Israeli Development Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa

This book deals with Israeli development aid to sub-Saharan Africa countries as a part of Israeli foreign policy.

The analysis is framed by the concept of soft power: an assumption that development cooperation increases attractiveness of the donor and contributes to constructive bilateral and multilateral relations. Israel is a particular case of a donor, as it concentrates on technical aid, and its aid is motivated by a distinct set of ideological and pragmatic motives.Covering the period since the 1950s till today, the book analyses specific Israeli resources relevant for African development and the system and contents of Israeli development aid, with a particular focus on a new phenomenon of the engagement of businesses and NGOs. Zielińska explores the geopolitical context of Israeli aid for sub-Saharan countries and the recipients’ perception of Israeli aid; asking if and how these attitudes influence the recipients’ behaviour towards Israel within their bilateral relations as well as on multilateral forums.

Contributing to the knowledge of development diplomacy as a form of expression of soft power and as a tool of foreign policy, it will be of interest to international relations’ students and faculty as well as to other people professionally dealing with Israeli foreign policies.

Karolina Zielińska is currently a research fellow in the Israel Research programme at the Centre for Eastern Studies in Warsaw, Poland.

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Israeli development aid to sub-Saharan Africa

Soft Power and Foreign Policy

Karolina Zielińska

First published 2021

by Routledge

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© 2021 Karolina Zielińska

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A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Zielińska, Karolina, author.

Title: Israeli development aid to sub-Saharan Africa : soft power and foreign policy / Karolina Zielińska.

Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2021. |

Series: Foreign policy analysis | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2020044767 (print) | LCCN 2020044768 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367633844 (hbk) | ISBN 9781003118961 (ebk)

Subjects: LCSH: Economic assistance, Israeli—Africa, Sub-Saharan.

Classification: LCC HC800 .Z54 2021 (print) | LCC HC800 (ebook) | DDC 338.91/5694067—dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020044767

LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020044768

ISBN: 9780367633844 (hbk)

ISBN: 9780367633851 (pbk)

ISBN: 9781003118961 (ebk)

Typeset in Times New Roman

by KnowledgeWorks Global Ltd.

Contents

List of illustrations

About the author

Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

Introduction

1 Theoretical basis and key definitions

2 Foreign policy of the State of Israel

Subchapter 1: Evolving Israeli identity and security considerations

Subchapter 2: Sub-Saharan African countries in Israeli foreign policy

3 Soft power of the state of Israel as a resource for development aid and public diplomacy

Subchapter 1: Development needs of Sub-Saharan Africa countries

Subchapter 2: Israeli soft power resources: Qualitative and swot analyses

4 Israeli development aid

Subchapter 1: Israel as a Donor

Subchapter 2: Israeli development aid to Sub-Saharan African countries

5 Israeli public diplomacy

Subchapter 1: Overview

Subchapter 2: Israel’s development diplomacy

6 Geopolitical considerations affecting Israeli relations with sub-Saharan African countries

7 International behaviours of sub-Saharan beneficiaries

Subchapter 1: Bilateral relations

Subchapter 2: Multilateral forums

Subchapter 3: People-to-people relations and public opinion

8 Development aid to sub-Saharan African countries as an element of Israeli softpower

Bibliography

Index

Cover

Half Title

Series Page

Title Page

Copyright Page

Contents

List of illustrations

About the author

Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

Introduction

1 Theoretical basis and key definitions

2 Foreign policy of the State of Israel

Subchapter 1: Evolving Israeli identity and security considerations

Subchapter 2: Sub-Saharan African countries in Israeli foreign policy

3 Soft power of the state of Israel as a resource for development aid and public diplomacy

Subchapter 1: Development needs of Sub-Saharan Africa countries

Subchapter 2: Israeli soft power resources: Qualitative and swot analyses

4 Israeli development aid

Subchapter 1: Israel as a Donor

Subchapter 2: Israeli development aid to Sub-Saharan African countries

5 Israeli public diplomacy

Subchapter 1: Overview

Subchapter 2: Israel’s development diplomacy

6 Geopolitical considerations affecting Israeli relations with sub-Saharan African countries

7 International behaviours of sub-Saharan beneficiaries

Subchapter 1: Bilateral relations

Subchapter 2: Multilateral forums

Subchapter 3: People-to-people relations and public opinion

8 Development aid to sub-Saharan African countries as an element of Israeli softpower

Bibliography

Index

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Cover

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Title Page

Copyright

Contents

List of illustrations

Acknowledgements

Start of Content

Bibliography

Index

List of illustrations

Tables

3.1 SWOT analysis of Israeli soft power in the context of SSA countries’ development needs.

4.1 “Top 5” largest recipients of Israeli ODA, 1997-2016.

4.2 Israeli aid implementing MDGs in SSA.

Figures

4.1 Total Israeli ODA since 1997 (in USD millions).

4.2 Percentage share of sub-Saharan countries in total aid 1997-2016.

4.3 Breakdown of total aid, 2016.

About the author

Karolina Zielińska, Ph.D., is a graduate of the University of Warsaw, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies. Specialising in international relations in the Middle East, her MA thesis dealt with Syro-Palestinian relations post 1967 (published in 2007). Expert in Israeli internal and external policies, spent significant time in Israel, mostly with academic affiliations related to her Ph.D. project focused on Israeli development aid to sub-Saharan Africa. Currently she is affiliated with the Centre for Eastern Studies in Warsaw, Poland, as a research fellow in Israel Research programme.

Acknowledgements

This book is based on the Ph.D. dissertation entitled Development aid to Sub-Saharan Africa countries as an element of Israeli soft power, defended in April 2018 within the doctoral programme of the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies of the University of Warsaw, Poland.

The author would like to express her great gratitude to the supervisor, Prof. Wiesław Lizak from the International Relations’ Institute, who was always ready to discuss, advice and dispel the doubts. Author’s gratitude goes also to Dr. Lynn Schler, Director of the Tamar Golan Africa Centre at the Ben Gurion University of the Negev, who supervised field research done by the author during the 2016/17 academic year, connected her and supported throughout.

Sincere appreciation is due to all the interviewees, who showed openness and trust and through sharing their knowledge and expertise made an invaluable contribution to this research.

The author is furthermore indebted to Prof. Joanna Dyduch and Prof. Krzysztof Trzciński from the Jagiellonian University, whose bold encouragement was vital for the publication to happen.

Special thanks go to the author’s mother Teresa and husband Michał. Without their continuous heartening and support in all spheres of life throughout the years, many things would have not been possible—including this book.

Abbreviations

AFD | AgenceFrançaise de Développement (French Development Agency)
AL | Arab League
ANC | African National Congress
AU | African Union
BA | bachelors degree
BADEA | Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
BDS | Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions
BGU | Ben Gurion University of the Negev
CAR | Central African Republic
CINADCO | (Israeli) Centre for International Agricultural Development Cooperation
CGIAR | Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research
DAC | (OECD’s) Development Assistance Committee
DRC | Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States
FAO | Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
FB | Facebook
GDP | gross domestic product
GIZ | Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Company for International Cooperation)
HUI | Hebrew University of Jerusalem
IAEA | International Atomic Energy Agency
ICRISAT | International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
IDB | Islamic Development Bank
ILO | International Labour Organization
IDF | Israel Defence Forces
IPALAC | International Program for Arid Land Crops
ISIS | Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
IBRD | International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICLEI | Local Governments for Sustainability
IDF | Israel Defense Forces
IGAD | Intergovernmental Authority on Development
JICA | Japan International Cooperation Agency
EU | European Union
HABITAT | United Nations Human Settlements Program
MA | masters degree
MASHAV | (Israeli) Department of International Cooperation
MCTC | Golda Meir Mount Carmel Training Centre in Haifa
MDGs | Millennium Development Goals
ME | Middle East
MFA | (Israeli) Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoD | (Israeli) Ministry of Defense
MoU | memorandum of understanding
NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEPAD | New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGOs | Non-Governmental Organisations
NIS | New Israeli shekel
OAU | Organisation of African Unity
ODA | official development assistance
OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIC | Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
OPEC | Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PA | Palestinian Authority
PLO | Palestine Liberation Organisation
PMO | Prime Minister’s Office
PR | Public Relations
SID | Society for International Development
SDGs | Sustainable Development Goals
SSA | sub-Saharan Africa
SWOT | strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats
TAU | Tel Aviv University
TIPA | Techno-agricultural Innovation for Poverty Alleviation
QWIDS | (OECD’s) Query Wizard for International Development Statistics
UAE | United Arab Emirates
UCLGA | United Cities and Local Governments Africa
UN | United Nations
UNCCD | United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNDP | United Nations Development Program
UNEF | United Nations Emergency Force
UNEP | United Nations Environment Program
UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNGA | United Nations General Assembly
UNIDO | United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNSC | United Nations Security Council
US | United States
USAID | United States Agency for International Development
USD | United States Dollar
USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEOG | Western European and Others Group
WMO | World Meteorological Organization

Introduction

States provide development assistance for various reasons, expecting varied results. They might be driven by purely altruistic motivations and aim at improving the situation of the recipient country's population; they might be guided by the desire to safeguard own interests: ensuring market presence or acquiring or maintaining political support. Their motivation may also be the improvement of image—both outside, in the context of building of an international role, and inside, through creation and strengthening of identity. These motivations and the ensuing aid are to a varied extent taken account of in the design of states’ foreign policies, as countries to varying degrees regard development aid as a tool of achieving the foreign policy objectives. Meanwhile, provision of development aid is recognized by both theorists and practitioners as a component of states’ soft power—a dimension of power in which the influence on other actors is achieved through attractiveness, appeal and persuasion rather than by coercion. Development aid as an element of soft power serves exerting influence, thus shaping attitudes of others and fostering the realization of the donor country's foreign policy objectives. This happens also through projection of other soft power resources (such as prosperity or scientific achievements) through aid.

The modern State of Israel began to provide development aid in the first decade of its existence, not long after it overcame the heaviest development problems of its own. Through development cooperation, Israel hoped to gain diplomatic support from countries of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Furthermore, the Jewish ethos required engagement in favour of the weak and needy, which coupled with the desire to share the experiences that the young state gained while facing challenges similar to those of the SSA. The progress of Israel's cooperation with SSA, of which development aid was a key part, halted in the late 1960s and 1970s due to the tightening of the Cold War divisions and Israeli-Arab conflict. Reconstruction of the relationship has been ongoing since the 1980s; in the 1990s, within the post–Cold War global system and in the face of changes within the Arab states’ system, a favourable climate for further development of Israeli-African relations, including through development aid, emerged.

Israel is currently one of the highest developed countries and increases its commitments as a donor. Israeli aid adheres to international standards, but is particular, since it is based on transfer of knowledge. Simultaneously, Israeli international position requires intense efforts to gain favour, or at least neutrality of other states. The question arises: how the Israeli soft-power resources in the form of development aid are used as an instrument of foreign policy?

The subject of the book refers to an increasingly important factor shaping the international relations: soft power and the nature of its impact. This impact grows due to democratisation of participation in international relations and of global information flow, is not only largely spontaneous but also is fuelled by foreign policy measures within the rapidly evolving field of public diplomacy. The so-called new public diplomacy includes development diplomacy, understood as the pursuit of foreign policy objectives related to the image of the country through means belonging to the field of development aid. Technical assistance is a type of aid that, according to soft power theorists, has greater potential for affecting attainment foreign policy objectives than either material or financial aid. At the same time, it seems that its effectiveness in building constructive bilateral and multilateral relations as well as position in international forums may depend on the geopolitical situation of the donor and beneficiary countries.

This might apply in particular to small and medium powers such as Israel and SSA countries, cooperating in-between themselves. Similarly, the role of developing countries in Israeli foreign policy is a fresh research area, highlighting a wider, non-Western-centric perspective on Israel's international role, including in the United Nations (UN). As it engages some of the most populated countries and some emerging powers, study of these relations reflects changing balance of power and a new architecture of alliances, increasingly rooted in the authentic interests and potentials and only indirectly in geopolitical necessities.

Moreover, while the power of Israel is of general interest, the issue of its soft power and its translation into foreign policy remains largely a fresh research territory. Available studies focus primarily on aspects such as attractiveness of Israeli new technology industries, the uniqueness of its sociopolitical regime or advantages of the education system; they rarely deal with matters of importance for developing countries, such as water management and agriculture, or recognise the role of non-governmental entities. The subject gained on validity due to the 2010s Israeli active building of partnerships with developing countries through technical assistance programmes, wherein Israel delivers knowledge and experience in the areas of development in which it is the most successful.

This book aims also to contribute to the knowledge of development diplomacy as a form of expression of soft power and as a tool of foreign policy. In the case of Israel, the available characteristics of its soft power tend to underestimate its potential and actual contribution to development. Likewise, existing analyses of Israeli public diplomacy are centred on communication policies at times of armed conflict and on messages addressed to Western audiences. This work aims to complement these deficiencies. The application of the concept of new public diplomacy widens the research field by including a growingly important phenomena of the role of individuals and their organisations, including enterprises, in development aid and public diplomacy, in particular contribution of these actors to development processes in SSA.

Israeli development aid in the form of technical assistance requires attention also because it reflects Israeli history of dealing with socio-economic development problems; offers solutions specifically tailored to the needs of recipients and has a strong interpersonal component, impacting in curious ways on the processes of relationship building.

The subject of this study is, thus, Israeli development policy and the accompanying public diplomacy, as a part of foreign policy towards SSA countries based on soft power resources. It purposes an analysis of the impact of Israeli development aid to SSA countries as an element of Israeli soft power. It studies the nature, directions and effectiveness of Israel's development aid to SSA countries in the context of pursuit of foreign policy objectives; Israeli development aid to SSA countries as a self-contained resource of soft power, and as an emanation of other soft power resources; Israeli development aid as a resource for public diplomacy and the ways in which development aid acts as a resource for Israel's soft power in relations with SSA countries in the context of changing geopolitical circumstances.

Chapter 1 anchor this work in the neoliberal theoretical paradigm and selected approaches in international relations theory (soft power, public diplomacy), defining key concepts and presenting a network of relationships between them. Chapter 2 deals with Israeli foreign policy, its rooting in interests, identity, internal and external determinants and evolution, particularly with regard to SSA and Israeli involvement in Africa, its motivations, ways of engagement and expected results. Chapter 3 is devoted to Israeli softpower resources in the context of SSA development challenges through the analysis of selected aspects of Israel's socio-economic development history as a basis for providing development assistance that responds to the development needs of SSA countries. Chapter 4 characterises Israel as an international donor through the study of evolution of the scale and nature of Israeli development aid, in particular assistance to SSA countries and including the role of Israeli non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and entrepreneurs. Chapter 5 deals with public diplomacy of the State of Israel in order to analyse the needs, institutional arrangements, content, addressees and internal debate around Israeli public diplomacy, with particular emphasis on the role of development diplomacy and Africa as potential recipient. Chapter 6 is concerned with the evolution of geopolitical conditions for Israel's soft power projection in SSA countries through development aid. Chapter 7 analyses positions held by SSA countries towards Israel within bilateral relations, multilateral forums and people-to-people relations in order to map out the impact of Israel's relations with the countries of SSA built through development aid as contrasted with the influence of geopolitical circumstances. Chapter 8 offers concluding observations and projections regarding effectiveness of Israeli development aid as an instrument of soft power in relations with SSA countries.

The spectre of this work is limited by certain circumstances. Israeli state archives are classified for a minimum of 25 years from the date of document's production. This is a source limitation for analysing events starting from the mid- 1980s. Furthermore, some engaged actors avoid speaking, in particular on the 1990s. Despite efforts, no interviews were possible with employees of the Africa Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The financial data on Israeli development aid are furthermore difficult to access and assess. Use was made of the official development assistance statistics published for the period since 1997 by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In the light of limitations of these data, their proper interpretation was pursued in the course of the interviews. Subject-wise, the work analyses Israel's development aid to SSA countries. Although it contains some information locating this aid in the general picture of Israel as a donor, it does not deal with other recipients in terms of soft power and foreign relations. The group of SSA countries¹ as defined for the purpose of this book excludes Mauritania, Sudan and Somalia, international behaviour and cultural identity of which locate them within the Arab block competing with Israel for influence in SSA. South African Republic is also excluded, since it was positioned outside the SSA core until the fall of apartheid and since relations with it are identified as one of the geopolitical factors influencing Israel's relations with SSA. Humanitarian aid was largely excluded from the subject matter, as was aid focused on Jewish communities and aid provided by non-Israeli Jewish organizations. Importantly, evaluation of the effectiveness of Israeli aid in terms of its input into the socio-economic development of recipient countries is not the subject of this work, unless this effectiveness is a source of particular political behaviours; the issue of perception of aid was dealt with rather than aid's actual long-term impact on development. Israeli soft power analysis was limited to resources which are potentially useful in the context of providing development aid to SSA. Accordingly, it does not include the analysis of the attractiveness of Israel's cultural industry or its tourism offer—soft power resources that are presumed to be important in relations with highly developed countries. The study of SSA perceptions of Israeli developmental activities, due to limitations in the range and accessibility of sources, is limited to the manifestations which transpire from international, bilateral and multilateral relations of the countries concerned; nevertheless, effort was done to approximate these perceptions also on different levels. The term “African Zionism” is not used so as to avoid confusion between different phenomena to which this term might refer.² Timewise, the theme is analysed since 1956 emergence of Israel's aid program until 2016, due to completion of the main body of this work in 2017. Still, certain references are made to later events. Efforts were made to concentrate on the period since the early 1990s, which is the least covered in the literature. Lastly, the analysis of Israel's development diplomacy as a part of public diplomacy is centred on contemporary phenomena, due to the specificity of new public diplomacy, operating within a globalized and democratised information environment, as well as due to limited availability of sources for earlier periods.

The sources of this research include numerous monographs, scientific articles and scholarly works dating back to the 1950s. Existing scientific analyses of the topic relate mostly to the period 1956–73. Moreover, the amount of sources coming from the recipient countries is very limited. Thus, this work includes also primary sources such as documents of the Israeli government and its agencies, bilateral agreements, national and international statistical databases, conference speeches of officials and analysts. Furthermore, empirical research was carried out by the author during stays in Israel: June 06–19, 2015 (self-financed) and October 31, 2016 to June 19,2017 (within a research scholarship granted on the basis of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of Israel on cultural, scientific and educational cooperation). Contacts were identified through literature and snowballed from interviews. The majority of potential interviewees addressed were happy to be interviewed, with some exceptions when a person usually declared him/herself as not relevant to the topic. Semi-structured, qualitative, mostly individual interviews with Israeli academics and employees of think-tanks (14 persons), Israeli ambassadors serving in SSA currently or in the past (6), other government and government agencies’ employees (7), representatives of NGOs and businesses (7), employees of SSA states’ embassies in Israel (4: Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Zambia) and students coming from Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria residing in Israel (8) were carried out on the basis of unified questionnaires. The interviews were not based on sociological sampling and play an auxiliary role. The interviewees (except for students) were contacted again in September 2018 for authorisation.

Vast use was also made of electronic editions of Jerusalem Post (articles by Herb Keinon in particular, but notably also those by Seth J. Frantzman, Lahav Harkov, Tovah Lazaroff, Yossi Melman and Sharon Udasin), The Times of Israel (Raphael Ahren, Shoshanna Solomon), YNet News (Ilana Curiel, Omri Efraim), Israel 21c (Abigail Klein Leichman), al-Monitor (Rina Bassist), ha-Aretz, Arutz Sheva and press agencies. Furthermore, online press communiqués by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MASHAV and international organisations’ publications were vastly used as well as the websites of institutions, companies and NGOs. Due to space limits, it was not possible to include references to each individual piece constituting basic background information about contemporary events, yet many of these sources are actually referred to in case they present unique information or opinion.

Notes

1 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines sub-Saharan Africa region as containing of 49 countries: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome e Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland (Eswatini), Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

2 “African Zionism” can refer to “Christian Zionism”, an “African Christianity” movement, popular in particular in South Africa (which in this book is treated as a special case and not part of SSA) and largely disinterested in Israel (though there is some positive coverage, it is doubtful that the attitude is universal); “Black Zionism” which was an African-American movement calling for a “come-back to Africa” from the Americas—a twin to the Jewish Zionism, yet many of its adherents turned quite critical of Israel; “Rastafarianism”, a spillover of “Black Zionism”, originating from Jamaica and focused on return to Ethiopia—positively predisposed towards Israel due to connection through Solomon and Sheba, but not really preoccupied with it. This work refers, however, in general terms to evangelical Christian churches pursuing active pro-Israeli agenda; to patterns of African nationalism which aligned it with Israel ideologically and on the level of identity and also mentions “Black Zionism”.

1Theoretical basis and key definitions

The neoliberal paradigm for the study of international relations emphasises cooperation, recognises the existence of multilevel communication channels and the role of non-state actors and is interested in socio-economic development. The concept of soft power captures the multifaceted impact on certain elements of country's attractiveness, reflected both in policies that utilise soft power resources directly (such as development policy which itself is a resource of soft power), and in narrative-based policies. The new public diplomacy notion emphasises the role of international communication in building an image based on resources of soft power and, thus, its role in the pursuit of foreign policy goals. It underlines the multifaceted nature of communication, the need for dialogue and the role of non-state actors. The relationship between development aid and international behaviour of recipient countries is also discussed.

Theoretical paradigm

The neoliberal paradigm (liberal institutionalism) appears the most appropriate to analyse the subject of this work. Similar to neorealism, neoliberalism refers to an assumption that international environment has an anarchic nature, that the states have relatively stable preferences and their decision-making is rational. However, neoliberalism pays great attention to international cooperation and underlines the weight of global interdependencies existing also on a supranational level. These interdependencies promote common interests and cooperation while limiting conflicts. Without questioning the key role of a state, neoliberalism appreciates a role for non-state actors in the state-level decision-making on international affairs, and in the international life per se. Researchers operating within this paradigm are interested in such issues as political economy, international trade, protection of natural environment, human rights and human welfare. A concept of complex interdependency draws attention to the fact that relationships between states can have a very diverse character, that manifold channels of communication exist and that this communication takes place on various levels and between manifold sectors, thus allowing for exerting influence through interlinkage of issues. External affairs of a state in the interdependency system depend on its power in individual spheres and on an internal social situation. But the nature of relation depends on the distribution of interests not on power. Neoliberalism also underlines the role of international institutions and regimes in promotion of joint interests. It proposes a rule of extended reciprocity, according to which benefits from undertaking cooperation do not need to appear in the same spheres for each of the cooperating actors, be equal or immediate. It also draws attention to the impact of flow of information on international environment.¹

These features make the paradigm fit for framing the analysis of relationships consisting of projection of soft, thus non-confrontational, power, working through international cooperation based on shared interests—such as flow of aid leading to the increase of international and supranational ties, undertaken inter alia with an expectation of—often indirect and long-term—political benefits, including on the level of global institutions.

The concept of soft power

Power is an elusive term with a variety of meanings going beyond the realm of politics, within which it is associated mostly with authority or ability. Power is recognised as a leading analytical category for international relations studies; neoliberals point out its variations in time and the need for reflection not only on the distribution of power, but also on diversification of resources of power and ways of its use (the processes of their translation into results), which in turn are influenced by international institutions: organisations, law or custom. Neoliberalism is interested in how the use of the resource of power in a given field can bring results in a different policy sphere, yet it does not expect that these results will be immediate and direct. On the rule, it sees such an exchange as difficult to gain. Thus, neoliberals pay much attention to the relational aspect of power. They point out that processes of diffusion of power become increasingly scattered, also within the state entities, where particular government agencies gain autonomy in relation to ministries of international affairs, which in turn limits possibility to coordinate effectively the policy carried out in different spheres.² These statements in a particularly essential way refer to processes that are the subject of this work.

