europe and Canada.

Taking all these factors into account, the pluralist view of social change requires a different planning methodology, one which is more open and participatory in nature. The example of the Ethiopians clearly demonstrates this point. The dramatic changes in their lifestyle—in housing, em-




FIGURE 9.3 Social change: Pluralism.

ployment, language, and cultural habits—demand a different planning approach which would honor and integrate their ethnic or cultural identity as well as provide them citizen rights. Progressive planning, and especially negotiated planning, seem suitable to this approach. As we have suggested, planning should be regarded here as a mutual learning process between planners and their target groups, and as fostering negotiation, the latter being a means to meet both ethnic and citizen needs within the constraints of planning.

Planning and Development for the Ethiopians in Israel: A Suggested Framework

It is true that this new approach involves deeply complicated questions. For instance, can such plans keep up with the changing needs of a society, and what happens if a given group undergoes a process of assimilation and its unique and ethnic needs vanish, maybe within a few decades? If the expression of needs changes, how do you solve the problem of the state's high investment in providing different solutions for different ethnic groups? Thus a further question must be asked: how can we bridge the gaps between the changing needs of societies and planning procedures? Research must focus on the unique needs of each new group, to find suitable solutions in all the various fields of employment, housing, education, culture, and political representation.

The experience that the Ethiopian immigrants and other societies in transition share, highlights the difficulties that must be considered in government supervision of regional and urban planning. In this paper, this process has been analyzed from the perspective of the relationships between ethnicity and citizenship. In order to clarify the issues involved in the process, models of social change were formulated, each of which represents different views of this complex relationship and different planning perspectives. In the past, bureaucratic planners have tended to ignore local differences and historic peculiarities, choosing to impose ideas which matched their own notion of cultural and historic diversity, giving priority to the needs of the state rather than those of its constituent parts. These new models could direct planners to accurately determine the situation of a community at a given moment in time and space. It may be that the *process* of change that a society (as well as an individual) experiences has a different rhythm in different sectors of development, so that in one sector it is more citizen-oriented, that is, it defines its unique needs as of less importance, while in other areas it is more ethnic-oriented. The suggested setting would facilitate the formulation of a planning framework flexible enough to accommodate the changing needs of communities. Each of the models can be applied to the process of social

change and allow for varying degrees of assimilation, while preserving ethnic uniqueness where possible. In this way they permit the recognition of and respect for diversity.

Applying these models to the planning process is a first step. It clearly needs to be followed by the adoption of a planning methodology which incorporates the political dimension of planner-beneficiary negotiation as its central concern, and abandons the traditional planning methods based on consensus thinking. This new line of thought is especially important when discussing the development of frontier areas, as these areas suffer from conditions of underdevelopment especially in infrastructure and social services. As a result, they need careful attention when formulating planning procedures so that the voices of the margins can be heard.

And last, but not least, the first two models presented above approach society as a single entity. At this point, it is suggested that the relationship between ethnicity and citizenship requires deeper examination. Other categories within society, such as class, gender, and age must be addressed in light of ethnic and citizen needs, and clearly, further research is needed to delve into the intricate dynamic between these two dimensions in each of the subgroups.

Notes

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1. The Law of Return stipulates a Jew's right to immigrate to Israel and to receive Israeli citizenship automatically.
2. Much has been written describing the difficulties Ethiopian Jews faced in coming to Israel. See for example, Westheimer and Kaplan (1992) and Ashkenazi and Weingrod, eds. (1987).
3. The conceptual framework suggested here focuses only on the dynamics of ethnicity versus citizenship for ethnic groups that are part of one democratic political unit with well-established values of citizenship, such as the U.S.A., Canada, the countries of Western Europe, and Israel. The dynamics of the separation of ethnic groups for political or for cultural and socioeconomic autonomy within one federal state is not included in this structure.

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10

From Periphery to the Core: Sources of Ethnic Political Leadership[1]

Lev Luis Grinberg

Introduction

This chapter analyzes the association between ethnicity and local government or leadership, and discusses the geographical, sociological and political significance of the findings. The close association between voting patterns and ethnic origin has been illustrated in many studies, but the explanation of the phenomenon, its significance and the degree of its continuity over time, have remained a matter of controversy. This chapter attempts to clarify the above issues by analyzing Israel's ethnic geography and comparing this to the ethnic origin of the people elected to local government. Local government serves, in this study, as an arena for examining a covert phenomenon which is difficult to detect. The study utilizes the role of local government as a precursor, whose transformations have been noted in the past to foreshadow later political changes on the national level. For example, the weakening of the Mapai Party and the increasing strength of the right-wing parties in the 1965 municipal elections, or the establishment of the Shas Party in Jerusalem in 1983, foreshadowed the phenomena which occurred later on the national level.

For the past few decades, the development of ethnic relations has been discussed in Israel on both empirical and analytical/theoretical levels. The aim of this study is to contribute empirical data about ethnic representation among local government activists and to examine possible theoretical interpretations. The sociological study of ethnic relations in Israel is characterized by multiple and varied approaches which may be categorized in different ways (Smooha, 1984; Weingrod, 1985). This study will merely differentiate between the cultural approach, that regards the eth-

nic phenomenon first and foremost as a result of the difficulty experienced by Jewish immigrants from Asia and Africa in integrating into modern Israeli society (Ben-Rafael, 1982; Eisenstadt, 1967; 1969), and the conflict approach, that attributes the emergence of the phenomenon to discrimination against Oriental Jews by the veteran Ashkenazi Jews (Smooha, 1978; 1984; Swirsky and Bernstein, 1980; Swirsky, 1981).

The present study does not concentrate only on Oriental Jews, but examines and compares all the Jewish political activists in local government. Thus it conforms to the basic assumption of the conflict approach, which links voter behavior to patterns of ethnic identification (both Ashkenazi or Oriental) (Peres and Shemer, 1984). However, from another point of view, this study is closer to the underlying assumptions of the cultural approach, in that it regards the ethnic division in Israeli society as not necessarily dichotomous, and makes no assumption of Ashkenazi or Oriental homogeneity. The degree of ethnic homogeneity is perceived as a research question and not as a theoretical assumption (Ayalon et al., 1987).

Previous academic literature on ethnicity in Israel is reviewed at the beginning of the chapter, along with the historical-political background of the development of local government and its ethnic context. This is followed by a description of the methodology used to collect and categorize the data presented in this chapter. The findings are then presented in two sub-sections: (1) demographic findings and, (2) the relationship between ethnicity and the various political parties. The summary and discussion in the final section then link the findings to the original theoretical discussion.

Theoretical Background

One of the main differences between scientific approaches to the study of ethnic relations in Israel is rooted in the different interpretations they give to the close link between ethnic origin and socioeconomic status. Researchers adopting the cultural approach regard the traditional culture and primordial relations of the Jewish immigrants from Muslim countries as the main explanation of their difficulty in integrating into westernized Israeli society. According to the cultural approach, the origin of contemporary social differences lies in the cultural heritage of the past, and the trend is one of diminishing gaps, as the Oriental Jews are increasingly exposed to the modern, egalitarian Israeli system. If the gaps do not disappear in one generation, this is not to be understood as the failure of the explanation; rather, proponents of this approach recommend examining the differences between the various Oriental Jewish groups and their

varying ability to modernize and integrate into society (their potential for social mobility).

In contrast, the conflict approach identifies the existence of a socially, economically, and politically dominant Ashkenazi group, that has a manifest interest in hampering the Oriental Jews in order to maintain their own dominant position. The conflict approach recognizes the cultural differences, but argues that Oriental Jews became a distinct ethnic social category because of their contentious encounter in Israel with the dominant Ashkenazi group, and not because of their heritage. Upon their arrival in Israel, Oriental Jews were relegated to the periphery in every way. In the labor market, they were employed in low-paying, low-skilled jobs, in some cases taking the place of Palestinians who left the country in 1948, and in other cases replacing veteran Ashkenazi Jews who moved on to more professional, administrative, and even top management positions. Oriental Jews were also located in the geographical periphery, mainly on land and in homes abandoned by the Palestinian refugees. The national policy of population dispersion meant taking over Arab land and houses in order to establish Israeli sovereignty, and thus the Oriental Jews became a tool in the national conflict with the Palestinians that had developed in the Land of Israel prior to the mass immigration from Mid-Eastern countries.

The relationship between social and geographical peripherality transformed the link between ethnicity and status into a structural phenomenon that was almost impossible to circumvent. Not only did exposure to the Israeli educational system fail to help Oriental Jews overcome their peripherality, it exacerbated the problem. Nahon's studies (1984; 1987) indicate that among those educated in Israel, the gap between Oriental and Ashkenazi Jews is increasing in the areas of education and employment. This gap is therefore due to the structuring and institutionalization of ethnic relations shaped in Israel as a result of the encounter between the two groups. Moreover, if differences in educational level between Israelis from diverse countries of origin did originally exist, these disappeared within one generation, leading to the formation of two quite distinct ethnic categories: Ashkenazi Jews and Oriental Jews (Nahon, 1987; 1993a,b).

The findings regarding education and employment correlate well with one of the political expressions of the phenomenon, as reflected in ethnic voting patterns (Peres and Shemer, 1984; Shamir and Arian, 1982; Diskin, 1988), according to which there is a great degree of ethnic homogeneity among voters in both groups. This combination of data emphasizes the importance of research into the political field as one of the clear expressions of the polarization between Oriental and Ashkenazi Jews in Israel.

The uniqueness of the present study is that it does not focus on the voters, but rather on the people they elect, and tries to examine the subject by analyzing the differential advancement of Oriental and Ashkenazi activists in the political sphere. However, I do not assume the existence of a uniform category of 'Oriental Jews.' Instead, I examine whether there is indeed a difference between electees of Asian as opposed to North African origin, as categories that may represent different social phenomena: those who are mobile and enter the middle class as opposed to those trapped in what is known as the "cycle of poverty" (Eisenstadt, 1993).

Does the very creation of an ethnic phenomenon, and even its exacerbation, necessarily indicate its nature? Ben-Rafael (1982) argues that the main problem lies only in those Israelis of Oriental origin found in low social strata, while the others have succeeded in integrating into the middle class and have abandoned their communal-cultural relationship to those of similar origin. In contrast, Swirsky (1981) argues that the Oriental Jews are discriminated against as a whole because of the class (bourgeois) interests of the Ashkenazi Jews.

According to Ben-Rafael's analysis, it would seem that the Oriental Jews, trapped in the cycle of poverty, have not succeeded in improving their status because of a lack of leadership, among other things, since the few who do advance economically or professionally abandon their brethren of like origin and assimilate into the middle class. This argument may be true in different areas. However, the political realm is fundamentally different to economic or social spheres, in that it is a collective action of social groups, in which ethnicity can become a resource for mobilizing support. If, in the economic or social sphere, individuals can abandon their group of origin even if it is discriminated against, the matter is more complicated in the political realm (and in cultural realms as well). The political activist interested in mobilizing support must try to express sentiments that provide a sense of collective identity, and therefore, to the extent that feelings of ethnic identification exist in society, must appeal to these feelings. This logically leads to the conclusion that research on the degree of representation of ethnic groups on the local level can indicate the existence of the phenomenon as it is interpreted by the activists and responded to by the voters.

Herzog (1986) studied the question arising from the conflict approach: the failure of political organization based on a separate ethnic base. She found that the process of enlisting voters' support, and the legitimization of appealing to ethnicity, are inherently contradictory. She argues that an important characteristic of the Israeli political system is the double message transmitted by the dominant groups: manipulative use of ethnicity as a means of obtaining support, combined with a denial of the legitimacy of independent ethnic organizations because they conflict with the

important national principle of social integration (ingathering of the exiles). Thus ethnic activity is seen as legitimate within the dominant political parties but not outside them.

If indeed intra-party activity is the legitimate arena for mobilizing support based on ethnic origin, here may lie the explanation (along with the widening of the gap and the exacerbation of feelings of discrimination) for the broad ethnic division in the support of the two large political blocs. The Likud, on the one hand, maintains the double message in the sharpest possible way—absolute negation of any differences between Jews by emphasizing the nation, alongside sophisticated use of Oriental Jews' feelings of ethnic discrimination in order to obtain their support. The Labor Party, on the other hand, represents the demand of the ruling groups in the economic and social spheres of assimilation (especially of Oriental Jews) into the dominant culture, which is possible mainly for the mobile groups who join the middle class.

Historical Background

The importance of local government as an arena of political activity that influences the core goes back only as far as the establishment of the state. Before then, local government was marginal in the Zionist political system. The Jewish National Institutions of the Mandate period regarded rural-agricultural settlement as their main goal, and dedicated most of their efforts to promoting it. Urban development took place in an unsupervised manner and was carried out by the local elite—merchants, craftsmen, and the farmers of the early settlements *(moshavot)* who identified with what was known as 'civil,' liberal circles. This was, to a great extent, the opposition to the workers' parties that ruled the national institutions.

The establishment of the sovereign state of Israel created a need to redefine the relationships between local government and the national leadership. This redefinition brought about the national government's close control of local government's activity. In the first years of the state, local government still had a significant degree of autonomy, especially in the cities and veteran moshavot. The move to closer control by the central government was reflected in the difference between the election results of 1950 as compared to 1955, when the power of the General Zionists decreased significantly and Mapai's power grew. From 1955 on, elections to local government took place together with elections to the Knesset, until the promulgation of a law regarding the individual election of mayoral candidates in 1975. In 1978, 1983, 1989 and 1994, local government elections were separate from the Knesset elections. The results of the first two of these election campaigns are analyzed below.

Israel's small size and centralist political and party system helped create a pattern of almost absolute dependency of local government on the national government. According to this pattern, every legislative and budgetary activity of the local government requires national government approval, first and foremost that of the Ministry of the Interior. Local government is dependent on the central government for the placement and development of industry, and for policy formulation and implementation in the areas of housing, health, education, employment, welfare, and police affairs. It is true that schools and welfare offices are under the jurisdiction of the municipalities; however, the latter are dependent on the national government for budget allocation and policy decisions in these areas as well.

One of the main causes of the local government's dependency on the national government in the first years of the state was the tremendous demographic change that occurred then. The national government had to supply the needs of the new immigrants and, most importantly, establish new settlements. Thus, local government was dependent on the national government in the most existential manner possible: would a settlement be created or not? Would it be expanded or not? Public housing policy was itself a tool in the hands of the ruling party to obtain political support on the local level (Gonen and Hasson, 1982).

The population of new immigrants was settled according to national and security considerations as defined by the government: first in the homes abandoned by the Palestinian refugees of 1948 in the cities; in the second stage, in the rural areas and border regions; and in the third stage, in areas with a high concentration of Arab population. The policy of settlement, which stemmed from the nationalist-Zionist principle of 'conquering the land,' conflicted with another nationalist-Zionist principle, the 'ingathering of exiles,' integrating and absorbing the immigrants. Locating the Oriental Jewish immigrants in the periphery that had been settled before 1948 by Palestinians, created homogeneous settlements, almost purely Oriental, and damaged the attempt to build one nation by integrating the immigrants from the various Diaspora communities (Cohen, 1969).

In the first years of the state of Israel, two forms of urban settlement can be distinguished—the veteran settlements and the new towns. The veteran settlements had an established and institutionalized party leadership, and enjoyed a certain amount of autonomy and initiative in determining policy and creating a mutual relationship with the central government. The new towns, established by the government according to its own considerations, were populated by new immigrants, upon whom an appointed local leadership was imposed, and who were absolutely dependent on the central government.

Local government gradually passed into the hands of the new immigrants, closely supervised by the political core. The Ministry of the Interior was authorized to decide when a settlement was ready for self-government. The participation of settlements in local government was, of course, accompanied by the involvement of the coalition parties. Consequently, power relations and political struggles between parties in the parliamentary and governmental spheres became extremely relevant to local government. Negotiations to establish coalitions in local government were connected to the national coalition negotiations. This fact made it difficult for local political forces to arise and push activists in local government to act in the framework of national parties and under their authority (Shimshoni, 1982; Arian, 1973). While it is true that groups of immigrants from Asia and Africa tested their power in local government by establishing independent parties as early as the 1950s, the phenomenon disappeared by 1965. The first striking change that reflected the desire to shake off the ruling party establishment and to protest against the pattern of dependency came in 1965. In that year, the opposition parties (Gahal and Rafi) received more votes in local elections than in the Knesset elections (Weiss, 1970; Weiss, 1974). Local government became, therefore, the arena of public activity for new political and social forces.

The allocation of resources by the local government is a significant incentive for such activity. Even though major decisions are made in the central government, local government as a whole allocates fairly large resources. Political entrepreneurs work to get votes with the aim of participating in and controlling the allocation of resources. One of the relatively easiest and accepted ways of acquiring support is recruiting political entrepreneurs of various ethnic origins. Moreover, the friction between ethnic groups competing over allocation of resources is quite striking in local government, because people know each other well and know who gets what (see, Deshen, 1970). Ever since 1965, and especially after 1967, local government became one of the places most open to activists seeking to enter politics, because in these elections they were practically speaking to the individual (Arian, 1973). This phenomenon encouraged many to demand legislation permitting individual elections in local government, which was approved in 1975.

The striking difference between veteran cities and the small towns regarding dependence on the central government decreased over the years. Local leadership developed in all localities and created a similar party base. Economically speaking, however, the difference remained very significant. While the older cities developed and grew, thanks to local economic and social forces, the new towns and cities, in contrast, remained undeveloped, offering entrepreneurs from outside fertile ground for investing with government subsidies. However, when they utilized

available labor, they did not contribute to real local development. The peripheral 'development areas' became areas of stagnation, with few opportunities for professional careers, in contrast to the veteran cities, especially the metropolitan areas of Tel Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem (Spilerman and Habib, 1976; Razin, 1984). Normal regional relations between the city and the rural areas could not be established in the new towns, due to the national urgency to conquer the lands before 1948 and to control organization of agricultural settlements (the kibbutzim and the moshav movements) that supplied all their administrative, marketing, and cultural needs, which are elsewhere usually supplied by adjacent urban centers (Shachar and Razin, 1987). The centrality of the three major cities, politically and socioeconomically, is therefore the result of a peculiar process of settlement in Israel. However, this development did not stop, and indeed may have accelerated, the social processes taking place in the peripheral towns, especially the rise of a new local elite.

Local government was chosen for study because of its outstanding characteristics—its dynamism and its promotion of new leadership. These two characteristics are especially prominent in the period studied due to three main factors:

1. Elections took place according to the new law regarding personal election of mayors and municipal councils;
2. Elections took place separately from national elections to the Knesset;
3. During the two elections studied (1978; 1983), the Likud Party was in power. The Likud had a relatively small party infrastructure, and the relationship between the central party headquarters and the branches was weak.

Methodology

The research was based on a questionnaire that was sent to local governments in 64 Jewish urban localities having populations of more than 5,000. The questionnaire dealt with the election results from 1978 and 1983, and was answered by 798 and 872 representatives respectively. The questionnaire contained a small amount of data on the elected candidate: the party list he represented, year of birth, year of arrival in Israel, country of birth, father's country of birth, number of years of schooling, and occupation.

Six municipalities did not return the questionnaires regarding the 1978 elections: Givat Shmu'el, Gedera, Hatsor Haglilit, Yeroham, Kfar Saba and Safed. Three municipalities did not respond to the 1983 questionnaire: Gedera, Herzliya and Holon.

Data on the ethnic composition of each locality are based on the 1972 national population census, whenever more up-to-date information is unavailable. Estimates were made on the basis of changes in the overall population according to the Central Bureau of Statistics' figures from 1979 and 1984. The data are based on the assumption that developments taking place in the population at large, also took place in the localities studied, and that the localities researched did not undergo any substantial changes in their ethnic composition in the period studied. The data therefore should be handled carefully. Data on the demographic characteristics of the localities are taken from the Ministry of Labor and Welfare's publication, *A Social Profile of the Localities in Israel* (1979).

Several types and categories of origin were defined in presenting the data:

Continent of origin. This category, which excludes second-generation Israeli-born, includes the following:

1. Asian origin born in Israel or abroad—ASI;
2. North African origin born in Israel and abroad—AFI;
3. European or American origin born in Israel and abroad—EAI.

In a dichotomous characterization, this became Jews of Asian and African origin and their children born in Israel—ASAFI, and Jews of European or American origin born in Israel and abroad—EAI.

Size of locality. An attempt was made to ensure that the categories were sufficiently large and sensitive to distinguish between the various localities using the criterion of size, but made sure that localities would not move from one category to another because of population growth between 1978 and 1983 (the real range of the categories appears in parentheses; the data are correct as of 1978) (Table 10.1):

1. Small localities of 5,000–16,999 residents (from Hatsor Haglilit: 5,700 to Tirat HaCarmel: 15,500);
2. Large municipal councils and small cities of 16,000–34,999 residents (from Hod Hasharon: 17,000 to Kiryat Ata: 30,400);
3. Medium-sized cities of 35,000–74,999 residents (from Kfar Saba: 35,300 to Rehovot: 57,600);
4. Large cities with 75,000–200,000 residents (from Rishon Lezion: 79,100 to Bat Yam: 124,100);
5. The three metropolitan areas having over 200,000 residents (from Haifa: 227,700 to Jerusalem: 376,600).

TABLE 10.1 Estimated distribution of origin of population according to categories of size of localities[a]

	Size of Locality			
Origin[b]	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4–5*
1978				
ASI	23.8	23.6	20.9	27.3
AFI	14.3	28.0	30.7	42.4
EAI	61.9	48.4	48.4	20.3
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(In thousands)	(995)	(250)	(182)	(132)
1983				
ASI	24.1	21.9	27.1	23.8
AFI	29.9	32.7	44.	15.7
EAI	46.0	45.4	28.5	59.2
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(In thousands)	(151)	(205)	(278)	(1068)

[a] The estimate was calculated according to the data base of the 1972 population census and CBS data for 1978 and 1984. The data refer to the adult population aged 20+.

[b] The categories of origin in all tables as follows:
ASI = Asian Origin and their children born in Israel;
AFI = North African Origin and their children born in Israel;
EAI = European and American origin and their children born in Israel.

Representation. Representation in local government can be measured using two indices: the "representation index" and the "weighted representation index":

1. The "representation index" permits a comparison between those elected and the voter population, in order to answer the question: to what degree are certain groups overrepresented and others underrepresented? The index neutralizes the influence of the size of the social category in the population, as compared to the size of that category among the electees;
2. The "weighted representation index" is important because there are two primary differences between the electees of local government in the big cities and those in the small towns:
   - The importance or authority accruing to the position: a representative in a larger city is partner to the decisions and budgets affecting tens of thousands of residents, while his colleague in a small town controls a much smaller population and resources;

- The value of the electee in the sample: the population of electees to local government includes all electees in towns of 5,000 or more residents. Thus, the population of the smaller towns received a greater value than the population of the larger cities. For example, the 343,200 residents of Tel Aviv have only 33 representatives, while the 272,000 residents of the smaller towns, each numbering up to 17,000 residents, have 277 representatives.

Thus, giving greater weight to the representatives, without taking into consideration the differences in the sizes of the towns in which they were elected, distorts the data by increasing the significance of the electees from smaller towns. This distortion makes it hard to analyze different characteristics of the representatives. For example, if the electees in small towns are younger, the younger age category among the representatives nationwide will appear to be very large. Thus a kind of size bias is created that makes it difficult to understand and analyze the significance of the findings.

In order to avoid the size bias, the "weighted representation index" was built, and this allows for the simultaneous neutralization of the size of the group in the population studied (like the "simple" representation index), and the size of the locality.

Demographic Characteristics

Population Distribution and Origin

It has been noted above that this study does not accept, a priori, the existence of a dichotomous ethnic division between Oriental and Ashkenazi Jews. This sub-section compares the representatives' characteristics with the composition of the population in their localities of origin, using representation indices. Examination of the geographic distribution of the population by locality indicates the need to distinguish between residents of Asian and African origin, if only for the methodological considerations of constructing a reliable representation index.

Table 10.1 clearly shows that the first and main difference distinguishing between groups of origin is structural: geographical distribution, connected to the length of stay in the country. The concentration of Jews of European-American origin is in direct relation to the size of the locality: the smaller the locality, the lower their proportion in the population. An inverse relationship pertains to the Jews of North African origin: the larger the locality, the smaller their proportion in the population. Jews of Asian origin differ from both the above groups, in that their proportion in the population remains more or less stable in all categories of locality.

This difference alone makes it necessary to separate the two categories of Oriental Jews in order to avoid the size bias discussed above, where the concentration in smaller localities increases the proportion of the group of origin, while concentration in the larger localities decreases it. Built to overcome this size bias, the "weighted representation index" grants each electee a different value in accordance with the size of his/her locality (Grinberg, 1989). Table 10.2 presents the weighted representation index compared to the simple representation index, and shows how the correction of the bias works: Jews of European-American origin move over to the category of overrepresentation, Jews of North African origin move to an appropriate level of representation, achieved only in 1983, while Jews of Asian origin remain underrepresented.

Length of Residence, Age, and Continent of Origin

The three categories of origin discussed in this sub-section can be easily distinguished by the order of their arrival in the country. A very high proportion of Jews of European-American origin arrived prior to 1948 or were born in the country. In contrast, very few Jews of North African origin, in fact almost none (to the extent that there are no numbers relevant to statistical calculations), are native Israelis or arrived prior to 1948. Here too, Jews of Asian origin are an intermediate category. A significant proportion of them immigrated before 1948 or were born in the country, mainly those of Iraqi and Yemenite origin.

After neutralizing the influence of the size of population and its differential distribution in localities of varying sizes using the "weighted representation index," it can be seen that in all three groups of origin and in both terms of office, there is a distinct advantage to longer residence in the country. At the same time, among those who arrived after 1948, Jews of North African origin have acquired greater representation. This finding allows us to hypothesize regarding the attribution of ethnic significance to representation in local government: if an electee is supposed to

TABLE 10.2 "Simple and weighted" representation index according to origin

	1978		1983	
Origin	*Simple Index*	*Weighted Index*	*Simple Index*	*Weighted Index*
ASI	0.89	0.88	0.85	0.90
AFI	1.22	0.91	1.34	1.03
AEI	0.95	1.20	0.95	1.15
Total	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

represent a particular group of origin, then a veteran electee might be considered a representative of his/her group of origin even if they arrived after he/she did. This hypothesis explains the fact that immigrants from Europe and Asia who arrived after 1948, and have relatively large numbers of representatives from among their veteran brethren, are actually under-represented, in certain cases strikingly so. At the same time, Jews of North African origin, who do not have any 'veterans' of their own, are actually overrepresented in comparison (Grinberg, 1989).

The age distribution of representatives of North African origin is the opposite to that of representatives of European origin: approximately 70 percent of the representatives born in North Africa are under 45 years of age, and approximately 60 percent of European-American-born representatives are over 44 years of age. Here too, Jews of Asian origin comprise an intermediate category. However, these differences are due, in most cases, to the composition of the population and its distribution. After neutralizing these factors, using the "weighted representation index," the interesting finding is the similarity between the age distribution of electees of North African and European origin in 1983 (Figure 10.1). The 35–54 age groups have the highest level of representation. The electees of North African and European origin in 1983 are mainly at opposite ends of the scale. Younger electees comprise a relatively higher proportion of representatives among Jews of North African origin, while among electees of European origin, the over 55 age group predominates. Among electees of Asian origin, the interesting change is the increase, between 1978 and 1983, in the proportion of older electees.




FIGURE 10.1 Weighted representation index: Origin and age.

The advantage of length of residence in the country among all groups of origin, and the similarity of age distribution among representatives of North African and European origin, are both interesting findings, but the most surprising finding, one that could indicate a unique social phenomenon, comes from combining age with length of residence. This combination illuminates the difference between North African representatives on the one hand, and Asian and European-American representatives on the other. The unquestionable advantage of veteran status seems to be a phenomenon characterizing the electees of Asian and European origin, even when age is also taken into account. In contrast, among North African electees, the characteristic advantage is that of youth, despite a slight advantage accruing to veteran status as well. In this group, the most striking aspect is the underrepresentation of the older age groups, something which may indicate the existence of a young and ambitious social group that has pushed aside its older generation. This group, a kind of new "political generation" of North African origin, seems to have increased its strength between 1978 and 1983, when the 45–54 age group achieved overrepresentation (Table 10.3).

Ethnicity and Political Parties

Comparing data on electees in the Histadrut (Grinberg, 1989) and in local government with data on representation in the Knesset and in the political parties creates a dichotomous picture in both major parties between 'ordinary' representatives in large local institutions on the one hand, and Knesset members on the other (Table 10.4). In wider party institutions there is a correlation between the origin of the voters and that of the electees. In the Knesset, in contrast, one finds an Ashkenazi hegemony in both major parties. In other words, Oriental Jews—both activists in the wider party institutions and voters—were underrepresented in the Likud. One may ask why this is the case. In order to answer this question, we will now examine whether, beyond the public image of the two parties—Labor as an Ashkenazi party and Likud as an Oriental party (see, Diskin, 1988)—there was an actual difference between them in the way activists entered the party and advanced within it, that may be connected to the peripherality of the Oriental Jews and the location of the Ashkenazi Jews in the core.

Local government data permit a discussion of differences between the representatives of the Likud and those of Labor, and enable us to locate the roots of the phenomenon there. The year 1965 marks a political turning point in local government, as the ruling center begins to weaken and the power of the right is on the rise (see, Weiss, 1970; Arian, 1973). The Likud, as the opposition party lacking positions of power to distribute,

TABLE 10.3 Averaged representation index according to origin, veteran status and age

Veteran status	Origin	ASI			AFI				EAI			
	Total	Veteran and Israeli born	Mass Immigration	New Immigration	Total	Veteran and Israeli born*	Mass Immigration	New Immigration	Total	Veteran and Israeli born	Mass Immigration	New Immigration
Age												
1978	1.00	1.62	0.91	0.19	1.00	(1.97)	1.28	0.67	1.00	1.72	0.55	0.33
25–34	0.30	0.37	0.39	0.03	0.64	0.31	1.01	0.64	0.49	0.49	0.66	0.39
35–44	1.27	2.21	1.09	0.36	2.00	(4.5)	2.40	1.45	1.60	2.78	0.89	0.56
45–54	2.14	4.46	1.74	0.19	1.03	(7.4)	0.96	0.45	1.48	2.83	0.84	0.53
55–74	0.88	2.09	0.42	0.48	0.38	(4.8)	0.37	0.00	0.90	1.94	0.23	0.07
1983	1.00	1.53	0.76	0.15	1.00	(0.80)	1.36	0.88	1.00	1.55	0.65	0.40
25–34	0.42	0.50	0.32	0.08	0.67	0.45	(5)**	0.78	0.23	0.21	0.36	0.26
35–44	1.28	2.96	0.90	0.20	1.67	(1)	1.77	1.62	1.54	2.08	1.24	0.03
45–54	1.65	4.20	1.03	0.00	1.73	(4.3)	1.96	1.13	1.61	3.26	0.79	0.33
55–74	1.08	2.74	0.52	0.31	0.20	(2.9)	0.16	0.00	1.00	2.04	0.42	0.20

*There are no complete data regarding those born in Africa who arrived in Israel before 1947; the base is estimated and rounded up, and that is why the numbers appear in parentheses. An additional reason for the parentheses is their low proportion in the population less than 1%; thus the index is rounded upwards, except for the proportion of the 25–34 year old category, which is heavily influenced by Israeli-born.

**The index is calculated on the basis of existing data, but the base is low (0.3%) and so the index is rounded upward.

Source: Adapted from Grinberg, 1989.

TABLE 10.4 Percentage of Oriental and Ashkenazi Jews in the Knesset, in the Likud and Labor parties, in institutions, and voters

Institution and Knesset Voters	*Knesset*[a]		*Party Institutions*						*Voters*	
			Party Congress[b]		Histadrut[c]		Local Government[e]			
Party	*Likud*	*Labor*	*Likud*	*Labor*	*Likud*	*Labor*	*Likud*	*Labor*	*Likud*	*Labor*
Origin[f]										
ASIAFI	20.8	23.9	60.3	35.5	56.8	33.6	57.0	41.2	70.0	25.0
EAI	79.2	76.1	39.6	64.5	43.2	66.3	43.0	58.8	30.0	75.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(48)	(46)	(169)	(169)	(44)	(107)	(158)	(255)	(381)	(369)

[a] Tenth Knesset (1981–84), based on *Who's Who in the Knesset*, 1981.

[b] Data from Herzog, Shamir and Sukerman (1989), on the conventions of the two parties in 1987. It should be noted that this figure differs from the preceding ones because it relates only to the central party in each bloc.

[c] Data from this study, 1981–85 term of office.

[d] Data from this study, 1983 term of office.

[e] Data from Peres and Shamir (1984: 321, Table 3) on voters in 1981.

[f] The ASIAFI category of origin refers to those born in Asia and North Africa and their Israeli-born children, comparable to EAI in the preceding tables.

could become a kind of temporary shelter for new activists who did not find their place in the ruling party. Local government supplied not only the locus of mobilization for new activists and positions of power, but also a test for the talents and abilities of the new political activists.

In 1978 the main difference between the representatives of Likud and those of Labor was found among North African (not Asian) Jews in the small localities, with the difference diminishing according to the size of the town (Table 10.5). A parallel phenomenon is found among electees of European origin: in small towns their proportion is greater in the Labor party than in the Likud, but these differences diminished as the size of the locality grew. One may say that until 1978, there was a difference between Likud and Labor among electees of North African origin in the development towns, but not in the Ashkenazi control of the major positions of power in the large cities, where the prevailing situation was reminiscent of that existing in the Knesset until today. However, this situation changed toward 1983 when the proportion of Likud representatives of Asian origin grew significantly in the middle-sized and larger cities. This change is important to our discussion for two reasons: the electees in the large cities are mostly older, and they serve in positions which have greater power than those in the peripheral development towns.

The power of Likud electees of Asian origin in the large cities delineates another difference between the two parties. In the Likud they predominate over the electees of both European-American and North African origin. North African electees in the Likud stand out in the 35–44 age category, while the Asian-origin electees predominate in the 55+ category. In the Labor party, in contrast, a more homogenous picture is drawn in 1983: the 45–54 category predominates in all groups of origin. However, in the other age categories, the electees of European and American origin predominate (Figure 10.2). The weighted representation data according to veteran status, together with the data on age, create a complete picture. The Oriental representatives in the Likud come from the periphery, more than is the case in the Labor party—and they are younger and have been in the country fewer years. However, no less significant differences exist among the Likud activists themselves, between those of Asian and North African origin. Electees of Asian origin have been in the country longer, and became stronger in the large cities toward 1983, without the advantage of younger age categories. Electees of North African origin clearly reflect the phenomenon noted above of the younger activists developing in peripheral localities. These facts hint at two different ethnic phenomena existing within the Likud: one, activists from the periphery, mainly of North African origin, and the other of mobile Oriental Jews in the center, mainly of Asian origin. This finding correlates well with the findings of Ayalon et al. (1987) regarding voters, which show

TABLE 10.5 Origin of council members by size of localities in Labor, Likud and the Religious parties (in percentages)

Size of Locality (no. of residents)	*Small Localities*			*Large Localities (Local Councils)*			*Middle-sized Cities*			*Large Cities*		
Party	*Labor*	*Likud*	*Religious*	*Labor*	*Likud*	*Religious*	*Labor*	*Likud*	*Religious*	*Labor*	*Likud*	*Religious*
Origin												
1978												
ASI	26.3	23.8	27.3	26.6	26.6	33.3	16.3	18.7	0.0	19.3	15.9	6.7
AFI	28.1	54.8	66.6	13.3	24.4	44.4	20.9	25.0	52.9	7.0	9.0	40.0
EAI	45.6	21.4	6.1	60.0	48.9	22.2	62.8	56.2	47.1	73.7	75.0	53.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	57	42	33	75	45	18	43	32	17	57	44	15
1983[a]												
ASI	23.7	18.6	34.1	16.2	15.7	18.2	20.8	27.3	23.5	17.6	30.8	0.0
AFI	30.3	55.9	50.0	17.5	25.5	54.5	20.8	31.8	58.8	15.7	15.4	9.1
EAI	46.0	25.4	15.9	66.2	58.8	27.3	58.3	40.9	17.6	66.6	53.8	90.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	76	59	44	8	51	22	48	22	17	51	26	11

[a] The data for the religious parties in this term of office do not include Tami or Shas (which contended for election in local, not national authorities).
Source: Grinberg, 1989.




FIGURE 10.2 Labor, Likud and the religious parties—Weighted representation indices: Origin and age.

that among Likud voters of Moroccan origin, there exists a relationship between low socioeconomic status, young age, and protest voting, much more than among Iraqi-origin voters. Oriental activists joined the Likud while it was in the opposition, devoid of power bases and interested in creating such bases by competing in local government. In this process of power struggle, Oriental activists were the full partners of the Ashkenazi leadership, due, among other reasons, to the fact that they succeeded in mobilizing a large group of supporters to strengthen the Likud. This fact transformed the discrimination against the Oriental Jews into a source of power for the party, in general, and for the activists representing these groups, specifically. The mobilization of activists in the periphery on the basis of feelings of discrimination, combined with the activists' partnership in the party's organizational effort and the ideology of Jewish solidarity, created a unique and paradoxical phenomenon of ethnic mobilization without separate, independent ethnic organization.

It may be asked why Jews of Asian and African origin continued to be a minority in the Knesset despite their overrepresentation in the wider institutions of the Likud. The blocking of Oriental activists from obtaining positions of leadership in the Likud stands out more distinctly than in the Labor party, in which the proportion of Oriental Jews in the Knesset reflects the general trend among voters and party institutions (Table 10.4). For years now, the Likud has used an open competitive method for choosing its representatives in the Knesset, with the apparent aim of promoting all its activists on the basis of open competition. This method contrasted especially with the Labor party's committee which expressed the party establishment's trend to control candidates. Labor's method enabled the promotion of Oriental candidates in the proportion desired by the party establishment, which determined who would be promoted.

In the Knesset election campaign of 1992, despite the differences in methods of selection, Oriental representation in the Likud declined, while in the Labor party, which adopted a more open and competitive method, it rose. Thus, despite Oriental voters' bias for preferring the Likud, the picture in the Knesset was reversed: in the 1992 elections only about 25 percent of the Likud electees were Oriental compared to approximately 40 percent of Labor electees. In other words, Oriental activists were blocked in the Likud! Many of these activists, whose advancement has been stymied, have acquired much experience and power in local government and have proven their ability.

It would seem that the explanation for this 'bottleneck' in the Likud is the difficulty that Oriental Jews have in competing with the Ashkenazi Jews in the core. Most of the Oriental activists in the Likud represent the ethnic population in the periphery that is structurally discriminated against in terms of geographical location, education, and employment,

and this creates unequal competition between them and the Ashkenazi activists. The latter are of higher economic, professional, and social status, and some of them have a special position in the party as children of activists or leaders of the Herut movement. The advancement of Oriental activists in the periphery is possible because of the latter's homogenous population, whereas in the large cities of the core, Oriental Jews are generally underrepresented in both Likud and Labor. This fact indicates that the Oriental Jews, as a group structurally discriminated against, have succeeded in advancing within their separate enclaves, but have failed in the open, as it were equal, competition at the core, where the Ashkenazi Jews are the dominant group.

The situation is different in the Labor party, in which the 1992 open elections (primaries) gave Oriental activists greater representation. Oriental activists in Labor belong more to the 'mobile' population that has succeeded in advancing to the middle class by virtue of its educational and professional achievements, and has acquired power not as representatives of local government in peripheral localities, but rather in the core.

The 'bottleneck' phenomenon reached a peak in the Knesset elections of 1992. In the crisis that hit the Likud, and which instantly acquired a blatant ethnic tone, the Oriental activists from the local government were conspicuous in their activity. It was at this stage that competition among Oriental Jews from the different camps for individual positions on the party list reached a peak, and the representatives of the development towns were brushed aside. As the findings of this study show, it was the group of mayors of development towns and 'middle-sized' cities, the group who aspired to transform their control in the periphery to power in the core, who were blocked within the Likud. As a result of this, it is possible to understand why the Oriental activists, who felt blocked and pushed aside despite their contribution to the Likud in the elections, considered seceding from the party and setting up an independent party, putting pressure in this direction on David Levy, the chief Oriental leader in the Likud.

The question indeed arises as to why this social phenomenon has not acquired an autonomous political expression. Herzog (1986) argues that the reason lies in the two major parties' absolute negation of the legitimacy of separatist ethnic political organization, especially the Likud with its emphasis on Jewish national solidarity. The findings of the present study indicate that the religious parties, especially Shas, filled the gap. In 1978 it was already possible to observe the Likud's ethnic-peripheral phenomenon in the development towns (a high proportion of representatives of North African origin, young age and relative lack of veteran status). This is especially striking in the religious parties, in which representatives of North African origin have a very high weighted representa-

tion rate (Tables 10.5 and 10.6, and Figure 10.2). The phenomenon apparently began to disappear toward 1983. However, this was due to technical reasons only—in this election campaign the two parties very strongly linked to the process of ethnic polarization—Tami and Shas (running that year as a local list in the Jerusalem municipal elections)—were not categorized as religious parties, and therefore are not included in the data. However, these two groups together were part of a process leading to a crisis that engulfed the Ashkenazi leadership of the NRP (National Religious Party) and Agudat Israel, and eventually gave birth to Shas as an ethnic social movement with its own intrinsic value.

It would seem that until 1978 the religious parties used, to an even greater extent, the same method that the Likud employed—they appealed to the Oriental vote without providing fitting representation in the elite. Tension rose after the Likud came into power in 1977, because as a ruling party, the Likud ceased to be the lodestone for all protests against structural discrimination of the Oriental Jews. In addition, the legitimacy of Oriental culture grew, with the rise in status as a result of the political reversal of 1977 and the peace agreement with Egypt. However, the ruling Zionist ideology still had difficulty digesting a separate ethnic-Jewish organization, even if it attempted to base itself on Jewish tradition, as Tami did. It would seem, therefore, that Tami, which derives its authority from a religious-ultra-orthodox (non-Zionist), source is capable of granting legitimacy to separate ethnic organization. However, this should still be understood in the overall social context of structural discrimination of Oriental Jews, while the Likud continued to block its own Oriental activists.

TABLE 10.6 Weighted representation index: Origin and party

	Party		
Origin	*Labor*	*Likud*	*Religious*
1978			
ASI	0.88	0.83	0.53
AFI	0.62	0.94	2.19
EAI	1.18	1.04	0.77
Total	1.00	1.00	1.00
1983			
ASI	0.81	1.25	0.68
AFI	0.83	0.99	1.56
EAI	1.15	0.89	0.92
Total	1.00	1.00	1.00

Summary and Discussion

The findings of this study strengthen those of Nahon (1993) regarding the nature of the ethnic phenomenon, which was a result of processes in Israeli society and of the absorption of immigrants from Asia and Africa. Oriental Jews' structural location—geographical and economic—or their institutional integration—in the educational system, management, and the political parties—determine their chances of advancement. Ethnicity is a developing, latent phenomenon that from time to time emerges in public debate.

The institutional openness of local government, along with the structural dimension of the differentiated geographical distribution of ethnic groups, facilitated the relatively easy entry of Oriental Jewish activists into the public arena. Using the "weighted representation index," we discovered that the group of elected candidates of North African origin reached full representation in local government relative to their proportion in the population around 1983, and is growing rapidly.

For this group of educated young activists, length of residence in the country is not a distinguishing factor. In contrast, the status of immigrants of European and American origin is especially high in the large cities in which they predominate, and their relative advantage is their veteran status in the country. Asian-origin electees occupy a middle position according to most of the variables, including geographic distribution. However, they are similar to the European-American group in that they also enjoy the advantage of veteran status.

The move of North African-origin activists to the Likud, when it was an opposition party in the 1960s, created a new, more egalitarian, basis of partnership between them and the Ashkenazi Jews, in which the North Africans gathered political power. Indeed, this fact contributed to the creation of the Likud's Oriental image, compared to Labor (see, Diskin, 1988), even though this is not reflected in the composition of the two parties' lists for the Knesset. In fact, it is the ability to block the advancement of the Oriental activists in the Likud's list to the Knesset that requires analysis and explanation, because it is more striking than in the Labor party.

In the Likud, as in Labor, groups of Asian-origin activists were active even before the establishment of the state. These activists accepted the superior position of the Ashkenazi Jews on the national level of leadership and did not try to enlarge their representation. The expansion of the Likud's power base came as a result of the activists who joined them, representing a new phenomenon—North African Jews, a mistreated population that interpreted its distress as being the responsibility of the Labor government. This change was expressed mainly in the voting in develop-

ment towns, because support for Gahal among residents of distressed neighborhoods in the large cities had been established as early as 1965 (see, Smith, 1969).

Within the Likud there exist two distinct groups of Oriental activists, differentiated by their continent of origin and by their economic status and length of residence in the country:

1. The peripheral Oriental Jews who live in development towns and the middle-sized cities, represent a distressed population, acquire political power in their places of residence, and aspire to increase their representation in the center. The rise of local leadership in development towns is a phenomenon that reflects an Oriental population that has not succeeded in freeing itself from the "poverty cycle" due to their structural discrimination caused by, among other factors, their geographical location in the periphery. In conditions of great ethnic homogeneity in localities which are not developing economically, it is not hard to understand why their distress is perceived in terms of ethnic discrimination. This population is not solely North African, and includes relatively significant numbers of Asian-origin Jews (Table 10.1). Although this is true, it is reasonable to assume that the size and centrality of Moroccan Jews makes them a leading and representational factor for the entire social category. Thus children of this population seek to advance themselves by abandoning their home localities, except for those who make their way as activists in local government.
2. The mobile Oriental Jews of Asian origin live mainly in the large cities. They represent a population that has joined the middle class, and they do not aspire in the same way to acquire independent representation. This group is composed mainly of Yemenite and Iraqi Jews, of which some—thanks to their veteran status and location in the center—have succeeded in overcoming structural discrimination in education and employment. They wish to integrate into the stronger social groups, and, therefore, do not emphasize social discrimination, but rather the importance of their individual achievements. This approach strengthens the cultural interpretation of the social gap that is more convenient and easier for the Ashkenazi Jews, according to which social disadvantage is a result of traditional (non-modern) culture. According to this approach, lack of mobility testifies to the individual's personal difficulties rather than structural or institutional discrimination. This interpretation gives legitimacy to Ashkenazi control of the core, but also strengthens the Oriental mobile group. The members of the latter progress according to their individual achievements, and serves as

> proof that there is no ethnic discrimination. Indeed they point an accusing finger at Oriental Jews who have not advanced, due to so-called personal reasons, yet constantly complain of discrimination. In other words, the advancement of the Oriental mobile group is a kind of indirect criticism of the claims and struggles of the Oriental peripherals.

It is the Oriental peripheral group which is in conflict with the Ashkenazi leadership of the Likud, and demands an increase in its representation. Weingrod (1979) defines this group as proletarian, and argues that its members have also culturally crystallized in the big cities. In other words, there is a kind of Oriental ethno-class that exists not only in the geographical periphery of the country, but also in the periphery of the large cities. However, politically speaking, the Oriental peripherals in the large cities are characterized by their failure to organize and promote independent political activists. The reason for this may well be, among other things, the abandonment of mobile groups of Oriental Jews who succeed in advancing economically and professionally, and can leave the ethno-class in the cities more easily than in the development towns. This abandonment also has a geographical expression in the formation of mixed Oriental-Ashkenazi middle-class neighborhoods in the large cities, in contrast to the homogenous poorer neighborhoods of the Oriental ethno-class (see, Gonen, 1985).

The demands of the mobile Oriental Jews, most of them apparently of Asian origin in the cities, differ from those of the peripheral ethno-class, and are also easier to fulfill. They are already located in positions of power in the economy, society, and politics, and seek to preserve their status and improve it gradually; they make no demand for a change in economic priorities or social policy. In contrast, the more far-reaching demands come from the peripheral ethno-class, who seek to change existing power relations in the economic, social, and political spheres.

In conclusion, the continued existence, and even exacerbation, of gaps due to institutional discrimination in education and employment (Nahon, 1993), along with the structural discrimination inherent in the population's geographical distribution, form the basis for the creation of feelings of peripheral ethnic identity simmering beneath the surface of Israeli politics. This study points to the rise of a group of Oriental leaders in the periphery, where geographic isolation feeds the group's sense of a separate and different identity. Since this leadership is being formed on the basis of structural discrimination, it tries to translate its power in local government into power in the political core, by demanding structural and institutional changes that will favor the Oriental ethno-class.

Note

1. This study is based on research carried out between 1984–6 at the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies; an abbreviated version was published in *Ethnic Communities in Israel,* edited by S.N. Eisenstadt and M. Lissak, 1993 (Hebrew), published by the Jerusalem Institute of Israel Studies.