The theory of soft power, preoccupied with indirect and non-coercive ways of the use of resources of power, emerged within the framework of neoliberal paradigm. The concept is associated mainly with Joseph S. Nye junior, who created and popularised it, though reflections on the subject were undertaken by others also. There is no soft power theory that would be commonly agreed upon, including the issue of the position of development aid as one of soft power resources. According to Nye,

soft power is grounded in the country's culture, political values and foreign policies;

it means the ability to arrive at a desired outcome through attractiveness rather than coercion or payment;

it manifests itself in shaping preferences of others;

it is more than persuasion, it is also an ability to attract that can result in cooperation;

its resources are those that cause the attraction;

its political effectiveness needs to be checked on a case-by-case basis.³

Soft power is based on attractive ideas or political projects responding to interests and aspirations of others. Influence of its resources is possible only through relationship. Importantly, the same potential, for example, economic, can be used, depending on the circumstances, both as an element of soft as well as hard power. Moreover, soft power resource refers to both material aspects (possession of) and actions (like aiding, informing), which use different resources; it also needs to be underlined that soft power resources and soft power as such are hard to measure. Moreover, including soft power within a strategy of action is difficult due to three factors: dispersion of competences related to various resources of soft power between different governmental agencies (and non-governmental entities); dependence of the real impact of soft power on the will of the subject of influence and time needed to generate the results of influence. Of importance also is the role of external perception of given actions as authorised or not and the issue of power of persuasion which depends on credibility and reputation. Soft power can be addressed either to the state's elites to influence their decisions directly or to the public, influencing the environment in which those elites decide. It is also noted that culture, norms and values are seen as attractive only when the success of the state and its citizens (in economy, lifestyle, wealth) is visible. Therefore, hard power resources enhance soft power projection. Other such conducive elements are citizens’ civic engagement and a democratic regime, allowing for stability and flexible, effective management.⁴

This work reflects not as much on soft power in general, as on a particular relation between distribution of development aid and soft power.

Development aid as a soft power resource

Nye defined soft power resources as the culture of a state (where it is attractive to others), its political values (if it adheres to them in internal and external politics) and its foreign policy (if it is perceived as law-abiding and having a moral authority). Development aid could be located in the second or the third of these categories. Yet, according to Nye, aid belongs to the economic power (existing alongside soft and military power)—together with bribe and sanctions. In his later (2011) work, he underlined that economic resources are a source of both soft and hard power. Moreover, foreign aid does not always have a form of direct financial handout; it can constitute of transfer of technology, training, admission of foreign students. Aid also often contains a projection of a given social model. Taking this into account, development aid is mentioned by Nye in the context of soft power when he refers to the importance of facilitating admission of foreign students. It is also recognised as a global public good, care for which serves accumulation of soft power. Nye also concludes that aid better serves accumulation of soft power when the projects are small and implemented in concert with local population, while it diminishes when aid undermines local power relations or is conditional.⁵

Development aid also finds itself on other researchers’ lists of formative elements of soft power.⁶ Łoś underlines that aid can generate goodwill in the receiving country's elites and build linkages between the respective administrations, promoting cooperation in other fields. Development cooperation can impact all three elements of attractiveness: benignity (disinterested aid builds sympathy, trust and reliance), brilliance (when aid is based on the willingness of the recipient to follow solutions used in the donor country) and beauty (when aid is based on common values, ideals and visions). Furthermore, development aid is included as an indicator in several rankings of soft power. The linkage between development aid and soft power is made—and potential in this regard is seen—also by some Israeli researchers. For example, Fried suggested that benefits of aid should be construed as a part of a soft power strategy.⁷

To conclude, development aid constitutes a resource of soft power as such, thanks to its role in promoting positive emotions, gratitude and awe towards the donor. It also promotes other soft power resources of this donor, such as its culture, political system, technological innovativeness or quality education.

Understanding of development aid

Development aid can be defined as a transfer of resources (financial, material or in the form of know-how) which are conducive to development, done on preferential terms by states or societies directly or through international organisations.⁸ Technical cooperation is defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as comprising grants enabling training of beneficiaries’ nationals and the costs related to the provision of training.⁹ While development policy relates to policy supporting development of less developed states and regions formulated by the donor and realised through aid, development cooperation refers to a comprehensive cooperation aimed at eliminating inequalities and problems linked to underdevelopment. Development cooperation does not limit itself to one-sided actions and is characterised by a lesser asymmetry of relation, particularly in terms of level of activity and realisation of needs. Thus, aid can be treated as an instrument of development policy which turns into cooperation when the beneficiary state actively engages in the processes in question.¹⁰ Here, the two terms are often used interchangeably, while the book's spectre refers obviously to a broader understanding, due to a particularly cooperative nature of technical assistance.

A division between project and programme aid can also be of relevance to analysing Israel as a donor. In contrast to project aid, programme aid is more thorough and general, as it concerns transfer of financial or material resources to the beneficiary state and is devoted to development overall. There is a trend towards reversing from project to programme aid, though seemingly project aid is more conducive to the public diplomacy aims.

This work concentrates on the development aid given by the state of Israel and its institutions. Thus, it refers mainly to the official development assistance (ODA) defined by the OECD as grants or loans to developing countries and multilateral organisations done by the official sector, aimed at promotion of economic development and welfare and at concessional financial terms, and technical cooperation.¹¹ In this work, however, due to the contemporary realities of both development cooperation and public diplomacy, some attention is also devoted to aid not classified as ODA, that is, one coming from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and entrepreneurs. The role of such entities is already recognised by development aid theorists.

Regarding NGOs, theorists point to their role in all aspects of socio-economic life, including aid; NGOs are behind growing rates of unofficial aid. While during the 1990s NGOs were seen as a “golden formula” for fostering development, contemporarily there is already much evidence of controversial aspects of their engagement, such as limited cooperation with host governments (national and local) restricting their contribution to the realisation of these states’ development plans and engagement of these authorities which is necessary to guarantee sustainability of results.¹²

As regards businesses, it is emphasised that they are currently in disposal of a greater capital than many nation states, which makes their contribution key to development. Owned by the governments or private, enterprises distinguish themselves as a for-profit type of organisation whose activity in the area of development is not dependent on donors. In development discourse, the main fact of foreign investment being located in a developing country tends to be described as providing development opportunities, as it promotes employment, use of new technologies, reorganisation of enterprises, new market opportunities, strengthening of local producers of components and overall tax base. Main motives and functions of business’ developmental engagement are: promoting better policies, broadening of the markets, improvement of image, limiting production costs and investing in conducive legal and market environment. Approaches to businesses’ roles range from corporate social responsibility schemes, through business models in which business is done with full awareness of and proactive attitudes towards involved issues (sustainability, environmental impacts, etc.), to business models in which development is the prime aim of company's activity, with profits treated as company's lifeline, but with no capital accumulation targets. Role of private sector has been recognised in international documents on aid, for example, the 2011 Busan agreement.¹³

The main thrust of this research refers to aid that is transferred directly to the beneficiary states. However, certain attention is given to aid flowing through international organisations, in particular the United Nations’ (UN) specialised agencies, due to particular role of such aid in promoting donors’ international position.

The concept of development diplomacy¹⁴

Public diplomacy refers to a dialogical political international cooperation meant to create a positive image among the foreign public in order to improve the environment assisting realisation of policy aims. In line with neoliberal paradigm, appreciation of the role of public diplomacy reflects this paradigm's attention to non-governmental actors, such as media and public opinion. Public diplomacy is also recognised both as a tool of soft power and a tool necessary to sustain and promote soft power.¹⁵ This branch of foreign policy gains on intensity due to information revolution and democratisation of international relations. This led to an introduction of the term “new” public diplomacy which underlines the dialogical and the role of non-governmental entities. Subkinds of “new” public diplomacy proliferated in the literature to include citizen, Diaspora, digital, educational, historical, local authorities or social diplomacy.

Development diplomacy¹⁶ is among the newest subkinds recognised and refers to fostering public diplomacy aims through development aid. The borders between development diplomacy and other subkinds of “new” public diplomacy are often blurred. Furthermore, in times of budgetary constraints, development activities tend to increasingly serve also non-developmental, self-promotional aims of donors. Arguably, the definition of development diplomacy shall include the following aspects:

development aid as public diplomacy: contributions that improve the image of the donor among the beneficiaries through their face value;

communicating development aid among beneficiaries and international community aimed at bettering donor's image as a part of public diplomacy efforts;

additionally, the internal discussion among the institutions concerned with public diplomacy on the one hand and development aid on the other can be taken into account.¹⁷

While reflecting on various categories identified by scholars to describe contemporary public diplomacy, it can be observed that development aid, especially technical aid which takes a form of projects that include people-to-people contacts and knowledge sharing, can be classified as belonging to the strand of public diplomacy which pertains to relationship building, and that it is a relational (rather than informative) type of activity, deemed to be the most long-term oriented and best serving active engagement of both sides.¹⁸

Thus, the list of features which predestine particular forms of development aid to be of noticeable potential for a modern public diplomacy based on soft power resources is long. Aid shapes positive attitudes towards the donor, not only of gratefulness but also of appreciation. Aid can work as a means of communication of knowledge about and trigger of interest in the donating state and its values. Technical aid is often based on donor's non-material resources, such as knowledge and know-how, achievements and discoveries. Development aid as a part of a (new) public diplomacy by itself constitutes a soft power resource which can be used by public diplomacy, but it is also a vehicle enabling other soft power resources to boost public diplomacy. Aid that develops mutual, symmetric and positive relationships is particularly conducive to enhancing soft power and public diplomacy of the donor state. These processes are of course not automatic and require donors’ profound understanding of what resources are at their disposal and what could be most effective ways of their deployment.

Development aid and foreign policy¹⁹

This book is concentrated on political aspects of aid giving. Some reflections already exist on the topic, most of which refer to the Marshall Plan and associated motives: altruistic, economic and political, such as support for countries which are historically, culturally, linguistically close or similar in terms of political system. An analysis of motives for Cold War and post–Cold War aid carried out by Jean-Claude Berthélemy points out that these motives mainly have political (thus egoistic, interest-based) rather than altruistic character, though there are significant differences between donors in terms of the balance between the two. Schraeder, Hook and Taylor showed that American aid to Africa in the 1980s was focused on countries where strategic and ideological interests were located, yet the poorest ones mainly. Japanese aid targeted countries where various economic interests (row materials, markets) were present. Swedish aid went mostly to ideologically close (progressive, socialist-oriented) countries, and French one—where the promotion of its own culture was possible.²⁰ Increasingly, the range of motives broadens to include also security matters (prevention of migration, state's failure and terrorism).

Complex architecture of factors determining donor-beneficiary relations demands that any study of foreign policy benefits of aid-giving needs certain limitations and a methodological rigour. One commonly employed approach refers to study of beneficiaries’ international behaviours, in particular voting at the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Although existing studies show that aid does not buy votes, they point that voting patterns reflect closeness of relations between the donor and the beneficiary. It is also underlined that perceived importance of a given vote for the donor's agenda is a major factor, as is the share of the given donor in overall aid received by the beneficiary and perception of aid as either an entitlement or part of a relationship.²¹ Thus, existing research does not confirm the existence of a direct linkage between extension of development aid and beneficiaries’ voting patterns. Yet, it considers mostly great powers’ and established donors’ aid. More research employing the same methodology is needed to make assumptions regarding middle powers and emerging donors, such as Israel.

Notes

1 Czaputowicz 2008: 214–221, 227–235, 238–240, 251.

2 Wojciuk 2010: 87–88, 92–94, 96, 100.

3 Nye 2007: 25, 35.

4 Wojciuk 2010:105, 110–112; Nye 2011: 83, 93–94, 103–104; Łoś 2017: 12–13, 53, 114–118.

5 Nye 2007: 40, 62, 77, 97, 111, 185; Nye 2011: 52, 76–79, 96, 99, 108, 210, 221, 227.

6 Potocki, Miłoszewska 2010: 4; Wojciuk 2010: 112–113; Kugiel 2013.

7 Łoś 2017: 73–74, 128; Maagar-Mohot Interdisciplinary Research and Consulting Institute, Inc. 2008: 6.

8 Bagiński, Czaplicka, Szczyciński 2009: 12, 129.

9 OECDa.

10 Bagiński, Czaplicka, Szczyciński 2009: 13–14.

11 OECDa.

12 Bagiński, Czaplicka, Szczyciński 2009: 108; Lewis, Opoku-Mensah 2006: 665–675.

13 Bagiński, Czaplicka, Szczyciński 2009:151.

14 For more, see: Zielińska 2016.

15 Ociepka 2008: 12; Gilboa 2008: 42; Ociepka 2012: 130.

16 The term (sustainable) development diplomacy is sometimes used to refer to global diplomacy—international negotiations and meetings focusing on developmental topics. This understanding is not used in this book.

17 Pammet 2016: 7, 9, 10–11.

18 Ociepka 2008: 25, 27; Ociepka 2013: 73.

19 For more, see: Zielińska 2016.

20 Berthelemy 2006: 179–194; Schraeder, Hook, Taylor 1998.

21 Rai 1980; Alesina, Dollar 1998; Wang 1999; Dreher, Nunnenkamp, Thiele 2006; Adelman 2011.

2Foreign policy of the State of Israel

SUBCHAPTER 1: EVOLVING ISRAELI IDENTITY AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

This subchapter presents overall ideological, strategic, political and historical context for further research: historically evolving Israeli national identity and strategic considerations as well as their impact on the evolution of internal, foreign and security policy. Concentration is here on aspects, factors, phenomena, tensions and dilemmas which are key to the subject of the book. Self-imposed limitations on literature used, some generalisations and summarising approach are a necessity in this, nonetheless essential, part of the work.

Aside from geostrategic considerations that obviously impact Israel's relations with the world, following the neoliberal paradigm, influence of identity and internal politics on security and foreign policy needs to be discussed. Moreover, this internal context has an explanatory valour towards phenomena observed in Israeli cooperation with sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and development aid programme. Consequently, in this subchapter, two sets of factors are presented, that is, the evolving identity of the Israeli nation and basic presumptions of its strategic culture. Further on, a historical outline of consequent internal and external policy considerations is presented, concentrating on the events as they were seen by the Israeli public and elites, and only those which were most important for shaping Israeli identity and policy considerations. As external factors are going to be discussed at length in Chapter 5, this subchapter refers to them only to the extent that is necessary.

Identity factors and their influence on Israeli foreign and security policy

Identity politics has a significant explanatory potential towards legitimacy of rulers, external enmities and alliances in the Middle East (ME), at times even overwhelming the influence of strategic considerations. They are clearly visible within the inter-Arab politics, Arab-Israeli conflict and also Israeli-Western relations and can in fact.¹ It is enough to mention ideologies that resulted from these identities—such as pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism, pan-Syrianism, Zionism—to demonstrate, through the history of the region since the early 20th century, the power of identity.

Israeli national identity has a few constant patterns, but it also evolves. This evolution results both from inherent tensions within the main elements constitutive for this identity and from historical developments since the creation of the state. Several national identity factors influencing Israeli foreign policy orientations can be enumerated. Del Sarto mentions Zionism, the Holocaust, the Jewish state, the principle of self-reliance and identification with the United States (US), which can be extrapolated to a general identification with the West.²

Zionism

Zionism was born as a distinctive Jewish nationalism and identified with the case for revival of an ancient statehood. It reflected trends dominant in the 19th-century Europe and was also perpetuated by Europe's persistent anti-Semitism. The movement was not and is not a monolith, with varied attitudes towards the relationship between religion and the state, desired political system or shape of the borders. Even if dominated by those aiming at a collective secular nationalism and practical goals, Zionism never cut off from Jewishness. As a product of the tensions that challenged the Jewish identity in the 19th century, a century marked by rise of various nationalisms and utopian ideologies, it proposed a new vision. “Bible, Israel, the Homeland, the Return to Zion from Exile, the Jewish National Fund and the Hebrew language”³ were at its centre, underlining the unaccounted for elements binding the Jewish nation with the land of Israel, the place seen as the only one where real emancipation of the Jew could happen. Theodor Herzl (1860–1904), who founded political Zionism and its first institutions, envisioned a state created through diplomatic efforts and representing the Jewish nation internationally—a modern, secular democracy, based on a social contract between its citizens. Herzl detailed plan included slow outmigration of Jews from Europe and future state's institutional and economic frameworks. He projected equal rights for the Arab population, saying that it shall be able to benefit from the Jewish migration and development.⁴

The first three waves of aliyah (mass migrations) until 1923 brought to Ottoman Empire, and later on British mandate of Palestine, a large influx of people from Eastern Europe. With an exception of the second aliyah, they were influenced by the Russian Socialist Revolution (mainly Menshevism) and represented the Zionist Labour movement. With them arrived elements of ideology that to a large extent shaped the state in its first decades of existence: high political self-consciousness, collectivism and communalism (cooperative economy), appreciation for manual labour, ideal of service and individual sacrifice, workplace democracy, trust in bureaucracy, attention devoted to education and high culture, secularism and protection of religious institutions.⁵ Political Zionism quickly merged with, or was dominated by, socialist Labour Zionism. Socialist Zionists were no internationalists and were not detached from Jewish heritage. The ideas that inspired the political platforms of the ruling parties until mid-1960s included the notions of working in agriculture for the “redemption of the soil” (Moses Hess, 1812–75); voluntarism, individualism, cooperative workers’ settlements, merger between Zionism and socialism for a revolutionary transformation of social contract (Nahman Syrkin, 1868–1924); national emancipation of Jews of all classes in the face of growing cultural and economic anti-Semitism (Ber Borochov, 1881–1917); “religion of labour”—a plea for reuniting with nature and farming the land as a way of escape from the city and decadence of the European urban culture, soul-renewal and self-realisation (Aaron David Gordon, 1856–1922); “revolutionary constructivism”—development led by self-organised, self-governed settlement groups (Berl Katzenelson, 1887–1944).⁶

The Zionist revolution was thus anchored in historical heritage and responded to political circumstances by fusing religion (modernised notion of the return to Zion), nationalism (call for creation of a state) and socialism (call for a radical change in the situation of the Jews). It was willing to negotiate with world powers and with Arabs, ready to make concessions externally and internally, to limit itself while pragmatically focusing on main aims.⁷ It laid ontological grounds for the creators of the state and architects of the African policy, including aid programme: Chaim Weizmann, David Ben-Gurion, Golda Meir, Moshe Sharett, Moshe Dayan, Shimon Peres and Levi Eshkol.

Revisionist Zionism, on the other hand, was initiated around 1925 by Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky (1880–1940), who argued that the Zionist plan would meet Arab resistance and cannot be realised unless the Jews hide behind strong defensive walls. Jabotinsky distrusted the British and foresaw the need for an armed struggle against them. He believed there is space for both Jews and Arabs, advocated fairness and respect for the Arabs’ rights and patriotism while acknowledging the need to confront tensions. In his opinion, Zionism should aim at creation of a new, exemplary national culture.⁸ Jabotinsky did not win much support in pre-state times, yet, his legacy lived on. This branch of Zionism became identified with a drive for strong capitalist economy directed by a state and military strength. In a simplified and radicalised (if not distorted) form, Jabotinsky's thought inspired the Likud party platform, who took over the government in the late 1970s, and the settler movement.⁹

Lastly, Religious Zionism emerged in the second half of the 19th century in opposition to Jewish religious circles opposing Zionism, believing that return to Zion shall only result from divine intervention. Epitomised by Rabbi Abraham Kook (1865–1935), it claimed that only by living in the Land of Israel, one could be the true Jew, united with the Torah and the Land. It called for renewal of Hebrew as a plain-used language and immigration of secular or even atheistic, socialist immigrants, as parts of the general movement towards redemption, which would in the end have an universal impact. And yet, Religious Zionism of Kook feared that the modern Jewish state would need to behave like all unrighteous states, contrary to the Jewish spirit; so it preferred it to emerge only after political transformation and redemption of an entire world. After Israel's independence, this branch evolved to demand extension of powers to the religious echelons.¹⁰

The Jewish state

The Jewish state (a state of their own, a safe haven for Jews) is a complicated notion, since it refers simultaneously to the ethnos and the religion. At inception, Zionism envisioned creation of anational, secular entity (with space for attachment to ancient Israel and support for archaeology documenting its history). Deliberations on how to define the Jew (is religious status more important than roots? to what extent the state shall abide by religious rules? and what shall be its attitude to residents of other ethnicities?) gave rise to defining Israel as a (Western) democratic, but still a Jewish state. Hard dilemmas arouse, however, since the 1967 war, triggering an ongoing identity crises. While possession of the territories gained is often seen (by the Israeli right in particular) as essential for Israel's durable security, persistent occupation represents a drive towards Eretz Israel (ingathering of the territories that historically belonged to ancient Israel) rather than towards Medinat Israel (territorially limited modern state). The first one threatens Israel's Jewish (in terms of the ethnic make-up of population) and democratic character, while also boosting insecurity—though it can be argued that the overall security balance resulting from relinquishing territories (Sinai in 1982 to Egypt, South Lebanon in 2000 to Lebanon and Gaza in 2005 to the Palestinian Authority, PA) is highly disputable.

The relationship between religion and the state is a constant source of conflict in Israel, despite the fact that the majority of Jewish population is secular and the majority of religious Jews recognises the state and democratic system. This is largely due to the strong position of ultra-orthodox domination. Religious parties as part of ruling coalitions, secured rights (authority over issues of marriage, divorce and burial; autonomous schools’ system; exceptions from compulsory draft) and imposed rules over the society (kashrut in public institutions). When the political system evolved into bipolarity, they started to play decisive role in the process of forming coalitions. They joined in the electoral and government-formation bargaining, gaining further autonomy, privileges and influence. In the 1990s, however, Basic Laws encroached upon some of these advantages. The role of judiciary, especially of the supreme court (superior also to religious courts’) and the state comptroller, grew; the role of political parties declined; there was a turn towards more transparency and good-governance standards in treatment of different groups; moreover, massive immigration of Jews from the former Soviet Union (and from Ethiopia earlier on) questioned the ultra-orthodox monopoly on defining the Jew. These changes teamed up with the evolution of apolitical outlook of the religious groupings. Where once cross-cutting cleavages divided the society along many different lines (thus not creating silos), until the mid-1990s, amore bipolar system developed with high religiosity and more hawkish foreign policy and security orientation often correlated, although a division into the religious and secular right is still valid.¹¹

Remembrance of Holocaust

Remembrance of Holocaust remains a very strong part of Israeli identity. Unprecedented effort of systematic annihilation of an entire nation undertaken by the Nazi Germany left a deep scar on subsequent generations. Creation of Israel in the aftermath of the Second World War to no extent diminishes the horror and trauma of the Holocaust, which almost aborted the Zionist project. The notion affects the so-called Oriental Jews as well, as only the defeat of Hitler prevented their genocide, already planned with Nazi Germany's Arab allies.¹² Shortly after the 1948–49 War of Independence, Oriental Jews suffered from a wave of anti-Semitism that resulted in their dispossession and outmigration. These events made the need for own state more obvious and alerted foreign policy to dangers presented by those who openly call for the destruction of Israel.

Identification with the West

Identification with the Western civilisation, its culture and values is another important element of Israeli identity. Jewish religion and tradition (generally, without dwelling into variations within Judaism) accredits importance to the individual, including right to self-fulfilment, independent thinking and contesting authorities. The democratic spirit is largely shared among Jewish Israelis irrespective of their divisions. The state was built on assumptions of democracy, rule of law, equality of rights, freedoms and development. Yet, Israeli identification with the West seems to be mainly on a level of values and not on a political level. Some factors worked against the latter: history of persecution and genocide in Europe, self-perception as a developing country, exclusionist trends within the Judaism itself (“a people that shall dwell alone”) and later on the evolution of the make-up of Western societies and rise of the so-called new anti-Semitism. After creation, Israel avoided declaring itself within the Cold War division. Once it did so, it was not really the result of calculation of interests (and indeed was not gratified with durable alliances), but rather a choice of conscience to take a stance in favour of the free world and its values.

This ambiguous provenance of identification explains why it does not translate into “feeling at home” in the Western environment. Expectations for sympathy and understanding from the Western world are usually unfulfilled. Many European countries were and remain motivated mainly by interests and colonial heritage in their relations with the Arab neighbourhood. As for the US, close relation with Israel cemented in the 1970s. Factors explaining Israel's affinity with the US include strategic interests; similarities in ethos of nations built by immigrants fleeing persecution; shared trait of the resulting diversity, with history of pioneering movement; strength and activism of American Jewish Diaspora; theological beliefs of US evangelical churches. Due to perceived lack of solidarity of the West with Israel, identification with the West made Israelis feel even more alienated in their region.

Principle of self-reliance

The principle of self-reliance refers back to ancient Jewish struggle for independence and to the history of Jewish Diaspora communities, where cohesive communities with a strong leadership and inclusive and well-organised voluntarism were crucial.¹³ Contemporarily, the notion translates into belief that no alliance can be fully relied on and that the Jewish state should develop resources, including military capability, which will ensure its existence and freedom in whatever international circumstances.¹⁴

The abovementioned identity factors, combined with objective strategic environment, stand behind almost unchanged, although evolving, basic conditions for Israeli foreign and security policy. The ME subordinate system as a theatre for this policy can be described as comprising: the Near East core of Israel and Arab Muslim states: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria (and the Palestinian Authority, [PA]); periphery comprising Algeria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar (Arab, Muslim), Iran, Turkey (non-Arab, Muslim), Cyprus, Ethiopia (non-Arab, Christian) and the outer ring: Libya, Morocco, Oman, Tunisia, Somalia, Sudan and (South, North, united) Yemen. Brecher points to normal diplomatic, economic and cultural relationships Israel maintained with four non-Arab members of the system (Iran, Turkey, Cyprus, Ethiopia, joined by independent Eritrea in 1991 and South Sudan in 2011) and to unremitting hostility it endured from the other members, with the dynamics of the subsystem determined by its Arab core. While Israel was not able to join any regional grouping, the Arab League (AL, established in 1945) presented sole claim to the territory ranging from Iraq to Morocco and the right to exclude or expel non-Arab elements. League's call for a total war with Israel has been complemented with concrete political, military, economic (boycott of trade) and psychological (propaganda) hostile acts. Divided along the secular versus traditional, revolutionary versus moderate, socialist and nationalist versus capitalist lines, Arab states are tied by many layers of value system: common language, history and culture; experience of foreign domination, resentment towards colonialism and attachment to own independence.¹⁵

Thus, the first factor for the Israeli foreign policymaking context is a perception of an existential threat from the side of hostile Arab states (and Iran since 1979), neighbouring directly or within the MENA region and often calling for its destruction.¹⁶ Israel fought six major wars: War of Independence (1948–49), Sinai Campaign (1956), the Six-Day War (1967 plus War of Attrition on Sinai Peninsula, 1967–70), Yom Kippur War (1973) and war in Lebanon (1982). Moreover, there is almost a constant state of low-intensity conflict, mostly with non-state actors. Some states moderated their policy, but more or less direct enmity remains, especially in terms of populations’ attitudes, even in the case of signatories to peace accords (Egypt, Jordan in particular). Some states, like Morocco and Tunisia, maintained diplomatic relations with Israel only for a short period, when the peace process was at its highest. In many cases (most notably Syria), vilifying Israel as an external enemy and presenting fight against it as a prioritised national interest were among the means by which regimes justified their dictatorial practices. The so-called Arab Spring challenged governments which for decades stifled internal criticism and economic and social development. It is too early to assess impacts of changes in the MENA region since 2011 on Arab populations’ opinions and states’ policies towards Israel. While immediate conventional threats to Israel diminished, dangers coming from terrorist organisations and mercenaries active along its borders enhanced.

These constant threats adding up to the traumas of the previous generations elevate security to the top of the list of national interests, steering the foreign policy. Dominant strategic culture sees the state of Israel as a national homeland, essential to preservation of Jewish existence, to be defended by all means (deterrence, also nuclear one, mobilisation capacity, possibility of pre-emptive strike, avoidance of war on own territory, reducing impacts of terror on civilians) in the face of what is perceived as an existential threat while adhering to Jewish values in warfare (going to war only when it is imposed, restrictions on the use of force, rules protecting populations). Threat is perceived as an encirclement by large hostile populations.¹⁷ Issues that are the most commonly discussed in this context and which result directly from identity features and regional realities discussed previously are deterrence (avoidance of war, accumulation of power, pre-emptive strikes); geography (issues of strategic depth and land-for-peace); manpower (investment in constant, specialised, high-quality training and readiness of large amount of well-equipped reservists); offensive manoeuvre warfare (preference for short wars outside own territory); move away from conventional to unconventional threats (since 1973); self-reliance in manpower, doctrine and armour; as well as great power patronage and regional partnerships: alliances with non-Arab states and minority populations—Iran (until 1979), Ethiopia, Turkey (until the 2010s), Iraqi Kurds, Sudanese Black Africans and Lebanese Christians.¹⁸ Following the 1973 war, strategic subcultures emerged. The dominant one centres on security, calls for war avoidance and foresees use of force only for survival while maintaining predominant military power. Another one is conflict-centred—it perceives the Israeli-Arab dispute as a manifestation of historic hatred of Jews, unsolvable in a foreseeable future, and calls for holding on to any territory and not restraining from war. The third one centres on peace as essential to development and democracy; it sees the conflict as negotiable.¹⁹ Yet Israeli endurance and successes in confrontations are also explained by the nature of its civilian character, so different from that of its adversaries: stable democratic polity, educated, loyal, united citizens able for full mobilisation, qualitative superiority overall and of the army.²⁰

Notions of Zionism, Holocaust and the Jewish state explain strong emphasis placed on encouraging the immigration of Jews: a priority since pre-state times and an element of the Israeli foreign policy since inception. The principle of self-reliance can be linked to the pre-state organisational activism, which led to creation of democratic institutions, ready to undertake running the state; and the initial policy of non-alignment (supporting the United Nations [UN] instead of any of the camps). Below, a brief summary of the main lines of evolution of Israeli external policies is presented.

Historical outline of Israeli foreign policy

Creation of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was based on the work done since the mid-1930s by Moshe Sharett and his aides. Systematic approach to foreign policymaking within the MFA was introduced, structure of diplomatic outposts and their functions defined, contacts with the Jewish Diaspora initiated. However, differences between David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett led to weakening of the MFA, a process that reached its climax in the 21st century. Mamlachtiyut was the central concept for state-building: a sovereign state was to allow for political self-liberation of Jews, responsibility taking and respect for civic virtues. This impacted foreign policies, centralising power within the inner circle of army elites and the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) which assumed activist approach.²¹

In its early years, Israel upheld a policy of equal distance and non-alignment. It did not want to alienate any of the great powers within the Cold War binary system. International recognition, support and joint work for development, promised by the UN and its subsidiary organisations, were of crucial importance. The new state declared,

“We extend our hand to all neighbouring states and their peoples in an offer of peace and good neighbourliness, and appeal to them to establish bonds of cooperation and mutual help with the sovereign Jewish people settled in its own land. The State of Israel is prepared to do its share in a common effort for the advancement of the entire Middle East.”²²

In 1949, David Ben-Gurion guidelined the foreign policy towards good-natured relations with the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), accommodation with the Arabs, support for the UN and world peace. He also put aliyah—“ingathering of the exiles”—as the core interest of the state, superseding defence.²³

The 1948 war between Israel and the attacking coalition of Arab forces resulted from Arab rejection of the UN Security Council (UNSC) partition resolution (181, November 29, 1947) providing for emergence of two states, Jewish and Arab, on the territory of the former British mandate. The war ended with armistice agreements, meant as transitory measures towards permanent settlement. The agreements banned aggressive actions, their planning or threatening. Still, Israel was plagued by Arab cross-border raids. The ensuing dilemmas, lasting until today, can be described through diverging opinions of Ben Gurion—believing that reprisals to those raids are necessary to save lives and reassure the citizens—and Sharett, who held that reprisals tarnish Israel's image and that complaining and appealing to international community will finally bring results.²⁴

As a result of the war, a Palestinian issue emerged as hundreds of thousands fled or were expelled to neighbouring countries. Except in Transjordan, they were not granted full citizenship in those Arab countries. The Arab states which gained territories in war did not create a Palestinian state there: Transjordan annexed the West Bank and Egypt applied military regime to the Gaza Strip.

On the 11th of May, 1949, Israel was accepted as a member of the UN, yet all its neighbourhood—Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan—voted against, declined to recognise its existence and to negotiate peace. This refusal towards even starting the talks lasted, in spite of continuous appeals by Israel and some international pressure, until Egypt broke off in the late 1970s and negotiated a peace treaty. Only Jordan had a more nuanced attitude, itself endangered by pan-Arab and Palestinian nationalism and affiliated with the West. In 1948, it did not attack Israel within territories assigned to it by the UN. In 1967, it attacked “reluctantly” and after the war, it established an “open bridges policy” for a shared management of West Bank, lasting until 1988. In 1970, Jordan counted on Israeli help when dealing with attempted coup d’état by Palestinian terrorists aided by Syria; it refrained from attacking Israel in 1973. Jordan eventually entered peace, based on economic and infrastructural cooperation.²⁵

As for the Soviet Union, in spite of enmity towards Judaism and national ambitions of Tsarist Russia and later the USSR, 1948–51 was a period of converging interests. The USSR voted for partition of the mandate and recognised Israeli independence. Military equipment from Czechoslovakia was crucial for maintenance of this independence against Arab attack. This reflected USSR's interest to fill the void after the European mandate powers, while most Arab states were still monarchies linked to Britain.²⁶ Israel's attitude towards the USSR was informed by ideological and moral questions resulting from the increasing oppressiveness of the Soviet regime; the fate of the Jewry left there and in its satellite countries; Israel's economic and security needs. Israel took as a good sign the diplomatic support and establishment of relations by both the US and the USSR. However, many in the government were disgusted by the Soviets. Within Mapai, which since pre-state times was an essentially socialist, and not a communist party (as Mapam), two ways of understanding non-alignment emerged: one saying that it shall be absolute in relation to two world powers and another that it shall mean independent position, while upholding that Israel belongs to the free world based on its Jewish nature and social order. Analysis of internal discussion and its results testify to the dominance of the latter understanding. After prolonged debate, Mapai decided to leave the (Soviet-affiliated) Communist International and to renew participation in the Socialist International, gathering the Western left. The decision was taken only in 1952, when the hopes for saving the USSR Jews faded, with about 2 million left behind, and emigration of Jews from satellite countries (with use of bribe, economic trade-offs and diplomacy) ceased. On a strategic level, it became obvious that actual Soviet interest was in destabilising the region, including through sustained Arab-Israeli conflict. USSR started to display vagueness towards Israel on the UN forum and to court the Arab states, including through arms sales. Cultural, scientific, social ties were never allowed, diplomatic bilateral relations intractable, the Soviet press anti-Semitic; Soviet secret service operations targeted Soviet and world Jewry. On the multilateral level, “non-aligned” increasingly meant pro-Soviet and pro-Arab. Yet Israel tried to avoid any clash, out of fear for the Soviet Jews. Stance taken by Israel in the 1950 Korean War, today often perceived as a sign of a turn towards the West, at the time was rather an expression of support for the authority of the UN. The Israeli decision to link to the West became vocal only after an open outburst of anti-Semitism and breaking off of relations by the USSR (January 1953).²⁷

The Israeli establishment also concluded that in terms of economy, especially foreign capital (loans were crucial to finance absorption of immigrants), the state was growingly dependent on the US. The US was seen as key to peace, though its politics in the region were ambiguous. Israel launched efforts for as close relationship with the US as possible, warmed up relations with Britain and cultivated ties with France. This was not an easy path. In 1953, the US turned towards the Arabs; unwritten alliance with France was based on weak foundations (personal affinities, socialist proximity and attitude towards Algerian war); commonality of interests with Great Britain was incidental. Israel felt abandoned on all fronts—East, West and the UN; it was, moreover, suffering from Arab economic boycott and naval blockade. In 1956, change in policy came with nomination for Golda Meir as a Foreign Minister. It was concluded that only as a power not dependent on others’ protection Israel will be able to gain support. Correspondingly, Israel entered the agreement with France and Great Britain which triggered in the 1956 Sinai War. Participation in the campaign, despite obvious downsides (being an attacker, the danger of further alienating the world powers), was seen as a chance to solidify ties with the Europeans, breach Israel's isolation and to overthrow el-Nasser. As regards the US, the quick turnabout that Israel made in the face of American disapproval of the tripartite action won it American sympathy, but overall, the campaign did not integrate Israel into the Western defence system. Still, Israel received clear support on the question of freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba, confirmed by stationing of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in Sharm el-Sheikh.²⁸

The 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine, meant to support pro-Western Arab states through military and economic aid, did not prevent the fall of monarchy in Iraq and the 1958 Lebanese Civil War. This alleviated the process which led the Americans, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, to perceive Israel as a possible counterweight to Arab nationalism and Soviet dominance. One of the decisive factors was the Israeli “periphery strategy”, seen by the US as conducive to their interest of stabilising the region. More solid guarantees and support came late and partly out of the US concern that Israel might develop nuclear capability if not given a sufficient conventional one (first substantial loans were extended only in 1971, economic grants in 1972 and military grants in 1974; some American arms came in 1967, but still in 1973 Israel had to beg—and probably threaten that it might need to use atomic weapon—in order to obtain life-saving American supplies).²⁹

According to Alpher, in the face of regional isolation, Israel in its early decades employed four grand strategies with external policy dimensions: hooking up with great power(s), mass immigration, development of a nuclear deterrent and periphery doctrine. The most important for this work are the second (see Chapter 3) and the fourth one. Periphery doctrine assumed construction of two triangles of friendly states located closely beyond the immediately neighbouring line of hostile countries. It was meant to court states opposing Egyptian expansionism and to show the US that Israel can be a worthy ally in containment of Soviets, replacing Egypt, which joined the USSR. The Northern triangle included Iran (till 1979 Islamic revolution), Turkey and regional minorities: dispersed Kurds and Maronites in Lebanon. The Southern triangle included Sudan (until the 1958 military coup) and Ethiopia (plus to some extent Morocco and Oman). The doctrine developed Southwards, to also encompass rebellious royalists in Yemen and in the Southern part of Sudan, Kenya, Uganda (until the mid-1970s) and Eritrea (after 1993 independence). To its new allies, Israel offered security cooperation and technical, scientific and research assistance in such fields as education and agriculture.³⁰ The effort did not lead to creation of a more formalised grouping of non-Muslim, pro-Western states. Yet, despite its failures and limitations, the doctrine was instrumental in creating an image of backstage influence, which had a deterrent impact on Israel's adversaries (for example, through the issue of Nile sources, in the case of Egypt). Thanks to contacts with the future mediator, Morocco, the doctrine contributed to the achievement of 1979 peace with Egypt.³¹

Israel also sought close relations with the European Communities. Identifying with European values and dependent on trade with Europe, its efforts left it often disappointed. Instead of association agreement for which it applied shortly after European Economic Community's 1957 creation, it received a limited trade agreement only in 1964. A more complete one was signed in 1970 and followed by the1975 comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreement. Another step forward came only in 1995, with the Association Agreement with the European Union (EU; in force since 2000), and the 2004 Action Plan within the European Neighbourhood Policy. The agreements with the EU, in contrast to the EEC, concern not only trade, but also various levels of political dialogue and Israeli participation in EU programmes, notably in the area of research. The Barcelona Process and the Union for Mediterranean created chances for Israeli-Arab expert meetings. Still, the overall balance of relationship is unsatisfactory from the Israeli point of view. Some European countries and EU institutions are perceived as biased against Israel, motivated by interests in cooperation with (or blackmailed by) Israeli adversaries and ineffective in their Palestinian policy (epitomised by huge donations given irrespective of impacts on development and peace). Lack of trust is rampant.³²

The 1967 war was a turning point both in terms of internal and external Israeli policies. It was preceded by a series of hostile actions by the Arab states: attacks from behind the Syrian border, terror groups’ raids and a flood of propaganda (including false accusations), skilfully steered from Moscow, which also intensively armed both Syria and Egypt. Publicity of genocide to come upon the Jews reached nadir. Egypt was the main Arab force behind the tensions, depleted by the war in Yemen and suffering from financial difficulties (which led to food rationing); possibly, external aggression was to serve consolidation of the Egyptian regime. After winning the war, Israeli self-confidence was at its highest; the reunification of Jerusalem—gaining access to the Jewish district and the Western Wall in particular—led to a nation-wide euphoria. Hopes for conclusion of peace with the Arab nations, through their reconciliation with Israel's existence and possibly in exchange for the territories, emerged, yet were quickly rebuffed by Arab intransigence and intensification of terror attacks. The internal debate on the price for peace and on the fate of territories caused polarisation of opinions and subsequent indecision. In the meantime, the settler movement arose (claiming a Jewish duty to settle in all of the Biblical land of Israel, in addition to Jewish towns destroyed during clashes in 1929, 1936 and 1948),³³ while West Bank and Gaza quickly integrated economically with Israel. Loss of French ally was compensated by closer relations with the US, while the late 1960s wave of terror against civilians distracted Israeli public opinion from rapprochement with the Arabs.³⁴

The 1973 Yom Kippur War deepened Israel's reliance on the US, especially its financial aid; it ruptured relations with many African and Asian countries, carefully nurtured for two decades, and led to a culmination of isolation and condemnation on international forums, strengthening a “Fortress Israel” or “ghetto” mentality. The war, initially successful for attacking Arab armies, especially the Egyptian one, caused Israel large casualties, damage and threatened Israeli existence. It led to some corrections of the foreign policymaking to make it less personalised, centralised, unsystematic, improvisational and reactive; several centres for foreign policy research emerged. Contemporarily, the impact of public opinion polls, media criticism and access to sensitive information grows, while in the 2000s, the importance of MFA further diminished. Still the policymaking process has such important advantages as ability to react fast and flexible, embedded pragmatism, good communications, high participants’ motivation, closeness to the daily life of the population, quality of underlying expertise and clear mechanisms for judicial and media review.³⁵

Another important result of the 1973 war was an end of an overall consensus on foreign policy aims. Coupled with intensification of terror, the perceived failure at war radicalised popular outlooks, especially as regards the Palestinians and territories of West Bank and Gaza Strip, which were increasingly seen as the key to security of Israeli civilians and as part of the ancient heritage. However, tightening of the grip on the territories and expansion of settlements in the early 1980s was quickly met not only with terror, but also with Israeli social resistance. In 1977, Prime Minister Begin launched the idea of granting autonomy to the Palestinians and made steps towards peace accord with Egypt, which brought forcible evacuation of settlements from Sinai.³⁶

Changes resulting from the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt and Islamic revolution in Iran cannot be underestimated. Egypt ceased to be an enemy. On the other hand, one-time ally, Iran, became an arch-enemy, which soon started to inspire and support Shiite radicalism, especially in Lebanon, where Hezbollah was created (1985). Arms race continued; Palestinian and later on Sunni terrorism (al-Qaeda, ISIS) grew. Israel's security environment became only more complicated, new threats emerged, especially those related to non-state actors and non-conventional weapons; and wars, though more limited in scale, became more frequent.³⁷

The 1982 intervention in Lebanon (triggered by constant attacks of Palestinian terrorists from Lebanese territory during the second Lebanese Civil War, in which the Palestine Liberation Organisation [PLO] was one of the major fighting forces) disturbed both internal (large civil protests) and external policies. The scale of the intervention exceeded beyond its initial aims and led to a scandal when Israeli forces were accused of inaction in the face of a massacre in two Palestinian camps committed by the Maronite Phalange. While the inhabitants of South Lebanon often welcomed the Israeli troops, the PLO forces flew to the North, where they were attacked by Syria. Syria then torpedoed the prospect of the Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty, initialised in May 1983.³⁸

The period of national unity governments (1984–92) was in turn marked by foreign policy moderation. Closer ties were developed with Europe, some African and moderate Arab countries. With Egypt they were fully regulated upon the agreement on the sovereignty of Taba in 1988. Jordan became an important interlocutor regarding the future of the West Bank, openly discussed with a view to a “Palestinian peace”. These talks were disrupted by the outbreak of walkouts and violent protests in the occupied territories called the First Intifada (1987–93). In the face of these events, leading to the Oslo accords, Israeli society was divided. Both crave for peace and deep suspicion of the Arab people were common. The numerous Russian-speaking immigrants of the early 1990s also largely mistrusted the Palestinians, though at the same time, many backed the two-state solution. In the 1980s and early 1990s, there was also a rise of anti-Arab violence steered by extreme right-wing, messianic settler movements, driven by radical ideology which sought Jewish redemption and establishment of the “kingdom of Israel”. They demanded rights to territory and access to the Jewish holy places. This culminated in the 1995 murder of Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, who led the peace process; afterwards right-wing violence lost much of impetus, until 2010s.³⁹

The results of the fall of the Soviet bloc and its net of alliances, the way towards Oslo accords and the peace process triggered a breakthrough for diplomatic relations of Israel, primarily with post-Soviet and developing states. Renewals of relations were followed by bilateral treaties regulating various spheres of cooperation. Most of these relations (except for some Arab states) stood the test of time and the faltering of the peace process following the failed July 2000 US-mediated Camp David negotiations where Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak agreed to a reportedly profound (if measured against the two-state framework as envisaged by the 242 resolution), package of proposals, which was refused by the PA Chairman Jassir Arafat.⁴⁰ A bloody terror campaign, killing dozens of Israelis on a daily basis for 5 years, was launched. The Second Intifada, from the time perspective, might be said to mark the end of the era of hopes for a peaceful solution within the Oslo framework. Israelis lost faith in a possibility of Palestinians agreeing to a deal other than one based on liquidation of their state. Recourse to unilateral solutions followed: construction of a separation wall between Israel and the West Bank and disengagement from Gaza. At the time of writing, Israeli experts underlined that although the PA leadership is less directly involved in terror, it still funds incitement. As for Gaza Strip, the withdrawal of Israeli army and civilians, motivated by high costs of protection of small pockets of population, left the territory in the hands of PA's rival, extremist Hamas, which won the elections in 2006 and took over Gaza by force from the PA in 2007. Gaza-based terrorist organisations engage in cycles of indiscriminate rocket attacks on the Israeli population; these are met with repercussion strikes. The two Palestinian entities are also at loggerheads with each other; the PA repeatedly tries to undermine the Hamas rule through limitations on resources coming to Gaza, contributing to the crises and radicalisation within the enclave. This situation on the internal Palestinian front is no incentive for Israelis to extend far-reaching proposals. Some analysts treat recourse to unilateralism as a change in national doctrine, meant for creation of conditions for survival until a deep sociopolitical change on the Palestinian side takes place.⁴¹ Simultaneously, the Arab states, interested in solving the conflict on the basis of “two states for two peoples” formula, had a limited leverage over Israel or Palestinian ruling elites. Decades of anti-Israel propaganda made them hostages of own populations which disliked to see any pressure put on the Palestinian movement, including Hamas, despite the fact that it was increasingly seen as an exposure of unwanted Iranian presence.