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PART THREE

The Frontiers, Peripheries, and Ethnic Encounters



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11

Sociocultural Encounter on the Frontier: Jewish Settlers and Bedouin Nomads in the Negev

Avinoam Meir and Ze'ev Zivan

Introduction

This chapter is concerned with the micro-scale analysis of frontier encounters. States authorities and institutions do not themselves occupy, settle, or develop frontier regions. It takes persons or groups that actually depart from their place of origin and penetrate the unfamiliar and, at times, empty frontier. In certain contexts they act on behalf of the state or other non-state organizations or communities. In others, they act on their own initiative, that later becomes integrated within national or wide communal objectives. Nevertheless, it is precisely these individuals or groups that were the actors on the frontier. Furthermore, it is precisely their micro scale local activities that shape the nature of transformation of the region from a non-integral, unsettled, and undeveloped frontier, into an integral part of the state and society.

While there have been situations where frontiers were no-man's land, genuinely empty of inhabitants, many others involved encounters between the newly arrived settlers and the local indigenous population (Kimmerling, 1982). These encounters, which took place on a local and daily routine basis, may have contributed largely, although not solely, to shaping the sociopolitical nature of the frontier region (see also, Clement, 1987) and the manner of its transformation (if in fact it did occur) into an integral part of the state and society.

The analysis of frontier encounter has not received proper attention in studies of frontiers which, as Kellerman (1993a) notes, mostly tended to emphasize macro-scale processes of settlement. The objective here is to

analyze the encounter between the Jewish settlers and the Arab, Bedouin, semi-nomadic society in the Negev desert of the land (Palestine) in which the State of Israel was established. This process lasted about three decades, from the 1930s to the early 1960s, when the Negev was no longer considered a frontier. More specifically, our thesis is that the frontier encounter in the Negev underwent considerable change from being relatively voluntary and peaceful to being compulsive, coercive, and relatively violent. Furthermore, while this change may be explained in part by the internal dialectics of the encounter itself, we also argue that the external intervention of national and wide communal political forces in local affairs provides another explanation. In so doing, we suggest that in the case presented here there are two circles of contexts. One circle refers to the universal issue of conflict between pastoral nomads and state governments. The second circle is related to the national-territorial Israeli-Arab conflict. Admittedly, these circles are closely interrelated in the present case. The second context has shaped the entire relationship between Israeli Palestinian-Arabs and Jews in Israel, and its impact upon the frontier encounter in the Negev cannot be overlooked. Yet, in the present discussion, emphasis is put on the first context. Finally, we propose that the change in the nature of the encounter was responsible for changes in space production to the disadvantage of the local original population.

Encounters within Frontier Regions

The pioneering discussion in 1893 of the nature of frontier and of frontier settlement in North America (Turner, 1962) triggered a century of analysis of frontiers elsewhere, as well as a myriad of perspectives, definitions, and models. Progressing from an approach that regarded the American frontier as unique, we are now in a position to make more generalized interpretations about frontier settlement processes (Webb, 1952; Lamar and Thompson, 1981). One of the most central generalizations that is relevant to our theme refers to the power relations between settlers and the local population. Mikessel (1960), relying upon comparative studies in the old as well as the new world, drew a distinction between processes of inclusion and exclusion, both social and spatial, of the local population by the settling population. While in some regions, the local population became included, through assimilation, by the settling population (e.g., the South American Spanish frontier), in others, the local population was excluded socially and spatially (e.g. the North American, Australian and South African frontiers).

The major question concerns the nature of these processes. Grossman (1971), examining various frontier settlement processes, suggested that frontier regions can seldom be settled without confrontation, or at least

negotiation, with the local population. Confrontation usually takes place over physical resources. Settlers, therefore, are attracted to sites over which there is strong competition and around which they tend to establish buffer spaces as defense mechanisms. This is perhaps the basic idea behind Mikessel's exclusion process. This also explains the why, according to Grossman's interpretation, settlers actually seek the challenge of confrontation rather than its avoidance.

It should be noted that settlers are not the earliest pioneers to have penetrated the frontier. Turner, and later on Treadgold (1957), Mikessel (1960), and others, have suggested the notion of a "commercial frontier" that precede the "agricultural frontier" in quite a number of cases. Settlement in the phase of a commercial frontier is not as intensive as in the agricultural frontier. Therefore, the encounter between the local population and the newly arriving trade agents has taken an ephemeral nature. In contrast, the agricultural frontier assumes a fixed and rather immutable nature. Agricultural settlement has often been used systematically by states to determine geo-political boundaries, or, as regarded by Hasson and Gosenfeld (1980), as a strategy to settle the largest possible territory with the smallest number of people. It is within this type of frontier that the intensive encounters (positive and negative) at the local, personal, or group level take place, thus shaping the true nature of the frontier.

One important issue that transpires from the concept of the agricultural frontier is the degree of social organization of frontier settlers, that is, whether the settlers arrive individually or in pre-organized groups. This determines the nature of the frontier encounter and the manner in which the human landscape is shaped. In examining Hudson's (1969) locational theory of rural settlement, Grossman (1971; 1983) argued that this theory is appropriate primarily for societies which encourage individualism rather than cooperative social organization. In his opinion, frontier settlement, more often than not, required group action in order to cope with both the human and physical environments.

A more elaborate and detailed theory of the frontier settlement process was developed by Hudson (1977) and is composed of four models. The models are developed along two dimensions: distance from the core (close vs. remote) and the number of groups competing for frontier space (single vs. multiple). These dimensions determine the types of competition and conflicts that are likely to evolve between the frontier and the core and within the frontier itself. Of the four models, the one that concerns us here regarding frontier encounters is that of group conflicts. Several possible processes are outlined: (a) being relatively stronger, one group will overcome the other by violent means and take control over space and resources; (b) when no group has a physical power advantage,

and both compete for the same space and local resources, there will emerge border disputes for controlling them; (c) when there are different needs and no common claim for the same space and resources, both groups will live side by side and develop symbiotically, and; (d) when both groups have similar needs and both seek control over the same space and resources, they may reach an agreement over cooperation in their utilization or sharing them.

This model outlines a range of frontier encounters, from most hostile and violent to the most peaceful and cooperative. To a considerable degree, the type of frontier encounter that develops depends upon the size of the penetrating group, its degree of social organization, and the level of moral, organizational, and material support it receives from the political or social establishment in the core. The larger these are, the more secure, confident, and daring the settlers may become in managing their encounter with the local population. This does not imply their automatic and immediate resort to physical force and violent means. It may provide them, however, with emotional power in developing their social relationships with that population within an alien environment and culture. Too often, however, such emotional force tempts settlers to resort to physical power in an attempt to dominate the frontier and its original population. The degree to which an encounter of domination develops depends upon the original ideology and the kind of motivation behind the settlers' penetration into the frontier. At the macro level we can therefore see the dominating nature of frontier settlement in South Africa as against the least dominative and more symbiotic one in New Zealand as two extremes of a continuum.

Several examples of micro level frontier encounters may be examined. Early encounters between North American Great Plains Indians, fur leather hunters, and representatives of white man's trade companies during the first half of the 19th century took place within the commercial frontier framework. In studying this process, Wishart (1976) (see also, Spicer, 1961) has put it in the context of a treaty between two cultures in which each side has something the other wants. The Indians assumed, in this collaboration, a major role of supplying goods to traders from the East. This trade became successful because the product was indigenous to their culture and its production process did not violate their traditional mode of living. As long as this culture remained unchanged, that is, as long as the encounter took place within a framework of cultural equality, both cultural groups exchanged and adopted mental, social, and material innovations. As trade developed and intensified, and traders gradually began to settle within the frontier, they not only adopted Indian food and clothing, but also subjected themselves to the Indian traditional legal system and intermarried with Indian women. The Indians, on the other

hand, adopted goods and artifacts brought in by the traders such as firearms and alcohol.

In early phases of the encounter, the medium of mutual interest–the fur trade–did not generate pressure on the Indian land-use system or upon their religious beliefs and social ideas. These phases were characterized by a collaborative and mutually conciliating approach rather than one of exclusion and conflict (see also, Cronan, 1983; Golley, 1993). The frontier did not assume the nature of physical separation between groups, but rather of an ongoing mutually faceted encounter.

It was only in later phases that the nature of the frontier encounter became more conflictual and, at times, violent. The Indians were seriously affected, especially demographically, by alcohol and diseases introduced by the white man. Concurrently, economic pressure from core companies to intensify the fur trade, and the Indians' increasing dependence upon the newly adopted cultural traits, resulted in the expansion and depletion of hunting territories, and their eventual disappropriation from the Indians. This process intensified when these territories became further valuable to the core companies due to the discovery of other physical resources. Thus, fur trading, a traditional Indian occupation, vanished, and the frontier assumed an exclusive nature. During this phase, those local micro-type cultural exchanges that shaped the collaborative, egalitarian, and non-conflictual nature of the frontier, and which developed out of individual or group local self and mutual interests, gave way to those with wider economic, social, and political powers, thus changing the nature of the frontier encounter from a more personified into a publicly alienated one.

Structurally-similar processes took place in the East Kimberley of northern Australia in the early 19th century. Clement (1987) studied the early contact between the Aborigines and European intruders. The intruders viewed the region and its inhabitants as resources to be exploited for their benefit in the long run. However, securing a supply of fresh water was the most basic of the short term objectives pursued by the Europeans, who usually denied the Aborigines access to this resource. Yet, before experience prompted the latter to view Europeans with distrust, they were seldom explicitly hostile to the intruders, at least not to the extent that it became a commonplace response. This is significant despite the fact that the intruders were quite vulnerable. Only at later stages, when growing numbers of elaborately organized outsiders failed to respect the intricacies of local protocol and the significance of revered objects or places, has the nature of the frontier encounter become more violent and hostile.

The above discussion outlined the nature of frontiers in terms of intergroup relationships which contribute to the evolution of their social land-

scape. The examples presented, which are certainly a drop in the ocean, suggest the importance of interpersonal or intergroup local microlevel encounters in shaping the sociopolitical nature of the frontier. Furthermore, they tend to support the notion suggested above of the changing sociopolitical nature of the frontier as settlers grow in numbers and become more established and further anchored in the core establishment or polity. They provide, therefore, a conceptual basis for an examination of the evolution of frontier encounter and frontier change in the Negev as outlined below.

A Methodological Note

In studying the frontier encounter in the Negev, we focus on the 1940s (the pre-state period) and 1950s (the first decade of the state of Israel). Beyond these temporal limits, the frontier has neither evolved, nor prevailed any longer. The data and information were gathered from several sources: individual kibbutz archives, which included primary local documents, leaflets, correspondence, and personal diaries; national and institutional archives, which hold mainly official documents, correspondence, and reports; and above all, personal interviews with dozens of individuals who participated actively in the Jewish-Bedouin encounter: officials, kibbutz members, and Bedouin. Altogether sixty people were interviewed in lengthy semi-structured interviews based upon a pre-outlined list of topics that would, in our minds, encompass the dimensions of the routine and intimate encounter at the micro level. These dimensions were, in part, extracted from an in-depth review of literature that describes the Negev frontier settlement process at the macro-level. The others emerged during the interviewing process.

The information gathered from personal interviews is biased toward the Jewish settlers' perspective. Although Bedouin sources were consulted, these do not constitute a complete Bedouin perspective. Many of the Bedouin who were active in the encounter are now beyond our reach. Matching the complete Bedouin perspective with that of the Jewish one is an interesting angle worthy of future research.

Negev Frontier Encounter—The 1940s

The Context

Jewish modern settlement in the Negev frontier in the pre-state period (before 1948) can be divided into three stages (Kark, 1974; Kellerman, 1993b). The first stage (1880–1917), during Ottoman rule, was a period

dedicated mainly to the formulation of ideas and plans and only two settlements were established. The second stage (1917–1939) took place during the British Mandate, and concentrated on various experiments and on land purchases; therefore only one additional settlement was established. The third stage (1939–1947), which is our main concern here, signaled the beginning of more systematic settlement activity.

The frontier encounter between Jewish settlers and Bedouin in the Negev was unique in its political and organizational dimensions. The political context is ecologically-oriented, as is typical of the Middle East. The concept of "the struggle between the desert and the sown" (Reifenberg, 1949) is very familiar to historians and political scientists studying the history of Palestine. The settled frontier there advanced and retreated interchangeably throughout history, according to the balance of power between central governments and pastoral nomads. Nomadic encroachment upon settled territories in the Negev was not politically motivated. The main motivation was ecological, an attempt to gain better means of subsistence beyond the borders of the desert ecological zone. It was political only in the sense that there was a struggle taking place within a territory governed by a central government.

Perhaps only with the establishment of the British Mandate in Palestine after World War I did the pastoral nomadic Bedouin of the Negev realize their technological inferiority in the face of western technology and cease their historical attempts to encroach upon settled territories. In fact, they have changed their mode of living and have become semi-nomadic sedentary themselves, combining pastoral economy with dry-farming agriculture. Thus, the generalization made by Shafir (1989) that the Arabs in Palestine were a sedentary agrarian population and not a tribal one must be relaxed as far as the Negev Bedouin are concerned. Agrarianism and territoriality among the Bedouin at the time of the onset of the Negev frontier were only beginning to emerge, and tribalism was still strong although declining (Meir, 1996). This adds to the uniqueness of the Negev within the general frontier context in Palestine.

Another aspect of the political dimension refers to the Jewish Zionist (and later Israeli)-Arab conflict over controlling land and territory in Palestine. Land acquisition from Arab individuals and Negev Bedouin, which was loudly and violently denounced by Arab leaders in the Middle East, facilitated the establishment of a Jewish frontier in the Negev. This acquisition proved highly instrumental in the inclusion of this frontier within the state of Israel in 1948.

Transforming land acquisition into frontier settlement became possible through a unique organizational framework (Kark, 1974). World Jewish community financial resources were harnessed to put into practice the collectivist social ideology in kibbutz-type frontier settlements that were

supported by an organizational apparatus and institutional infrastructure at the core. In contrast, the Bedouin were loosely organized into tribes who were historical and territorial rivals. Being semi-nomadic or semi-sedentary, they were also loosely connected to their Arab core institutions in Palestine throughout the pre-and post state periods. At its peak, in the mid-1940s, their population numbered about 70,000, organized into five clans (confederations) divided into about 100 tribes mostly located in the northern Negev (Ashkenazi, 1957).

It is within this macro context that frontier encounters between the Jewish settlers and the local Bedouin have developed at the micro level. While in other frontier regions of Palestine, a Jewish population existed prior to the major settlement waves of the 1930s and 1940s, few Jews lived in the Negev frontier prior to the 1940s. For the Bedouin, who had experienced very little interference in their territories up to this point, the penetration of western settlers was virtually unheard of. This context had the potential to be tense, hostile, or even violent. The main question to be explored here is whether this potential was brought from the macro to the micro level of frontier encounter, and whether it affected this encounter.

The Jewish-Bedouin Encounter

Jewish settlement expansion into the Northern Negev (see also: Kark, 1974; Kellerman, 1993b) took several stages, beginning with the three agricultural "observation outposts" (1943), through the "eleven spots" (1946), the seven pre-Independence War "stronghold settlements" (1947); and a few others (Figure 11.1). All these settlements—mostly kibbutzim with a total population of about 3,000 by 1948—were established on pre-purchased land and were under the auspices of core settlement organizations. Their establishment was contrary to the British Mandate White Papers policy and regulations regarding Jewish settlement in Palestine (Porat, 1985; Danin, 1988; Weitz, 1965). Their common experience was the cultural and ecological uncertainty and the precarious security involved in settling within a remote and poorly accessible desert environment and alien Bedouin population.

Settling within Bedouin territory, Jewish settlers were split between two central issues: their attitude toward the Bedouin, and whether Bedouinization, in behavioral terms, should be adopted. With regard to the first issue, there were two opposite approaches. The militant approach advocated an advance manifestation of an "iron arm" attitude toward the Bedouin to guarantee local security immediately. At the other extreme was the peace-seeking approach that preached the maintenance of mutual




FIGURE 11.1 The Negev frontier in the 1940s. (*Source:* Meir, 1997. Reprinted by permission of Westview Press.)

respect for life styles and interests. The encounter was conducted primarily between representatives of Jewish settlements and Bedouin tribal sheiks, other local leaders, or Bedouin hired as guards of Jewish settlement's cultivated fields. The representative of the kibbutz was usually the local *mukhtar* (chief), who, by virtue of his command of Arabic, was capable of handling all contacts with the Bedouin and diffusing tensions (Danin, 1977). Occasionally Jewish field-guards also assumed these responsibilities.

A particular kibbutz's communal attitude toward the Bedouin was largely determined by its mukhtars' position regarding either of the above approaches. In general, the peace-seeking approach predominated primarily due to the socialistic ideology of kibbutzim, especially with regard to international comradeship (see also: Kellerman, 1993a), and the resulting need to establish friendly intergroup neighborhood relationships. It was, however, also a product of core institutional advice. Consequently, settlers found it instrumental to establish local liaison committees to handle bilateral neighborhood affairs with the Bedouin. This ideology met with traditional Bedouin hospitality; together, these two approaches created friendly relationships. Amitai (1983) and Keren

(1987) indicate that mukhtars who advocated this approach disapproved of carrying weapons so they would not be feared by the Bedouin, and, moreover, preached mutual respect and security. Indeed, as will be shown below, this attitude proved mutually beneficial, especially in the early phases of frontier settlement.

However, everyday experience with the Bedouin caused occasional retreat from this approach. Water pipelines to kibbutzim were repeatedly sabotaged by some hostile Bedouin; others would repeatedly trespass into the premises of the kibbutzim and graze their flocks on the cultivated fields. Stealing from Jewish settlements was not uncommon, and occasionally, local dirt roads would be sabotaged or blocked simply to impede Jewish transportation or to extract thru-passage charges. There was even some minor bloodshed. This sporadic strife occasionally required resort to forceful measures as advocated by proponents of the militant approach. Yet, throughout these years this approach was never carried beyond the need to assert firmly Jewish-Bedouin mutual respect.

Opinions were also split over the issue of Bedouinization. The question that concerned settlers was whether the adoption of Bedouin cultural traits was necessary, and if so, to what degree, in order to strike roots within the frontier. It should be noted that British romanticization of Bedouin culture, following Laurence of Arabia, had an upon both Jewish leaders and local settlers. David Ben-Gurion, the national leader, envisioned Jewish desert people, Jewish Bedouin, who would combine modern with traditional cultural skills to settle the Negev desert (Ben-Gurion, 1954). Lower rank officials also advised local settlers to adopt Bedouin behavioral norms in order to withstand Bedouin demographic hegemony (Weitz, 1960).

The extent to which this advocated behavior was pursued in reality varied among kibbutzim. Bedouinization was practiced mostly by mukhtars and field-guards. Bedouin hospitality tents *(shiq)* or huts *(madafe)* were erected at kibbutz gates, complete with Bedouin-style serving of coffee, cigarette smoking and the like. The Bedouinization process included: adopting Bedouin clothing artifacts, carrying symbolic Bedouin arms such as knives *(shebaria)* and wearing bullet-belts, raising pedigree Bedouin racing horses and camels, participation in horse and camel races (care being taken to avoid winning) or in wrestling, and the adoption of modest dress by women outside kibbutz quarters. These practices were, to a limited degree, essential means of bridging the cultural gap, gaining Bedouin's confidence, and establishing intimate neighborhood atmosphere. Above all, the skill of recounting Bedouin legends and quoting Bedouin proverbs around the fire in Bedouin tents, as well as the willingness to accept the Bedouin legal and judicial system for conflict resolution, was considered by the Bedouin as the highest form of Bedouiniza-

tion possible under the prevailing constraints. Those few mukhtars and field guards who reached this level were even awarded Bedouin names, accepted as honorable Bedouin, and some were even given the status of arbitrators in inter-Bedouin, intratribal conflicts (Efrat, 1992; Meitiv, 1977; 1986; and Bar-Zvi, 1971). Those kibbutzim that were located deep in Bedouin territory were more inclined to adopt these cultural traits. In general, however, the prevailing attitude of the settlers was one of Bedouin-style respect toward the Bedouin without cultural self denial.

These issues of the attitudes toward the Bedouin and Bedouinization, with which the Jewish settlers concerned themselves quite intensively, shaped their mutual relationships to a considerable degree during the pre-state period. A detailed analysis of these issues is required, as they constitute the essence of the frontier micro-level encounter. Various factors at the local level are discussed here as being beneficial either to the Jewish settlements, to the Bedouin population, or to their mutual benefit.

Benefits to Jewish Settlers

Jewish settlements benefited in several ways from developing positive attitudes on the above issues. These are related mostly to physical security, but in some ways also to securing economic resources for initial development. In the early 1940s, penetration into Bedouin territory was accompanied by concern about security. This concern was shared by both national leaders (Yaari, 1943; Knaani, 1981) as well as by settlers themselves, even though settlements were always located on legally purchased land. The settlers were strangers to local sheikhs, even constituting a nuisance in some respects. As a minority, the settlers found it beneficial to seek the patronage of the sheikhs in order to gain some degree of security. One of the most common methods was the payment of a monthly patronage fee to the sheik in addition to the original payment for the land (Bar-Zvi, 1971). In some cases, an extra monthly payment was demanded by the sheikh, and paid by the settlers, for salaries for various tribesmen who served as field guards or local police officers in the few British desert police stations, or guarded water pipelines from the north to the kibbutzim.

However, sheikhs' patronage alone did not provide a complete solution to the problem of security. The remoteness of cultivated fields meant that one Bedouin guard did not suffice to protect crops and Jewish farmers. At times, Jewish guards had to accompany the Bedouin guards or even had to stand guard against them. For the Bedouin, stealing and looting from non-Bedouin settled farmers was not considered a crime, but rather an integral part of a survival game on the frontier between the desert and the sown. This also explains why Bedouin flocks trespassed on

a kibbutz's crop fields, creating a source of frequent conflicts and even causing some minor bloodshed on both sides. Such was the case especially with the more nomadic Bedouin from northern Sinai who, during their seasonal migration into the northern Negev, were hard put to comply with the new frontier reality. Although a sheikh was considered a patron formally, the loose sociopolitical tribal structure was an obstacle to his control of individual tribesmen. It should also be noted that territorial resource-sharing (water and grazing) between tribes was quite a common ideology (Meir, 1996). This implied that the Bedouin regarded space, grazing, and water resources as open and free, and therefore the patron sheikh could not assume responsibility for the other tribes' conduct.

One of the security issues in which Jewish settlers were assisted considerably by individual Bedouin was military intelligence. The gathering of local information was initiated at the national level, but mukhtars and Jewish field guards were the local activists. This activity became institutionalized, especially after the construction of the regional water pipeline in 1946, and the allocation of financial resources by the pipeline company for this purpose (Danin, 1977). The social network of mukhtars and Jewish field guards was highly instrumental in this regard. This facilitated the systematic gathering of information from hired Bedouin informants and field guards or from occasional sources, who either came to the hospitality tent at the kibbutz gate, or were approached at neutral locations. Even some Bedouin policemen were among the paid informants. For the Bedouin, selling information became an important economic resource. For the Jewish settlers, this information was highly valuable even during the relatively peaceful years before 1948.

The frontier encounter also yielded some benefits to the settlers in securing environmental resources for initial development. One of the most important economic benefits was in land transactions. It is noteworthy that many Bedouin in the early 1940s were already semi-sedentarized peasants. The British Mandate government had semi-legalized Bedouin land ownership. This act, as shown by Ben-David (1989) and Kressel et al. (1991), upgraded land values in the real estate market Due primarily to economic need, many Bedouin willfully agreed to sell patches of land to Jewish organizations, beginning first with marginal low-quality lands and later even selling premium land. Virtually any offer for land transaction was accepted by Jewish organizations. Once again, the social networks of mukhtars and field guards became instrumental, not only in persuading Bedouin to sell land, but also in practically freeing and extracting from Bedouin possession land purchased earlier.

The political context of land transactions, as discussed above, put Bedouin who sold land under considerable pressure. A Bedouin sheikh who was active in land transactions had to confront three pressure groups: the

British Mandate government, which tried by legal means to ban these transactions; the Arab-Palestinian national movement and local Bedouin activists who forcefully denounced Bedouin selling land and threatened their lives; and Jewish buyers whose land acquisitions made Bedouin wealthy (Bar-Zvi, 1977; Porat, 1985). Eventually, the high prices offered by Jewish buyers (at times more than double their real value) outweighed the other pressures, but forced the Bedouin into a double standard: selling land secretly, but voicing their loud and open opposition (Weitz, 1965). Kark (1974) has noted that neither side found it necessary to resort to legal registration of land transactions. The Bedouin in particular argued that there is neither God nor government in the desert (Amitai, 1983; Meitiv, 1986). They were thus expressing their loyalty to their traditional, political, centrifugal attitude to central governments which is, according to Meir (1988), a universal process among pastoral nomads.

One of the problems that faced Jewish authorities and settlers was how to maintain their rights over acquired but uncultivated land. Here, too, the Bedouin became instrumental. In addition to helping in extracting pre-purchased land from previous owners, Bedouin also leased land plots from Jewish organizations. In his account of early settlement attempts in the Negev, Bar-Zvi has indicated that these lease payments were channeled into a local fund aimed at strengthening contacts with the Bedouin, paying for their hospitality in Jewish settlements, and feeding their horses (Bar-Zvi, 1971). In other cases, where such land leasing was impossible, land was plowed by settlers only in order to evade the old Ottoman law whereby failure to cultivate for three consecutive years justified its return to the original owner.

Another environmental resource, which was an immediate need, was water. There was no doubt among settlers that Bedouin aid in supplying water was crucial for successful initial rooting (Meitiv, 1958). The traditional Bedouin custom of sharing water with neighbors (Marx, 1974; Kressel et al., 1991) would perhaps explain their altruistic attitude towards settlers. However, as noted by Keren (n.d.), the same code was also the source of their expectations for reciprocity once water resources were developed by the Jewish settlements. Local wells, despite their low discharge, were thus made available to settlers. Also, despite external Arab nationalistic opposition, the Bedouin permitted the water pipeline, laid in 1947, by Jewish organizations from the northern core region, to pass through their tribal territories, albeit at a monthly fee (Gavri, 1985).

The Jewish settlements were also assisted by the Bedouin in several other ways. First, despite their primitive technology, the Bedouin had accumulated considerable experience in the harvesting of local runoff and subsurface water resources in dry-farming land cultivation, and, obviously, in flock grazing. Porat's detailed discussion of this issue (Porat,

1992) reveals that, contrary to prevailing myths, these skills were of considerable benefit to the settlers. In addition, some kibbutzim bought sheep dung from Bedouin for fertilization, others bought barley for marketing in core region markets, and still others bought poultry for food conservation in a local small factory. The production of kaolin from a local mine in the Negev Highlands was made possible with Bedouin assistance (Efrat, 1982; Bar-Zvi, 1976). Although the main supplies to Jewish settlements came from core markets, local markets in the few Bedouin villages and the town of Be'er Sheva, as well as individual Bedouin neighbors, served to supplement various daily needs in goods and services (such as postal services and public transportation).

Benefits to Bedouin

Although suspicious in the very early phase, the Bedouin in general accepted the new Jewish settlements favorably in anticipation of the development of irrigation and farming technology, as well as the diversification of their income sources. Indeed, the frontier encounter benefited the Bedouin to a considerable extent. Beyond the immediate benefits from land transactions, patronage fees, salaries to the Bedouin field guards, and other functionaries, there were more fundamental benefits in several respects.

The most important of these benefits was water supply. The Bedouin never had sufficient irrigation water, and local wells barely supplied enough water for their animals and domestic needs. Although water resources developed by the settlers and their core institutions did not suffice for Bedouin irrigation as well, and were irrelevant to their dry-farming agriculture, Bedouin expectations for reciprocity in water supply were met to a considerable degree. At the local level, as soon as a water well was dug by a Jewish settlement, a special pump and outlet tap were made available, free of charge, to Bedouin. Individual Bedouin imitated local Jewish attempts and dug their own private wells in the vicinity of those of the settlers. Bar-Zvi (1971) discusses a larger project in which Bedouin also attempted to emulate, with the aid of settlers, a kibbutz's project of damming winter flash flood water. At the regional level, the pipeline from the North was made available to supply water to sheikhs and to tribes living along its route, as well as to the few regional desert police stations. Some of the sheikhs even sold these water allocations to their tribesmen, thus benefiting twice after collecting their pipeline-passage permission and guarding fees.

With the gradual growth and development of the frontier settlements, various employment opportunities became available to the Bedouin. These included the hiring of Bedouin labor as field guards–an occupation

they highly respected, for dam construction, for the kaolin mine, for the regional water pipeline project, for crop harvesting as share-croppers, and for camel-plowing of cultivation fields, and camel–transportation of construction materials for the water dam project or of kaolin from the mine. Most of these jobs were, however, only temporary due to the Bedouin's traditional aversion to manual labor. Some technical services were also available to Bedouin such as carpentry, locksmithery and other machinery facilities in kibbutzim. Bedouin were also allowed to use surplus grass from local cultivated fields as animal feed. Another economic benefit to individual Bedouin was the purchase of goods for them by mukhtars and individual settlers in core city markets in the north. The latter even became instrumental for the Bedouin in their attempts to obtain seedlings of eucalyptus trees from the Forestry Department in order to plant them as a future source of timber for their dwellings. On occasion, mukhtars looked away or actually provided a cover-up against government attempts to curtail the Bedouin traditional smuggling activities. This, however, was the only area in which the settlers lobbied the government, or provided otherwise related services to aid the Bedouin. Usually, British Mandate officials sought direct and independent channels of communication with the Bedouin, and the latter found no need to resort to the settlers as a resource in this regard.

The Bedouin were also aided by settlers in medical services, an important area given their remoteness from medical centers in central places. Already in the late 1930s, a Jewish medical doctor was stationed in Be'er Sheva by the land purchasing organization specifically to build a network of relationships with the Bedouin (Gal-Pe'er, 1985). Later on, the Bedouin began to regard every Jewish settler as a medical healer. Some mukhtars were also active in this regard and their kibbutzim became local centers for medical services for the Bedouin, including some primary outreach services in medical care or instruction in elementary hygiene.

Post-Independence Frontier Encounter—The 1950s

The Context

The War of Independence, (November, 1947–March, 1949), was a turning point in the relationships between the Bedouin and the settlers. The major change is related to the battles between the Egyptian army and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in the Negev. This conflict immediately shifted the focus of Jewish-Bedouin relations in the Negev from a regional and local sociocultural encounter to a national, political and even militaristic one. Although some indications emerged earlier, the ability to shape the relationship now shifted from the local people (Jewish settlers and Bedouin alike) to the state and political arenas.

The Bedouin were not monolithic in their attitude to the war initiated by the Arab nations. As far as involvement was concerned, there were only a few direct independent Bedouin attacks on Jewish settlements in support of the invading Egyptian army. However, some Bedouin adopted individual initiatives. These included attacks on patrol units along the regional water pipeline, mining transportation routes, preventing access to local water wells, or inflicting casualties on settlers. Many of these hostilities were conducted by the Bedouin in order to blur their previous cooperation in intelligence or land transactions with settlers. Other Bedouin continued to cooperate with the Jewish settlements in intelligence activities or in supplying them with food during the war.

While, in the short run, the settlers and the Bedouin alike suffered considerably during the war, in the long run, it was the Bedouin who suffered most of the consequences of the political changes in the Negev. On the one hand, their sources of livelihood dwindled due to the war, and they became a burden upon the Egyptian army supply sources. The latter also expelled many Bedouin who were suspected of previous cooperation with the Jewish settlers, or who refused to take part in the invasion. On the other hand, the policy of the IDF during the war was to avoid causing damage to the Bedouin, especially to those who had previously been cooperative. The IDF could not refrain, however, from making changes in the pattern of Bedouin territories and habitats according to military tactical needs.

During the war, the attitude of state and military officials toward the Bedouin was not unanimous. Morris (1987) has shown the split between those who supported expulsion of all Bedouin from the Negev, and those who advocated allowing the loyal ones to stay. However, similarly to Arabs elsewhere in Israel, most of the Bedouin (about 58,000 out of 70,000) temporarily left the Negev for the Egyptian Sinai and areas that later became Jordanian. As indicated by Amitai, the Bedouin in particular believed that their territorial rights would not be violated by the political change (Amitai, 1983), an approach which is also consistent with their traditional pastoral nomadic territorial ideology (see, Meir, 1996). Some of the remaining tribes signed an agreement with the IDF to guarantee their territorial rights and ensure the respect of the authorities for their rights in exchange for loyalty and cooperation. Now, however, they had to deal with state authorities rather than with the neighboring settlers. Thus, for the first time, the state political apparatus was introduced into the delicate fabric of relationships between the Jewish settlers and the Bedouin.

Immediately after the war, the authorities barred the return of tribes that had left the Negev and established a military administration over the remaining tribes. The latter act required the relocation of many tribes into a military administered zone *(sayig)* that was located east of Be'er Sheva

and away from the Egyptian border (Weitz, 1965) (Figure 11.2). Relocation implied the severance of these tribes from their territories, pastoral, and agricultural resources, and a population density within the sayig of more than threefold its previous level. The Bedouin traditional territorial order was therefore seriously disrupted, creating a long standing land dispute between them and the state. This dispute, as will be shown below, also affected their relationships with the settlers.

Several factors at the national level during the 1950s had an impact on the state's attitude toward the Bedouin. Military and international factors had the greatest impact; they were discussed by Milshtein (1985) and Lustick (1985). During the early 1950s, the Negev frontier was permeable to Bedouin infiltraters who cooperated with Arab armies or sought access to their territories (see, Khawaldi, 1992; Meir et al., 1992). By doing so, they often clashed with the IDF and also inflicted civilian casualties. In those years the Negev was given the nickname of the "Wild South." Consequently, additional expulsion acts were carried out.

Second, the Negev frontier, especially its northern part, became inhabited by dozens of new Jewish agricultural settlements and development towns. These settlements served a double function as buffers along the borders (Figure 11.2) and as homes for masses of Jewish immigrants from Europe and North Africa. Many of these settlements were located on territories that were previously owned by those Bedouin who absented themselves or were relocated (Artzieli, 1978). Third, the development of the regional labor market and economy were geared primarily towards absorbing the new immigrants. Marx dwelt quite extensively on this issue as it imposed a further constraint on the already distressed Bedouin livelihood within the sayig because many of them became landless and lacked sufficient economic resources (Marx, 1974). Finally, the universal problem of controlling the Bedouin nomads and their relationships with central governments in the Middle East—as shown by Kazaz (1972), Bailey (1972), Chatty (1980), and Meir (1988)—was also shared by the new Israeli state. This added further tension to the intricate system of relationship between the Bedouin and the Jewish population.

Despite these problems, which were all condensed spatio-temporally into a small area within a short period and existed under military administration, Bedouin welfare did not become a top priority of the state. The latter was preoccupied with more pressing problems and therefore, according to Weitz (1968), adopted a policy of "no long-range policy" regarding the Bedouin. This government approach was in effect until the mid-1960s. However, the problems with the Bedouin required heavy government involvement in their affairs, beyond the universal raison d'être of the state, in the areas of regional security, land ownership, local governance, and the provision of social and economic services.




FIGURE 11.2 The Negev frontier in the 1950s. (*Source:* Meir, 1997. Reprinted by permission of Westview Press.)

Economically, Bedouin access to their traditional marketplace in Be'er Sheva was barred until 1956, and their free integration into the labor market became possible only in the late 1950s (Ben-David, 1986). In that decade, the Bedouin continued their traditional agro-pastoral economy. However, as these resources became highly constrained within the sayig, many intensified their involvement in smuggling goods and narcotics across the borders. Administratively, the Bedouin were awarded citizenship in 1954 and the idea was even broached, but soon discarded, of exploring the possibility of converting them to Judaism (Geva, 1994). Some Bedouin, however, especially in the mountainous central Negev and eastern Negev, then still outside the sayig, violently resisted Israeli sovereignty in an attempt to maintain their territorial and tribal coherence across borders. Consequently, they were driven into the Sinai and some, earlier on, were sent into Jordan (Wallach, 1985), while others were forced to relocate into the sayig. Since then, with the exception of several dozen families, the Negev Highlands remained virtually empty of Bedouin.

Jewish-Bedouin Encounter

It is within this context, marked by vacillation between processes of exclusion and inclusion of the Bedouin by state authorities, that the encounter continued in the first decade of the state. The circumstances of the encounter, however, have now changed radically. Spatially, due to relocation into the sayig, only few of the early Jewish settlements could maintain direct neighborhood contacts with the Bedouin (Figure 11.2). Demographically, the Bedouin, who were once a large majority, became a small minority. By the end of that decade they constituted no more than 11 percent of the Negev population. Politically, the focus of relationships between the Jewish population and the Bedouin has now shifted to the military administration and state bureaucracy (see also, Horowitz and Lissak, 1977). This reduced considerably the relative importance of direct neighborly contacts conducted previously by the local population.

The nature of the relationships, which were previously characterized by broad mutuality, now became mostly unidirectional and narrow in scope. The settlers became a majority, heavily backed by state authorities and institutions. They no longer had to resort to local aid from the Bedouin as before. The Bedouin, on the other hand, were left with virtually nothing significant to offer to their neighbors. Given the major political-ecological change in the structure of their economy, they now became almost totally dependent upon the state and its bureaucracy for their survival. Furthermore, kibbutz settlers were not as physically close to the Bedouin as they were before because the Bedouin were relocated to the sayig. Other types of new Jewish settlements, such as moshavim, were largely irrelevant in terms of the encounter, due to the fact that their inhabitants were new immigrants and their relationship with the small urban population in the Negev was negligible. On the other hand, due to travel restrictions imposed by the military administration on the Bedouin, only a few kibbutzim were now accessible to them.

At the local level, kibbutz mukhtars continued to maintain contact with the neighboring Bedouin. However, their previous status, vis-à-vis the present state bureaucracy, was diminishing rapidly. Through informal discussions in kibbutzim (e.g. Shoshani, 1954), it became apparent that this function would soon disappear, which was indeed the case. Moreover, most of the activities of settlers in their relationships with the Bedouin were no longer institutionalized at the kibbutz community level. Rather, the focus shifted to the initiatives of a few individual members, usually former mukhtars and field guards, who wanted to preserve the past. The more socialist the orientation of the kibbutz, the more inclined it was toward more institutionalized assistance to the Bedouin at the kibbutz community level. Indeed, it so happened that kibbutzim with such

an orientation (i.e. mostly those of the Hashomer Hatzair movement) bordered the sayig. There were, however, a few kibbutzim which had been established after the war, and had not participated in the early phase of frontier encounter.

The initiatives taken by individual settlers were all geared toward assisting the Bedouin in their attempts to survive the hard years of military administration. However, the ability of kibbutzim to provide direct economic aid was quite negligible. They concentrated, therefore, on other kinds of local support. Thus, one kibbutz established a small informal elementary school for the Bedouin in its vicinity. A former mukhtar of another kibbutz became a governmental officer in charge of agricultural extension. Through his activities new strains of wheat were introduced, making it more dominant and profitable than in the traditional Bedouin dry-farming economy.

These kinds of support were, however, random and narrow in scope. Judged in contextual terms, they were only a small remnant of the relatively broad fields of support which constituted the rich encounter in the 1940s. Indeed, many of the previous dimensions of encounter had disappeared. Bedouinization attempts were no longer relevant. Gathering intelligence now became the responsibility of state authorities, in addition to the provision of public services such as health services and handling water resources and supply. Due to employment regulations, the Bedouin could no longer expect gainful employment in the kibbutzim. In short, the range of benefits gained by the Bedouin from their encounter with Jewish settlers during the 1950s decreased considerably.

The kibbutzim were left with the possibility of extending moral support alone to the Bedouin. The most urgent and intensive activity during the early 1950s stemmed from the need to foil government attempts to relocate Bedouin tribes, especially those that were cooperative and friendly. In some cases, such intervention attempts were initiated by newly established kibbutzim that adhered to their socialistic ideology of international comradeship. Some of these attempts were successful, but in many other cases, the kibbutzim were helpless in the face of the government and military authorities, whose national considerations outweighed the local ones. Aid was also given by individual settlers, who either lobbied for, or actually obtained travel and work permits outside the sayig for individual Bedouin. Other individual settlers helped individual Bedouin families by buying goods for them in Be'er Sheva, a town that was administratively inaccessible to the Bedouin in those years.

Another important area of lobbying concerned the land ownership dispute. Bedouin ideas of formal land ownership begun to develop only during the British Mandate, and therefore most of them did not have any formal land titles. Consequently, the government neither recognized their

territorial rights, nor attempted to solve this problem. Most of the Jewish lobbyists in this regard were, again, members of kibbutzim, and their attempts were inspired, presumably, by their unease of possessing land that was previously considered the territory of Bedouin who were now absentee or relocated. Therefore, they publicly criticized the "policy of no-policy" but with little success. Some of them became members of a public advisory council during 1956–1961 in an attempt to provide the Bedouin with formally-owned land. Even this council, however, had little success in the face of a rigid governmental attitude toward the Bedouin and Arabs at large. Finally, kibbutzim, especially the more socialistic ones, were very active politically in trying to end the military administration (Amitai, 1988) which was not lifted until 1965.

These activities, together with other attempts at lobbying, or local agreements with Bedouin neighbors concerning the usage of local resources (see, for example: Naor, 1986), created a conflict between Jewish settlers and the military administration and the state. The interest of the latter, which was a function of both the raison d'etre of the state and the Israeli-Arab conflict, was to impose order upon the Bedouin. The activities of the kibbutzim, that aimed at creating an atmosphere that would facilitate long-range relationships with the Bedouin, were therefore regarded by the authorities as an obstacle. In some cases, kibbutz members became government or military administration officials themselves and were trapped within this conflict. The kibbutz settlers were thus caught in a difficult dilemma between their ideological commitment to the Bedouin and their civil duty to support the Israeli state. This dilemma, which was very minor during the 1940s, now added considerable tension and confusion on both sides of the encounter.

The dilemma was exacerbated even further, primarily by the security issue which seriously complicated the settlers' relationships with the Bedouin. As part of the policy of the rural frontier settlement (see, Efrat, 1981), kibbutzim also fulfilled a quasi-military mission of securing the borders against infiltrates. This function, as indicated by Meitiv, was carried out in close cooperation with, and under full supervision by the military authorities (Meitiv, 1969). Many of the infiltrates were Bedouin who previously lived in the Negev and, as shown by Khawaldi, 1992; see also, Meir et al. (1992), now sought to use their pastoral territories in complete disregard of the border. Dayan (1976) has also discussed the military dimension of such infiltrations and indicated that many of the Bedouin infiltrates sought revenge through sabotage, terror, or by serving in the Egyptian and Jordanian intelligence. Many also participated in smuggling goods and narcotics, crossing the Negev from Egypt to Jordan. Altogether, these violations of the border were very intensive, and added to the "Wild South" image of the Negev during that decade. These

activities imposed a heavy security burden upon Jewish settlements, especially those close to the borders or located in the more remote areas of the Negev Highlands. However, beyond that, they further complicated their relationships with their neighboring Bedouin, many of whom cooperated with their kin across the borders or provided refuge for infiltrates.

Another source of friction and tension was the issue of land ownership and the usage of pastoral resources. The Negev Bedouin, loyal to their traditional ideas of resource utilization (see, Meir, 1996), attempted repeatedly to graze on their traditional territories. Many of these lands, however, were now transferred by the government to both old and new Jewish settlements. While for the Bedouin, grazing on these lands seemed natural and right according to their custom, the Jewish settlers saw it as trespassing, as it violated Israeli law. Consequently, in many cases kibbutzim were heavily and bitterly criticized by the Bedouin for possession of their land. In others, such trespassing was part of what Reifenberg (1949) called the general conflict between the desert and the sown. Such trespassing caused numerous local clashes between the settlers and the Bedouin and even occasional casualties on both sides. It took the whole decade for the Bedouin to adapt to the new reality. In the meanwhile, in order to pacify them, the kibbutzim involved made every attempt to compensate the Bedouin for these casualties (Gavri, 1985). Some other kibbutzim adopted the solution of leasing stubble fields to the Bedouin for grazing purposes and allowed them to use water from local irrigation pipelines.

Nevertheless, as indicated above, the friction between the Jewish settlers and the Bedouin generated considerable tension among the former who were torn between their sympathy for the Bedouin and their loyalty to the state. This was perhaps the reason for their intensive lobbying with the authorities to ease the survival stress of the Bedouin. This dimension of encounter, however, remained the only significant one within a system that had previously encompassed richer fields of mutual relationships. Even this encounter, however, became highly constrained by the difficult circumstances of the 1950s.

The second decade of the frontier encounter in the Negev ended in 1959 when an Israeli army officer was murdered by Bedouin near the Egyptian border. Consequently, severe punitive measures were taken against Bedouin still living in this area, including forceful expulsion to Sinai or relocation into the sayig. After that no major incidents of military or security nature were recorded. In the early 1960s the government began to recognize the need to reconsider its approach to the Bedouin. The reconsideration process had began even earlier (the mid-1950s) and was expressed in the easing of the strict travel and labor regulations, contin-

ued with lifting the military administration in 1965, and culminated in a plan, launched in 1966, to settle the Bedouin in towns. Following these measures, and especially after the Six Day War of 1967, the frontier reality of the Negev ended.

Conclusions

The nature of the encounter between Jewish settlers and the Bedouin in the Negev changed considerably between the two phases of frontier settlement. The turning point came, as postulated, with the politicization of space through, first, the involvement of military authorities (Egyptian and Israeli during the War of Independence), and later with the involvement of Israeli state apparatus in the region. Although the Jewish settlers arrived in the Negev as part of the mission of its core institutions, it may be argued that, in the early phase, the relationship between each group in the frontier, particularly the Bedouin, and the national core was relatively weak. Apparently, the weakness of the core during the 1940s contributed to a relationship that was symbiotic and, in general, non-conflictual. Later on, during the 1950s, the power of the Jewish core, now transformed into a state apparatus, increased considerably while that of the Bedouin almost disappeared. Jewish settlers found themselves supported by a strong core which, due to its centralist ideology, rendered them highly dependent on it. Thus, paradoxically, this core had limited their ability to maintain the previous nature of the encounter. However, in its attempt to control the nomadic and often hostile Bedouin population, this core imposed the same constraints upon the Bedouin. In other words, the nature of the frontier encounter changed from a relatively voluntary and peaceful one to an alienated, compulsive, coercive, and, at times, even violent encounter with the diminished power of the Jewish settlers and the Bedouin alike in shaping these relationships.

Kark (1974) has addressed the role of the Arab core within Bedouin society and is correct in asserting that if Arab nationalists in Palestine had not interfered with the encounter in the Negev during the late 1940s, the Jewish-Bedouin symbiosis would have prevailed. The limited activities of the kibbutzim during the 1950s support this assertion. Indeed, if it were not for these settlers, the Bedouin would probably have been under even more stress. Following the present discussion, the same assertion can be made regarding the Jewish core, namely the Israeli government in the 1950s, whose interference in the Bedouin society had strong political and military dimensions that originate in the national-territorial Israeli-Arab conflict. However, even if these dimensions could be discounted, the centripetal nature of the modern state and state apparatus, as shown by Meir

(1988), would still stand in sharp contrast to the centrifugal nature of the nomadic Bedouin society. Consequently, the nature of the encounter between the Jewish settlers and the Bedouin in the state period would still have remained within a coercive context. Space in the frontier would thus be produced, as indeed it was in the state period, not through the mutuality of social and cultural relationships within the local encounter, but rather through the manipulative and controlling power of the state and its apparatus, and its tendency to integrate the frontier into the core.

Studies of frontier settlement have not paid much attention to the possibility of a double-phase process in the evolution of encounters between settlers and the local population. It transpires from the present study that the nature of the frontier encounter at the micro level can undergo considerable changes from voluntary, peaceful, and symbiotic to coercive and relatively violent, once the political core at the macro level interferes. This conclusion can serve as a useful hypothesis for further studies of the evolution of ethnic frontiers, and to help in understanding the nature of the production of space within them.

Notes

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12

Minority Higher Education in an Ethnic Periphery: The Bedouin Arabs

Ismael Abu-Saad

Introduction

This chapter deals with education, higher education in particular, among the Bedouin Arabs who live in the peripheral region of the Negev desert in southern Israel. The Bedouin community is part of the larger Arab minority in Israel, and is therefore situated on the ethnic as well as the spatial periphery of mainstream Jewish Israeli society. This chapter will review the changes that the Negev Bedouin have undergone in recent history, and the effect of these changes on the Bedouin's position in both Arab and Israeli society. Furthermore, the chapter includes an examination of how the provision of educational services and opportunities relates to the peripheral status of the Bedouin in Israeli society, and their potential for development.

Arabs of the Middle East have developed three predominant settlement patterns, which also determine their identity: town dwellers *(medani),* villagers *(qarawi)* and desert-dwellers or Bedouin *(badwi).* Desert, village, and city are intimately related to each other in Arab society culturally, socially, and economically. Though the Bedouin constitute only a small and declining proportion of the Arab population, they have played an important role in creating the values of Arab civilization; in addition they perform important economic functions (Berger, 1964). Traditionally, they have adapted to the harsh desert environment by engaging in pastoral nomadism, either depending totally upon their animals (nomads), or practicing a combination of agriculture and herding (semi-nomads) (Kasasbeh, 1988). Thus they played the vital role of the stock-breeders of the Middle East.