The actual and alleged civilian death toll of Israel Defence Forces’ retaliatory strikes on Gaza Strip proved destructive for Israeli public relations. In addition, few foreign media address low credibility of the casualties data, location of Hamas military infrastructure at civilian buildings, such as schools and hospitals, or Israeli army efforts to warn civilians and limit numbers of casualties.⁴² The increasing recognition of the role of public diplomacy in the Israeli foreign policy also results from the events in the West Bank. The PA's governance is marked by internal violence and corruption. In relation to Israel, in the 2000s, it focused on delegitimisation through unilateral activities, mostly at the UN, meant at gathering recognition for Palestinian statehood and undermining Israeli international standing. These actions were seen in Israel as a means of avoiding direct negotiations; they also undermined the prospects for creation of an actual, socially and economically viable Palestinian state ruled by legitimate authorities within “two-state solution”.⁴³

An earlier Israeli unilateral step was the 2000 disengagement from South Lebanon. In the short term, it was capitalised on by Hezbollah, which said it proved Israel's weakness. In the long run, Hezbollah propaganda, claiming that the withdrawal was incomplete, was in vain as the move took place in coordination with the UN and was confirmed by it as complete. Moreover, international and internal pressure forced the Syrian army—Hezbollah's ally—to leave Lebanon in 2005. The Lebanese Army started to regain control over territory held by Hezbollah, which suffered further losses in the 2006 confrontation with Israel and in the Syrian civil war since 2011 (still, participation in Syrian fighting enhanced Hezbollah's know-how and armoury). Diminished involvement in Syria in support of Assad's regime and acquisition of advanced weaponry from Iran means that the group might want to provoke a confrontation with Israel across the border with Lebanon or Syria, so as to consolidate support and provide occupation for fighters.

Both Israeli unilateral withdrawals, though inevitable for many reasons, undermined the “land for peace” formula and led to strengthening of terrorist organisations and other radical elements refusing mutual recognition and peace, giving arguments to those opposed to relinquishing of territories and supporting settlement activity. The Arab Spring, in particular cruelties in Syria and expansion of Iranian proxies on the Northern border, increased perception of insecurity. Israeli strategic position at the time of writing was influenced heavily by the regional turmoil, bringing confusion and discouraging bold moves, even if the costs of status quo on the Israeli-Palestinian theatre were enormous.

Lately, opportunities for informal cooperation with some Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, emerged, based on shared interests, inter alia—in containment of Iranian nuclear weapon programme and influence. There were several Israeli-Saudi high-level meetings; anti-Israel propaganda in the Kingdom's media reduced; Hezbollah's TV al-Manar has been banned in Saudi Arabia while access to Jerusalem Post online edition enabled.⁴⁴ Ties with UAE grew even closer and more acknowledged, a process which culminated with a September 2020 Israeli-Emirati peace treaty, promising partnerships in a range of fields. Cooperation with Cyprus, Greece and Egypt cemented as well, resulting in funding of a specific regional cooperation organisation, Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, also joined by Jordan and the PA.

On the other hand, Israeli alliance with the US has been strained, in particular since the beginning of the second premiership of Benjamin Netanyahu (2009). Israel was sceptical towards American interventionism under President George W. Bush junior (second term, 2005–09), unwilling to concede to conditions under which President Barack Obama (2009–16) wanted to re-start the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and unhappy about the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, of which the US was part (until 2018).⁴⁵ President Donald Trump's (2016–) term in office largely falls outside the timeframe of this book; arguably, its ME policy, though praised by the Israeli government, raised concerns on whether it constituted a realistic vision of solving regional problems. Lack of certainty about the quality of the current and future US policy in the region was a common factor shaping opinions of both decision-makers and commentators.

It was thus feared that rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, China or Russia, based on short-term interests, came at the expense of the values Israel used to be standing for and weakened its relations with the West, while not bringing reliable alliances. Focusing on great and emerging Asian powers as well as on consolidation of contacts with Arab states that perceive Iran as a threat became two observable directives of the Israeli foreign policy. The third one was, in a sense, a return to the periphery doctrine, encompassing two EU members, Cyprus and Greece plus the Balkans to the North, Christian East Africa threatened by radical Islam—Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Uganda—to the South and, according to some, even Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. Warming up of relations with many small and medium countries and emerging powers would probably not bring quick, radical changes in Israel's international standing; yet it breaks the isolation and stigma. Doctrine's supposed and disputed comeback is strongly linked with stagnation of the peace process and emergence of new, radical Islamic threats. With Israel already an established player, these relations are also more in the open, in contrast to the original doctrine. Importantly, two Muslim states, members of Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Shia Azerbaijan and Sunni Kazakhstan, develop close ties with Israel, in oil trade, security, agriculture and technology. Israel aims to secure its regional interests and to turn these nations towards explicit support in the UN. As within the original periphery doctrine, Israel also cares for ties with Middle Eastern minorities; the most notable are its relations with the Kurdish Autonomy in Iraq. Although some of the mentioned states changed voting behaviours from anti-Israeli to neutral, their international influence is not huge. Bulgaria, Cyprus and Greece wouldn’t challenge Turkey, nor is Azerbaijan able to contain Iran. According to most commentators, these efforts can bring results, but not a break through, as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict circumvents the friendly governments. At least in this sense, the periphery doctrine should not work as an alternative to drive for peace, but to the extent possible it should be utilised to achieve it.⁴⁶

As for the international system, position of the State of Israel was fragile throughout the decades. Israel in away owed its formal creation to the UN, the main organisation of the system; it identified with it very strongly, on the level of values, principles and purpose. For Ben Gurion, supporting the UN was derived both from Jewish morality and interest; yet, he didn’t see the organisation as fulfilling expectations of a just world governance as the UN became dominated by “non-aligned” or rather overtly pro-Soviet states, often adhering to radical ideologies hostile to Zionism. The early signs of the trend were the UN indifference to the 1948 Arab invasion and its failure to urge Arab states to negotiate peace (though the UN played a significant role in the negotiation of truce agreements), which consolidated the abnormal state of lack of recognition and of permanent borders. The UNSC was also growingly paralysed by the Cold War dynamics. The UN's political bodies were seen as dominated by violent tyrannies and human rights abusers; unwilling to get busy with each other, but happy to condemn Israel. Relations deteriorated already in the 1950s. Even Sharett “did not see the UN as the determining factor”.⁴⁷

The process continued in the 1960s; Israel, unable to counter the growing anti-Israeli trend of the organisation, started to rely more on friendly powers instead. Increasingly, Israeli diplomacy based on ideals did not work and it had to back down to the Cold War realities. Israel also learned that despite some successes (participation in the UN Peace Observation Commission), Israeli proposals were blocked even when they expressed collective will—they needed to be presented by another country. Yet until 1967 (the Six-Day War), Israel largely saw the UN as a neutral place for parties to meet and negotiate. Importantly, it also quickly started to be active there in terms of technical aid; in 1952, there were six Israeli experts participating in development missions of UN agencies. Israel postulated enhancing technical aid programmes and their publicity and, in 1964, proposed creating special committees on malnutrition, illiteracy and primary education. During the 1960s, it started to view support of development as a primary goal for the UN, as the organisation was deemed ineffective in solving political conflicts and implementing peace; with or without the UN, there could be no peace, as one of the sides refused negotiations. In the face of disunity among world powers and lack of international community's reaction to Arab aggressive acts, Israel concentrated on taking care of its security itself. This affected Israel's stance on disarmament, on which it worked on international forums, yet without committing itself to unilateral initiatives. Arms race in the ME continued, with some powers actually arming both sides, and Israel started to seek nuclear capability.⁴⁸

Arens enumerated the main reasons for Israeli mistrust of the UN: its second-class membership; continued flow of anti-Israeli resolutions and rhetoric; the UNGA resolution 194 call for what was seen as impossible (return of all Palestinian refugees); 1967 withdrawal of UNEF from Sinai, opening the way for Egyptian army; complete inaction on takeover of Southern Lebanon by Hezbollah after Israelis left; acquiescence to UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) corruption, perpetuation of the conflict, cooperation with and infiltration by members of terrorist entities.⁴⁹ While able to count on the US veto in the most dangerous cases of UNSC votes, the evolving make-up of non-permanent members of the Council is a matter of public concern in Israel. Israel is disproportionately singled out for condemnation by various UN bodies, and manifold UN committees instrumentalising the “Palestinian cause” against Israel continue to operate.

For example, since 2015, the PA has tried to change the language of UNESCO documents on Jerusalem so that they use only Arabic names, ignoring historical ties of Jews to the city and presence of Christian heritage there. The 2016 saga started with such a resolution approved by the Executive Boardin April, which triggered intense Israeli efforts. In October, the Programme and External Relations Commission adopted similar resolution, yet with lesser support, as some of the formerly supportive countries abstained. Next came the World Heritage Committee Executive Board, preparing the World Heritage Committee, with ten votes for, two against, eight abstentions and one absence. Despite UN and UNESCO Secretary Generals’ cautious distancing and affirming rights of every religious community to its heritage in Jerusalem, Israel cancelled cooperation with UNESCO as a consequence.⁵⁰

An example to the contrary are the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conferences, where Arab countries, developing weapons of mass destruction despite obligations they took upon themselves—or even using them against own citizens (Syria)—put forward agenda items regarding Israeli capabilities and non-accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, these items are rejected by majority of states voting. In 2014, for example, there were 45 in favour of the draft, 58 against and 27 abstentions. Apparently, certain UN bodies are more visible and thus more useful for politically motivated initiatives than the others.

Nevertheless, Israeli standing has certainly taken on different dimensions over the years and some signs of improvement are visible. Israeli adversaries failed to exclude Israel from the organisation when Israel's international position was at its worst (1970s) and such attempts ceased after 1980s. In 1991, the 1975 UNGA resolution on the “Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination” which inter alia mentioned Zionism as a form of racism (dubbed “Zionism is racism” resolution) was revoked. While Israel was excluded from the regional groupings within the UN since their 1960s creation and thus derived of certain member state's rights, such as the right to propose candidates for the UNGA bodies, in May 2000, it was accepted by the “Western European and Others Group” (WEOG; a status permanently renewed since 2004) and allowed to represent WEOG in the UN Human Settlement Program, HABITAT, and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) (both based in Nairobi). Around 2003, Israel started to be a part of various committees and to nominate members of bodies; in 2012, it received a seat in the Executive Board of the UN Development Programme (UNDP). Israel is increasingly active in the organisation, with Israeli development aid institutions at the forefront of this engagement. It promotes own resolutions (Agricultural technology for development—2007, with 105 co-sponsors, 138 in favour, Arab states only abstaining; 2012 Entrepreneurship for Development, 2015 Agricultural technology for sustainable development), nominates its nationals to the UN positions,⁵¹ hosts conferences (such as the International Conference on Israel and the African Green Revolution organised in Jerusalem in 2008, in cooperation with UNDP) and participated in a UN peacekeeping mission (Haiti 2010). In 2016, a conference countering the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement was organised at the UNGA premises. UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process since 2015, Nickolai Mladenov, played crucial preventive and mediating role between Israel and Hamas while working closely on Gaza issues with Egypt. Israel also considered, but dropped its candidature for the post of non-permanent member of the UNSC for the 2019–20 tenure. Outgoing Secretary General of the UN, Ban Ki Moon, acknowledged organisations’ bias against Israel in his farewell speech and called for fair peace.

Israel's OECD membership (since 2010) is worth underlining due to this organisation's development activities, which Israel actively joins without being a member of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). In 2013, Israel hosted OECD's international conference on Joining Forces to Develop Smart, Cost-Effective Urban Water Utilities and in 2016, OECD's education ministers’ conference. Examples of cooperation with European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN, since 2011) and NATO (especially in technology and Eastern Mediterranean affairs) testify to the fact that Israel is perceived as a worthy partner—which can be at least partially explained by its soft power resources: economic, technological and scientific achievements.⁵²

A quote from the Israeli MFA official press release upon the 2007 adoption, with no objections, of the first Israeli-initiated socio-economic UNGA resolution on Agricultural Technology for Development sheds light on the linkage between Israel's international position, soft power resources and public diplomacy:

“The resolution (…) gives expression to Israeli know-how in the areas of agriculture, fighting desertification, rural development, irrigation, medical development, computers and the empowerment of women, as reflected for many years in Israel's contribution to developing nations, particularly in Africa.

(…) The broad support for the resolution testifies to its importance to many countries, especially the developing countries.

This is an important achievement for Israeli diplomacy, reflecting Israel's desire to fulfil its role in the UN institutions and the international community in the professional arena, and to demonstrate our high level and capabilities in the area of science and research. Now (…) will begin the phase of implementation (…) in which Israel's contribution will be brought into practice.”⁵³

SUBCHAPTER 2: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

This subchapter analyses the evolution of the place of SSA states within Israeli foreign policy: Israeli outlooks, motives and modes of operation. It explains the scale of interactions and their dynamics, as well as fields of cooperation other than development (to which Chapter 4 is devoted)—which are of political, economic and military nature. It concentrates on the perspective of the Israeli side, while the SSA perspective is analysed in Chapter 7.

For the sake of brevity, a general picture is provided, though relations with each of the countries in question were and are of its own specifics. In order to nuance unavoidable generalisations, examples are given to illustrate the most important particularities.

Subsequent sections deal with three distinct—and well established in the literature of the topic—periods systematising the nature of this relationship: the “honeymoon” or “golden” era, beginning with the launch of relationship with Ghana (1956) and ending with the 1973 Yom Kippur War debacle; an era of informal relations between 1973 and beginning of the 1990s (1993 is usually chosen as a censure); and lastly, an era of renewed, pragmatic relationship, from 1993 until the time of writing. Observations explaining the overall motives of Israeli engagement in SSA, against the background of its international relations in general, and relations with the developing world in particular, proceed this recount as a way of an introduction.

Israeli motives for relations with sub-Saharan Africa

There seems to be an agreement about the existence of strong ideological—or idealistic—motives behind Israel's engagement with Africa. Theodor Herzl's Altneuland raised the issue of slave trade and discrimination against Black people, calling upon the Jewish nation to engage in their liberation.⁵⁴ After creation of modern Israel, there was a strong sense of shared identity with the African peoples, their plight throughout the centuries, struggle for independence and endeavours towards nation-building and development. With Israel overcoming its nation-building and development challenges with quite a success, willingness emerged to share experiences and know-how. Country's leaders recognised the need and duty of more developed nations to offer assistance to address the growing gap between them and Asia and Africa.⁵⁵ The 1959 government platform explicitly stated that Israel will “continue its efforts to establish mutual relations of friendship” with them and “will, within the limits of its modest ability, aid the economic, cultural and social development of young States”.⁵⁶ Foreign Minister (1966–74) Abba Eban saw development aid as Israel's international role (“Israel's role in the great drama of international development (…) her principal vocation in international life”⁵⁷). This strong conviction of Israeli policymakers at the time of establishment of relation with SSA is recognised as a basis for the nature of this relation, to which development aid was constitutive, and its importance is highlighted even by authors concentrated on political dimensions. Levey among them points to the significant impact which relations with Africa (originated in the principle of liberation of all peoples) had on Israel's self-image and great interest of the media and the public. Decalo deconstructs the foreign policy role that Israel saw for itself in its early years as composed of “being a model socialist society based upon social justice, cooperation, progressive values and ideals” and “obligation to help promote the emancipation and development”. He underlines deep satisfaction derived by Israelis from participation in development programmes, the way they saw them as a sign of country's maturation, a privilege and a duty, emanation of a worldview and proper understanding of international obligation. Israel's economic and social model was also seen as a possible bridge between capitalist West and communist East.⁵⁸ This self-image and self-subscribed role are directly related to the Zionist-Labour ideology and explain why development aid became the primary instrument of the Israeli SSA policy.

Various reasons for which Israel is an attractive partner to sub-Saharan nations are recognised in Israel. Africans were seen as ideologically affiliated and similar victims of racism; young nations, with alike development needs, which encouraged sharing experiences.⁵⁹ Paul Hirschson, Ambassador of the State of Israel to Senegal at the time of writing (accredited also to Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Cape Verde), believed that the linkage between African peoples and Jews can be traced well back in history. The first engagement was when the Jews were in slavery in Egypt; second—when a group of Jews escaped Babylonian conquest and found refuge in Ethiopia; third—when persecution of Jews on the Iberian Peninsula coincided with beginning of an era of geographic discoveries, leading many Jews to flee and settle in West Africa, mixing with the locals (as confirmed by African family names like Levi and Cohen); fourth—with creation of modern Israel. This, in Ambassador's opinion, is a history shared and a common experience of slavery, exile and fight for independence, widely recognised in sub-Saharan countries, where both Christians and Muslims read the Bible and everybody knows about the Black Jews—their Black brothers. Thus Israelis and sub-Saharans can talk as equals.⁶⁰

Simultaneously, relationships with SSA were born as a part of a broader policy of engaging countries which (initially) did not identify with either side of the Cold War division. Until the mid-1950s Israel tried to maintain non-engagement; later on, its alignment with the West was for a long-time ambiguous from the Western side. Israeli policymakers recognised that Israel first needs to enhance its power before the West devotes the assistance it needed, hence the periphery doctrine, supported by perception of the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa as natural partners, politically and ideologically. Since the Arab world openly declared its will to annihilate the Jewish state, Israel knew it had to build up strength through positive relations with the non-aligned countries and gain their friendliness in multilateral arenas to safeguard its basic interest of survival and recognition. In Latin America, it did not face much trouble, but relations with Asia proved difficult, despite serious diplomatic efforts and initial positive results in some cases; cultural and political distance proved too wide. The first decolonised (in 1948) state to enter into diplomatic relations with Israel (1956) was Burma. The relation was warm and included trade and technical development aid. As this success story was not replicated in other Asian countries, in the second half of the 1950s, attention was drawn to Africa. Lack of invitation to participate in the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference (an Arab-Asian conference, bearing in mind its composition, before SSA decolonisation) in Bandung, Indonesia and its hostile resolutions triggered an alarm in Israeli MFA. Another alarm, but also an indicator of where allies might be found, was the 1961 Casablanca conference. It adopted resolutions in favour of “Arabs in Palestine”—but several African leaders distanced themselves from them. Last but not least, the security of Israel required build-up of alliances in its geographical proximity (limiting importance of Latin America countries): the periphery doctrine's Southern, African flank, was meant for not only bypassing, but also moderating the Arab circle, through isolating it, demonstrating Israel's peaceful and constructive intentions and non-alignment. There were also hopes that sub-Saharan countries could support direct talks or even mediate between Israel and Arabs, since they were seen as friends of both sides, free from preconceptions, discomforted with the conflict and willing to play a global mission. The quest for broadening the scope of Israel's diplomacy was furthermore resulting from its regional economic isolation, leading it to strive for trade with states beyond the neighbourhood; Africa was attractive, due to its proximity and export of some raw materials. Moreover, the need to bypass Egyptian blockade of navigation on the Sues Canal pushed Israel to seek alternative routes and secure its navigation rights along with the African coast (contemporarily, ports of Mombasa in Kenya and Dar as-Salam in Tanzania have a large role in Israeli trade and passenger shipments). As for Israel's increasingly problematic isolation in international organisations, the group of developing countries independent at the emergence of the Jewish state mostly comprised Latin American ones, clearly in favour of the UN partition resolution. Joining the UN by 17 newly independent African countries in 1960 affected the balance within the African group, ending numerical domination of Arab states. It also influenced mathematics of the composition of the two-thirds majority in the UNGA. With more than 30 sub-Saharan countries joining the UN during the 1960s, they started to be seen as a separate block gathering around one-third of the votes.⁶¹

The golden age: relations until 1973

First contacts with indigenous leaders of countries under colonial rule were established before their independence, mostly through Israeli labour union the Histadrut and through Socialist International. The policy was consciously developed following the 1958 initiative of the then Foreign Minister Golda Meir. Emissaries were sent to Congo, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanganyika, Senegal and Uganda; they often became first ambassadors. For Meir, African direction resulted from deeply held convictions and humanitarian motifs; simultaneously, she chose it as the one pivot where she hoped the MFA would exercise full control, undisturbed by the increasingly empowered Ministry of Defence (MoD). Technical assistance was chosen as the main implementation tool, often extended as a welcome gift to initiate relations upon countries’ independence.⁶²

The first newly decolonised SSA country to enter into relations with Israel was Ghana. It was also among the first to manifest interest in the Israeli model, initially in trade unions, as its representatives, together with ones from Northern Rhodesia, Nigeria and Upper Volta, demanded to visit Israel. The visit undermined their trust in Arab propaganda about Israel and involved them in serious debates about development. Development cooperation and trade (through Dizengoff West Africa Ltd.) with Ghana started already before an embassy was established in 1957 and included expert advice in agriculture, irrigation, housing and settlement, marine, air transport; and limited military training. Ghana became a centre of Israel's diplomatic efforts in Africa and an “exhibition” of assistance it offered (within few years, this centre of activities was moved to Ivory Coast).⁶³

Israel was usually among the first to recognise independence of the newly decolonised states. Tanganyika, Kenya, Congo, Senegal and Ivory Coast followed Ghana in establishing relations, as eventually did all the SSA countries (apart from Somalia and Mauritania), including majority-Muslim Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Mali and Senegal. Israeli embassy was established in each (a network of 33 outposts was bigger than what most world powers had), which, with half of Israeli embassies located in SSA, testified to Africa's importance in Israeli foreign policy. The relationships were based on statesmen's shared worldviews; they were seen as more important than relations with South Africa and Israel joined the African majority condemning apartheid.⁶⁴

The period under consideration marked the peak of idealistic foreign policy in the history of Israeli diplomacy, with development aid as the cornerstone of activity. Sense of closeness to the fate of African nations, of experience of discrimination and humiliation and feeling of obligation to help them, was dominant among Israeli elites. Their personal engagement expressed itself in close contacts with African leaders, including frequent travels by Israeli officials. Also Israeli public and the media had significant expectations of cooperation and friendship with Africa; this romantic enthusiasm had to be reportedly contained by an information campaign. In terms of balance of power, the Israeli influence on the continent was high enough to draw the attention and counteraction of the Soviet Union, China and their allies. Moreover, Israeli knowledge of and experience in Africa was recognised by the US and Great Britain, resulting in high-level consultations on African matters with Israel.⁶⁵

Having said that, African policy was nevertheless of secondary importance to the policy of Great Power alliance. For example, faced with a choice to speak for Africa or follow French interest in the case of 1960s atomic tests in the Sahara desert, Israel opted for the latter, as France was its only major ally at the time.⁶⁶ Works by Levey, based on newly disclosed 1960s national archives, importantly supplement the picture depicted in earlier sources. Levey argues that irrespective of initial (late 1950s and beginning of 1960s) successes in overcoming isolation, by 1967, Israel failed to achieve strategic objectives of its SSA policies. A 1961 MFA report set the goal of boosting Israeli image among the powers through achievements in Africa and influence on SSA foreign policies. The reason for failure was hoping for the best despite awareness that other actors (Arab states, USSR, China) offered competitive aid and ideological affiliation and despite signals that some SSA governments, while always demanding more assistance, do not intend to reciprocate by aligning their diplomatic behaviours. Moreover, Israelis were growingly aware that their posture as non-allied was undermined by their ever closer relationship with the West; at the same time, their activities in Africa undermined interests of former colonial empires, France and Great Britain.⁶⁷