Over the past half century, with the formation of nation-states and the encroachment of modernization, Bedouin life throughout the Middle East has changed to varying degrees. This change has been particularly dramatic for the 88,000 Bedouin Arabs living in the Negev desert (Melitz, 1995; Fenster, 1994) who make up part of the Arab ethnic minority in Israel, and live on the spatial as well as the socioeconomic periphery of mainstream Israeli Jewish society. They have inhabited the Negev desert since the 5th century C.E. (Maddrell, 1990), and were traditionally organized into nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes who earned a living raising sheep and engaging in seasonal agriculture (Shimoni, 1947).

Prior to 1948, estimates of the Bedouin population in the Negev ranged from 65,000 to 90,000 (Falah, 1989; Maddrell, 1990). During and after the 1948 war, the vast majority of the Negev Bedouin became refugees in the surrounding Arab countries/territories (i.e., the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Jordan, etc.), and only about 11,000 remained in the Negev (Falah, 1989; Marx, 1967). Most of these Bedouin were subsequently removed from their traditional lands, and were restricted to specified locations in the *saying* (closed area) set up for them in the northern Negev during the period of the military administration over Arabs in Israel (1948–1966) (Falah, 1989; Lustick, 1980; Marx, 1967; Meir, 1990). The Bedouin's traditional way of life changed dramatically due to the loss of their grazing and agricultural lands (Lustick, 1980; Maddrell, 1990), and the community began a spontaneous sedentarization process (Falah, 1985; 1989).

In the late 1960s and early 1970s the government began implementing plans to resettle the Negev Bedouin population into seven urban-style townships (Rahat, Tel-Sheva, Arara, Kseifa, Segev Shalom, Hura, and Laqiya). The official rationale for moving the Bedouin to townships was to integrate them into the modern nation-state and to provide them with services more efficiently, as well as to consolidate government control over the land by concentrating the Bedouin in one place and preventing them from cultivating, settling on, or claiming their lands (Bailey, 1995; Falah, 1989; Hazleton, 1980; Maddrell, 1990). The provision of services (i.e. running water, electricity, paved roads, local schools, community health clinics, telephone services, etc.) was used as an incentive to attract Bedouin to the government townships, while the spontaneous settlements were, for the most part, left without these services (Ben-David, 1991). The settlement program, however, has only been partially successful. Currently, 50 percent of the Bedouin live in the planned towns, while 50 percent continue to live in spontaneous tribal settlements (Melitz, 1995).

The disadvantage of the government-planned towns is that they lack basic infrastructure and services found in modern, urban settlements of

comparable size in the Jewish sector, such as internal sources of employment, public libraries, recreational, and cultural centers, internal and external public transportation networks, sewage systems, etc. (Ben-David, 1993). The unemployment rate in these towns is 25 percent, which is the highest in Israel (Ben-David, 1991). No reliable employment statistics are available for Bedouin still living in spontaneous settlements who, in general, depend upon a combination of traditional agriculture, herding, and wage labor for their livelihood.

Due to the loss or restriction of their traditional livelihood, the Negev Bedouin have become more and more dependent upon integration into the Israeli labor market for their subsistence. While the Bedouin are in the process of being removed from the spatial periphery of the country to planned, urban settlements, they remain on the social, economic, and political periphery of modern, Western-oriented Israeli society. This study focuses on the provision of educational services as preparation for higher education, and the importance of this for the development of the Negev Bedouin community in its new context. Much of the literature on the provision of educational services to nomads deals with problems of the mobility and sparse distribution of the population (Gorham, 1980; Arhem, 1985; Swift et al., 1990), the competing demands of the traditional economy (Swift, 1984; Swift et al., 1990), traditional education (Heron, 1983; Ponsi, 1988), and the relevance or appropriateness of the educational program for nomads and the nomadic lifestyle (Swift et al., 1990). Higher education is rarely mentioned, if at all, and, in many cases, the provision of educational services to nomadic and formerly nomadic populations is viewed as a government tool to bring these peripheral populations under their political control (Meir, 1986; 1997; Swift et al., 1990). Some of these issues are relevant to the case of the Negev Bedouin, but others are not, given the fact that the nomadic/semi-nomadic way of life is no longer viable for them due to the loss of their land base and the government-imposed "urbanization" process. In such a case, education must also be considered a tool of social, political, and economic empowerment for the sedenterized community. Thus, the situation of the Negev Bedouin parallels that of ethnic minorities whose lifestyle is much the same as other groups in their respective societies, but who remain on the socioeconomic periphery. This study discusses the potential role of higher education in improving the situation of such ethnic minorities, and examines the factors that aid or impede their access to higher education.

Higher Education and Minorities: Past Research

Higher education plays a prominent role in determining a community's competitiveness in the world marketplace. Just as raw materials were

once considered to be critical factors for survival in the twentieth century, intellectual capacity and technological innovation will provide key ingredients for success in the twenty-first century (Perry, 1990). In most societies, higher education is also recognized as the key to greater economic rewards and social mobility (Garibaldi, 1986; McCauley, 1988), making it of vital importance to those groups on the socioeconomic periphery of society. Research has demonstrated that increased educational attainment leads to a narrowing of the gaps between minority and majority occupational and economic attainment, as well as to minority community gains in political resources (Astin, 1982; Fleming, 1984; Garibaldi, 1986; McCauley, 1988; Mar'i, 1978).

A large body of research (Astin, 1977; Bowen, 1977; Chickering, 1974; Feldman and Newcomb, 1969; Pace, 1979; Mar'i, 1978) shows that economic benefits are not the only advantages of higher education. It helps the students develop a more positive self-image, a greater sense of intellectual and interpersonal competency, more tolerant views and attitudes toward others, and, of special significance for minority students, increased political awareness and social commitment. These studies also show that, for minority and non-minority students alike, higher education plays a major role in the development of an informed public.

However, in many societies, full and equal access of all citizens to higher education is a problem. Instead, patterns of socioeconomic inequality in society are often reproduced in universities (Astin, 1982; Abu-Saad, 1993). A number of factors contribute to this phenomenon, including pre-university educational preparation, university entrance requirements, and the socioeconomic status of peripheral minority communities.

There is a considerable body of research demonstrating that the quality of elementary and secondary education is critical in determining whether or not young people go on to higher education, what kind of institutions they attend, how they perform, and whether or not they are able to complete their degrees (Astin, 1982). This issue is of paramount importance to minorities, whose public education system is often the weakest. Predominantly-minority schools in low-income, peripheral communities typically have fewer resources (finances, facilities, high-quality teaching and administrative leadership, community involvement and support) than schools serving in predominantly majority group students in higher-income communities. In addition, middle-class, majority-group students often have resources and support systems outside school to compensate for deficiencies in the public educational system, while low-income minority students typically do not have access to such resources and support systems.

According to research done by Astin (1982) in the United States, the consequences of deficiencies in the pre-university education of minorities

are clear. High school dropout rates are much higher among minority students than they are among majority students. In addition, minority students who do go on to higher education tend to major in education and the social sciences, rather than fields such as engineering or the natural sciences, and are less likely than their majority counterparts to complete their university degrees.

To overcome these barriers to the involvement of minority groups in higher education, the Commission on the Higher Education of Minorities in the United States recommended that: resources be reallocated to redress the inequities and deficiencies in predominantly-minority schools; higher educational institutions involved in the training of elementary and secondary school teachers develop stronger academic programs to provide minority students with a high-quality education based on an understanding of minority cultures and values; and that school leadership make greater efforts to involve and respond to the needs and concerns of minority parents (Astin, 1982).

Another major obstacle to minority participation in higher education is related to institutional accessibility. Admission procedures in many universities rely heavily upon psychometric testing, which puts minority students, in particular, at a disadvantage. The aim of psychometric testing is to rate students in comparison to each other. Thus, it is not a measure of an individual student's knowledge or potential to learn. Research among minorities in the United States has shown that they tend to score significantly lower than their white counterparts on many standardized tests (McDowell, 1992). The performance differences of social, cultural, and linguistic minority groups were found to be attributable to a variety of factors, including "the existence of real inequities of opportunity (such as lower average income and higher unemployment rates), technical limitations of standardized measures, and the cultural orientation of tests (toward the topics, language and ways of knowing of one group, as opposed to those of others)" (McDowell, 1992: 46). Culture, in particular, plays an important role in test performance because it both forms the mental models that people construct to make meaning of the world, and mediates the ways in which people demonstrate the knowledge they have (McDowell, 1992). These factors, separately and in interaction, limit the possibility and practicality of constructing psychometric testing instruments that do not evoke unfair differential performance. Astin's study (1982), for example, demonstrated that, among minority students, aptitude test scores (such as the psychometric exam) were much poorer predictors of university success than were students' high-school grades. Therefore, the use of such tests to determine university admittance often results in allocating opportunity on the basis of race and culture rather than ability (McDowell, 1992; National Commission on Testing and

Public Policy, 1990). As a result, according to McDowell, "men, women and children of varied ethnic, linguistic, and cultural backgrounds are erroneously told that they lack the capacity to pursue their chosen careers and academic interests" (1992: 51).

Along with admissions policies, financial-aid policies have a major impact upon the access of minority groups to higher education (Astin, 1982; Falk and Aitken, 1984; Quevedo-Garcia, 1987; Pounds, 1987; Wetsit LaCounte, 1987). Research among minorities in the United States found that financial support in the form of grants of scholarships and work-study programs (involving part-time work on campus) tend to facilitate minority students' completion of an undergraduate degree (Astin, 1982).

Higher Education and Arabs in Israel

Very little research has been done on higher educational attainment among the Arab minority in Israel outside of Mar'i's (1978) and Al-Haj's (1995) studies. Mar'i's and Al-Haj's findings were quite similar to those of Astin on minorities in the United States, and revealed that poor educational preparation at the elementary and secondary school levels, poor economic return for the investment in higher education, and the socio-political significance of students in their society were among the major obstacles leading to the low higher-education ratios among Arabs in Israel.

Similar to minority groups in other societies, many Arab youth in Israel lack the necessary skills to pursue higher education, due to the quality of their preparation at the elementary and secondary school levels. Jews and Arabs study in separate school systems, each with their own language of instruction (Hebrew and Arabic, respectively). The Israeli State Comptroller's 1992 report comparing Jewish and Arab education in Israel revealed that school budgets, teaching hours, professional resources, and facilities are not equitably distributed between these systems (State Comptroller, 1992). In the 1990–91 school year, the annual per capita expenditure of the Ministry of Education and Culture was 308 New Israeli Shekels (NIS) per Jewish student, and 168 NIS per Arab student. This report also revealed that 54.6 percent of Arab students drop out of school before completing the 12th grade, as compared to 18.4 percent among Jews (State Comptroller, 1992).

In addition, much of the school curriculum, which is set by the Ministry of Education, is not relevant to the background of Arab students, especially at the high-school level. According to Peres et al. (1970), Mar'i (1978), and Al-Haj (1995), the Arab high school curriculum in Israel places more of an emphasis on Hebrew and Zionist studies than on

Arabic language, culture, and history. Furthermore, Brown (1986) reported that the Arab school curriculum in Israel emphasizes the creation and establishment of Zionism and diminution of the sense of Arab identity, alienating Arab students. Little attention is given to Arab culture, especially its contemporary political concerns. This emphasis in itself lowers the relevance of the educational experience for Arab students to the point of seriously estranging them from school.

Another related problem is the validity of the matriculation exams for Arab students, which is a basic requirement for pursuing higher education. Teacher-student interaction in Arab schools depends heavily on memorization and rote learning and understanding, while the matriculation exams rely more on higher levels of analysis, synthesis and application (Mar'i, 1978). Thus, the Arab high school student is evaluated for university admission on skills in which he or she has not been trained. Of the Arab students who completed high school in 1989, only 13.7 percent passed the matriculation exams, as compared to 42.3 percent among Jewish high school students (State Comptroller, 1992).

Second, Mar'i's (1978) study revealed that the economic returns for investment in higher education served to discourage Arabs in Israel from pursuing higher education. The Arab university graduates he surveyed earned only 9 percent more than their non-graduate peers. All of the university graduates in his study were elementary and secondary school teachers and administrators (though many were trained in fields other than education), and indicated that teaching in Arab schools was virtually the only job available for them. In another study reported by Mar'i (1978), the majority of Arab university graduates expressed dissatisfaction with their income as well as the job opportunities open to them. While this situation has changed somewhat in more recent years, the Arab school system remains the largest employer of Arab university graduates in Israel. Haider (1993) reported that 57 percent of Arab university graduates were employed by the Arab education system, 18 percent were self-employed (i.e. dentists, lawyers, physicians, pharmacists, accountants, etc.), 14 percent were employed by Arab local councils, 7 percent were employed by government offices, and 4 percent were employed by the Histadrut (General Federation of Labor). The second largest category, the self-employed, involves graduates with a profession that enables them to open private practices, if they are not absorbed by the Israeli public services or entrepreneurial industries, which often proves to be the case. For example, most physicians in Israel work as salaried employees in health care settings controlled by large government or non-profit organizations (Rosen, 1989). However, out of the 800 Arab physicians, the majority (57 percent) were self-employed, while 341 (43 percent) were employed by the major health service employers (the Min-

istry of Health, and the largest health fund in Israel—roughly equivalent to HMO—the Histadrut "Kupat Holim"). None of the Arab dentists were employed by the Ministry of Health or the Kupat Holim dental clinics. Though Arabs made up 15 percent of all Kupat Holim members, only 2 percent of its employees were Arabs (Haider, 1993).

In general, the employment statistics reported by Haider (1993) indicate that most Arab university graduates (89 percent in the combined categories of Arab educational system, self-employment, and Arab local councils) must find employment either in the Arab or the private sectors. Indeed, in a survey conducted by Smooha in 1988, 74 percent of Jews indicated that they "were unwilling to have an Arab as a superior in a job" (Smooha, 1990: 403). In view of majority public opinion, as well as of many state policies, Smooha concluded that discrimination against Israeli Arabs abounds and is particularly widespread in hiring people for white-collar jobs in the Jewish economy (Smooha, 1990). Given the lack of rewarding job opportunities and the socioeconomic selection processes due to minority-majority dynamics, the economic incentives for Arabs in Israel to pursue higher education remain quite limited.

A third and related factor affecting Arab higher education ratios in Israel pertains to the sociopolitical status of Arabs in Israeli society, which is, at best, ambiguous. Given the sectarian self-definition of the state of Israel, the broader Middle East political context, and the fear of the impact of higher education on the development of sociopolitical consciousness among Arabs in Israel, the official government position toward their involvement in higher education has often been explicitly negative (Mar'i, 1978; Lustick, 1980). Uri Lubrani, who was the Arab affairs advisor to the Prime Minister from 1960 to 1963, said: "Were there no Arab students perhaps it would be better. If they would remain hewers of wood perhaps it would be easier to control them. But there are things which do not depend upon our wish. There is then no escape from this issue, so we must be careful to understand the nature of the problems involved and to devise appropriate strategies" (Lustick, 1980: 68).

In that vein, in 1975, Israel Koenig, who was the Ministry of Interior's senior Arabist, wrote a confidential memorandum entitled, "Handling the Arabs of Israel." His recommendations included: a) making it easy for Arabs to leave the country for the purposes of obtaining higher education, but difficult for them to return and find employment (social and economic security); b) encouraging the emigration of educated Arabs; and c) diminishing the effectiveness of Arab university students' organizations (Lustick, 1980). The legacy of these historic government policies is clearly reflected in the current status of the Arab community in Israeli society. The economic underdevelopment of the Arab sector remains one of the most striking characteristics of Israel's social and economic struc-

ture (Lustick, 1980). The Arab community, as a whole, remains lower in all aspects of socioeconomic status than the Jewish population, as evidenced by levels of education, workforce stratification, unemployment, income, and living conditions (Al-Haj, 1992; Grossman, 1993; Landau, 1993; Lustick, 1980; 1988; Rekhess, 1993; Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein, 1987). This research tends to suggest that higher education is a relatively poor investment for Arabs in Israel from a sociopolitical point of view since the powerful positions in the Israeli socioeconomic and political structure are not, by and large, open to them (Lustick, 1988; Mar'i, 1978; Swirski, 1990; Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein, 1987). Nevertheless, Mar'i (1978) found that, while higher education does not give Arab students entrance into the higher-level Israeli socioeconomic or political structure, it has been very important in developing the political consciousness and social commitment of Arabs with regard to their minority status in Israel, and their role and identity within the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Provision of Public Educational Services to the Negev Bedouin Arabs

The difficulties that affect Arab education in Israel are compounded by the radical social changes the Bedouin community has recently undergone. According to Swirski (1990), who studied educational equity in Israel, the Negev Bedouin Arabs are at the bottom of the society's educational ladder. Furthermore, he comments that from the perspective of the Israeli educational authorities, the Bedouin are seen as outsiders rather than an integral part of the society; and consequently, the educational services provided to the Bedouin are very minimal.

Education is a basic prerequisite for the Bedouin's successful adaptation and economic integration into Israeli society. The Israeli educational system, however, which is based on the Western educational model, represents a new organization in Bedouin Arab society. Prior to the establishment of the State of Israel, there were a few Western-style schools in the area which were set up during the British mandate, but it was usually only the sons of wealthy sheikhs who had access to such educational opportunities (Berman, 1967). Apart from these schools, there were a few elderly teachers, (called *khatib*) spread throughout the area who had a basic knowledge of reading and writing, but no qualifications beyond that. The Koran served as the textbook, and the education was completed when the student had learned the entire book (Abu-Saad, 1991; 1995).

During the early stage of Israel's statehood, the schools introduced by the Israeli government were viewed by the Bedouin as an intrusion that was irrelevant to their way of life. Over time, however, as people began

to adapt to their new reality, they saw the importance of education, and began to demand educational services (Abu-Saad, 1991; 1995; Meir, 1986; 1990); but it was not until the late 1960s that schools were widely established for them. It was only in 1969 that the first high school for the Bedouin in the Negev was opened. By the end of the 1970s, two more high schools had been built for the Negev Bedouin in government-planned settlements (Abu-Saad, 1991).

The number of schools and Bedouin students has increased over time. Currently, there are 27,100 students in the 45 Negev Bedouin schools, of which 35 are elementary schools, 3 are intermediate schools, 3 are comprehensive schools (7–12 grades), 3 are secondary schools (9–12 grades), and one is a non-academic trade school (Melitz, 1995).

This growth and development has made education more accessible to the majority of Bedouin children. However, many aspects of the physical and qualitative development of the educational system have not received the support and attention they require, given the potential importance of education for the successful adjustment of this traditional, minority community to the new context in which they now live. The schools face a wide array of difficulties on the levels of infrastructure, material, and human resources. Facilities and equipment are insufficient, and in some cases, altogether lacking (Abu-Saad, 1991; 1995). The staffing of the schools is also problematic. The Bedouin schools suffer from a serious shortage of qualified teachers, with the Ministry of Education reporting that 23 percent of the teachers lack the most basic training and credentials (Ministry of Education, 1994).

Furthermore, as a relatively new institution in Bedouin society, the schools are not accepted by all, and little or nothing has been done by the Ministry of Education to address this important social problem. More than 70 percent of Negev Bedouin children drop out before completing high school in comparison to 18 percent and 55 percent dropout rates in the Jewish and broader Arab sectors respectively (Abu-Saad, 1994; 1995; State Comptroller, 1992; Shor, 1994). The issue of girls attending school is especially problematic. Traditionally, females were restricted to the world of the extended family, and took responsibility for many aspects of the household economy (i.e. herding; milking and processing milk products; making the animal hide and wool into carpets, tents, mattresses, and pillows; harvesting crops; etc.). They were also considered the "bearers of the family honor," and thus, their families preferred not to risk their reputations by allowing girls to travel alone and mix with males from other tribes (Maddrell, 1990). Therefore, there was much more reluctance among the Bedouin to send their daughters to school than to send their sons to school, especially when schools were far away. Despite the many recent lifestyle changes, the Ministry of Education's data show that 80

percent of girls drop out before completing high school, even in the government-planned towns (Abu-Saad, 1994; 1995).

All of these factors, combined, have led to very poor success rates in Bedouin schools. In the 1991–92 academic year, less than 5 percent of Negev Bedouin high school students passed the matriculation exams (*Kul Al-Arab*, 1992), a basic requirement for going on to higher education.

Higher Education among the Negev Bedouin

As predicted in the literature, the problems with the educational system in the Bedouin community clearly have an impact on the capacity of Bedouin students to obtain higher education. According to research conducted by Abu-Saad (1993), only 135 out of over 83,000 Negev Bedouin have undergraduate or graduate university degrees. This comes to approximately 2 graduates per 1,000. Table 12.1 shows, similar to Astin's (1982) findings on minorities in the United States, that nearly two-thirds of the graduates are concentrated in the humanities and social sciences, 15 percent are in the sciences, 12 percent are in medicine, 5 percent are in technology, and 5 percent study law. Presently, there are 163 Negev Bedouin undergraduate and 18 graduate students. Of these students, 30 percent are in the humanities and social sciences, 7 percent are in the sciences, 49 percent are studying medicine and other health-related fields, 2 percent are in technology, and 11 percent are studying law. Only four of the 135 Bedouin Arab university graduates and eight of the 163 university students are females. All of the female graduates and students are in the humanities and social sciences, with the exception of the one student who is in the field of health (nursing). Overall, the higher education ratios in the Bedouin community are very low, especially when compared to the Israeli national average of 80 university graduates per 1,000 (Roth, 1989).

TABLE 12.1 Distribution of Bedouin university graduates and students by faculty, 1993

Status	*Humanities & Social Sciences*	*Sciences*	*Technology*	*Health Fields*	*Law*
Graduates	87 (64%)	20 (15%)	6 (5%)	16 (12)	6 (5%)
Undergraduate Students	50 (31%)	12 (7%)	4 (2%)	80 (50)	18 (9%)
Graduate Students	14 (82%)	3 (18%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)

Source: Abu-Saad, 1993.

The socioeconomic returns for the investment in higher education among the Negev Bedouin are limited, as for the rest of the Arab minority in Israel. While employment rates are much higher among university graduates (virtually 100 percent) than among the community in general (70 percent), the range of occupations is limited. 64 percent of the graduates are concentrated in the fields of humanities and social sciences, and 15 percent are in the sciences. These two groups constitute 79 percent of the graduates, and the primary occupations open to them are teaching and social work (Abu-Saad, 1993). Among Bedouin university students now, only 30 percent are in the humanities and social sciences, and only 7 percent are in the sciences; while 49 percent are studying medicine and 11 percent are studying law, where the economic independence and return for investment can be expected to be higher (Abu-Saad, 1993).

Higher education has done little to improve the sociopolitical position of university-educated Bedouin. As part of the Arab minority, they remain largely shut out of the influential positions in the socioeconomic and political structure of the country. This is even true in relation to the senior positions in the local political structure. Paradoxically, while the government has pushed the Bedouin to modernize, government offices have been notably slow to absorb university-educated Bedouin into mid- and upper-level government positions, and instead they appoint unqualified Bedouin on the basis of tribal, family, or political party affiliation. Out of the 15 Negev Bedouin working for government ministries or Histadrut offices in the Southern (Negev) District, only three have university degrees. The situation is similar in the local and regional councils of the seven government planned Bedouin towns. Out of a total of 40 senior administrative/policy making positions, 27 are held by Bedouin, of whom only seven have university degrees (Abu-Saad, 1993). Thus, through their hiring practices, the government offices provide little or no sociopolitical incentive for Bedouin to go on to higher education.