From the Israeli point of view, the commitments undertaken—or what the African side expected from Israel in return for good relations—were often beyond resources. The US refused (aside from a one-time donation) significant assistance to Israeli African programme and was rather interested in Israeli engagement in training allied armies. One example is the 1964 operation in Congo: proceeded by engagement with Congolese and international actors involved in solving the conflict, such as the UN, and followed by a vast military training programme. The effort did not secure expected broader US support, but shuttered Israeli policy of neutrality. Due to recession, Israel would have to scale down its engagement even if it was not in deep trouble internationally after the 1967 and 1973 wars. Moreover, Israel refocused away from West Africa towards East Africa (Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya) around 1963. Motivated by geostrategic circumstances, primarily following on from a rift with the Soviets and the need to contain Egypt's growing influences, focus on East Africa indicated securitisation of nevertheless very idealistic policies; military cooperation, in contrast to earlier engagements, gained on relative weight.⁶⁸

Institutionally, the affairs were dealt with by the Asian-African Department within the MFA, holding the majority of the budget for African operations (72%: 4.2 out of 5.8 million USD yearly). Golda Meir visited the continent five times as Foreign Minister and as Prime Minister; Shimon Peres visited in his capacity of Director General of the MoD; Yigal Alon twice as a Special Envoy; President Yitzhak Ben-Zvi visited five West African countries in 1962 and in 1966, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol paid a visit to seven countries. PMO and military establishment used to play a strong role in relations dominated by strategic motives (like Ethiopia). Securitisation of African policy and the MoD's quest for locating Israel on the African arms market met opposition of the MFA, expressed openly by its high officials, who preferred to stick to development aid and promotion of trade in civilian goods. MFA condemned MoD's actions and blamed it for overstretching limited resources. It also prioritised cooperation with stable and democratic receivers and disapproved of ties with the dictatorships (like Idi Amin's Uganda); this run counters to Realpolitik carried out by the defence establishment and the overall tendency in SSA, where subsequent countries were falling to authoritarian rule.⁶⁹

Beyond political relations and development aid, trade and business expanded, though volumes were very small. Israeli export's volume grew from 9 million USD in 1963 to 37 million USD in 1972 (mainly in industrial and processed goods: chemicals, transportation equipment and textiles), while imports from 17 to 20 million USD, with peak in 1969 (USD 25 million). Share of SSA in Israeli exports varied between 2.5 and 4.3%, while its share in Israeli imports between below 1 and 3.2%. Exchange with Israel was also a tiny fraction of trade of any of the countries in question. Israel exported food, textiles, pharmaceuticals, agricultural machines, electronic and office equipment, while it imported mainly raw materials, including diamonds, uranium and beef. The respective markets were non-complementary: African countries did not have commodities Israel needed most (industry equipment, oil, grain). However, Israel was an important trade partner for sub-Saharan countries on some particular markets and one of the major customers of East African produce. These facts testify that development aid programme did not result in the growth of trade volumes. The programme was independent of economic considerations and did not contain economic strings, with aid scale dissociated from trade volumes. Still, several Israeli companies were engaged in building sub-Saharan infrastructure, including state-owned: Zim (shipping), Solel Boneh (construction), Tahal (water planning), Mekorot (water management) and Hadassah (health). Israeli architects is a group which left particular mark on contemporary Africa, as they designed manifold public purpose buildings, mostly in Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Ethiopia. Examples include Sierra Leone's parliament building (1961), Ethiopian MFA building (1962–64), Independence Arch in Accra (1961), Ife University in Nigeria (master plan and buildings such as library, secretariat, assembly hall, faculty of humanities, 1962–72), University of Addis Ababa (Arts Building, 1964), American School of Addis Ababa (1965), hotels in Monrovia, Addis Ababa or on Madagascar, apartment buildings in Abidjan and neighbourhood master plans such as the African Rivera in Ivory Coast (1970).⁷⁰

The extent of military cooperation remains difficult to evaluate due to scarcity and confidential character of resources. Among the motives for extension of military aid was a belief that if Israel did not do it—Egypt would; in particular in East Africa.⁷¹ Levey estimates that by 1966, there was such cooperation with 17 countries. Throughout the 1960s, defence cooperation with West African countries (Congo aside) was limited to sale of communication systems and light weapons and was abandoned by late 1966. This was counterbalanced by a growing military connection with East Africa, especially Ethiopia and Uganda (viewed as Ethiopia's underbelly, from which Egyptian, Soviet and Chinese influence shall be eliminated)⁷², Kenya and Tanzania (tens of thousands officers received training in Israel causing anxiety in former coloniser, Great Britain). Israel was furthermore engaged in the Sudanese civil war and supposedly also in Nigerian struggle with secessionist Biafra.⁷³

Period of severance—1973 till the early 1990s

Intensive and mutually beneficial as they were, relations between Israel and SSA countries did not survive the upheaval of the 1967, and in particular the 1973 wars. The African partners, all but few (Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland), succumbed to the pressure of Arab states demanding severance of relations with Israel. The wave started already before the 1973 war. Arab pressure also brought in an OAU resolution on the matter. All Israeli embassies were liquidated, as were African embassies in Israel; in Ghana, Ivory Coast, Togo and Kenya “interest offices” remained, while in some countries, Israeli interests started to be represented by third countries. For example, interest office in Kenya was affiliated to the Danish Embassy and also accredited to UNEP and UN-Habitat. It had a solid position, due to ties forged before; Kenyan senior officials would show up for Israeli Independence Day ceremony organised by the interest officer.⁷⁴ Still, development programmes were cancelled and experts called off, with only meagre alleviation for completion of some projects and for those who studied in Israel, who were allowed to stay on. African participation in UNEF, deployed in Sinai after the 1973 war, was rejected by Israel as a measure of diplomatic punishment.⁷⁵

The rupture was among the reasons for an about-a-face in Israeli foreign policy at large, with sharp turn away from idealism and towards Realpolitik in reaction to what was seen as betrayal in the face of and after Israel endured an existential threat—bitter, hard to digest for diplomats, experts, press and public opinion alike. Voices emerged saying the entire African venture was messianic, too serious engagement and a waste of time and resources, which should have been better spent on domestic social needs. One of the manifestations of the new Realpolitk was improvement of ties with South Africa. Geographically, efforts focused on Latin America.

With regards to SSA countries, Israeli policy became short term, based on immediate interests, concentrated on countries with natural resources or in need of armaments.⁷⁶ This happened despite significant time, effort and human capacity of diplomats and development experts, who, forced to cut short their missions abroad, were subsequently engaged by the MFA to analyse reasons for the break-up. Other institutions did the same: foreign intelligence agency Mossad concluded that the MFA was at fault, since it refused military assistance to some states. After blame-trading, Foreign and Defence Ministries buried the hatchet for a while. The policy became pragmatic and selective, with efforts concentrated on those states which, despite breaking off relations, did not present radical anti-Israeli views and even expressed regret over the fact that they severed ties. Israel decided it cannot let these countries enjoy “business as usual” relations within any “para-diplomatic” arrangement. Israeli diplomats at the UN were instructed to explain to their sub-Saharan counterparts the consequences of lack of formal relations. At the same time, these envoys remained important contact points and source of information; some unofficial meetings with African leaders were also organised. Moreover, guidelines were elaborated meant at sustaining low-level, informal and citizen-to-citizen ties. They advised Israelis to talk with African representatives at conferences, Histadrut to maintain its channels, sportsman to attend tournaments. Also, the Israel-Africa Trade Bureau was allowed to continue to operate. In 1974, a division of SSA countries into four categories emerged. Countries, with which Israel desired dialogue (Central African Republic—CAR, Ethiopia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, Upper Volta and Zambia), were addressed by emissaries in a continuous dialogue about resumption of relations. Other groups were countries with which Israel did not want contacts (Burundi, Congo, Guinea, Uganda), those treated depending on circumstances (Cameroon, Madagascar, Niger, Tanzania, Zaire) and those in which there was little interest (Chad, Gambia, Mali, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea). In agreement with SSA governments, a network of informers and intermediaries emerged, composed of journalists (like Tamar Golan), unofficial envoys and intelligence operatives.⁷⁷ In 1984, Israel-Africa Friendship Association was created, gathering former Israeli ambassadors to SSA countries, to maintain informal contacts. It published and distributed a bulletin, celebrated national holidays of these countries and encouraged students (especially those studying medicine) to come to Israel.⁷⁸

Paradoxically, the period in question, despite lack of relations, was marked by a visible increase in trade. Between 1973 and 1979, Israeli exports grew from 30.2 to 75.4 million USD; its imports lowered from 24.6 to 19.3 million USD, but in the meantime reached heights of 42.5 million USD in 1974 and 31.8 million USD in 1978. However, overall share of SSA in Israeli trade diminished.⁷⁹ In the 1980s, trade reached its lowest point, with overall imports from Africa reaching USD 7.4 million and exports to Africa only USD 26.7 million in 1985. Increase is observed at the end of the decade, with volumes reaching USD 30.9 million and USD 45.4 million, respectively, in 1989. The main share of African imports during the decade came from Gabon, while the main receiver of Israeli exports was Nigeria, followed by Kenya and Ethiopia.⁸⁰

Most Israeli state-owned companies had to close their African branches, but there are reports of Solel Boneh continuing urban construction projects in Ivory Coast and Kenya. In Nigeria, between 1975 and 1982, it completed, with authorities’ patronage, a number of investments for housing, industry and public services. Israeli private businesses were also able to operate, several thousands of Israelis reportedly worked in Nigeria in water and construction companies and hundreds in Kenya and Ivory Coast.⁸¹

Still, some of those private businesses engaged in dealings which aroused condemnations rather than awe. Arms trade and military assistance grew, creating an impression that the 1970s relations were dominated by this feature. Reports speak of contracts implemented with CAR, Ethiopia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire. The extent of this cooperation was circumvented by embarrassment caused by image-shuttering association with violent regimes, which Israel was gradually gaining.⁸²

Otherwise, progress was made on African studies, with departments operating at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (HUJ) and Tel Aviv University (TAU).⁸³

Until the early 1980s, despite peace process with Egypt, Israel was not willing to actively exploit the symptoms of African disenchantment with the Arab states, although it launched meetings with African leaders in the mid-1970s, which continued on various levels and forums in the 1980s. Israeli diplomats were of the opinion that resumption should be initiated by those who broke relations and that revocation of support for the 1976 UNGA “Zionism is racism” resolution should be the condition. Only in 1981, Israel undertook a more proactive policy. Former ambassadors travelled to the continent to restart dialogue and the Defence Minister at the time, Ariel Sharon, held a secret journey to CAR, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Liberia, Malawi, Senegal and Zaire. A conscious diplomatic effort involved establishment of a small inter-ministerial team of responsible diplomats; and a gradual intensification of relations through visits of Foreign and Defence Ministers, attempt to engage Israeli businesses in the process (met with reluctance sometimes, while on the other hand, in the late 1980s, some Israeli businessmen served as informal advisers to the African governments), moves towards restoring development aid programme and new military contracts. The political importance of this last element led both Peters and Ojo to conclude that again the MFA was sidelined by the MoD. Priority was given to economically and politically strong states, those which maintained close informal ties, had pro-Western orientation and feared the Soviets and Libya (which took over the role of Egypt in advancing a regional hegemony); irrespective of these policies, every opportunity was welcomed. New interest offices were opened in CAR, Gabon, Togo and Zaire. Some diplomatic support came from France and some material one from the US (which at the same time used Israel as an intermediary in an effort to arm friendly rulers). These efforts bore fruit. In 1982, Zaire and Liberia re-established ties, in the mid-1980s Ivory Coast and Cameroon followed, with others joining soon. The 1990s saw full come-back to relations, though of a different nature than in the “golden” period. Israel was already an established member of the West and in the club of highly developed nations, thus the initial ideological bond to Africans as partners in development became elusive; Israel also became a “normal” country in terms of national interest becoming the sole guidance of foreign policy aims.⁸⁴

Rebirth of relations since the 1990s

In 1995, Israel had diplomatic relations with 42 of 45 SSA countries. More pragmatic and less engaged, as it faced the need to cater to other regions freed after the Cold War, Israel opted for a limited number of diplomatic posts, with embassies usually responsible for a group of several countries. At the time of writing, Israel had eight embassies in SSA, Angola, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria and Senegal. Accounting for the contemporary geopolitical perspective, embassy in South Africa also needs to be considered. The tenth embassy was inaugurated in April 2019 in Rwanda.

In 2016, ties were re-established with Guinea, after 49 years, since it—as the first sub-Saharan one—broke off relations. Guinea's population is 85% Muslim and the state belongs to the OIC. Significantly, the breakthrough was achieved thanks to Israeli aid extended during the Ebola outbreak. The following states did not have formal ties with Israel at the time of writing: Mali, Chad and Niger (relations established in 1996 were broken in 2002 due to violence related to the second Intifada); Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Comoros and Mauritania (recognised Israel in 1999 but broke off in 2009 following Israeli intervention in Gaza). Prime Minister Netanyahu set himself a “strategic goal” of establishing relations with all the continents’ countries. The first meeting with Somali president occurred in 2016; talks held with Chad resulted in a ground breaking visit to Israel of the country's president in November 2018 and an actual renewal of relations with this country in early 2019.

Relations were quickly established with the youngest (2011) SSA state—South Sudan. Israel supported its struggle for independence—diplomatically and militarily—since the first 1955–72 war and whenever its state of relations with Uganda and Kenya allowed for transborder shipment of arm supplies.⁸⁵ Israel sees South Sudan as important for its geostrategic location and possible role in taming Iranian arms’ smuggle. Thus, it supplements the friendly nations of East Africa: Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania. Military cooperation, investments and development aid have been extended. The relationship came under scrutiny due to the ethnic civil war that engulfed South Sudan soon after independence, with concerns that Israeli armament and surveillance technology are used against the opposition and fear of falling again to a trap of cooperation with dictatorships.

Bilateral treaties are an important part of the infrastructure of relations. An analysis of the content of the Israeli MFA online treaty basis (updated as of 2014) allows to conclude that treaties’ network, although its structure is diversified, is quite systematic, yet incomparable in volume to the one between Israel and European countries. Almost all SSA states signed trade and technical cooperation treaties; cultural cooperation agreements are also frequent. There are also treaties that refer exclusively to development cooperation in a given field (irrigation, agriculture).

Following the period of idealism and subsequent bitter realism, the attitudes of Israeli foreign policymakers became characterised by pragmatism and selectivity. In the 1990s and early 2000s, agenda was dominated by the peace process and its impacts on relationships with the neighbours, as well as by relations with the major powers. Relations with SSA seemed to be of secondary importance and at some point, Israeli Africanists accused the government of a policy of negligence and marginalisation, with limited MFA interest, scarce resources, low quality and high rotation of responsible cadres. The policy was said to be going from one crucial UN vote to another, with occasional mobilisations of ambassadors to lobby for support and aid serving as an argument.⁸⁶

This was exacerbated by closure of African studies in Jerusalem (aside from the Institute for Asian and African Studies) and Tel Aviv (with the Department of Middle Eastern and African History left). African studies are currently carried out foremost at the Ben Gurion University of the Negev (BGU), with support of the Tamar Golan Africa Centre and an inter-university B.A. course of African studies is available thanks to cooperation between Ben Gurion, Tel Aviv and Open Universities. According to Naomi Chazan, the general trend in Israeli society's self-perception used to be towards becoming more Western oriented and less interested in Africa, lack of knowledge, exacerbated by limited academia possibilities, generated even more disinterest. This used to be a process for quite awhile; however, at the time of writing, there was an observable increase in interest in African studies, with classes packed with students.⁸⁷ Due to limited availability of courses, the number of MA students in African studies stands at around 30. According to the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies (MITVIM) and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung annual poll entitled Israeli Foreign Policy Index, a stable 3% of responders (asked that question since 2016) point to relations with African countries as the foreign policy issue which Israel shall prioritise.

A similar trend has been visible in Israeli external policy, with an outspoken Israeli come-back to Africa, implemented since 2009 by Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu and his governments. The first sign of this shift was an increase in state visits. In September 2009, Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman visited Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana and Uganda. In 2012, Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon visited Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, inaugurating Lake Victoria fishing project and Kampala trauma unit projects and discussing repercussions of the turmoil in North African countries, particularly in the context of small arms proliferation. He remarked positively on new opportunities created by economic growth in many countries, on the new African leaders taking on responsibility upon themselves and on the rise in regional conflict-solving mechanisms.⁸⁸ Then came the 10-day visit of the Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman, assisted by diplomats and businessmen, to Ivory Coast, Ghana, Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda in June 2014. Liberman returned to Africa (Rwanda, Tanzania and Zambia) again in 2018, this time as the Minister of Defence. In May 2018, President Reuven Rivlin visited Ethiopia and took part in the “Impact for Good” conference organised in cooperation with Society for International Development (SID) and meant to increase dialogue between various Israeli and Jewish development actors as well as their partners in Ethiopia and Africa.

During a conference organised in March 2016 by the Truman Institute of the Hebrew HUJ and Israeli MFA (most participants were SSA parliamentarians), Ambassador Yoram Elron, Deputy Director General in the MFA, spoke of a growing role of Africa in the Israeli foreign policy and of a growing interest of Israeli entrepreneurs. He acknowledged that Israel needs African support on the international forums against adoption of biased resolutions. He underlined the role attached by Israel to relationships with regional organisations, such as Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development), as well as frustration with the lack of observer status in the African Union (AU).⁸⁹ Elron also mentioned possible spheres of furthering cooperation due to Israeli expertise: agriculture, telecommunications, alternative energy and infrastructure; as well as development cooperation, with technical assistance seen as the most effective one. Combating violent Islam was presented as a common challenge, with Israel willing to upgrade cooperation on it. Ongoing visits, such as those of vice chancellors of universities, journalists and religious—also Muslim—leaders were highlighted.⁹⁰

In 2016, Prime Minister Netanyahu himself embarked on a tour through East Africa, visiting Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Ethiopia. Leaders from Tanzania and South Sudan joined for a regional Africa-Israel summit on various spheres of cooperation. The high level of this visit was lauded and—for its rarity—put into context of the tours by Levi Eshkol in 1966 and Yitzhak Shamir in 1987 (in West Africa: Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, Liberia and Togo). Netanyahu's trip was also an emotional one, commemorating the 40th anniversary of a successful, but tragic, hostage rescue operation at Uganda's Entebbe airport in 1976, during which the Prime Minister's brother Yoni, leading the operation, was killed. Netanyahu brought an economic package for Africa, including measures related to aid and business. His statement at the summit with seven heads of African states was framed alongtwo lines: prospects for the future development and medieval powers opposing freedom that want to spoil them. Netanyahu's reading of Africa's interests in cooperation with Israel is that they are twofold: one area is security and fighting terrorism (it was reported that he promised intelligence cooperation to Ethiopia and Kenya, in order to prevent terrorist attacks) and another is Israeli technology in various fields such as agriculture, water, health and energy. He announced willingness to scale-up development programmes and was assisted by various businessmen. Treaties were signed with Ethiopia on science, technology and tourism.

In press reports and official communications on these visits, aspects related to development cooperation (in agriculture; desertification-related issues, such as water technologies; health or high-tech) are the most visible and described as the most concrete results. Simultaneously, there is no hiding that there are political and security interests, shared and elaborated upon. Concentration on East Africa is a reflection of a broader geopolitical and security agenda and stabilising recipients through development aid is seen as inherent and legitimate. Importantly, there is no linkage made between the two.⁹¹ Aside from development cooperation, the main policy interests the Israeli side pursues in its current encounters with SSA countries are diplomatic—change in SSA UN voting patterns and awarding Israel observer status in the AU, security—strengthening efforts against radical Islam and economic—enhancing opportunities for Israeli businesses while sharing development-related Israeli know-how within enhanced development cooperation.

From an institutional point of view, at the time of writing, the Israeli MFA's Africa Division, one of the seven regional divisions, functioning under the Head of Political Affairs Directorate, was responsible for relations with African states and their regional organisations. It comprised two subdivisions, one responsible for the East and South Africa and another for the Central and West Africa. There was a dedicated post within the MFA called Special Envoy for African Affairs and some activity on the side of the Knesset (Knesset Caucus for Israel-Africa Relations, the Israel-Ghana Parliamentary Friendship Association, visits by parliamentary officials). The January 2018 Seventh International Development Day conference organised by civil society representatives took place within the Knesset premises. Furthermore, the Israel-Africa association was preoccupied with organising meetings in Israel for sub-Saharan leaders (with support of the HUJ), conferences and visits, inviting SSA ambassadors in Israel for trips and meetings (in communities affected by wars, in academic institutions, in Yad Vashem etc.).⁹²

In practice, the relations are largely privatised, with limited oversight of growing activities of businesses and NGOs. Analyses of data extracted from the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics and World Integrated Trade Solution database⁹³ show that in the early 2000s, the trade volume rose sharply in comparison to 1990s although it was subject to huge fluctuations. The peak in both volume and share of SSA in Israeli imports and exports (remaining however below 1%) occurred in 2009 and 2010. The main trade partners were Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania. The data testifies to the growing Israeli economic engagement on the continent with balance of trade increasingly in Israel's favour. However, decline in volumes around 2013 runs counter to the trend of increased political engagement. The analysis of main trading partners shows that trade intensity is loosely related to political relations, with East African countries among, but not exclusive as the main partners, and Nigeria having an important place. Share of SSA in Israeli trade is very below 1%, though growing.

In June 2016, Israeli government approved a decision on Strengthening economic ties and cooperation with countries in the African continent which inter alia provided for the establishment of two new posts of economic attachés and support for entrepreneurs through trainings, assistance in finding distributors and customers, networking and branding. Over NIS 7 million has been designated for the years 2016–18 to be distributed by the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economy and Industry and the PMO. Additional funding was earmarked for promotion of intergovernmental agreements meant to boost Israeli economic activities in Africa; development of financial protocols meant to provide insurance against risks in trade.⁹⁴

Israeli businesses became increasingly active in 1990s, in particular in construction and infrastructure (Solel Boneh), pharmacy and chemicals (Carmel Chemicals, Dizengoff), agriculture (Agrotop), communication and electronics (CORE, Motorola Israel) and mining (diamond projects in Angola), also encouraged by state insurance plans. In the course of 1990s, independence of the businessmen drew criticism, as some purposely bypassed the official channels, leaving the state unable to evaluate the overall scope of Israeli activities on the continent. In the 2000s, serious accusations of corruption emerged in cases of deals in mining and construction industries (in DRC, Guinea, Kenya). Nonetheless, Israeli companies implement manifold public investment initiatives (such as deepening of the Tanzanian port in Dar es-Salaam). Many Israeli exporters consider African markets as the most promising direction of expansion. Furthermore, as an importer of rough and exporter of polished diamonds, Israel participates from the beginning (2003) in the so-called Kimberley Process, certifying that stones entering international markets are not used to finance wars and rebel activities. Israel chaired the process in 2010 and was a vice chair in 2009.⁹⁵

Security cooperation, in particular against radical Islamist groups, has been so far limited, but is expected to grow in particular with Kenya and Ghana. In South Sudan, cooperation reportedly regards targeting of Iranian arms shipments to Middle Eastern terror groups. Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria are cited as receivers of arms or related equipment (such as drones, patrol craft). Available sources report that the government of Israel limited or even abandoned trade in military equipment and training; however, private companies (Soltam Systems, Israel Military Industries, Israel Aerospace Industries and Elbit Systems) operate freely. Most severely, private security companies and arms dealers reportedly even got involved in African conflicts, without concern for actual foreign policy of Israel (Cameroon). Sector's expansion and ensuing controversies reinvigorated an old quarrel between those operating in foreign policy domain, believing in the need for dominance of development cooperation, and those willing to let arm deals loose. Naomi Chazan, a prominent representative of the former, claimed that unwillingness of the state to subject the dealers to rules implies lack of clear policy towards the continent.⁹⁶

In the late 1990s, an issue of non-Jewish African migrants emerged: overstaying tourist visas to work illegally in Israel (different nationalities; reached around 20,000 before state clampdown in the early 2000s); and asylum-seekers: around 60,000, mostly from Sudan and Eritrea, who entered through Egypt (experiencing abuse and torture by gangs operating in the Sinai, and at times shot at by the Egyptian army; the inflow stopped after Israel constructed a border fence in 2011–13). While Israel did not grant them asylum or any status beyond temporary stay permit and in fact (violating international law) prevented many of them from even applying for asylum, for years it also mostly refrained from deporting them to their countries of origin. They stayed in- and outside of detention centres with no prospect for legalisation. The issue showed that Israel lacks policy regarding humanitarian asylum for non-Jews. The crises mobilised not only the NGOs, which tried to influence policies through court rulings, appeal- and aid campaigns, but also those perceiving African migrants as infiltrators endangering well-being and cohesion of Israel communities—especially in the South Tel Aviv area, where most of the around 38,000 remaining asylum-seekers live.⁹⁷ In early 2018, a plan to forcibly deport the asylum-seekers to Uganda and Rwanda emerged and was blocked by the supreme court, followed by a deal with UNHCR providing for integration of half of the refugees and acceptance of the rest by Western countries. Due to an outburst of anti-migrant sentiments the deal caused, among right-wing politicians and publics, in particular, it was cancelled abruptly. The issue endangered relations with Rwanda and Uganda and overall image of Israel in SSA.