Finally, the Negev Bedouin community's accessibility to institutions of higher education, particularly in Israel, remains problematic. As mentioned above, the academic standards and screening procedures, such as the matriculation and psychometric exams, in addition to being oriented to Western culture, evaluate Bedouin students on the basis of skills they are not being taught in schools. The impact of this cannot be overstated since, in general, psychometric exams in Israel are used to determine not only university admission, but also a student's field of study. As Table 12.2 shows, the majority of Bedouin university students study abroad (58 percent) rather than in Israel. Of the 69 students in Israeli universities, 65 percent are concentrated in the humanities and social sciences, 17 percent are in the sciences, while only 4 percent are in technology, 7 percent are in health-related fields, and 6 percent are studying law. Thus, 82percent

TABLE 12.2 Distribution of Bedouin Arab university students studying in Israel and abroad, by faculty, 1993

Faculty / *Country*	*Israel*	*Abroad*	*Total*
Humanities & Social Science	46 (92%)	4 (8%)	50
Sciences	12 (100%)	0 (0%)	12
Technology	3 (75%)	1 (25%)	4
Health	5 (6%)	75 (94%)	80
Law	4 (29%)	14 (71%)	18
Total	69 (43%)	93 (57%)	164

Source: Abu-Saad, 1993.

of the Bedouin students in Israeli universities are still channeled into fields which consign them primarily to professions in teaching and social work. In contrast, 94 percent of the Bedouin students in the health professions (physicians, dentists, pharmacists), and 57 percent of those studying law attend institutions overseas (Abu-Saad, 1993). These data are consistent with the literature (Astin, 1982; McDowell, 1992, Mar'i, 1978) and suggest that the use of the psychometric exam in Israeli universities to determine field of study may consign students to certain career paths on the basis of cultural differences rather than ability, and prevent others from pursuing their chosen careers. Indeed, the present distribution of Bedouin university students in Israel and abroad tends to indicate that entrance into fields that provide greater economic independence and rewards is blocked for the vast majority of Bedouin students in Israeli universities.

Another major barrier is the lack of financial assistance to Bedouin for university studies, especially given the economic status of the community. This problem is illustrated by the fact that in 1982 the Katzav Committee tied university tuition assistance to military service or development town residence (Abu-Saad, 1993; Nakomo, 1983); both categories exclude the vast majority of potential Bedouin university students. While the local and regional Bedouin town councils have provided some funds for scholarships, their efforts have been largely symbolic. Thus, despite the research demonstrating the importance of financial assistance to minority higher-educational attainment (Astin, 1982), neither the Israeli government, nor the universities provide substantial financial aid programs to Bedouin or other Arabs for pursuing university studies. This also tends to contribute to the high percentage of Bedouin university students studying abroad (primarily in Eastern or Western European countries that do not charge tuition), which costs the same or less than studying in Israel, and gives students more opportunity to choose their field of study.

Discussion

The provision of educational services to those on the ethnic and socioeconomic periphery of society entails much more than simply providing schools. In the Negev Bedouin community, the effort to deliver services itself has entailed a radical change of lifestyle. Thus, the educational services must provide the community with the skills they need to cope with the change, and must be of a high enough standard to enable them to successfully integrate into the wider society. Higher education is particularly crucial to this goal, and the government must provide educational services to allow it to be achieved.

The literature on education and minorities in other societies strongly supports the idea of the importance of higher education in empowering minority development and reducing majority-minority socioeconomic gaps (Astin, 1982; Fleming, 1984; Garibaldi, 1986; McCauley, 1988; Mar'i, 1978). However, to improve the access of minority communities, such as the Bedouin, to the society's institutions of higher education, the quality of their elementary and secondary education must be improved (Astin, 1982). The literature also indicates the importance of financial aid (Astin, 1982; Quevedo-Garcia, 1987; Pounds, 1987) and the use of culturally unbiased measures for admissions-screening (McDowell, 1992) for improving minority access, both of which are issues that are highly relevant to the case of the Bedouin.

In summary, the literature suggests that any effort to create lasting improvements in Bedouin education must address the following issues:

1. Educational opportunities for Bedouin children must be improved at the elementary and secondary levels, offer equitable material and human resources, and provide students with the skills and abilities they need to face the future as the equals of their Jewish counterparts;
2. School curricula and text books should be revised to make them more relevant to Arab culture and identity, and, in particular, to the radical social upheaval the Bedouin community is undergoing. The education they receive must be closely examined to ensure that it fits the social and economic needs of the community. It must provide them with security, pride in their heritage, and confidence in the usefulness of their skills for the future;
3. The student dropout issue must be addressed by creating special educational programs to improve student retention in school, with particular attention to girls' education;
4. Both the government and the universities need to make a clear break with the policies of the past that discouraged Arab involve-

ment in higher education. Instead, universities must review their admission policies for unfair cultural bias, and begin to develop recruitment programs to attract Bedouin students to their campuses and help them to successfully complete higher-education degrees. Examples of such programs include: a) a national scholarship program for Bedouin students; b) assistantship and grant programs; c) loan repayment incentive programs; d) support programs for reentry and career changes; and e) special support programs for Bedouin students who accept jobs in their communities;

5. The government must be prepared to absorb Bedouin graduates in leadership positions at a level that gives them a say in the future development of their own community, thereby improving the socioeconomic return of higher education and thus, attracting more Bedouin youth to study.

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13

Double Marginality: "Oriental" and Arab Women in Local Politics

Hanna Herzog

Introduction: Marginality, Subordination, and Women's Representation

Marginality, Subordination, and Women's Representationmen of socially defined minority groups were invisible in early social-political studies: they had either merged with their ethnic or national group, or were classified in a "women's" category (Rule and Zimmerman, 1992). This chapter aims to make these invisible women visible.

The idea of "minority" and minority rights reflects the democratic idea that the minority view must be heard as well, and that small groups must be protected. In reality, the underlying majority-minority dichotomy rests on assumptions regarding the nature of society. Political research, as well as minority group sociology, traditionally deal with ethnic and national groups within the boundaries of a given society. Yet women are also considered a minority, although scholars are always quick to note that they form a minority only in the sociological sense of the term. In other words, the dominant groups are identified with society and, regardless of their size, they are perceived as representatives of the majority. The term "minority" is often employed to describe a population distinguishable from the dominant population by a number of traits which expose tacit or overt assumptions regarding the society's essential character. In most cases, the "majority" supports the central trend in society and represents its cultural norms and values, whereas the minority is perceived as unrelated and marginal. The assumption that the different group is a minority apparently sanctions the different attitude toward those who belong to it. An additional view implicit in the dichotomy of "majority" and

"minority" is that they maintain certain hierarchical relations, and that these relations are "natural" since the "majority," after all, represents the larger part of the population.

Any conception (terminology) possesses great force. However, such force is especially conspicuous when the groups under question are socially defined as minority groups which are, nonetheless, practically equal in number to, or, in some cases, even larger than the "majority." In most societies women are perceived as a minority group although they comprise at least 50 percent of the population. They are perceived as such when struggling for political representation and are so defined by various scientific analyses (Rule and Zimmerman, 1992). Similarly, for a long time in Israel, people of Asian-African descent (at times constituting more than 50 percent of all Israeli Jews) were identified and treated as minorities (Peres, 1976); an attitude expressed by society at large, as well as by academic thought and research. In the cases of women and Asian-African descendants, the terms "dominators" and "dominated" describe social relations more accurately than majority-minority relations. The majority-minority dichotomy serves to construct an image of a just inequality, as if this inequality merely and solely reflects an objective fact of numeral difference. The use of these terms under the assumption that they describe "reality" conceals their selective, interpretive, and ideological dimensions. The terms themselves become instrumental in the struggle over production and exploitation of the social world's legitimate front.

Arguably the terms "majority" and "minority" are part of a continuous political struggle among groups over the essence of the society they live in and their own place within it. In that struggle, some of the groups, albeit numerically small ones, demand the right to become dominant and to define the collective and its boundaries. The minority which ruled South Africa is a case in point. To a large extent, the various religious groups in Israeli society also seek to appropriate the right to define the collective boundaries and the character of Israeli society, although in terms of numbers the majority is secular. Other groups refuse to accept their definition as a minority group despite the dominant society's tendency to perceive them as such. This rejection of minority status has been, for many years, characteristic of the "Oriental" (Asian-African descendants) struggle against their subordination to the Ashkenazi dominant group (Herzog, 1986), and the struggle of women today against male dominance in society. Still other groups fight for their recognition as legitimate minority groups entitled to protection and consideration. The Arabs in Israel, or as they prefer to be called, the Palestinians in Israel, are an example of such a group (Rabinowitz, 1993). They form, indeed, a numerical minority, yet they claim that their conceptualization as a minority is derived from the Jewish character of the state.

The presence or absence of members of certain subordinate groups can serve as an indicator of the openness of a political system. In focusing on the descriptive representation of women, we are making the implicit and explicit assertion that gender is politically significant in that it cuts across and transcends other descriptive characteristics, such as class, race, ethnicity, religion, etc. (Persons, 1992).

While women are underrepresented in Israeli local politics, the scantiest representation is reserved for women of Asian-African descent, that is "Oriental" and Arab women. This state of affairs does not diverge much from the situation in many Western democracies (Rule and Zimmerman, 1992). The rationale to bring together these groups emerges from two basic facts. The first is the high spatial segregation of these two groups. Arabs are segregated spatially in almost all communities, while Oriental Jews, though less segregated, are still overrepresented in most peripheral communities. The second reason is that these women suffer from a double marginality—first, as members of underprivileged ethnic and national groups, and second, as women in a gendered society.

Anchored in a broad study of women in local politics in Israel, this chapter demarcates the social profile and political world of Oriental and Arab women who were elected to local governments in Israel. It sheds light on the political world of Oriental and Arab women who succeeded in overcoming the formidable political and cultural obstacles that barred their way into politics. These women are new actors on the political stage. Who are they? What kind of human, social-organizational, and political resources do they bring to politics? What motivates them? Do they have new social messages as women and as members of subordinated groups?

Data and Methods

The study's population consists of Arab and Oriental women elected to local authorities in Israel, and it is part of a broad study on women electees between the years 1950 and 1989. During this period, 382 women in total were elected. From this group 331 addresses were traced and collected in 104 different towns throughout the country. A postal questionnaire was then distributed and answered by 217 women, constituting approximately 60 percent of the elected women who could be traced and 57 percent of the entire research population—a relatively high percentage compared with other postal questionnaires (Brichta and Levy, 1985; Nachmias and Nachmias, 1982). Among those who answered the questionnaire 7 percent were Oriental Jews. In depth interviews with 10 of the elected Jewish women helped clarify the findings of the postal questionnaire, along with hundreds of relevant newspaper articles published in the daily press, women's magazines, and local newspapers. Additional

insight into the world of these women was gained through participant observation in group discussions with women candidates and women elected to local municipalities (Herzog, 1995).

In the entire period only four Arab women were elected. Three of them were interviewed separately in personal in-depth interviews. The analysis of the fourth woman is based on written material since she passed away before the study was carried out.

"Oriental" Women in Local Politics

Representation

Beginning in the mid-1960s, changes occurred at the level of local government which can be described as. The first change was vote-splitting (Arian and Weiss, 1969) whereby voters voted differently for the Knesset and the local authorities.

The second major change in local politics was the significant rise in the number of independent lists running in the elections. Until the end of the 1960s, virtually no lists in elections were unaffiliated with national parties; almost all attempts to set up local lists proved abortive. In the late 1960s, however, independent lists began to appear in more and more localities. Even national parties, observing the growing interest in local problems and local needs, sometimes ran under a local label. The message they sought to convey was that the good of the locality was their primary interest. This phenomenon also supported vote-splitting and the changing character of local politics.

The third change was the new system introduced in local elections. Since 1978 personal elections have been held for mayors and the heads of local councils (Ben-Porath, 1978; Menuhin and Rubinstein, 1978). The formal change sanctioned processes which were already visible in the field, where the emergence of a popular leader could influence how people voted.

Another development was related to the change of government at the national level in 1977 when the Likud took power. The relationship between the center and the local branches was weaker in the Likud than it was in the Labor Alignment, and the Likud's party apparatus was relatively small (Grinberg, 1989). As a result, local forces, even from the ruling party, were able to run candidates whose local orientation was more important to them than national issues. The Labor Party's enfeeblement generated a similar process among its activists.

Finally, beginning in 1978, local elections were held separately from Knesset elections. The divorce of the two campaigns enabled the focus of political competition to be placed on local problems. Psychologically, it was a facilitating element for vote-splitters. Concurrent with these proc-

esses—the citizen's growing interest in his well-being at the local level and, consequently, the preference for local over national considerations in local government elections—structural conditions emerged which enabled those processes to come to fruition.

Structural changes tend to generate greater fluidity within a political system, opening opportunities for new groups to enter. In Israeli local politics these changes affected mainly the Oriental Jews. Beginning in 1965 there was an increase in the representation of individuals of Asian-African origin, particularly in localities where they constituted the majority of the population (Weiss, 1970; Gonen, 1982; Grinberg, 1989). By 1983 their representation in these localities was commensurate with their share in the population (Grinberg, 1989). Grinberg points to the dynamic, open character of local government which has brought about the emergence of a leadership striving to obtain independent power and full representation for the Asian-African communities.

These structural changes could affect women's prospects to enter politics. With the localization of political competition in local government, it could be expected that women, who are the main consumers of local services and the main activists (whether salaried or volunteering) in the institutions which provide those services, will be perfect candidates to represent the public as its awareness of local issues grows.

Elections results support this expectation, albeit in a moderate way. Since the late 1960s, there has been a steady, moderate increase in women's representation in Jewish localities, from 3.2 percent in 1965 to 10.9 percent in 1993. Nevertheless, this representation does not reflect their proportion in the population. Unlike the Orientals, who have dramatically improved their political power, women have remained marginal in local politics. Moreover, within the category of women, Oriental women are the least represented.

In the first election campaign for local government after Israel's establishment in 1948 most of the elected councilwomen were European-born. Over time their representation declined dramatically in favor of Israeli-born women and women of Asian or North African origin; nevertheless, Ashkenazi women continue to constitute the majority of councilwomen.

TABLE 13.1 Distribution of councilwomen by continent of father's birth

Father's origin	*1950s*	*1960s*	*1970s*	*1980s*
Asia-Africa	0	7	10	16
Europe-America	93	78	90	77
Israel	7	15	0	7
Total (N=213)	100	100	100	100

Source: Author's survey.

One reason for this bias in representation is that a large proportion of the Israeli-born councilwomen have parents of European or American extraction. We find no Oriental councilwomen in the first three election campaigns for local government. They began to enter politics in the 1965 elections and by the 1980s had doubled their representation (Table 13.1).

Social Profile

The enduring social inequality between people of European and American extraction—the Ashkenazi Jews, and Asian or North African extraction—the Oriental Jews, is well documented (Smooha, 1978; Nahon, 1987; Ben-Porat, 1995). This form of social inequality is reflected among the councilwomen. However, it is meaningless to draw a comparison with women of European-American extraction because of the negligible representation of women of Asian-African origin in the state's first decades. To assure a statistically significant comparison, I used only the councilwomen of the 1980s, a decade which saw a rise in the representation of Asian-African women. The councilwomen of Asian-North African extraction are not as well educated as their European-American colleagues. About 60 percent have only elementary-school education and the rest have high-school education or above; whereas among the European-American group, 51 percent had more than high-school education and only 12 percent did not attend high school. The councilwomen's subjective perception of their social status also differs. Among those of Asian-African extraction, 67 percent defined their economic situation as average for Israel and 33 percent said it was better than average; among the women of European-American origin, the comparable figures were 40 percent and 56 percent, respectively. Education as an objective index, and relative social position as a subjective index provide a mirror-image of the Israeli society (Nahon, 1987).

An additional social element, showing how the broad social structure is reflected in the councilwomen's profile, is that the Asian-African women tend to reside in peripheral areas and serve on small local councils. The women of European-American extraction are more broadly represented in the center of the country and on the councils of the large cities.

Most strikingly, these women are, on average, younger than their Ashkenazi counterparts. More than 50 percent of them were aged 40 or below, as compared with only 30 percent of women of European-American extraction. From this point of view, the female Oriental Jews resemble males from the same communities who have entered local politics vigorously in the past two decades and are also considerably younger than their colleagues of European-American origin (Grinberg, 1989). However, despite disparities of age and social status, councilwomen of different

ethnic origins are similar in other ways. The overwhelming majority of 1980s councilwomen, irrespective of origin, were married, had children, and worked full-time outside the house in feminine professions.

For most it was both their first time running for office and their first political success. The background to their entry into politics was similar, as was their participation in voluntary organizations. These similarities might seem to relegate the female politicians to the traditional women-and-politics pattern in Israel. In fact, this group of women, although small in number, is a defiant group and may herald the emergence of a new generation of women in local politics.

Political World

To what extent do Oriental women view social inequality and its overlap with ethnic origin as a cause for struggle the political arena? Does ethnicity create a power base? Ethnic origin is a negotiable resource in Israeli politics. While great awareness exists of social inequality corresponding with ethnic origin, there is at the same time criticism of the use of origin as a resource for political negotiating. As result of the "melting pot" syndrome there is a tendency to reject and brand political organizations that rest on an ethnic foundation (Herzog, 1986). The delegitimization of ethnic politics in Israeli culture has made it almost impossible for the Asian-African communities to utilize that resource to express the distress of their many socially deprived members. For years Israelis of Asian-African extraction were underrepresented in terms of political power. Even now, despite a sea-change in this regard, their representation at the national level is still not commensurate with their share in the population, nor is it congruent with their strength in the parties' centers. The situation is different at the local level. Grinberg (1989) notes that structural elements of the socioeconomic gap between the general population of Orientals and the general population of Ashkenazi Jews in education and employment are related to unequal geographical distribution, and give local government a unique ability to represent social groups that are developing in the periphery.

These findings are correct for males but not for councilwomen from the Oriental communities. The latter doubled their number in the 1980s, but are still underrepresented as compared with Ashkenazi Jews, and certainly as compared to males of Oriental extraction. Still, there has been a moderate, but steady, rise in the entry of women from Oriental communities into local politics.

Women of Asian-African extraction resemble the males from their communities in their approach to politics. Councilwomen of the 1980s, like councilmen from the same country of origin, have political ambitions

expressed in their declared expectations for a career (and disappointment at failure) and in intensive party activity. Nearly 70 percent of them (as compared with 40 percent of Ashkenazi women) reported that they had organized home meetings during the election campaign; 77 percent (55 percent of Ashkenazi women) said they had participated actively in such meetings; and 71 percent (31 percent of Ashkenazi women) campaigned door-to-door. They were also more active in persuading people to sign petitions and participated more in public debates with other candidates. In other words, as compared with women of European-American origin, Oriental councilwomen reported greater exposure in the local political arena and a readiness to embark on nontraditional roads of women in politics. These findings should not be ascribed to age, because when these parameters were examined in relation to the age of the other councilwomen, the differences according to ethnic origin remained constant. At the same time, a word of caution about these generalizations is in order because of the relatively small numbers involved.

Weiss (1973) attributed the low representation of Oriental women prior to the 1970s to the fact that such families tended to be more traditional in their ways. In his words:

> If the religious family projects [the concept of] 'the honor of the king's daughter' internally, then in the family of Asian or African extraction every public position, and not only those that bear a political character, is imposed on the male (Weiss, 1973: 12).

Weiss, then, looks to traditional frameworks and cultural restrictions in order to explain the meager representation of Oriental women in the period he is studying. Such cultural images undoubtedly affect women as much as they do men and hinder their entry into the public realm, but our findings suggest a new and still developing direction.

Councilwomen from the Asian and African communities belong to a group of women who challenge the status quo by becoming increasingly involved in politics and adopting activist patterns of behavior. As such they are not only joining the males of their communities, but are surpassing them. In 1983 Viki Shiran headed the list of Tami (Movement of Jewish Tradition) in the Tel Aviv mayoralty elections. "I am against every form of discrimination: Orientals, Arabs, and women," she declared (*Tsomet Hasharon*, 1986). Her list did not obtain the minimum number of votes required to elect a candidate. However, Ilana Morad, head of Na'amat in the southern town of Kiryat Malakhi, who was second on the Labor list there, was elected in 1983. She admits to using ethnic origin and gender as a political negotiating tool and to help convey her message. Morad identified herself in comments she appended to the questionnaire, which was meant to be answered anonymously, writing:

> The questionnaire is extremely complex and should be disseminated urgently among women to help prepare them for future developments, and not only among councilwomen. It is a good lesson for women in politics before they take up their elected duties, so that they will know what to strive and fight for. I have deliberately noted my name in order to serve as an example to my female colleagues.

Ilana Morad's remarks reflected her defiant attitude, which was also evident in other comments which she added to the questionnaire. To the question regarding the ultimate reasons that made her decide to run, she replied:

> As a woman I wanted to prove that women have strength and the possibility of [exercising] balanced judgment and understanding at work just as much as men, but the public is still not ready [...] I tried to exploit **my personality as a woman, young, of Oriental communities, and from a development town** (emphasis in the original).

In the 1980s a quarter of the women of Asian-African extraction, compared with 6 percent of their European-American counterparts, said the reason they had entered politics was the need for women's representation. They tended, more than Ashkenazi women, to promote a specific subject, attesting to a high degree of political awareness. They showed no substantial difference in their perception of women's place in society and politics. Like their colleagues, they did not think that a woman's place is in the home. Similarly, they claimed that the community and male politicians were conservative about the place of women. However, in comparison to their Ashkenazi peers, they were far more forthright about tension between politics and the home: 50 percent of the Oriental councilwomen of the 1980s, compared with 38 percent of the Ashkenazi councilwomen, disagreed with the statement that political activity interferes with family life. Defiance, it seems, topples normative barriers. These young women "have not yet completed their maternal role" and are from more traditional families, yet their approach virtually nullifies the normative view of inter-role conflict and/or is able to resolve it. Besides finding no conflict between home and politics, these women also reported a more egalitarian division of roles with their spouses. A prime example is Dalia Itzik who, at age 36, was head of the Teachers' Union in Jerusalem, at age 37 began serving as a deputy mayor of Jerusalem, and at age 39, in personal primaries, won a high position on the Labor Party's list for the general elections of 1992 and entered the Knesset. In a press interview following her victory in the primaries she said:

> People's view of life is that the woman should take care of the kids and the husband make a career, and if the reverse happens they don't accept it. My

> husband does accept it; he is ready, in addition to his job, to help with the children because he knows that I am extremely busy and that I can't be home at noon with the kids, but his social surroundings make things difficult for him. I refer to women who are my best friends, and I know they mean well, and to my mother, who certainly means well, but who asks him all the time: 'You're by yourself again?' (*Hadashot*, 1992)

Dalia Itzik's ethnic origin may not have been the major feature of her political calling card, but she did not try to deny the presence of that element in her campaign. "I am, after all, no less Oriental than he is [referring to Yamin Suissah, a neighborhood activist with the same ethnic background]," Itzik said in the interview. "I was born in this country and my parents immigrated from Iraq. I also come from a home where there was economic hardship" (Interviews).

It is in fact characteristic of Oriental councilwomen that, far from trying to hide their origin, they consider it another justification for their candidacy. Thus they claim double disadvantage: as members of an underprivileged ethnic group, and as disadvantaged women within their own community.

Arab Women in Local Politics

Arab councilwomen are a rare breed in Israel. At the time of the local elections in 1989 the Arab sector consisted of three municipalities and 55 local councils. Only three women were elected in these 58 places: Samiyah Hakhim was elected to the Nazareth Municipal Council, and two women were elected to local councils: lawyer Nahidah Shehadeh in Kafr Yasif, and Fathinah Hana in Kafr Rama. They were preceded in the Arab sector by the late Violet Khoury, who was a member of the Kafr Yasif council and acting council head from 1979 to 1988, and council head in 1972/3. I interviewed the three councilwomen elected in 1989. The analysis that follows takes an extremely cautious approach and avoids generalizations, an absolute necessity given the small number of Arab councilwomen.

Sociohistorical Background

As their minuscule number shows, it is no easy matter for Arab women to enter local politics in Israel. Arab society is predominantly traditional and emphatically patriarchal in structure, based on the male's authority over the female and her obligations to him (Hassan, 1991). Nonetheless, the status of women in Israel's Arab society is changing; Arab women are less willing to accept their traditional, passive role or their marginalization within the community. Among the indicators of this

shift is the incipient entry of women into local politics. Mariam and Sami Mar'i (Mar'i, 1989; Mar'i and Mar'i, 1991) view this development as part of a process that is under way in Arab society as a whole. Israel's establishment severed the continuity of the Palestinian society. Nearly all its political and organizational institutions collapsed, its economy was transformed, and its social patterns were vitiated. The Arab male became more vulnerable as a result of: loss of income; lengthy absences from home (because of work); exposure to a foreign culture; his encounters with Jewish women, whose behavior he found alien; and particularly his dependence on the Israeli authorities, and the threat to his national identity. In this traumatic situation, Arab society clung tenaciously to its cultural traditions.

This general insecurity also brought in its wake tighter social control over women. Indeed, that control became the barometer for measuring Arab society's ability to preserve its sense of self and distinctiveness. Shokeid (1980) also found a similar phenomenon. His anthropological study of a mixed (Jewish-Arab) city found that Muslim males were deeply committed to the moral code of female honor. Their commitment was a response to the personal and social problems which arose in the wake of the community's structural metamorphosis in the aftermath of 1948. By preserving traditional values, the city's Arab residents expressed their differentiation from the Jewish society around them and their significant identification with the Arab world surrounding Israel. The role of women was to preserve and transmit the society's culture, and protecting their honor helped consolidate ethnic identity.