Conclusions

Seen against the background of the identity foundations and historical practices of the Israeli foreign and security policy, the Israeli SSA policy can be treated as of special interest, as a function of the overall policy trends and reflection of the dominant foreign policy motives and threat perceptions, while it also has distinct traits that make it particular. Notably, Israeli SSA policy has reflected the changing narratives of the Israeli self-identification and self-defined role of Israel in the international relations: from idealist, socialist and development oriented, through aloof, conservative and security obsessed, to pragmatic, capitalist and mutually cooperative. The place and nature of the role of the SSA countries in the Israeli foreign and security policy fluctuated together with Israel's position within and interests in international alliances, both in bilateral and multilateral frameworks: from non-aligned, through aspiring Western ally implementing periphery doctrine, to an uncertain member of the West aspiring for broader recognition and backup alliances among the developing countries.

Having said that, Israeli foreign policy engagement on the continent tends to be designed in a particular emotional and motivational environment, which clearly influences decision-making and modes and extent of engagement. The most obvious expression of this phenomenon is the Israeli development aid.

Notes

1 Barnett 1996.

2 Del Sarto 2003.

3 Adelman 2008: 121.

4 Herzl 1988, 1997.

5 Adelman 2008: 38, 130; Olshan 1984: 50.

6 Hertzberg 1959: 329–390; Avinieri 1981: 125–158.

7 Adelman 2008: 126–127, 170–175.

8 Sarig 1999: 1–5, 33–47.

9 Adelman 2008: 139, Olshan 1984: 50.

10 Avinieri 1981: 187–197; Olshan 1984: 50–53.

11 Cohen, Susser 1996; Zameret 1999; Skorek 2015.

12 Mallmann, Cüppers.

13 Cummings 2012: 44.

14 Bialer 1990: 207.

15 Brecher 1969.

16 Gamal abd el-Nasser and the Soviets employed former Nazi propaganda specialists to create anti-Semitic content for them. Fishman 2012: 15–16. Adelman 2008: 25, sites 1948 calls for “driving the Jews into the sea” and 1964 AL summit call for “the final liquidation of Israel”. In the run up to the 1967 war, el-Nasser declared will “to exterminate the state of Israel”. Cummings 2012: 94. Yassir Arafat, shortly before receiving UN observer status for the PLO, declared: “The goal of our struggle is the end of Israel, and there can be no compromise or mediations. We don’t want peace, we want victory”. Gilbert 1998: 467.

17 Giles 2009: 1–2, 12–14.

18 Rodman 2003; Tal 2000.

19 Giles 2009: 5–6, 10.

20 Desch 2008: 95.

21 Brownstein 1977: 262; Kedar 2002; Aran 2013: 17–18.

22 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1948.

23 Gilbert 1998: 251; Bialer 1990: 59.

24 Meir 1975: 274–275.

25 Adelman 2008: 192; Gilbert 1998: 254, 959–960.

26 Laqueur 1972: 578–579.

27 Bialer 1990: 1–2, 14–33, 39, 42, 52.

28 Bialer 1990; Gilbert 1998: 347–348; Decalo 1998: 29; Lahav 2010: 62, 71–72, 75, 79; Rodin 1969: 150–151, 154, 168.

29 Adelman 2008: 102; Littlem 1993; Halevi 2011: 132.

30 “Israel has since trained more than 1,500 rural cooperative workers in Iran. In 1965, Israel had 90 experts serving in the Mediterranean region. Countries involved included Cyprus, Greece, Iran, Malta and Turkey.” Holbik 1967: 204.

31 Zielińska 2020.

32 Heimann 2015; Pardo, Peters 2010.

33 Laqueur 1967; Meir 1975: 353; Gilbert 1998: 469–470, Pedahzur 2012: 35–60.

34 Sachar 1996: 667–713; Goodman 2018.

35 Brownstein 1977: 259–279; Freilich 2012; Benziman 2014.

36 Gilbert 1998: 460–461, 480–481; Sachar 1996: 841–842, 887.

37 Shebtai 2010: 7–18.

38 Zielińska 2007: 77–81.

39 Sachar 1996: 953–966; Sprinzak 1998.

40 Ross, 2005: 650–711.

41 Cohen-Almagor 2012: 566–570.

42 Behar 2014. Suffering of population under Hamas is worsened by the destruction resulting from the conflicts and due to foreign aid being utilised for military build-up (including concrete tunnels leading into the Israeli territory). The situation on the Strip become of security concern for Egypt too, which blocked its part of the border with it.

43 Johnson, Greene, Bell-Cross, 2015: 6–10; Bury 2010.

44 Johnson, Greene, Bell-Cross, 2015: 17–20; Rubin 2006.

45 Sasnal 2017: 109–149.

46 Mintz, Shay, 2014; Zielińska 2020.

47 Oren 1992. Disappointment with the organisation is said to have contributed to the downgrading of the role of the Foreign Ministry and Sharett's resignation in 1956. Fischer 2005.

48 Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1956: 264–268; Oden 1970: 183–249, 240, 317–321.

49 Arens 2004.

50 Keinon 2016c; Lazaroff 2016.

51 UN Ambassador was appointed multiple times as one of the 21 UNGA vice-presidents. In 2005, Israeli diplomat was elected to the deputy chairmanship of the UN Disarmament Commission; in 2007 to head the UN Committee for Program and Coordination; in 2012—as the legal coordinator for the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate; 2013—to the Board of Directors of UNICEF (for the third time, but after 40 years); 2016—Israeli Ambassador became a chair of the UN Legal Committee.

52 Inbar 2013.

53 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007.

54 Herzl 1997. Creation of a Jewish state in Africa was never a seriously considered option. An idea to establish a Jewish region in Uganda (present-day Kenya) as a temporary shelter before a movement to the Land of Israel, was met with a vehement opposition of the Zionist establishment and negatively verified by an on-the-spot mission, which classified local conditions as inhabitable. Carol 2012: 37, 65–67.

55 Carol 2012: 39–40.

56 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1959.

57 Laufer 1967: 217.

58 Levey 2012: IX, 2; Decalo 1998: 5 (quote)–8.

59 Neuberger 2009: 10–11; Chazan 2006: 2.

60 Interview with Paul Hirschson.

61 Decalo 1998: 28, 30, 36, 50, 135–159; Neuberger 2009: 10–11, 16–18; Carol 2012: 37, 45; Oded 2010: 122–124; Patten 2013: 28; Rodin 1969: 187–189, 200; Belman-Inbal, Zahavi 2009: 18.

62 Chazan 2006: 2; Carol 2012: 58; Oded 2010: 128–129; Levey 2003a: 14–36; Levey 2001: 87–114; Medzini 2011: 90.

63 Avriel 2008; Levey 2001: 90; Levey 2003b: 156, 165.

64 Oded 2010: 122; Neuberger 2009: 15, 18.

65 Rodin 1969: 140; Oded 2010: 125–126; Levey 2003b: 164; Levey 2012: 10.

66 Neuberger 2009: 12.

67 Levey 2004: 71–87; Levey 2003b: 162–163; Levey 2001: 94.

68 Levey 2003a: 15–16; Levey 2004: 72–76, 79, 81–82.

69 Oded 2010: 129–130; Levey 2004: 74, 77, 80–82.

70 Nadelmann 1981: 191; MERIP Report 1973: 16–18; Levey 2004: 81; Peters 1992: 11; Ojo 1988: 23–24; Rodin 1969: 82–92; Oded 2010: 132; ISPADA. Israeli designers also prepared a series of Ghanaian postal stamps, depicting the country's leader and a campaign against nuclear tests. Wilburn 2012: 26–27, 30.

71 Jacob 1971: 175.

72 Military aid to Uganda (organisation, materials and training for various kinds of armed forces) started in 1963 and continued under dictatorship of Idi Amin. Due to Amin's request for aid against Tanzania and massacres he orchestrated, he was rebuffed. Consequently, entire effort proved worthless in terms of securing his loyalty. Levey 2013: 137–152.

73 Levey 2004: 72, 74–75, 77–78; Peters 1992: 9; Ojo 1988: 144–145; Levey 2012.

74 Interview with Arye Oded.

75 Levey 2012: 180–181.

76 Chazan 2006: 6.

77 Levey 2012: 5, 178–185.

78 Interview with Shlomo Avital.

79 Nadelmann 1981: 191.

80 Own calculations based on monthly records for each country extracted from the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.

81 Decalo 1998: 149, 152; Babatunde 2017: xxxiii; Oded 2010: 136.

82 Klieman 1985.

83 Chazan 2006: 6.

84 Ojo 1988: 63, 90, 92–94; Chazan 2006: 6–9; Peters 1992: 113–131; Decalo 1998: 163.

85 Carol 2012: 373–375.

86 Oded 2010: 138; Chazan 2006, 10–11; Interviews with: Naomi Chazan, Lynn Schler.

87 Interview with Naomi Chazan.

88 Bassist 2016.

89 According to Oded 2016b, Israel never had an observer status, but used to be an “invited guest” in the 1960s (a status allowing the attendance of summits’ opening and closing ceremonies). According to Bishku 2017: 91, Israel had such a status, but following Libya's efforts it lost it in 2002 on the occasion of OAU's transformation into AU, while the Palestinians re-gained their status in 2013.

90 Elron 2016.

91 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016.

92 Interview with Shlomo Avital.

93 Own calculations on the basis of monthly records for each country (based on the SSA definition adopted for the purpose of this work).

94 Prime Minister's Office a.

95 Oded 2010: 138–139; Africa Report 2012: 24; Chazan 2006: 12; Carol 2012: 360.

96 Oded 2010: 138; Africa Report 2012:22–24; Babatunde 2017: ci–cii.

97 Sabar 2013: 58; Interview with Simon Seroussi; Moskovich, Binhas 2014.

3Soft power of the state of Israel as a resource for development aid and public diplomacy

SUBCHAPTER 1: DEVELOPMENT NEEDS OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA COUNTRIES

SSA is a very diverse region in every respect: its natural environment—climatic and geographic conditions, flora and fauna as well as populace—is diversified in terms of ethnicity, languages and religions. Importantly, this diversity expresses itself within states themselves, as many of the borders were drawn without taking into account natural conditions and local peoples. Development level of SSA countries at the brink of independence (1960s) was usually poor, and majority of the region still suffers from manifold development challenges. In fact, many development-related problems became a specific African characteristic, as they are no longer observed on a large scale on other continents. These include low primary school attendance, high malnutrition and child mortality, diseases such as HIV/AIDS (reducing life expectancy, causing large-scale orphanhood, disrupting social and economical structures) and malaria. Although key indicators (on infant mortality, access to clean water, literacy and school enrolment) improved significantly since the 1960s, there is an alarming distance to other continents and huge discrepancies between particular SSA countries.¹

This analysis of the developmental needs of SSA countries is limited to the essential observations and does not aspire to be a thorough examination of SSA developmental history or the donors’ development discourse.

Post-independence until the 1990s

The emerging independent SSA states faced many developmental problems inherited from centuries of internal warfare, slave-trade, mismanagement and exploitation by colonial rulers. This is a very generalised view, since particular conditions varied greatly, depending on precolonial history, policies and the length of the given colonial power. Sub-Saharan countries used to be overspecialised in limited number of crops, with very small industrial base. Yields were weak and natives resistant to adopt new techniques; connections with global capitalistic economy and modernisation trends superficial, with traditional lifestyles prevailing and preferred, and poor state of modern education and communication infrastructure. The essential feature of a colonial African state was that it functioned on the surface only; even active locals were agents, not actors. Planning for the development of industrial base and introduction of democratic practices started only around 1945. Post-independence leaders were motivated by nationalistic convictions but usually depended on clan loyalties.²

In many SSA countries, ethnic diversity was a major obstacle to state-building. Many countries lack a clear majority group at all; the region houses 20 most ethnically diversified countries. This implies also linguistic diversity and splits between nomad and settled populations. Within colonial borders, various tribes were gathered under a centralised external authority, perpetuating lack of unity and causing violent conflicts after independence. Most of African civil and international wars have more or less direct ethnic dimension. Moreover, the alienation of the centralised state impeded development efforts and led to overexploitation of natural resources. Ethnic diversity and ensuing power struggle elevated inequalities between privileged and underprivileged tribes, corruption and tendency towards autocratic or military rule, quickly after the common banner of struggle for independence turned into multiparty politics based on ethnic conflict. The civil service politicised.³

Moreover, effective governance was impeded by the natural conditions, such as poor soils, unpredictable rain, wide diversity of difficult climates, including warm semi-arid, tropical savannas, warm desert, humid subtropical climate; high distances to coastline and poor rail and road infrastructure, leading to high costs of transport and losses in transported food; small size of most states, hampering scales of trade; low population density and—with few exceptions—lack of significant (known at the time) natural resources. Around one-third of the region’s population lives in countries which are both landlocked and resource-poor. To this adds quick demographic growth, with fertility rates not subduing despite lowering death rates, apparently for culture-related reasons. Africa’s population grew threefold between 1950 and 1995. Coupled with low density and high urbanisation rates, this impeded adequate and equal provision of services by states.⁴

The prevailing economic doctrines of the time also contributed. Ghana, which at independence had good development prospects (though depended on export of crops and import of industrial products), within 10 years headed towards crises, caused by a vast industrialisation scheme implemented through multiannual, centrally prescribed development plans. Investments were poorly designed, without resolve for conditions on the ground (like availability of necessary raw materials), constructions were delayed and more costly than assumed, while weak tax base and collection impeded financing. Such industries’ products were eventually costlier than they could be with the use of pre-industrial methods; machines, unadjusted to local conditions, run by untrained staff, would quickly break. Government reacted by granting monopolies to such companies, banning imports and pre-industrial forms of production. Thus, the poorest farmers bore the costs, already suffering from monopolies on agricultural market—and industries remained ineffective. Efforts to reform agriculture in a centrally planned way were equally unsuccessful. No capitalistic market economy would be allowed under Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah; plans remained on paper, while the debt rose. As development plans failed, Nkrumah started to call for pan-African economic planning. When political opposition grew, he responded with authoritarianism.⁵

Nevertheless, until 1973 there was steady progress in some spheres (school enrolment, infrastructure), though the development of agriculture lagged behind, as the sector was neglected in many countries. Growth benefitted only fractions of societies, marginalising rural populations and was divorced from increased productivity. Needs justified centralisation, state intervention and bureaucracy, yet belief in a “big push” theory of huge investments bringing growth proved false. Overall optimism that independence itself will bring wealth and ensuing economic isolationism quickly led to dependence on foreign creditors: with agriculture development held back, countries needed more and more imports. The oil crises hit SSA hard, first in 1973, then in 1979; this coupled with growing prices of credit, increasingly taken from private sources, and downturn in foreign investments, as well as periodical draught (not abnormal, but hitting already fragile countries), resulting in a full-blown crises. The year 1973 is treated as marking the moment when African politics started to be governed by predominantly authoritarian rulers, with the mid-1970s to the 1990s described as a period of military and dictatorial regimes and depression.⁶

Overall, despite periods of fast growth locally, the African average real income per capita rose minimally between 1960 and 2000, while income inequalities rose sharply. Economies did not diversify. The capital, which could otherwise be accumulated and reinvested, was dispersed by failed governance, inefficiency of public sector investments, tax avoidance, rent-seeking and corruption. This long-term failure had much to do with the lack of democracy (in the case of Africa, fall into autocracy and stumbling growth were closely related) as well as manifold armed conflicts, including civil wars, and their huge economic and social costs.⁷

The 1980s were marked by liberalisation efforts, led by international institutions. This brought mixed results at best, to many—devastation. Radical reforms met with resistance or were incomplete. Liberalisation primarily included freeing of markets for agricultural produce and fertilisers. Since the 1970s Africa has become a net importer (15% of consumption) of agricultural commodities and staple foods. Crises in agriculture furthered rural poverty. Due to policy barriers often still in place, market reaction was muted, while diminished state support even worsened conditions in agriculture economy, limiting services to farmers. Regional trade liberalisation programmes, meant to reduce barriers for regional market exchange, were introduced. Yet reforms reproduced existing patronage bonds, in some cases petrified pathological regimes, in others—catalysed violent conflicts.⁸

Following the end of Cold War

The end of Cold War opened a new chapter in world affairs, with market economy reforms and democratisation wave reaching SSA. The initial period of democratisation was marked by rapid increase in internal violent conflicts and ensuing lowering of growth. Only later the steady move away from conflicts, forward to democracy and development, took place. With debt crises eventually behind and generation of new leaders in place, in the 2000s–10s SSA entered the pace of growth, with several countries among the world’s fastest growing, and managed to attract increasing flow of foreign investments. Among the most successful are Botswana (five decades of growth), Angola, Ethiopia and Nigeria, and also Ivory Coast, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Still, some lag far behind the leaders.⁹ Furthermore, according to the 2014 Human Development Index (HDI) by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), most of the SSA countries were in the group of low HDI countries, with only four in the medium group (Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, Ghana). Still, the 2018 HDI update shows that the medium category already broadened to include also Equatorial Guinea, Congo, Kenya and Angola. Botswana and Gabon advanced to the level of high human development.

The 2000 report by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) listed development needs and chances of African countries at the beginning of the 2000s, providing an apt reference point for analyses of the content of (Israeli) development aid during the last decades. The report mentions processes triggering new development opportunities: increased political participation leading to greater demands for accountability; the end of Cold War, which dissolved the paradigm of political patronage and allowed adoption of more market-oriented, open attitudes; changes emerging out of globalisation, information accessibility and communication revolution. It points out the untapped potential of African women, constituting the majority of workforce, but whose productivity is constrained by barriers to education and labour market; more gender equality could reduce poverty. Enhanced regional cooperation and long-term commitment of donors could bring rapid results. It is also recommended that more funds are directed to rural areas, that agricultural research and public-private partnerships are promoted, that development is more beneficiary-driven and that Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries open up their food markets to imports from African countries. The spheres where progress is needed to break the cycle of underdevelopment and poverty are governance and conflict-resolution, economic competitiveness and diversity, aid dependence.¹⁰

Investing in people is underlined, as sources of growth shift away from natural resources, gradually depleted and loosing value; and also because investment in people accelerates turn towards knowledge-based economy, propensity to save and invest—and limits demographic growth. Investment in people means enhancing range and quality of education, also tertiary education, which should include new technology-related skills; and investment in health of the current and future workforce. This includes reproductive health, tackling HIV/AIDS pandemic, action on tuberculosis, malaria, cholera or river blindness, requiring money and carefully tailored strategies for wise spending. This translates also into a need for increased donor interest in supporting research on diseases plaguing the SSA nations, currently under-financed despite dangers of transmission of endemic African diseases to other continents. Moreover, health disorders related to lifestyle: heart diseases, diabetes and cancer are a new challenge. Brain drain needs to be tackled, possibly through circular migration which enhances gains from mobility (flow of remittances, new competences). All these need to be undertaken with demographic growth in mind. It slows down, but not dramatically and at varied speeds, with most of the countries’ fertility above four children per women and many between five and seven. Only wise policies can turn the surplus into demographic dividend of large labour force while further reducing fertility through better healthcare and women empowerment.¹¹

As regards infrastructure, the needs include design of weather-resistant systems of roads and railways, in particular, in the rural areas—housing majority of populations—to serve their market integration, access to services and jobs. Reliable water and irrigation systems are of dire need for human consumption and agriculture, as large share of SSA territory cannot sustain agriculture relying only on rainwater, and danger of drought is huge. Such investments are said to be particularly beneficial to the lot and productivity of women. Investment in sanitation facilities and wastewater treatment is also key to improve hygiene, thus reducing costly illnesses. Provision of sources of non- and renewable electricity is another challenge and opportunity. Amending low-productive and low-profit agriculture demands investments in farmers’ education and in agricultural research. Of the most important sub-Saharan crops, only maize has been substantially researched and harvests improved, while other kinds (sorghum, millet, cassava, oilseeds, pulse beans, bananas, plantains) are classified as “orphan crops” for the lack of sufficient research in them; true effort is needed to improve their resistance to pest, disease and environmental stresses (drought, flood), growing due to climate change. Methods introduced through research and demonstration facilities are often not adopted on a larger scale. Aside from increasing yields through upgraded crops, improvement in services for agriculture is also needed. All these efforts are essential not only to provide food security but also to increase returns from agriculture and related industries which are seen as main sources of budgetary income that could, in turn, boost further investments. These investments would also support diversification of economies, through the development of industry, services and exports. Beyond national means, financial (non-project) aid and debt relief are still vastly needed. Overall, investment in agriculture “contributes 4.25 times more towards reducing poverty than comparable investments in any other sector” and “agriculturally driven growth generates a larger welfare effect than non-agriculturally driven growth, especially for the poorest 20% of the population” in SSA.¹² Still, many deplorable investment-related practices common in the 1960s, 70s and 80s are alive. Ethiopia forcibly relocated people both in the 1980s and in the 2010s. Overinvestment in agriculture had also dire environmental consequences.

African urbanisation, the fastest worldwide, is dangerous as it does not go together with rise in incomes or changes in food market. Cities (increasingly classified as megalopolis) are unable to guarantee the newcomers jobs and minimal range of services, such as running water and sanitation. Among the actions needed, loss-reduction, rainwater collection, increasing recycling of water, fixing and extending of infrastructure, introduction of effective water and wastewater management and finding solutions adaptable to the changing climate are mentioned.¹³

One method used to reduce the increasing hazards of life in major cities is population dispersal through design of satellite cities. They happen to replicate the wealthy centre plus slum periphery/informal settlement scheme, especially in Eastern Africa. Urban(ised) poverty is a huge problem. Challenges include also poor industrial, educational and healthcare base, high costs of fuels, need for the development of local renewable energy sources, low competitiveness, increasing environmental (pollution, traffic congestion, un-recycled waste) and climate change threats. Large cohorts of young people could drive development, but only if they get opportunities to gain education and jobs (preferably, in advanced economy) and to become included and engaged in communal life. Moreover, high levels of urban violence caused by social, ethnic and religious conflicts or armed groups’ attacks on urban centres emerged once international and civil wars receded.¹⁴

Good governance is a challenge of turning from corrupt and malfunctioning to just, effective and accountable. This requires difficult combination of stable polity, capable state and reasonable growth; however, in SSA, improved governance, as defined by Western institutions, does not necessarily translate into better growth. Decentralisation and democratisation could allow for better use of available resources (including people’s time). Reforms shall be further supported to reinforce national institutions, democratic processes and rule of law. In some countries, peace-building and reconstruction aid is needed to overcome impacts of protracted violent conflicts on individuals, society and economy. Responsible leadership needs to be trained and promoted and culture of good governance and resistance to corruption supported. Closely related to democracy and accountability of growth is the development of genuine civil society and free media. While they should in principle rise from below, external aid can help local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and media outlets to advance and professionalise. Prosperity gospel preached by Evangelical (mostly Pentecostal) churches works often as a new popular ideology of growth.¹⁵

It also needs to be underlined that SSA is particularly vulnerable to and suffering from various impacts of climate change: anomalies in precipitation, extreme weather phenomena, desertification—in particular, in the North, bordering the Sahara desert. In Western Africa, some territories are affected by the expansion of semi-arid Sahel climate; the coastal areas in West, Centre, South and East alike are endangered by floods, storms and rising sea level, causing salination of water resources and soil erosion. Overall increase in rainfall in most Eastern Africa might result in increase in diseases such as malaria where so far it has not been common (Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda). Changes in temperatures and rain occurrence (rains coming later, rarer, but massively, causing flooding) threaten food security of the Central and Western subregions. In the East, prolonged periods of draught affect also hydroelectric power generation and in the in-land South—water security levels. Effective urban management is seen as key to climate change mitigation and adaptation.¹⁶ Developmental planning needs to be enhanced, with the help of experts, to make sure that current investments take into account the future climate.

SSA environment suffered greatly throughout the decades of poor management, overexploitation, demographic growth, unregulated hunting and armed conflicts. Erosion, combined with chemical and physical damage, led to the degradation of more than half of Africa’s farming land, endangering productivity of agriculture and poverty eradication. There is a need for taming the overexploitation by international concerns and empowering local farmers through new technologies to maximise crop while limiting ecological burden of production.¹⁷ Deforestation is a particular problem, especially in Central Africa, with ensuing the loss of biodiversity and soils. Typically, when large trees are cut out, charcoal producers destroy the remaining vegetation; then farmers arrive and abandon the land in few years at the stage of complete degradation. Around 9% of forest cover was lost in the region in the 1995–2005 decade alone. On the rule it is not replanted, agriculture expands to new areas, while local population still depends on forest-related resources, furthering deforestation even more. Additional results are loss of water resources and increased propensity to malaria. While there is a need for systematic cut in dependence on forests for everyday fuel and on non-renewable energy sources for the production of electricity, the region has a big untapped potential to benefit from solar and hydroelectric power.¹⁸ This requires knowledge-sharing and investment by developed countries experienced in such technologies.

Examples of specific cases

The countries chosen for case studies present three differing sets of conditions and paths for development, in terms of, inter alia, size, geographic location, access to natural resources.

Nigeria

Nigeria, at independence (1960), was a promising West-African country. Large in terms of territory and population (55 million in 1970, 151 million in 2008), it adopted a federal system in which strongest ethnic groups dominated its 12 (later 19) states. By the 1970s, political corruption, military coups, suffocating of opposition and free press, lagging development and the 1967–70 civil war tarnished its image and prospects. There was no national identity to unite Nigerian peoples. The country became dependent on food imports as progress led farmers to invest in children’s education (rather than in farms) and educated children did not come back to farm the land. Already the year 1965 saw instances of political violence over elections. Secession of Biafra and ensuing civil war led to local starvation and high military spending. The increasing revenue from oil production in the early 1970s was distributed unevenly, between those with access to state power. Rent-seeking, mismanagement and fraud were common. Corrupted politicians, middlemen and businessmen steered policies, while academics and civil servants were uninfluential. Oil dependence resulted in increased import of other commodities and in rising debt, especially when oil prices decreased. In the 1980s, civil society organisations emerged, either representing opposition to authorities, or providing services independently of it. On the other hand, inflation and rising unemployment led to empowerment and politicisation of religious divisions, to urban crime, riots and clashes, violently dispersed. Authoritarian regime, food rationing, widespread surveillance and other measures introduced as a part of the “War Against Indiscipline” did not solve country’s economic problems, foremost among them—debt, exceeding one-third of revenue. Structural adjustment programme following from the 1986 deal with the World Bank Group not only led to some positive macroeconomic results but also caused suffering, outmigration of educated cadres and further downgrading of living standards and access to services. Privatisation demanded by creditors was unsuccessful due to low interest of foreign investors. While the 1990s brought some development in large cities, the overall poor economic situation combined with autocratic rule was still furthering ethnic tensions. Democratisation gained upper hand in the late 1990s, yet political corruption and election fraud were still common¹⁹ largely until the 2015 elections. While economy showed the highest growth rates in the world, poverty and unemployment rates were high. Moreover, the rise of Boko Haram, representing violent Islamic radicalism terrorising North-East of Nigeria, exposed the weakness of state’s structures and the army and endangered freedoms and the development of wide civil populations.

Zambia

Zambia is a small (15.5 million), landlocked nation. At independence (1964), its society was strongly stratified, with foreigners at the top. With advice of United Nations (UN) agencies, Zambia designed multi-year development plans reflecting what was called “Zambian humanism”. The first plan, 1966–70, aimed at increasing state’s influence on economy, its diversification beyond copper mining, reduction of the share of imports in consumption and the development of infrastructure. Although reduction of imports was resisted by industries and consumers, there were significant investments in roads, rail, electricity and communication as well as in agriculture, education, health and welfare. The second (1970–76) plan aimed at food self-sufficiency, comprehensive regional development, further diversification of industry and import substitution. Implementation was based on solid data, though sometimes lacked proper coordination and follow-up. Agriculture was slowly mechanised due to people’s preference to be unemployed in the city rather than work the land. Large corporations were created in various sectors to realise state’s policy aims and usually successful, although they suffered from inadequately trained managerial cadres. Some cooperative solutions were introduced, but their aims were rather ideological (to sustain traditional ways of living) than economic and had to be heavily subsidised. Overall, Zambia succeeded in developing indigenous industry, including processed products (refined sugar, refined copper) and in achieving high annual growth rates. On the other hand, since 1972 until 1990 Zambia was a one-party state under President Kenneth Kaunda. Poverty has not been eliminated at the times of prosperity and until today. Since mid-1975, the USSR produced large amounts of copper, which was still Zambia’s main source of revenue, leading to sharp decline of the country’s economy and debt crises. The 1980s World Bank-led restructuring efforts largely failed. This was coupled with rising dissention, food shortages and ever growing poverty rates, political instability, and coups of the 1990s. Privatisation of state assets drew attention of foreign investors, yet also caused rise in unemployment. Rising copper prices brought more affluence in the period of 2009–14; their later downturn hit the economy again. In the meantime, some diversification has been achieved, thanks to support for local private entrepreneurship, with agriculture and tourism sectors growing.²⁰

Tanzania

Tanzania, in East Africa, population of which grew from 12 million (1967) to 45 million in 2012, is an example of a country ruled through multi-year programmes, where planning descended to the level of an individual citizen. The plans were adopted in 1961—concentrated on agriculture and individual’s duty to commit to development; 1964—on rising life expectancy, literacy and income; 1969—on mechanisation of agriculture and industrialisation. Plans were realised within the context of Tanzanian socialism called ujamaa. Power was heavily concentrated, with one political party and all means of production nationalised, effectively discouraging foreign investors. Agriculture was declared the foundation of economy. Peasants were to join new, large, poorly planned villages, run as cooperatives irrespective of economic feasibility. Their income went to bureaucracy. Since the mid-1970s relocation started to be compulsory. The villages, originally seen as a way of individual voluntary advancement within the community of equal, under guidance of a teacher, started to be forcibly filled up by people whose property was destroyed by state forces, thus unwilling to create community and ruled by an enforcer. Following heavy crises, exacerbated by costs of war with Uganda, the 1980s saw plans on Structural Adjustment (1982–85) and Economic Recovery for Stabilization and Liberalisation (1986–89), followed by further reforms in the 1990s. Though they eventually led to growth, the immediate impact was negative for state employees, who suffered from dramatic cuts in state’s functions and benefits for peasants, devoid of subsidies. Wealth went to politicians, corruption emerged; civil society organised itself for self-help. Contemporarily, planning is concentrated on alleviating poverty. However, the Development Vision 2025 is said to be poor in operational details, not well implemented and progress is not sufficiently evaluated.²¹

Development needs according to public opinion polls

According to a range of the Pew Global Research Centre polls carried out in 2002 and 2007, people were mostly concerned with lack of resources for food, health and cloth in Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. More than 80% of respondents from Ethiopia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Mali, Senegal and Tanzania pointed to finances as their most important problem. Kenyans and Ugandans found it most difficult to cater for education. In Mali and Senegal, food was perceived as harder to get than education. Still, Africans appeared to be the most optimistic in the world, believing in the improvement of their and their children’s lives. Polls from 2012, 2014 and 2015 also document the extent to which the African nations are concerned about public health. AIDS and other diseases are often seen as the greatest danger. The top three health-related needs in the countries surveyed combined are hospital infrastructure, fight against AIDS and access to drinking water. The inhabitants of Ghana perceive water access as the greatest one, Senegalese—fight with hunger, Kenyans and Ugandans—building and improving infrastructure. In another survey, climate change proved more important to African nations polled (especially in Burkina Faso, Ghana and Uganda) in comparison to threats constituted by Iran, ISIS, Russia, China and economic instability. Concern for inequality was also on the rise.

Conclusions

As much as it is rational to generalise, the SSA countries’ overall development since independence was in the majority of cases non-linear. An initial period of growth based on socialist-isolationist economic theories was followed by visible worsening of performance caused in part by the 1973 oil crises; this downturn lasted at least until the mid-1980s. Later on most countries went back on the development track and—in many cases, successfully—adopted new philosophy of development based on free market and good governance. At the time of writing, majority of the fastest growing economies was situated in SSA, the conditions for business were improving and more and more attention was devoted to the rapidly growing markets of the major cities (megalopolis).²²

Manifold development needs apparent at their independence are in existence until today, although their contexts have obviously changed. A broad list of categories of such needs includes the following:

economic needs: enhanced tax-base and tax collection; better quality and diversity of crops; soil, forest and biodiversity conservation; improved water management; industrial development; foreign investment in infrastructure; research in those aspects;

social needs: elimination of endemic diseases; improved water access and sanitation; nation-building beyond ethnic and religious divisions; use of demographic dividend while reducing fertility rates; empowerment of women; overcoming consequences of warfare;

political needs: reliability of civil service; empowerment of local government; combating corruption and cronyism;

new challenges: preparing for and overcoming consequences of global warming; management of urban sprawl and megalopolis.

SUBCHAPTER 2: ISRAELI SOFT POWER RESOURCES: QUALITATIVE AND SWOT ANALYSES

Bryc observed that Israel can survive in its external environment only by preserving multidimensional power: both hard and soft power, and variety within each. While Israeli existence rests upon its military capability, the awareness of the value of “economic” and “soft” in the power mix grows together with rising employment of non-military means on the part of Israeli adversaries. It is also derivative of diminishing role of states in international relations.²³

As explained, development aid (cooperation) can be treated as an element of soft power as such—according to the “we aid the others, therefore, we are more likeable” logic. But as a phenomenon resulting from one nation being able to give something to another, less developed one, aid depends on manifold resources, many of which have a soft power nature. Special features of aid given by less affluent countries—as Israel used to be in the first decades of its modern existence—pertain to the fact that to a large extent this aid comprises assets which can be classified as soft power resources. As a matter of fact, reflections on Israel’s attributes that can be conducive to Africa’s development were initiated early on, when the cooperation started. Though not called “soft power”, these reflections concern exactly those features that need to be analysed here. One example is the 1962 Israel Yearbook which provided a detailed list of qualities of Israel’s industrialisation (related to social mobility, complexities of management and of public governance, use of external aid, etc.) which could be considered by the African nations as an example to follow.²⁴

Yet no comprehensive, contemporary analysis of Israeli soft power resources has been found by the author. Lack thereof has been confirmed by the interviewees.²⁵ A tally that more systematically, but still in a very sketchy way, refers to Israel’s experiences vis-a-vis Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) was prepared by the Reut Institute.²⁶ MASHAV (Israeli development aid agency) adds some information on Israeli achievements when presenting aid principles and activities done in different fields; in most cases, this information is very limited in scope and detail, however. Therefore, an original analysis of a specific selection of soft power resources particularly relevant to sub-Saharan development is needed. This subchapter concentrates on positive sides of issues described, with adverse sides signalled and underlined in the concluding strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats (SWOT) analyses.

The beginnings

As Adelman shows, Jews used to be an impoverished, marginalised and traumatized nation, relatively traditional and passive. At the turn of the 20th century, its chances for independence were smaller than those of Lebanese Christians, Armenians and Kurds. According to Adelman, the decisive factors in Jewish success were leaders’ realistic outlook; national cohesion, early creation of institutions; willingness to fight; immigration to the territory of the future state and Diaspora’s willingness to help; thrust towards modernisation; ties to the West. To Adelman, Zionism was not only a national liberation movement, but also a revolutionary movement. In its early years, Israel had many features of what was then called the “Third World” country: it gained independence through armed struggle against the coloniser; it was strongly underdeveloped; its elites were young; the ruling party (socialist Labour) mobilised the nation to modernise and put national interests above class issues; its struggle gained international support and legitimisation. Israel was cash-stripped, first due to development costs, than due to growing share of the military budget; though not land-locked, its economic development was slowed down by isolation in the region and lack of significant natural resources (except for Dead Sea potash and bromine; offshore gas was discovered only at the turn of the century). Despite these similarities, there were yet also differences between the situation of Israel and that of other developing countries, which explain in-transferability of some of Israel’s experiences through development aid. The success of Israel to transform its economy resulted largely from the conscious decision to prioritise investment in human capital. The following achievements comprise the picture of the Israeli success in the soft power sense:

creation—on a voluntary base—of political and administrative institutions;

building of the nation state out of extremely diversified immigrant population;

establishment of self-governing habitats and economy;

maintenance of democracy despite adverse conditions;

revival of language, creation of culture valuing experimentation and education.

While constant danger paradoxically helped in maintaining the atmosphere of revolution, this zeal also inflicted some heavy costs (Adelman mentions emotional public discourse, mistreatment of minorities, inequalities and pollution), becoming the source of current challenges with which Israeli state and society struggle.²⁷

State- and nation-building; evolution of internal politics and economy

Jewish immigrants arriving to Israel before the Second World War were ideologically and religiously (and not economically) motivated. The country was poor, backward and neglected throughout the 400 years of the Ottoman empire. Deforestation, overgrazing, abandonment of irrigation systems that resulted in soil infertility and erosion, harsh climate, swamps, lack of basic infrastructure, abundance of locusts, poverty, malnourishment and disease including malaria, cholera, typhus and pox—these were the predominant conditions. The land was bought overprice and laboured by immigrants. Thousands of them died of diseases or other condition-related factors; or out-migrated. Development was slow due to the lack of natural resources and immigrants’ maladjusted qualifications.²⁸

The mass immigration after the Second World War²⁹ suffered from the lack of food, shelter, healthcare, jobs, education and a common language. Hundreds of thousands were housed in wooden shacks in temporary camps without electricity and running water. Food rationing was introduced. Those times symbol hardship, detachment and discrimination. Unemployment was alleviated through a vast programme of public works, bridging also newcomers’ skill gaps, integration difficulties and infrastructural needs. However, the programme also caused later social stagnation of its, mainly Sephardim (of Oriental origin) participants. While the state institutions were built and consolidated throughout the 1950s, the process was challenged by rapid growth of population, losses sustained during the war of independence and economic problems. The number of citizens quickly doubled to more than 1.4 million. Immigrants originated from around 70 countries and were much different than the previous aliyot (plural for immigration—aliyah) in terms of ethnicity and motives. Inequalities, in itself contradictory to the leftist ideology of the government, were high and also had an ethnic face.³⁰

Israeli economy in its early years was characterised by public ownership of companies, subsidies of consumer goods, state planning, high taxes and limitations to private entrepreneurship. The state focused on growth, living quality, welfare, diversification and know-how. It had control over land, capital, labour force and economy, growth of public administration and service sectors. Israel had to rely heavily on financing from Diaspora, especially the American one. However, the government was open to internal and foreign experts’ critique and adapted its policies accordingly. Thus, Israel enjoyed about 11% yearly growth during the 1950s and around 8% in the 1960s. The economy was increasingly mixed, some privileges were given also to the private sector, so Diaspora Jewish investors and foreign companies operated in the country; in the 1970s, privatisation of some state-owned companies followed.³¹

Ben-Gurion’s mamlachtiyut (Zionist republicanism) guided the transfer of competence from pre-state to state institutions and separation and independence of those institutions from party structures and particular political interests. This was later on translated into principles of independence of judiciary, unity of the army, primacy of the Knesset decisions. The drive for modernization and absorption of immigrants was of Ben-Gurion’s prescription, as was the development of the Negev desert region, which he saw as key to the country’s future. Yet the public feelings were not always as positive as expected, since many immigrants had no choice of place of settlement; and the conditions in development towns (see later) or kibbutzim (collective agriculture units) were difficult. Furthermore, massive immigration resulted in high population density in the Coastal Plain, which, together with improvement of living conditions, exerted enormous pressure on natural resources. The price of demographic and economic growth quickly expressed itself inter alia in loss in biodiversity, pollution (and related health concerns), destruction of natural landscapes and freshwater shortages.³²

David Ben-Gurion was in strong opposition to both the communists (Maki) and revisionists (Herut), whom he saw as destructive. His retirement, internal divisions within the party, other internal factors and the shock of the 1973 war weakened the Labour. After 1967, the centre of political debate shifted from issues of nation-building and internal development—socialist in spirit—to dilemmas of tradition and religion, and nationalistic discourse. New generations of constituents and bureaucrats were much less ideological and had more appreciation for free market, integration with the global economy through free trade treaties and liberalisation of the domestic market. Finally, with the 1960s introduction of television and private radio stations, investigative journalism emerged, revolutionising the power relations between the state and the media, allowing for more criticism and debate. The party system evolved to a multiparty one characterised by fluctuating balance of power.³³

Although until the mid-1960s socio-economical gaps narrowed significantly, full equality was distant. Dissatisfaction with the leftist bloc grew, especially among Oriental Jews. Their fate improved a lot since arrival, but they were still underrepresented in institutions and found it difficult to obtain white-collar jobs. This to a large extent explains why Likud won the May 1977 elections. It run on an “undivided Land of Israel” platform, yet its success was not as much a sign of a public’s turn towards maximalist view on territory, as it was a result of social protest and perceived need for change. Yet, importantly, the integrity of professional civil service, including ministerial employees, was maintained. Successful projects, of importance to Likud’s electorate, were in fact often of a leftist nature: introduction of free high school education, social housing programme and rehabilitation of 82 underprivileged neighbourhoods. Economic trouble, social costs of liberalisation of economy, exacerbated by some populist decisions (as cuts in regulated food prices), high oil prices and costs of engagement in the Lebanon war were the main reasons behind a decade of national unity governments (1984–92) which resulted from repeatedly indecisive elections. The period was marked by further liberalisation and reforms in the public sector meant among others to curb inflation (reaching 450%) and was aided financially and overseen by the United States (US). This plan was largely successful, cemented smaller role of government in the economy and triggered development of financial markets. The reforms stabilised the economy, and Israel readily engaged in the globalization processes. This impacted on national decision-making, both internal and foreign: key businessmen became less dependent on the state but joined the decision-making circles.³⁴

The late 1970s also saw emergence of non-governmental sector, which gradually replaced unified organisations (for culture, sport, youth, women and other) attached to the Labour movement. NGOs represent the diversity of Israeli society, its cultures, interests and political views. They grew rapidly in the course of the 1980s and consolidated in the next decade, taking over some welfare functions of the increasingly neoliberal state. The sector also takes part in the contemporary struggle against right-wing enforcement of a national, unified, ethnicity-based identity.³⁵

The 1990s and early 2000s brought important political and social changes as the Jews were allowed to leave the USSR (or the states that gained independence after its dissolution). Around a million migrated to Israel. Many of them were secularised, had a distant historical connection to Judaism, were motivated mainly by economics and fears of instability and ethnic tensions in the post-Soviet area. The issue renewed the “who is a Jew” debate: though majority of them met the definition of the Jew for the purpose of recognition by the state and full nationality rights, it did not meet the criteria of the ultra-orthodox rabbinate and religious courts’ governing marriage, divorce or burial. Furthermore, the new cohorts strengthened the right-wing and led to the emergence of new parties, notably Yisrael Beiteinu. Russian immigrants constitute also a support base for the Likud, though their voting increasingly spreads throughout the spectrum.³⁶

A smaller wave (over 10,000 in 1983–85, nearly 30,000 in 1989–92, 20,000 in 1994–2003³⁷) of immigrants came from Ethiopia. Most of them suffered prolonged waiting in refugee camps in Sudan or in Addis Ababa slums. Their integration was challenging due to their social structure, level of education, instances of racism against them and differences in religious customs (in the case of Falashas, those who continued to practice Judaism throughout) or enforced conversion to Christianity (Falash Mura). The fact that immigration quotas were profoundly reduced in the 2010s led to family dramas of thousands whose relatives still await for relocation to Israel.