During the 1960s, unemployment among Israel's Arabs grew, while pressures for a higher standard of living intensified. The result was that more Arab women joined the unskilled-labor market. In the meantime, the application of the compulsory education law to the female population not only raised the educational level of women, but it also generated a greater demand for educated people and made teaching positions available to women. With their higher educational level, women could penetrate into the labor market more easily. They began to join women's organizations, particularly those that were established ad hoc. The result was that Arab women, who were perceived as the upholders and transmitters of the traditional culture, also became agents of social change. Taken as a whole, these developments: women's education, their entry into the labor market, the adoption of modern lifestyles and cultural attitudes, began to undermine the traditional family structure.

Until 1967, the changes in the patterns of women's behavior were strongly resisted within the Arab community, as they were identified with Jewish society. However, when Israel's Arabs encountered the West Bank Palestinians following the 1967 Six-Day War, they discovered that

women's liberation was a heady issue among much of the Palestinian population. The push for women's equality ceased to be seen as an imported "Jewish" issue and was viewed as a general question pertinent to Arab society. To be "modern" was no longer perceived as an attempt to emulate the Jews. The year 1967 was also a watershed in the process by which Israel's Arabs reclaimed their Palestinian identity. Such developments helped pave the way for women to acquire higher education, enter the labor market, and become involved in public activity (Mar'i, 1991).

Al-Haj (1988) has found a widening disparity between the ideology which perpetuates male superiority, the image of the submissive woman, and everyday reality. His research shows that women have crucial input in decisions relating to major family expenses and to general budgetary goals. By entering the labor market Arab women did not alter their status, but the move enhanced their self-image, imbued them with greater self-confidence, and gave them greater power within the family. Al-Haj's description demonstrates how the mechanism of the private-public dichotomy blocks change in the Arab sector, just as it does among Israeli Jews. Arab women, though, face additional obstacles.

The last decade has seen an Islamic revival in both the Israeli-occupied territories and among Israeli Arabs. The Islamic movement wants women to return to their traditional place, behind the veil. Palestinian women are caught between two forces that are driving them in opposite directions: either to break into the public realm and gain equality as Palestinians and as women, or return home, and take on a conservative national-religious identity. The social transformation that is under way in the Arab sector, which is connected with the development of a Palestinian identity, has encountered frequent obstacles and restrictions imposed by the Israeli authorities (Mar'i, 1991). The paradoxical result is a convergence of the interests of the conservative forces in the Arab community, which are unhappy about women's forays into politics, with those of the central government.

These cultural barriers are heightened by the competitive aspect of politics. Fierce competition means less chances for women. Local government is the only political context in which Arabs exercise direct influence: it is a central channel for the allocation of resources, jobs, and patronage. Its importance has increased in recent years, following the establishment of the Committee of Arab Local Governments. Despite its name, the creation of the new body heralded a shift within the Arab sector in which preoccupation with purely local issues gave away to a greater interest in national questions which affect all Palestinians in Israel and elsewhere. The struggle for control of local governments has thus assumed an added political importance, generating harsher competition for positions of power and influence.

The local arena had always been a battlefield for power struggles between traditional hamula (clan) leaderships. In the last two decades a young, educated, and politically aware leadership has emerged, which seeks power and influence (Al-Haj and Rosenfeld, 1990). With few positions available, the entry of new political elements has intensified the (already intense) political infighting. Such conditions are inimical to women, especially in a traditional society. The Islamic Movement, preaching a traditional, religious way of life, made significant inroads during the 1980s. Faced with these developments, Arab women in Israel, particularly if they are affiliated with the (former) Communist Party or with Zionist parties, are hard-put to effect egalitarian ideas.

Women's Social and Political World

Each of the four Arab women elected to serve in a local government, has found ways to mitigate the tension between traditional patterns and her aspirations to become independent and be involved in public life. Each woman, in her own way, is a trailblazer. Violet Khoury, who married at a comparatively late age, explained that she was doing so in order to silence the wicked tongues in her village, those who looked askance at her many trips away from home and her staying out late. It was an arranged marriage.

Samiyah Hakhim followed a more traditional road. She married at 17, soon had two sons, and when they were 14 and 12 she joined the party. Of her move into politics she relates: "When I started out, I was not accepted. People would say, 'Is it right for a young girl to go out and return in the middle of the night?' There were many unpleasant incidents. But you have to go on, you have to shut your ears" (Interviews). She tries to resolve the problem of criticism by acting in close concert with her husband, consulting with him on every issue. He was more resolute when I asked him what he thought about his wife's political activity. "She is not alone, we do everything together" (Interviews), he asserted. Fathinah Hana also noted that "Not everyone likes the idea of women going into politics. In my case, my husband gives me encouragement, otherwise I would not succeed" (Interviews). Nahidah Shehadeh, unmarried, admits that her single state gives her more time for politics, but also subjects her to social censure in her village. But she says she will not give in. She will marry "only if I find someone who suits me" (Interviews). That, she knows, will not be easy because "the Arab male wants an obedient woman, and I am not that type" (Interviews). Asked if she was under pressure at home to marry, she replied: "They know better, because putting pressure on me just makes me do the opposite" (Interviews).

The Arab councilwomen told of their apprehensions about joining the council and about how they had overcome the reservations of their male colleagues. For example, Violet Khoury entered politics after her husband, Fawzi Khoury, was council head and because, after a conspiracy against him, he decided to quit politics altogether. "When he decided to leave politics I told him: 'Fawzi, perhaps you will allow me '[...] And he said, 'Yes, give it a try.' He was positive I wouldn't succeed" (*Hotam-Al Hamishmar,* 1980). Following a political overthrow within the local council, Violet Khoury was asked to head the new council, a request she naturally found very flattering. Violet Khoury's condition for accepting was that "I am not turned into a puppet" (Interviews). She insisted on being granted right of signature together with the treasurer, showing that she understood a local council's inner workings. She was no stranger to politics, but in her new position she needed to overcome cultural barriers. In her first speech as council head she said: "I worked with you when I was a social worker. Now I have another challenge: to prove that Arab women have a contribution to make to society. I will be very tough in working with you." To facilitate her work and to sidestep the hurdle of getting men to accept her authority, Khoury appointed women to various council positions, such as clerks, secretaries, and treasurers. At the same time, this also served her purpose of enhancing the status of women in the village (at times this sparked anger among the incumbent staff). "The staff of the local government, which was all-male, felt insulted when she was chosen" (*Hotam-Al Hamishmar,* 1980).

Khoury was nominated for her first term, but then she headed a list and ran in the elections. She relates that her supporters faced pressure in the form of sarcasm and disparagement. "Your leader is a woman," villagers hurled at them–but they stood firm. Even though Khoury's list won only one seat, her supporters organized a haflah (a mass celebration) and walked down the street singing after casting their ballots. However, her supporters were an exception: generally women and men had shunned her political activity. It seems that both women and men are eager to preserve the status quo: the traditional division of roles between genders, and the split between private women and public men. Being the only women in a male dominant surrounding was a challenge for all the elected Arab women.

Generalizing, as I pointed out above, is hazardous with such a small sample. Still, some common elements can be noted. All four councilwomen are Christians and are from areas in which Christians (Greek Orthodox) are the majority. As Fathinah Hana explained:

> In a village where the population consists of a mixture of different communities, the minority is influenced by the majority. In my village, the

> majority are Christians; they influence the Druse and Muslims. There is a religious revival going on among the Muslims, a real storm, and calls to return women to the home. You do not find this in the Christian religion. The majority in our village are Christians, and that is positive. Everyone studies, there is no religious regression (Interviews).

Hana noted two traits of the community which could facilitate the entry of Arab women into politics: religion and the degree of religiosity.

A third element is education. As a whole, the Christian Arabs in Israel are better educated than the Muslims, and their connections with the Christian world give them greater exposure to Western ideas. They also have more ties with the Jewish population, particularly in the mixed cities (Shokeid, 1980). Kafr Yasif, the home of two of the Arab councilwomen, and Kafr Rama are known as villages with a high educational level. Three of the four women had university degrees; two (Khoury and Hana) were social workers and the third (Shehadeh) was a lawyer. In Shehadeh's home, both the males and the females were able to complete their education. Indeed, she attained higher degrees because "father kept the sons close to him so that they wouldn't start taking drugs or get involved in other bad things (Interviews)." Education is also dominant in Fathinah Hana's home. Her husband is a mathematics teacher and her two sons are university graduates (one has a degree in food engineering from the Haifa Technion and the other a law degree from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem). The fourth councilwoman, Samiyah Hakhim, has had only ten years of schooling, but her two sons are physicians, one having studied in Germany and the other in Romania.

The councilwomen related that their home upbringing had encouraged them to be independent and recognize their self-worth. They were treated on a par with the boys in the family and were given the opportunity to study and acquire a profession. Their independence was expressed primarily through their work. Nahidah Shehadeh has a private law practice in Akko; Samiyah Hakhim, a hair stylist and cosmetician, has her own business; the two social workers were employed outside their villages, requiring them to make daily journeys, but also giving them a large measure of freedom from community scrutiny. They differed from traditional Arab women in terms of their occupations, and the families they raised did not fit the mold either. They had small families, unlike the traditionally large Arab family of the type they themselves had grown up in. Violet Khoury had three children and the others two.

The four women say they took an early interest in politics. Violet Khoury says that her political activity began in her Haifa school; afterward she joined Mapam (Left Zionist party). The three others were active in the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE; the Communist

Party). Samiyah Hakhim says that she grew up in a "politically savvy home." She was seven in 1948, when her family left their Haifa home and settled in Nazareth. "They took our house, and ever since I have been in politics," she says. "Father and mother talked about land and home. It was a political house." Nahidah Shehadeh was active in the Communist Party at an early age. She recalls that her father was involved in local politics and that political questions were discussed around the dinner table. "Many people would come to the house to talk with father about different political issues. He never told the children to leave the room. He let them listen. The girls were also part of things, like the boys" (Interviews). However, it was from their activity in the Communist Party, and in Violet Khoury's case from Mapam, that the women derived their ideas about gender equality and were inspired to enter politics. Home prepared the ground, but the party afforded the content and the opportunity.

Their involvement in local politics was not based on a whim. Violet Khoury was a member of the local council for nine consecutive years, and had earlier served as council head. Nahidah Shehadeh's election in 1989 was her second election to the Kafr Yasif local council. Fathinah Hana was a candidate on behalf of the DFPE in 1983, although she was not high enough on the party list to have a realistic chance of being elected. Indeed, she was in fifth place again in 1989, and the party won only four seats, but the person who held the fourth slot, a pediatrician, resigned after a year in office (as he had pledged to do) enabling Hana to become a councilwoman. Both Hana and Shehadeh are active in their party's national politics and neither rules out a career at that level. The three DFPE members were active for many years in the party before being elected; Samiyah Hakhim, for example, was a party member for about twenty years.

Local government in the Arab sector is basically nonparty in character. Although the parties play a significant role, behind the scenes it is a hamula (clan) game. Al-Haj and Rosenfeld (1990) maintains that clan-based politics is the handiwork of the general population, which, particularly among the Christians and Druse, views the hamula as an effective instrument for organization. Government policy too has long encouraged the traditional clan leaderships, thus securing their support while pursuing a divide-and-rule approach. The family, then, plays a dual role in Palestinian politics. It is an agent of socialization, but through its contacts and status in local society, it can also be a channel to politics. Violet Khoury's husband was a council member, as was Nahidah Shehadeh's father; Fathinah Hana's family has long been active in the village, and her younger brother and her uncle were council members; while in Hakhim's family "the sons were party members, then my husband joined, and I was last."

The three DFPE women ascribe their realistic positions on the list to the party. In each case, the position was determined by an arrangements committee, but the list was approved by an open vote in the local party branch. It also helped that the three live in big villages where there are large councils: where more positions are available, it is easier to be "generous" and set aside a place for a woman. The DFPE has made no decisions about guaranteeing women's representation, but awareness of the problem is beginning to seep in. Hana relates, with gratification, that in secret elections to her party's National Secretariat she received 140 out of a possible 200 votes. This is an impressive achievement not only numerically, but even more so because most of the voters were men. Moreover, after the DFPE began to place women on local lists and involve them more in national politics (the head of the Follow-up Committee of Social Services in the Arab Sector is a woman, Hakhamiyah Halihal, from Nazareth, and her deputy is Fathinah Hana). Its rival, the Arab Democratic Party, also added women to its Secretariat. The "copycat" mechanism that we find in the Jewish sector is beginning to appear in the Arab community as well; so the advancement of women in one party may induce another party to follow suit. However, one must be cautious regarding this observation. In the first place, even in the Communist Party, women's representation is at a very preliminary stage; and second, it is too soon to say which direction Israel's Arab community will take; will the forces of liberal egalitarianism dominate, or will fundamentalism, which demands that women return to the home, become the dominant ideology. How each of those forces develops will depend on the scale of equality and advancement throughout the entire Arab sector. If conditions in the Arab regions improve, a liberal thrust will likely prevail; but if nothing is done to equalize the Arabs' status, their frustration will grow and reactionary forces will triumph. The structure of opportunities available to women is inextricably linked to the structure of opportunities of all their membership groups.

All four councilwomen linked their local activity to their work at the national level, some more blatantly than others. They spoke of dual marginalization: in the Israeli society as Palestinians, and in their own society as women. "Without peace it will be impossible to improve the social situation, there must be coexistence, [Israel must] recognize the right of existence of the Palestinian people, to which I belong, the Arab population must be given equality. The local council cannot develop projects for the residents due to a lack of funds," claimed Hana (Interviews).

The Arab councilwomen, like their Jewish counterparts, deal mainly with issues which the public perceives as "feminine," such as culture, education, welfare, and health care. Shehadeh is also a member of the council executive and the public-tenders committee. They do not necessarily

define themselves as women's representatives, nor was this the focus of their campaigns. Of the four, only Fathinah Hana says that she considers advancing women's causes an important part of her work. In addition to her work on the council and her membership in the Movement of Democratic Women, she serves as chairwoman of an association of women against violence in the Arab sector. This organization undoubtedly confronts patriarchal values and the basic cultural code that demands the wife's unconditional obedience to the husband and asserts the husband's authority over his wife. Ideology that perpetuates male supremacy is still rife in the Palestinian society. Her friends agree that women have a distinct perspective. "Everything comes from within the family cell," they say, but they are ready to defend the traditional patterns, at least at the declarative level. "If a woman doesn't give her family enough time, she won't give her society [enough either]. The family deserves more. Who will educate the children if the wife is out of the home?" asks Shehadeh, who is convinced that when she marries she will have to moderate her political activity. Only Hana goes further in the feminist direction, arguing that the fact that women are discriminated against is reason enough to challenge the system and try to transform their situation, both in the labor market and in the family cell.

The dilemma of how far an Arab woman might go in her radical attitudes is reflected by Khoury's public declarations. In press interviews Violet Khoury explained her views about women's position in society. Like many other women, she took a deeply negative view of feminism. She described herself as a "non-feminist," explaining: "Liberation and freedom are not interchangeable. I am for liberation. Freedom borders on licentiousness, for both men and women" (*Ha'aretz*, 1981). At the same time, she did not forget her place as a woman: "manager of the kitchen and provider of services" (*Yediot Aharonot*, 1983). As for herself, she conceded that it had not been easy. She had to maneuver between work, the election campaign, and functioning as a housewife and mother of three. Her situation demanded considerable resourcefulness, the ability to improvise, and a sense of humor.

Violet Khoury says about her political activity:

> I did it, but not as though it were a man's place. There is no place reserved for men and there shouldn't be one for women. Men are simply sitting in women's places, which are half the places in the world, but which are not in our hands. We are only just beginning to take what is ours by right. No, I am not out of the ordinary, it's men who are out of the ordinary because they haven't let women attain their natural status. But I know how to break the mold (Interviews).

Khoury did more than talk: she gave women salaried positions on the council and also co-opted women to serve on council committees, but they had few actual tasks to fulfill. In contrast to the attitude of many women in politics, Khoury makes no references to voluntarism or to public service. Politics is seen as an arena of struggle; the name of the game is power, and that is her constant reference point. Nor did Violet Khoury want to limit herself to local politics: when a women's party was established to run for the Knesset in 1977, she offered to join and to mobilize support for the party in her village, and among Arab women in general. Her condition was that she be given second place on the list. However, that slot was earmarked for Ruth Resnick, who refused to budge (*Hadashot*, 1992). Most of the high points in Khoury's life, according to interviews she gave, were connected with politics, about which she said: "I love politics but I am also increasingly afraid of it. I am drawn to it but also flinch from it like a moth from a flame" (*Ha'aretz*, 1981).

Concluding Remarks

While women in general are underrepresented in political life, Oriental women and Arab women are far more marginal. All women in politics have to overcome cultural limitations that place them in the private sphere, and see their entrance to the public sphere as a digression (Herzog, 1994), but in more traditional communities these social barriers are fundamentally entrenched. Nevertheless, the obstacles in the way of social change are not only cultural: the social position of a community within the structure of a given society serves either as a stimulator or as a barrier for change. Disadvantaged groups have to compete with the dominant groups, and, in unequal situations, the political positions available to weak groups are fewer than those potentially open for the dominant groups. As a result, the competition within the weak groups over the small number of positions allocated for them becomes stronger than ever.

The fewer positions available, the greater the competition, and thus women have a poor chance of success. This explains why almost no Oriental women had entered local politics until the late 1970s, while their political representation was doubled in the 1980s. Until the 1970s, Oriental men were also marginal in the local political scene. When they attained power positions and earned proportional representation in their own communities, the gate for women began to open. The Arab communities on the other hand, have not yet reached such a situation. The economic and political positions available for Arab citizens in Israel are confined to local institutions. Since there are very few available political positions, the struggle is harsh, and women are excluded almost by definition.

Against such a background it is clear that those women who have succeeded in paving their way to the male dominated world are powerful and impressive. They are women who are ready to take risks and to challenge their own societies and Israeli society as a whole.

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14

Arab Industrial Frontiers: Sales Linkages and Spatial Integration

Izhak Schnell

Introduction

This chapter explores the possibility of integrating Israeli Arab entrepreneurship on the national periphery into the national economy, thus transforming their regions into industrial frontiers. Integration can be measured on various levels, starting with the degree of similarity or diversity in characteristics of Arab and Jewish plants, such as size, technological and organizational complexity, distribution by sectors, etc. Industrial integration can also be measured by the degree of integration between Arab and Jewish manufacturers in the manufacturing process, such as between capital, labor and Jewish and Arab land. Alternatively, it is possible to examine the degree of integration of Arab industry in the marketing chains of the Israeli industry as a whole. The more products sold by Arab industry beyond the boundaries of a particular settlement, whether to other Arab settlements, to Jewish settlements, or to markets outside the State of Israel, the greater the integration of Arab industry into the Israeli economy.

The data relating to Arab industry indicate that enterprises identified as "Arab" are almost always located in Arab settlements, and employ Arab workers. Only a few enterprises have located in Jewish settlements, due to fear of competition from local plants for the secure market of the local community. Moreover, since only a few plants employ Jewish workers, the degree of integration of Arab industry into the Israeli economy may express itself, if at all, through the sales and purchasing destinations of Arab industrial products. The patterns of integration of Arab plants in Israeli markets are affected by three groups of factors—their belonging to a minority ethnic-national group, the transition from traditional peasan-

try to a modern market economy, and their location on the national periphery. Each of these factors places the Arab entrepreneur in a disadvantaged position vis-à-vis Jewish entrepreneurs in competing for industrial markets.

Being part of a traditional economy which is taking its initial steps toward integration in the market economy, the Arab entrepreneurs tended to rely on local markets within the boundaries of their settlement which they perceived as relatively secure. As members of a minority ethnic-national community, they tended to focus on internal ethnic markets, and due to their location on the periphery, to base themselves on regional markets. Thus, the process of integration in the markets has been accompanied by the shattering of a series of structural barriers, communal, ethnic-national, and geographical, within the Israeli space economy.

The first two sections of the chapter establish the conceptual and methodological framework for the analysis of industrial linkages by means of economic development. The rest of the chapter describes the spatial distribution of industrial sales, leading to a more systematic analysis of the spatial patterns and barriers to sale linkages.

Conceptual Discussion

Arab entrepreneurs are forced, as stated, to compete for their share in the marketing chains of Israeli industry on disadvantaged terms. Being located on the national periphery, their plants lack what Pred (1977) and van Geenhuizen and Nijkamp (1995) have described as necessary for industrial integration: they are far from the large markets and complementary economic activities on which the functioning of the plant depends, from opportunities for growth deriving from the advantage of size, from information on market conditions and ability to evaluate the potential of the various opportunities. Since Arab entrepreneurs belong to an ethnic-national minority, they might encounter difficulty in the integration process due to business culture differences among the various ethnic groups, and because of the entrepreneur's tendency to enlist production factors such as labor, capital, and management from intraethnic sources. This cultural problem causes immense difficulties, which must be overcome when business connections are to be established among bodies on both sides of the ethnic divide, problems even greater than those caused by their location on the national periphery, as Camagni (1991) and Ratti (1992) have described more generally.

The reaction of the minority entrepreneurs to the communications rift between the majority and minority entrepreneurial cultures, was to reduce the danger inherent in entrepreneurship based on interethnic resources and markets. The ethnic markets became a solid foundation,

ensuring the survival of the business; only upon this secure foundation was it possible for the entrepreneurs to take calculated risks and to attempt to penetrate new markets beyond the intraethnic system (Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, 1993; Waldinger, 1986). A society which is being restructured from a traditional subsistence economy to a modern economy integrated in the market economy, generally lacks risk-reducing institutions involved with entrepreneurship (Czamanski and Taylor, 1986). As a result, this factor also reinforces the Arab entrepreneurs' tendency to rely on secure markets rooted in the clan and the local community. Notwithstanding the above, we learn from examples in the Third World that small entrepreneurships in the traditional economy may gradually expand to integrate into the capitalist economy. In the initial stages, businesses tend to maintain links with the informal economy, but over time the links with the formal economy expand until the businesses are fully integrated in this economy (Geertz, 1966; Roberts, 1978).

In the Israeli context, Arab industrial entrepreneurship began at a stage where capital accumulation began to form around large national corporations (Hasson, 1981). It is estimated that the Israeli economy began to reform around flexible capital accumulation only in the late 1980s. These conditions may substantially increase the opportunities and restrictions under which the Arab entrepreneurs operate in the future. In theory, it is possible to identify four possible types of integration of Arab enterprises into marketing chains. Each type may be connected with a different structure of the Jewish and Arab economies in Israel.

The first type characterizes economies in their initial transition stages from a traditional subsistence economy to an economy integrated into some sort of market economy. At these stages, the enterprises tend to rely on local markets in settlements where they find security stemming from kinship and links with the general community. This pattern is derived from the mimicking behavior which characterizes entrepreneurs in economies which are in their initial modernization stages. These entrepreneurs generally attempt to emulate preexisting patterns of economic enterprise. Such behavior characterizes entrepreneurs in economies lacking risk reduction institutions. As a result of this behavioral pattern, the entrepreneurs tend to mimic successful entrepreneurship in their surroundings. The mimicking mechanism leads to the opening of a large number of similar enterprises, whose owners are satisfied with smaller profits as a result of being based on local markets (Czamanski and Taylor, 1986). The peripheral location of the Arab settlements in the national space makes it difficult to create opportunistic Jewish markets, in contrast to businesses of ethnic minorities in metropolitan centers. Thus, at this stage, the enterprises have a strong inclination to rely on local and intraethnic markets.

The second type characterizes a pattern of core-periphery links in which the economy is controlled by large corporations. In these circumstances, industry in the peripheral areas is integrated into the marketing chains within the framework of a clear spatial division of functions. Two kinds of enterprises are located on the national periphery. First there are large plants, characterized by labor intensive mass production of inexpensive products for markets throughout the entire country. Most sales of products of these enterprises are intended for the large markets concentrated primarily in large metropolitan core areas. The second kind includes small enterprises existing alongside large enterprises that are integrated into the regional economy. These enterprises either manufacture intermediate products which constitute input for the large enterprises, or serve the demand created by the ultimate consumers in the region. Most sales of these enterprises are within the region itself, which constitutes part of the national periphery (Felsenstein, 1992).

Arab industry is unsuccessful in competing with the new Jewish cities on the periphery for the attraction of large enterprises which are seeking cheap land and labor. In the new Jewish development towns, enterprises benefit both from a developed and subsidized infrastructure and from cheap labor, while in the Arab settlements there is a severe shortage of land for industry and a total absence of industrial infrastructure (Sofer et al., 1995). Almost all Arab enterprises are small and started as private initiatives financed by personal and family savings. The industry is therefore expected to develop, inter alia, by breaking out of the local markets which characterized Arab industry until the 1980s, into regional markets in the periphery. The fact that the entrepreneurs belong to a less industrialized ethnic minority leads to the assumption that Arab enterprises create only regional, monoethnic markets for themselves. Deviations from this pattern are the regional sewing shops which operate as subcontractors of plants in the new towns or in the Jewish core.

Two other types characterize peripheral areas in countries where capital accumulation is flexible. One pattern consists of regional industrial agglomeration with a high frequency of intraregional links between enterprises, which may develop side by side with a lower frequency of interregional links (Scott and Storper, 1987). This pattern is characteristic mainly of sophisticated industries which at times tend to maintain intensive regional ties, primarily with the service sector (Hagey and Malecki, 1986). However, this pattern has been only partially verified (Felsenstein, 1992). An alternative, more complex pattern has developed in other regions of the world, in which enterprises maintain a broad variety of close and distant links in accordance with the character of the enterprise, its size, and the characteristics of the environment in which it operates (Amin and Robins, 1990).

These patterns are almost certainly not relevant for Arab industry, since it has not, as yet, developed large and sophisticated enterprises integrated in the industrial system with links to international capital. Thus, the objective of this chapter is to examine which of the patterns presented here are being crystallized in the course of the industrialization of Arab industry in Israel. The initial assumption is that until the 1980s, Arab industry developed by means of mimicking mechanisms and was based on local markets (Czamanski and Taylor, 1986). The question posed against this background is, to what extent has Arab industry progressed from this initial stage to start developing broader markets, and according to which pattern is it developing. Considering the fact that this is an ethnic industry, it may be assumed that it is inclined to base itself on closed regional Arab markets which are limited in extent. Furthermore, I wish to examine whether Arab industrial enterprises have broken into Jewish markets, which would undoubtedly enable Arab industry to grow at a faster rate.

Arab Industry in Israel

The nine hundred thousand Arabs living within the boundaries of the State of Israel (not including the Palestinian population in the territories of the Palestinian Authority and the West Bank and Gaza Strip) reside in some 130 settlements concentrated in the Galilee hills, the Little Triangle, and the Be'er Sheva basin, where groups of settlements have crystallized into regional complexes. These complexes are characterized by a continuum of several settlements undergoing latent urbanization processes, in turn giving rise to strengthened regional and ethnic awareness and the development of business relations between them (Schnell, 1987).

Altogether, the Arab space in Israel can be divided into nine principal regions and several secondary concentrations in small settlements and mixed population cities. The present study examined sales patterns in a sample of settlements in eight of the nine principal Arab regions (Figure 14.1). The ninth region, the Bedouin settlements of the Be'er Sheva basin, contains only a few enterprises and was therefore not included in the analysis. More than two-thirds of the Arabs in Israel are concentrated in some 70 towns which house about 90 percent of all enterprises in the Arab economy. Altogether in 1992, Arab industry comprised some 900 enterprises (Sofer et al., 1995).

Arab industry began to develop in the 1960s following the transition of the Arab economy from a subsistence economy based on peasantry to integration into the Israeli economy. This development gained momentum in the 1970s, with the completion of the integration of Arab settlements into the physical, administrative, and educational infrastructure of




FIGURE 14.1 Arab regions in central and northern Israel.

the country. By the early 1980s, some 450 small enterprises had been established, employing an average of about five workers each. The plants developed in the food, construction, and textile sectors. The first two sectors served the local markets within the community, while the textile sector carried out subcontracting work for Jewish parent enterprises. To this day, these three sectors constitute about two-thirds of Arab industries, with lumber, metal, plastic, and printing enterprises making up most of the remaining industries. The average enterprise size has doubled to about 11 employees, but most prominent is the fact that several dozen plants have grown to employ more than 50 workers. These enterprises have invested in recent years more than $300,000 each in developing and renovating fixed installations and machinery.

Methodology

The study is based on questionnaires prepared for the sample of industrial entrepreneurs in eight of the study regions. A total of 514 entrepreneurs in 37 settlements were sampled, including all large settlements and a sample of medium sized settlements in the complexes. The sample includes 68 percent of all enterprises in these regions, or 57 percent of all Arab industry in Israel. Each entrepreneur was asked to list settlements to which he sells the output of his enterprise. Each regular destination settlement of the plant was recorded as an industrial linkage, unrelated to the financial sales volume. These data were aggregated into the number of sales from each settlement to other settlements. Emphasis was placed on analyzing sales by settlements to other settlements in the region, to other Arab regions, and to Jewish regions.

Data analysis is based on two complementary methods. In the first stage, I performed block cluster analysis, which grouped settlements with a similar system of sales destinations into distinct groups. In the second stage, a spatial interaction pattern was adopted, examining the degree of distance friction in the business links of Arab enterprises with the three areas: the Arab settlements in the region, other Arab regions and Jewish regions. The pattern is expressed by the following equation:

$$I_{ij} = E_j A_j d_{ij}^{-\alpha}$$

where:

I_{ij} = Number of mutual links between the settlement of origin and the destination j;
E_j = Turnover volume of enterprises in the originating settlement;
A_j = Population size of destination;

d_{ij} = Distance in km. between i and j;
α = Distance friction coefficient.

And from this, the function formula:

$$\ln \frac{I_{ij}}{E_i A_j} = \ln d_{ij}^{-\alpha}$$

According to the equation, the number of mutual links between the settlements of origin and the destination depends on the extent of business links in the settlements of origin as measured by the enterprises' volume of turnover, the strength of market demand measured by population size, and the distance friction between origins and destinations (Noronha and Goodchild, 1992). The objective of the analysis is to examine whether there are significant differences between the regression slopes of sales of the Arab industry to Arab settlements in the region, to other regions, and to Jewish regions. The existence of such gaps indicates the existence of separate ethnic or interregional areas, while similar distance frictions indicate the formation of a uniform economic space in which all industrialists participate.

The Spatial Distribution of Sales

The spatial distribution of sales by Arab enterprises is presented by a table distinguishing sales within the settlement from sales to all Arab settlements in the region where the enterprise is located, as defined in Figure 14.1, other Arab regions, Jewish settlements, Palestinian regions, and exports (Table 14.1). Earlier studies indicated indirectly that the enterprises based themselves on local markets–primarily the settlement itself, and at times even the clan, and to a limited extent, neighboring settlements (Czamanski and Taylor, 1986). This pattern derived from the mimicking behavior which characterized the behavior of the entrepreneurs until the 1980s, and from reliance on secure markets in the community as derived from the ethnic enclave assumption.

In striking contrast to these trends, during the 1990s only one-quarter of all sales by Arab enterprises met the demand within the settlement. These findings indicate that Arab industry has undergone a qualitative change, expressed in the entry into new markets which are more extensive than was customary in the past. Whereas previously sales outside the region were mostly opportunistic, at present these sales predominate. These findings bring us to the next question: Is Arab industry creating monoethnic regional markets on the periphery, or is it integrating into

interethnic markets within the country at large? According to the above-mentioned theory, it can be hypothesized that regional monoethnic markets are developing in the Arab settlements. The table indeed indicates that nearly half of the sales by Arab enterprises are within the boundaries of the region where the enterprise is located. About half of these sales are focused within the boundaries of the settlement and the other half in neighboring settlements. The remaining sales were directed mainly to Jewish settlements. The significance of these data is that it is possible to assume that the development of regional systems of Arab settlements is characterized by a high frequency of functional links among all settlements in the system.

In any case, if such functional regional systems are developing, they are quite open, with links primarily to Jewish settlements in the country. The extent of exports to the occupied territories and overseas is negligible,

TABLE 14.1 Sales from industrial regions by destinations (in percentages)

	Same Settlement	*Same Region*[a]	*Other Arab Regions*	*Jewish Settlements*[b]	*Judea and Samaria*[a]	*Overseas*
Central Upper Galilee	25	47	19	33	–	1
Western Upper Galilee	29	58	8	36	–	2
Beit Kerem Valley	27	55	29	16	–	–
Sakhnin Valley	23	40	45	14	–	1
Western Lower Galilee	27	45	16	37	1	1
Nazareth Region	28	53	8	37	1	1
Wadi Arra	25	43	21	35	1	–
Triangle	18	25	26	48	1	–
All Arab Industry	25	48	16	34	1	1

[a] Sales within the settlement are also included in sales within the region.

[b] About half of sales to the Jewish sector are to the Tel Aviv and Haifa metropolitan areas, and half to nearby Jewish cities.

Source: Field research.

while the extent of sales between the Arab regional systems is also relatively limited. Jewish settlements purchase about one-third of all sales of Arab industry. About 90 percent of these purchases are made by the metropolitan core areas of Tel Aviv and Haifa, with only about 10 percent going to the Jewish settlements on the national periphery. We may conclude from this that there is no spatial integration on the periphery between neighboring Arab and Jewish settlements. Also striking is the absence of any trend to sell to the Palestinian territories in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The most significant trend is a qualitative change, expressed by the penetration of new markets, more extensive than was customary in the past.

The volume of products marketed to the Jewish economy varies according to industrial sectors. As expected, the textile sector markets most of its production to the Jewish sector, selling about 80 percent of its production to Jewish settlements. However, it turns out that other sectors also sell a substantial part of their production to Jewish markets. The sectors related to the construction industry are known to have one of the highest volumes of sales to Jewish markets. The mineral, non-metal, and metal sectors, which previously were directed almost exclusively to local Arab markets, market over one third of their products to the Jewish sector. Enterprises in the wood sector, divided into two categories, wood for construction and furniture, market about 40 percent to the Jewish sector. Only the printing and food sectors market little of their output to the Jewish economy. Most of the food enterprises are olive presses, manufacturing oil for internal consumption by residents of the settlement.

Certain differences exist between the Arab regions in the spatial distribution of the sales. In the western Upper Galilee, the Beit Kerem valley, and the Nazareth region, more than half of the sales are within the boundaries of the region. In the Triangle, the extent of sales within the region remains very low, while the volume of sales to the Jewish sector is substantial. It may be said that industry in the Triangle settlements, from Baka al Gharbiya in the north to Kafr Qasim in the south, has become part of the national metropolitan core system. Especially prominent in this region are enterprises in the construction sector, which are assisted by Arab contractors in the sale of building materials to the Jewish market. Also prominent are carpentry enterprises which sell relatively inexpensive furniture to metropolitan residents. Even enterprises in the printing and food sectors, which are based on unique ethnic demands such as language and specific foods, are succeeding in penetrating the Jewish market by utilizing the Triangle's proximity to the national core.

In spite of the growth of sales to Jewish markets in the Triangle region, the Sakhnin and Beit Kerem valleys remain isolated from Jewish markets. Both regions lack developed urban centers, and other Arab centers lo-

cated between them and the large Jewish centers, constitute intervening opportunities for their enterprises. These regions therefore have become important marketers of agricultural products and building materials to settlements of neighboring regions, utilizing their central location on the map of Arab settlements in the Galilee, and their expertise in growing olives for the oil industry.

The Spatial Model of Sales

We learn from analyzing the distribution of sales that Arab industry has begun to break into Arab interregional markets as well as into Jewish markets. However, this gives rise to several questions. What spatial patterns are being formed as a result of these trends? Is the formation of regional markets on the ethnic periphery the dominant trend ? Or, is Arab industry integrating into the general Israeli market? In other words, is Arab industry operating within a uniform and continuous space where its sales to the various sectors are affected by the same distance friction coefficients? As stated, the power to break through ethnic and regional barriers, as expressed in the spatial sales pattern, was examined by two complementary methods: cluster analysis and the spatial interaction pattern. The analysis of the spatial pattern of sales by means of cluster analysis shows that business links clearly indicate the formation of regional systems of neighboring Arab settlements. The regional structure forms a three-level hierarchy, with some of the regions dividing into subregions on a fourth and even fifth level (Figure 14.2). On the first level, it is possible to identify four principal industrial regions comprised of the Arab settlements in the Western Galilee, central Upper Galilee, the Nazareth region, and the Triangle region in the central part of the country. The Western Galilee is divided into three subregions at the second level: the western Upper Galilee, which is inhabited by a large Druse population, the western Lower Galilee, which is located on the fringes of the Haifa metropolitan area, and the Beit Kerem valley, located on the border between Upper Galilee and Lower Galilee. The central settlements are also divided into the principal region and the southern group of settlements surrounding Kafr Qasim and including also Kafr Bara and Jaljulya. On the third level, we can identify a secondary division separating the Sakhnin valley and the western Upper Galilee region, and the Druse villages on Mt. Carmel and western Lower Galilee. In the central region, there is a separation between the Wadi Arra region, the southern Triangle, and the Zemer block of settlements, which is composed of four small agricultural settlements. Beyond that, several additional subgroups were recorded as described in Figure 14.2.




FIGURE 14.2 The spatial pattern of industrial regions according to cluster analysis.

Each of these regions is characterized by a high frequency of sales among the region's settlements and a relatively low frequency of sales to settlements outside the region. The similarity between the settlements in each group stems primarily from sales to the other settlements in that region. In three regions–western Upper Galilee, Beit Kerem valley, and Nazareth–sales volume within the region amounts to more than half of the total sales. With the exception of the Triangle, sales volume to other settlements in the region reaches more than 40 percent of all sales of the settlements in the said regions (Table 14.1). On the basis of these data, eight principal industrial regions were defined which function as regional markets for Arab industry (Figure 14.3). In all cases, complete congruence was found between the geographical proximity between settlements belonging to the regional systems of Arab settlements as previously defined in the first part of the discussion (Shmueli and Schnell, 1980; Soffer, 1984; Schnell, 1987). There was only one exception among all settlements, Maghar, which geographically belongs to the Sakhnin valley, but from the point of view of industrial links, belongs to the Nazareth region. Another important finding was the fact that neighboring Jewish settlements did not become significant destinations for sales by Arab industry. None of the Arab regions included any Jewish settlement whatsoever as relevant component characterizing the common pattern of sales within the cluster.




FIGURE 14.3 Industrial regions.

Cluster analysis thus reinforces the hypothesis that Arab industry is beginning to organize itself in monoethnic regional systems. The Arab regions, which were identified in the past as focal points of a homogeneous Arab population and of national-ethnic identification, are revealed in this study also as economic entities in their initial crystallization stages. Almost no enterprises have been found thus far which are jointly owned by entrepreneurs from neighboring settlements. However, workers are beginning to commute to and from various settlements, and the volume of sales to neighboring settlements is also beginning to grow. The findings testify to the development of complementary functional links among enterprises of neighboring Arab settlements. Thus, Arab industry is beginning to extricate itself from the mimicking stage, and is beginning to develop in the monoethnic regional-peripheral markets according to the predicted pattern of countries where the predominant capital accumulation is by large corporations managed from the national core.

At this stage, we may ask whether these findings indeed testify to the existence of national-ethnic barriers in marketing industrial products. Alternatively, we may ask if the regional clusters which have crystallized in the analysis are the result of the spatial organization of the enterprises and the markets which function in a uniform and continuous space. The comparison between distance friction coefficients in intraregional as against interregional sales, may indicate the degree to which the boundaries of the regional systems are open or closed. Comparing distance friction coefficients in sales to Arab regions with those of Jewish regions may reveal the strength of the national-ethnic barriers in sales of industrial products. In both cases, the pattern neutralizes the differences in the number of links between the origin and destination deriving from the strength of the industrial activity in the region of origin, market size of the potential destinations, and the relative distance from the settlement where the enterprise is located.

According to aggregate analysis, the regional barriers of all eight Arab regional systems are only partial. The distance friction coefficient of sales within the Arab regions is $b=-0.49$, while the distance friction coefficient of sales to other regions was $b=-0.68$ (Figure 14.4 and Table 14.2). Thus the distance friction of intraregional sales is lower than that of sales to settlements in other areas. This gap is relatively small, and its significance is marginal ($a=-0.06$). Therefore, although Arab industry is organizing itself around Arab regional markets, the borders of these markets are relatively open, and distance factors predominate in surveying the variance of sales to the various Arab settlements in the Arab space in Israel ($R^2 = 0.36$). The gap between sales to the region and to all other Arab regions was not measured for each region separately, because the frequency of external sales for each of the other regions separately was too low to yield significant results.




FIGURE 14.4 Interethnic and interregional distance friction functions.

TABLE 14.2 Regression slope coefficients according to sale destinations

Sector	Sales Destinations: In the Region	In Other Regions	Difference	Arab Space	Jewish Space	Difference
All sectors	-0.49	-0.68	0.19	-0.67	-1.50	0.83
Food	-0.50	-1.24	0.74	-0.63	-1.70	1.83
Textiles	-0.06	-0.24	0.18	-0.67	-2.00	1.33
Building Materials[a]	-0.50	-0.64	0.14	-0.68	-1.27	0.59

[a] Building materials sectors include building, metal and lumber.

A comparison of the three principal sectors—food, textile, and construction—in the spatial sales pattern, shows that the food sector is especially prominent as a sector selling most of its products within the boundaries of the region where the enterprises are located. The distance friction coefficient of sales to other regions is double that of the appropriate coefficient for all sectors. In contrast to the food sector's high distance coefficient are the low distance friction coefficients of the textile sector, both in sales to settlements in the region and in other regions. In addition to their sales to the Jewish parent enterprises, the textile enterprises tend to sell to Arab shops in a broad variety of settlements. Some market their production to neighboring Arab settlements, while some also market to distant Arab settlements, ranging mainly from the Galilee to the Triangle (Table 14. 2).

According to aggregate analysis, ethnic-national barriers are still very powerful for most Arab regions. The distance friction coefficient of sales to all Arab settlements is -0.67, while the distance friction coefficient of sales to Jewish settlements is very high, reaching -1.50. This deep coefficient gap stems from the tremendous power of distance friction in the Jewish space (Table 14.2 and Figure 14.4). This means that Arab industry is still encountering difficulty in selling products to Jewish settlements in volumes approaching that which could be predicted by the extent of demand in the Jewish markets, notwithstanding the fact that about one-third of all sales of the Arab industry is earmarked for Jewish markets. An interesting fact is that the gap between the distance friction coefficients is especially large in the textile branch. This gap is once more explained by the great power of the distance friction of sales to the Jewish space. This means that most subsidiary plants in the Arab settlements are selling most of their production to the parent plants in Jewish cities near the Arab settlements. Cities such as Afula, Natseret Illit, Karmi'el, and to a certain extent also Beit She'an, Safed, and Kiryat Shmona, have become

important destinations on the sales map of textile plants in Arab settlements. While the volume of sales to the parent enterprises in the Haifa and Tel-Aviv metropolitan areas is indeed higher, it is relatively lower than what could be predicted from the size of the metropolitan markets. In contrast to the textile sector, the building materials enterprises show a more moderate difference in distance friction due to a certain penetration of Jewish markets by these enterprises. Notwithstanding that stated above, it is important to note that the building materials enterprises are still suffering from significant barriers which restrict their sales volume to the Jewish markets (Table 14.2).

Thus far the spatial pattern at the aggregate level has been examined. Now it can be asked: to what extent do the sales patterns of the various regions differ? It would be best to examine whether enterprises in the Western Galilee and Triangle sectors, located on the fringes of the metropolitan cores, tend to integrate more intensively into Jewish markets than other regions which are located on the national periphery and which suffer from intervening opportunities (Beit Kerem valley, Sakhnin valley and Wadi Arra). The distance friction coefficients of the intraregional, Arab interregional and ethnic-national dimensions indicate significant interregional variance. In order to examine the nature of these differences, I located each region on three axes of a 3-dimensional space, with each axis depicting the strength of the distance friction coefficients of the region's enterprises (Figure 14.5).

In general, it is possible to identify on the diagram two groups of regions and two additional regions which do not fit into either group. The first group includes the regions located at the fringes of the large metropolitan area—the Triangle, western Upper Galilee, and western Lower Galilee. This group is characterized by a relatively low distance friction coefficient with settlements in the Jewish space, approaching values similar to the strength of the distance friction of these regions with other Arab regions. In the Triangle region, located in proximity to the national core of Tel-Aviv, the distance friction coefficient with settlements in the Jewish space is even somewhat lower compared with the distance friction with Arab settlements in other Arab regions. In these three areas, the distance friction in sales to settlements within the region is among the highest of all Arab regions. Thus, these regions sell a considerable amount to Jewish markets, at the expense of sales within their regions.

The second group consists of the Sakhnin valley, Beit Kerem valley, and Wadi Arra regions. These regions, relatively distant from the metropolitan centers, suffer from high distance frictions with settlements in the Jewish space. The strength of the distance friction with Jewish settlements is double that with settlements in other Arab regions. The Wadi Arra and Sakhnin regions, however, can compensate by a strong regional system,




FIGURE 14.5 Distance friction coefficients in the Arab regions.

expressed by very low distance friction of links within the region. In fact, the distance friction coefficients are so low that it could be stated that the region has become a single space chosen by all consumers in the region. A similar pattern exists in the Nazareth region, which maintains strong intraregional links expressed by a relatively low intraregional distance friction coefficient. Nazareth also excels in the volume of its sales to the Jewish space. Its distance friction coefficient with settlements in the Jewish space is the lowest of all regions and is significantly lower than the distance friction coefficient of its sales to Arab settlements in other areas. It could be assumed that Nazareth's size and strength facilitated the opening of large enterprises which maintain extensive business relations with Jewish cities such as Tel-Aviv, Haifa, Afula, Tiberias, etc. The central Upper Galilee is similar to the Arab regions near metropolitan areas in the strength of its links with the Jewish space, at the expense of relatively low volume of links with other Arab areas. Its uniqueness stems from the fact that most of its inhabitants are Christian and Druse who are at the fringes of both the Arab and Jewish spaces. In these circumstances, the strength of the Jewish economy makes it more attractive to Druse and Christian entrepreneurs.

Conclusions

The above analysis shows that Arab industry has been undergoing qualitative changes since the 1980s. Until then, the Arab enterprises had local characteristics, raising most of their resources from kinship frameworks, each marketing its products within the boundaries of the settlement in which it was located. In the course of the 1980s and early 1990s, a transition took place toward marketing industrial products outside of the settlement. About three-quarters of the total marketing is directed to other settlements. In the process of breaking into new markets, regional monoethnic markets developed. These markets become part of the process of growth of the regional systems of the Arab settlements of Israel.

It can be concluded from the above, that the Israeli periphery is, to a certain extent, splitting into two principal subregions. One is the Jewish periphery, which is absorbing the low-wage production processes of the large corporations. The other is the Arab periphery which provides production workers to plants in the Jewish periphery, and which maintains, alongside these enterprises, industry based on small plants supplying the special demands of the Arab periphery. These demands are evident in the food products and building materials industries. Food products manufactured by the Arab industry concentrate on the unique tastes of the Arab sector, primarily olive products, and to a certain extent, cheeses, hum-

mus, and tehina. The building materials plants produce for the large construction market which characterizes the Arab economy due to its high birthrate and accelerated urbanization. Another prominent sector is the textile industry, engaged in manufacturing standard products as subcontractors for Jewish parent plants.

The Arab regional systems are relatively open. About half of the enterprises' sales are to settlements outside these systems. The Jewish metropolitan areas are the principal purchasing foci for Arab production in the above mentioned settlements. These sales are manifest, first and foremost, in the textile sector, but also in the wood and building materials sectors, where the Arab entrepreneurs have carved out a substantial niche for themselves. Several dozen large enterprises have fully broken into Jewish markets. These entrepreneurs have become suppliers to Jewish contractors under long term contracts, or have adapted their marketing to Jewish markets. They note that the first stage of penetration into Jewish markets was particularly difficult for them as Arabs. However, after they had built a reputation for themselves, the way to the Jewish markets was opened.

These findings indicate that, at times, traditional and marginal peripheral-industrial systems may develop and penetrate interethnic markets, even if this requires greater effort and determination on their part. However, this penetration is often accompanied by the creation of certain ethnic industrial enclave regions as the above analysis has shown. At the same time, the process of integrating into the national economy requires the allocation of resources and opportunities by the state; without such resources it is doubtful whether the entrepreneurs will be capable of closing the gap between Arab and Jewish industry. The fact that the Jewish economy is more developed accelerates the industrial integration process, enabling the Arab entrepreneurs to penetrate large and advanced Jewish markets. This process, however, mandates improving the quality of their products and their manufacturing processes, thus developing more advanced industrial entrepreneurships. Therefore, a public policy which encourages the spontaneous industrial processes in the Arab economy in Israel may reduce economic gaps between the economies, as well as strengthen the social cohesion around common economic interests.

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