The peace dividend of the 1993 Oslo Accords, mass immigration and globalisation led to economic growth on scale unseen since 1973. Israel achieved per capita product levels typical for lower income Western economies. Another rupture in growth was seen around 1997–2005. Overall liberalisation has been coupled with consolidation of central healthcare institutions and welfare system, aimed at reducing the social impact of growing income inequality. Contemporarily, according to the OECD, Israeli growth results mainly from high-tech industries, such as defence, computer components’ manufacturing, software engineering, medical technologies and pharmaceuticals as well as agriculture-related water management. Main challenges’ result from geographical distance from major markets, isolation from neighbouring ones and regional instability, generating high defence-related costs and distracting investors. Relatively high rates of poverty, especially within some groups (Arab-Israelis and ultra-orthodox Jews) remain of concern. So does a growing, multi-dimensional divide between secular Jews and increasing numbers of ultra-orthodox, whose participation in workforce and army service is low. Social protests triggered by growing costs of life and inequalities—in income, access to public services and burden-sharing—encouraged reforms meant to portion the duties more equally and enhance ultra-orthodox participation, yet their implementation is a challenge.³⁸

Integration of migrants, society building

In contrast to early migrants, the post–Second World War ones usually were not ideologically motivated and ready for hard work and sacrifice. Children lost years of schooling. Dire physical and mental condition of many of the survivors made integration difficult. To some, however, absorption and engagement in state-building allowed reworking traumas and rebuilding lives. As for Oriental Jews, they were a very diversified group in terms of education, affluence and culture. They usually displayed high levels of religiosity and had patriarchal family structures; many were unacquainted with modern lifestyles. Their professional and educational unpreparedness was to some extent addressed, so as to avoid emergence of “two nations”. An additional problem was that initially they were in minority and almost not present among the elites. They were also quite resistant to change in lifestyle and unaware of Zionism (although had some nationalistic and Messianic tendencies). For all, challenges included struggle with new conditions, learning language, loss of status, need to acquire new professional skills and a growing gap between parents and children, who adapted faster. For some, questions of identity and attachment to the country of origin also constituted an important matter. Many had no trust in politics and states after the war. For most, the envisaged revolution in social relations—characterised by plain life, direct communication and equality, including gender equality, translated into communal forms of social, economic and political life—was radical.³⁹

As the result of mass, varied immigration, Israeli society at the time was characterized by divisions and social mobility. Opportunities were plenty and motivation to advance strong, despite challenges (inadequate education, knowledge of language, ethnic prejudices). Class differences largely overlapped with ethnic ones. The lower sector tended to be composed of Oriental immigrants and the upper level of Ashkenazis; the middle class was mixed, but still mainly Ashkenazi. Oriental immigrants were settled on the peripheries, geographically, economically, socially and politically. The process of falling into lower strata was pretty automatic, despite their role in the country’s growth. In spite of overall development, tensions emerged related to this stratification. Definitions and identities—of a Jew, an Israeli, a Zionist, of the state—were intensively debated, as were relations between the state and religion and between the state and the Diaspora. The debate on the minimum expectations of a “pioneering” citizenship understood as voluntary activism, going beyond voting, paying taxes and compliance with legal order is still ongoing.⁴⁰

Integration was seen as the most important issue after security. Identification with nation-building effort served as an umbrella unifying immigrants with very different identities, motivations, expectations and aspirations. The state created highly institutionalized (the Jewish Agency), and, from today’s point of view, paternalistic, often semi-coercive and discriminatory integration system. With time, mechanisms of natural (spontaneous, within everyday encounters) social integration took over, while some elements of integration policies were incorporated into overall social policy. Yet systematic discrimination of some groups continued; divergence was huge and tensions did rise high leading to several instances of violent clashes. Questions of quantity versus quality were raised by some old-timers challenging the policy of open immigration. During the 1950s, various derogatory expressions emerged in the popular language describing new immigrants, mainly Orientals. Ethnic prejudices and stereotypes, based on perception of them as backward, ignored the fact that all the groups, also Europeans, were highly internally diversified. Groups preferred to stick together, mixing and intermarriage were not yet common, and attachment to particular traditions even grew among Oriental Jews. Furthermore, there was some resistance against pervasiveness of socialist ideology over-present in all areas of life. Early integration policies negating cultural backgrounds of newcomers, not interested in and not recognizing diversity were acknowledged as faulty still in the 1950s and modified.⁴¹

In the meantime, Mapai governments managed to limit inequality. While it reached exorbitant levels in the years of mass immigration, by the end of the 1960s Israel entered the group of most egalitarian states, ranking the 5th at the World Bank Gini index. Policies which led to this result included redistribution, stimulation of development, fiscal measures and social welfare, preventing wide poverty, hunger or unemployment. It was, however, the inequality in political structures that led socio-economic imbalance to rise again in the 1970s and ended political dominance of the Left. Paradoxically, the melting-pot policies of the early decades led Mizrachi Jews to vote right-wing.⁴²

Policies regarding the Arab minority evoked controversies too, especially when it was under military governance (1951–66), which separated it and regulated its mobility and economy. Encouraging Arab population to establish institutions of local self-government met with the lack of understanding and human capacity, due to weak leadership and resistance to co-finance it from new taxes. Where no local authority emerged, government established direct oversight. During the 1950s, services such as electricity, water, sewage, telephone lines and local roads were introduced. In Arab areas, participating in national elections, turnout was high. It is disputed whether the government could have dealt better, given the massive size of immigration, limited resources, know-how available and external circumstances. Yet Arab communities (around 20% of the population) still suffer from underinvestment and neglect. The 2016–20 investment plan was to channel towards the community 9.5 billion New Israeli shekel (NIS) of new funds, in particular to boost employment, with untapped potential of the Arab population seen as the country’s next growth engine. The number of Arab Israelis who voluntarily join the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) grew, triggered by loyalty to the state and education and job prospects entailed by service. As regards the native Bedouin population, their situation is improving, but still of particular concern due to land disputes, resettlement policies, demolitions of housing, planting on the ruins of Bedouin villages, poverty, unemployment, crime, internal rivalries between clans, high birth rates and state of rights of the Bedouin women (suffering from polygamy, in theory illegal, in practice—under-persecuted due to cultural sensitivities). Due to escalating conflict with the state, numbers of Bedouin volunteers for the army fall down dramatically. Several governmental and NGO initiatives aim at boosting Bedouin education and employment, though highly educated women find it often challenging to perform professional duties against the patriarchal clan pressure.⁴³

As regards Ethiopian Jews, despite initial enthusiasm and commitment, the un-worked traumas as well as cultural and economical distance made integration difficult; furthermore, the gaps between old and young generations impeded cohesion and well-being. The community continues to be among the most impoverished and disadvantaged or even discriminated against among the Israeli Jewish population. Special programmes on primary, secondary and tertiary education, employment and psychological wellbeing are designed to amend this situation, but things change slowly.

The integration of migrants from the former USSR was a different challenge. Its size strained housing, educational and healthcare infrastructure. Despite efforts to make the use of the new migrants’ skills and knowledge, many were left jobless or working far below capacities (especially teachers, engineers, bookkeepers, doctors). Still, their general employment quickly soared, with unemployment reduced from 38.5% in 1991 to 6% in 2008.⁴⁴ Russian aliyah also brought in certain soft power resources: educational capital, self-assurance, individual ambition, high level of entrepreneurship, contributing to emergence and success of the Israeli high-tech industry and overall growth.⁴⁵ As Smooha points out, contrary to their predecessors, Russian immigrants were better educated, the receiving institutions and the society had more resources, tolerance and acceptance for selective integration instead of full assimilation. The integration policy decentralised; while maintaining absorption centres for those less able to undertake independent life straight after arrival, it provided an “absorption basket” option composed of money and privileges, to be used according to own decisions, easing up the way towards independence from state aid.⁴⁶ Integration was not as complete as with other European aliyas since its massive scale, strength of identity and mostly economic motivation led it to create separate, Russian-speaking subculture and concentrated living areas with own, often non-kosher, shops and services.⁴⁷

Ultra-orthodox component of the society (around 11%) is the fastest growing one, the poorest, but also undergoing changes and significant internal diversification. The level of employment among men grew and women are increasingly active politically. Volunteering to IDF service is low, contested, but growing, while resistance towards compulsory draft quotas creates constant tensions. Enhancing Haredi education in secular subjects remains a challenge.

Israel witnesses also certain outmigration, amounting to some brain drain. According to Dan Ben-David, while half of the Israeli children attend religious schools, where the level of education is “substandard”, the well-educated ones, carrying most of the burden of the state’s functioning and responsible for innovativeness and development of its economy, out-migrate on an accelerated pace. In 2017, for every 4.5 Israelis with academic degree who left, only 1 returned. In his opinion, the trend will intensify with increasing costs of life, diminishing quality of education overall and rapid growth of Haredi population.⁴⁸

Historical differences limit the potential for Israeli experience in Diaspora relations to be a source of advice for SSA nations. Only in a very broad sense could the engagement of Jewish Diaspora’ in Israeli state-building be seen as an example to follow.

Democracy and rule of law

Importantly for state-building, the Zionist movement established self-governmental institutions (the Community Government, Elected Assembly, National Council, civil service, defence force, compulsory primary education, higher education, strong labour movement; even national theatre) long before the actual creation of the state. As a result, at independence, the Jewish community was well organised and experienced with democratic governance. Political culture was highly deliberative. After independence, already the first parliament had Arab representatives, with translation in and from Arabic. In the early 1950s, a system of entry exams and trainings for civil servants was introduced to promote professional (rather than party-affiliated) administration; it was sometimes evaluated as too rigid in imposing standards for candidates unequal by ethnicity, culture and education.⁴⁹ Although Israel does not have a written constitution (major issues are governed by so-called basic laws instead), it has a stable (in institutional terms) political system. As a parliamentary democracy, it holds regular, general, equal, direct, secret and proportional parliamentary elections to the parliament. The principle of separation between executive, legislative and judiciary is respected. Independent Supreme Court, besides being the highest court for appeals, functions also as the constitutional court and has a real impact on the content and interpretation of the laws, in particular, in the face of the absence of a single bill of individual rights. Furthermore, the State Comptroller has a critical oversight over activities and effectiveness of the administration.

Fragmentation of party system is a constant feature of Israeli democracy and its political culture. It results from a highly proportional electoral system, diversified population and is also attributed to Israeli contentious national character. Israel is not exempt from global processes harming quality of democracy. Since the 1990s, party system has been shaken up, with proliferation of groupings, frequent changes of banners and early elections. Instead of programmes, personalities started to matter most. Threats to the system and falling citizens’ trust in institutions awakened discussion in defence of the democratic process. Analysts point out that more and more key problems are managed and politicised instead of being solved.

A look at international rankings is informative. In the 2015 Democracy Ranking by the Economist Intelligence Unit, Israel ranked the 34th with the score of 7.77. It was categorised as a “flawed democracy”, just as such European Union (EU) members as Poland (7.09), Slovenia (7.57), Portugal (7.79), France (7.92), Belgium (7.93) or Italy (7.98). Israel ranked very high for pluralism, electoral process and for political participation; its lowest mark (6.18) it received for civil liberties. Of the SSA countries, Senegal, Zambia, Namibia, Ghana (with lower ranks) and Botswana (ranked higher) qualified to the same group. Israel improved: in 2012 report, it was the 37th, in 2007—the 47th. The improvement regards also the civil liberties (up from 5.29 in 2006). The Freedom House Freedom in the World classified Israel (2016) as “free” with score 80/100, rank 1 (best possible) for political rights and rank 2 (out of 7) for civil liberties. Israel’s overall classification has not changed since the first, 1998 ranking. Israel received 1 for political rights throughout, with elections characterised as free and fair, the system as pluralistic and highly participative and media as vibrant and free; events such as the second intifada had no influence. Discriminatory practices affecting minorities is noted, although rights of minorities are said to have a strong legal foundation. Vast majority of SSA countries were classified as partly free or not free. The 2015 Global Democracy Ranking placed Israel as the 24th with relatively stable position since the index has been launched (2000). Charts for Israel reveal relatively high notes for health and low for environment. The press was also strong, although military censorship places restrictions on security-related reporting. Therefore, Israel’s overall rank according to Reporters Without Borders was lower than it would otherwise be (101st in 2016). The position of Israel in this ranking varied (92nd in 2002, 36th in 2004, 93rd in 2009 or 112th in 2013), which can be explained by external circumstances. In 2015 and 2016 internal factors played out, as planned reforms of the state media endangered their independence. Moreover, the press market changed adversely, with a free hand-out daily “Israel HaYom”, financed by right-wing circles, increasingly dominating among advertisers, making it difficult for regular circulation newspapers and affecting the public opinion.

Corruption scandals on the highest levels of power were exposed in the 2000s. They ended in conviction for a former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, indictment (at the time of writing) for a serving Prime Minister Netanyahu and conviction of his wife. Yet this also demonstrated an ability of the system to tackle such problems and social resilience against them. Israel’s location on the Transparency International corruption perception index is high yet reflects these events: the 14th in 1996 (out of 54 countries), the 16th in 2001, the 34th in 2006 (out of 163 countries), the 36th in 2011 and the 32nd in 2015. The democratic ethos is also reflected on the level of civil society: cooperative movement, youth movements, (NGOs). Within the OECD, Israel scored the 18th out of 34 on the civic engagement scale, measured by participation in elections and decision-making.

Still, the radical part of the right-wing gained ground in Israeli politics. Even though its postulates did not yet lead to fundamental changes in the system at the time of writing, the process of undermining of liberal democracy’s features (independence of courts, equal rights of citizens, open civil society and free press) through new laws—adopted or just proposed—was seen by liberal commentators in the run-up to April, September 2019 and March 2020 elections as endangering the very foundations of Israeli democracy. Combined with annexationist platform of the right-wing towards the Palestinians, this was even seen by some as paving the way towards a one-state solution, within Israel which would thus essential cease to be a democratic state, unless all the Palestinians within its borders would be granted equal voting rights.

Creation of urban and rural dwellings

Housing was a distinctive problem of the new state, addressed by the government through internal and external policies—including Golda Meir’s travel to the US with an appeal for aid. Diaspora’s donations for housing, education and healthcare services were not sufficient. With weak human and physical resources and unstable situation at the borders, Israel also did not attract many foreign investments. It resorted to borrowing; also food was purchased against loans. Another influx of financial resources, yet a heavily contested one, was German reparations. By late 1950, only one-third of planned housing units were built and Israel was still dotted by tent camps, housing hundreds of thousands. Public company Solel Boneh was created in 1921 by the trade union confederation Histadrut and responsible for the construction of buildings and infrastructure. Amidar, a state-owned enterprise, created in 1949, was tasked with construction, administering housing, assigning inhabitants, encouraging them to take proper care of flats and neighbourhoods, and organising communal activities. Subsequently, majority of inhabitants were given possibility to buy out their flats. Investment and engagement of government was crucial for eventual success of many cities and rural cooperatives, not necessarily promising economic viability, as they were located in isolated areas and often meant to safeguard the border.⁵⁰

Between 1948 and 1950, migrants (mostly European, who arrived first) settled predominately in the Coastal Plain. However, dire need for housing, jobs and population dispersal led to the establishment of numerous new dwellings, among them so-called development towns (such as Beit She’an, Kiryat Gat, Kiryat Shmona, Yeruham), which, after difficulties resulting from delays in construction, their peripheral location and unwillingness of immigrants to settle there, became the backbone of the economy. Development towns were created with complete physical (roads, electricity, solar water heaters) and social (administrative offices, healthcare, education, libraries, synagogues) infrastructure and served to absorb the inflow of migrants and develop the industrial base: food processing and other light industry. Moreover, 230 moshavot (plural for moshav—a type of rural cooperative) were created from 1948 till 1956; kibbutzim were less able to absorb migrants, still new ones emerged. The process was not that spontaneous and voluntary as previously, leading to low motivation and resentment at times—and took place also in the Negev, which became the theatre of a new pioneering, struggling against lack of water and skills needed to survive in the desert and farm land there. Establishment of new dwellings continued throughout the 1950s.⁵¹

Population dispersal was the government’s strategy, implemented through public or subsidized housing, allocation of land, personal and investment incentives, as well as some coercion. Measures were introduced to equalise rural and urban living standards and to encourage youth to stay in the rural areas. Local authorities and city councils were created with own budgets (though initially too limited). Many mistakes were made, especially in the early 1950s and in particular regarding development towns, due to inadequate knowledge of urban planning and unexpected social consequences. Some groups, like Iraqis, refused being sent to remote areas; as a result, North African Jews arriving later on were often forced to settle there. Among lessons learned informing later policies was that city population must be a varied mixture of old and new citizens and that such cities need industrial, not only agricultural economic base. In older cities, new neighbourhoods were created, often turning into pockets of poverty, from which new immigrants or their descendants moved out.⁵²

Contemporarily, Israel lags behind in terms of catering for the housing needs of young families, with prices rising sharply since around 2008, while real wages stagnated, despite rise in productivity. Ecologically sustainable housing is inadequate, with only 7% (in 2014) of constructions voluntarily applying such a higher standard.⁵³ Yet Israelis start to champion the “smart city technologies”, an important sphere in the age of global urban sprawl. The development of the Negev continues, boosted by increasing presence of enterprises (also foreign), high-tech, and the army. The subsequent governments aspire, with mixed results, to boost Negev infrastructure and quality of life, minimise socio-economic divergences with other regions and to improve the situation of the Bedouin (whose lot varies depending on localities and attitude of clan leaders towards state’s policy of settling them, often implemented in a flawed way) while preserving the desert landscape and ecosystem.

The Histadrut, its affiliates and corporations

The General Federation of Jewish Labour—the Histadrut—created in 1920 out of several institutions, for decades used to play a much larger role in Israel’s economic, social and political life than the one usually subscribed to trade unions. Beyond labour issues, it run healthcare, kibbutzim, industries, Solel Boneh, newspapers, schools, public works and workers’ kitchens. By 1926, 70% of Jewish workers were members. In line with the Zionist Labour ideology, it aimed at creating a new type of a Jewish worker and of workers’ community. It was tasked with the development of a cooperative economy, through creation of a market chain of workforce, financing, production, distribution and supply. The list of fields of engagement of Histadrut grew to include a supermarket chain, an airline, pension and insurance services, development of Arab and Druze villages, cultural and social activities (sports, films, magazines) and women’s organization. It was also very active internationally and able to engage in relations with partners from countries hesitant to officially engage with Israel. The status of Histadrut changed with the 1977 electoral upheaval. It lost governmental support and accumulated debt; its industries faced bankruptcy. It also suffered from image problems, accused of corruption and inefficiency. In 1994, organisational crises sparked by cessation of the Labour Party patronage forced it to radically downscale its activities, privatise assets and concentrate on core labour issues. The organisation gathers around 30% of the workforce, but is perceived as a part of the system, against which 2011 social protests took place.⁵⁴

Another institution typical for the early years of the state was a public corporation: a government-established company of combined public and private ownership. Corporations emerged out of awareness that state-owned companies are mostly ineffective and poorly managed. They also served, at least in the short run, to cater for overall development needs in a given area rather than for own profit. Corporations usually had a business-oriented mode of operation, were able to employ private sector managers and undertake risky or innovative ventures; on the other hand, they often turned to monopolies with no real oversight. Nevertheless, they constituted one of the elements of the system which, while regulated until the 1970s, was not purely socialist, saving Israel the fate of countries that nationalised their economies completely. Vast liberalisation resulting from the late 1970s changes in government as well as the 1970s/80s economic crises did not lead to withdrawal of the state from economy; it rather meant a change in the mode of operations. Instead of direct oversight, various apolitical institutions (such as the central bank) were created to enable capital accumulation and investment, good business environment and adherence to fair market rules. The way the state remained involved in harbouring development despite liberalisation and privatisation is best visible in its direct (investment grants, hybrid funds) and indirect (tax exemptions and benefits) financial support for the development of high-tech sector.⁵⁵

General education system

Israel adapted a Western model of education to the needs of a developing nation. Yet the system was not fully coping with the fast growth and diversification of pupils’ educational and cultural backgrounds. Needs included ensuring adequate infrastructure and getting everyone into the system; creating a symbolic framework for common identity; providing for social and national integration; developing creativity; catering for special needs’ groups (youth at risk, those suffering from Holocaust-related traumas or orphanhood); producing apt workforce. The initial practice of coercion into the Labour education system was abandoned in the early 1950s move away from “melting pot” towards “cultural pluralism” policy. In 1953, State Education Law established more centralized school system, while religious education sector maintained independence. Vocational and adult education developed, providing new migrants with skills needed in agriculture and industry besides ulpanim teaching Hebrew. Towards the end of the 1950s, greater emphasis was put on including elements of Jewish and national education within the curricula and on integration and adjustment of requirements for disadvantaged groups.⁵⁶ Youth Aliyah movement helped with education and integration, inter alia through a system of boarding schools; another innovation were pre-university schools meant to equalise the levels of knowledge. Central, free, compulsory education catering for special needs contributed to alleviating differences and enhanced chances for social mobility, although did not eliminate major social divisions.⁵⁷ It also helped in building up the well-educated class needed for the modernization push.

In 2014, Israel ranked the eighth in the 2000–11 OECD Overall composite innovation in education index. Still, the inequalities between the pupils are large and reflected in overall relatively poor PISA results. The system is growingly decentralised, with separate school systems for various religious and secular denominations. Although in theory under state’s oversight, they vary greatly in the content of curriculum and promote emergence of silos, damaging ability to cooperate between social groups. Discrimination against pupils of Ethiopian origin is also a matter of concern, though this problem is addressed by a multi-partner cooperation, including Israel Center for Educational Innovation, the Ministry of Education, local municipalities and others.

Higher education and high technologies

Higher education system, based on institutions created during the mandate, was developed post-1948 along utilitarian assumptions. Researchers were to solve concrete problems, from renewal and redefinition of national culture, through land and water management, agriculture to security. Awareness of usefulness of manifold discoveries and inventions for other nations came quickly; so did methods for knowledge-sharing. Quality education and training, coupled with rapid development—which often required design of innovative solutions adjusted to particular, usually harsh conditions—led even to temporary surplus of highly qualified experts, especially in agriculture and related fields.⁵⁸

Contemporarily, there are around 150,000 students in Israel. The oldest academic institutions—the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (HUJ, established in 1925), Technion—Israel Institute of Technology in Haifa (1924) and Weizmann Institute of Science (1934) score among the world leaders. According to the Shanghai Academic Rankings of World Universities, the HUJ and the Technion are within the top 100. The Weizmann Institute and Tel Aviv University (TAU) locate within the second 100. Overall level of enrolment in tertiary education is one of the highest among the OECD countries. Since 1953, all universities admit Israeli Arabs. Their enrolment grows rapidly, although so far it has not reached a level proportionate to their share in the overall population.

Technological development was championed since Ben-Gurion as a source of advantage—a measure to improve country’s attractiveness, international standing, image and defensive ability—meant to compensate for the size of the country. In 2006, Israel had 4000 high-tech and 1500 biotech start-ups, 80 companies listed at NASDAQ, 1188 patents granted in the US (2015; the third in the world), high-tech exports of United States Dollar (USD) 15 billion. In scientific citations, it is on the level of Singapore and Canada. Israel can also boast of a significant, for a young and small state, number of Nobel Prize Laureates (the majority awarded in the 2000s), especially in chemistry. Israel is the only country outside the US where research and development centres of Microsoft and Cisco are located; Intel Centrino chip was designed by Intel Israel; large share of Windows system was designed in Microsoft Israel. Investment in civilian research and development, run mostly by the Office of Chief Scientist, is on record height among OECD and reaches above 4% gross domestic product (GDP) (though recently, R&D and related institutions’ budgets have been declining). According to the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2014–15, Israel was among the 37 “innovation-driven” economies and the 27th on Global Competitiveness Index, distinguishing itself through capacity for innovation and good environment for start-ups, among others. Importantly, Israeli technologies often origin in companies basing on foreign capital or become quickly internationalised through mergers. Due to the lack of large-scale industries, many technologies do not find application within the country, so there is no reason for the state to protect them from competitors and successful start-ups are acquired by foreign capital. Only recently legal changes and incentives have been introduced to improve that. Still, Israeli macroeconomic environment and quality of general education need improvement. There are obstacles in the areas of stability, legal framework and freedom.⁵⁹ Numbers of young professionals in sciences are inadequate. Efforts are made to encourage Arab, Haredi and women students to join science faculties.

Importantly, Israel is highly recognized for its clear technology (related to climate adaptation and mitigation) innovations done mostly by small- and medium-size enterprises. It tops rankings for such criteria as number of innovations, of companies per GDP or concentration of capital in these fields. There is a network of supportive public policy mechanisms (investment in North-South industrial research collaboration, technology incubators), and particular backing is given to technologies related to water, renewable energy, and agriculture (inter-ministerial Israel New Tech programme; includes support for internationalisation). Israel is also active in health research, with advanced works on tackling HIV/AIDS. Nevertheless, the actual share of ecology-linked R&D is relatively low. More needs to be done to connect small innovative companies with technology transfer and market opportunities in the developing South.⁶⁰

Health

Health hazards were among the most dangerous impediments to the pre-state settlement, causing deaths and outmigration. Malaria was the most prevalent. The first breakthrough came in the 1920s, when Israel Kligler together with his team introduced and implemented an approach which combined limiting mosquitoes’ habitats, improvement in housing conditions, systematic surveying and, most importantly, vast education of population. Malaria had been present in modern Israel until the late 1950s but on a very limited scale and afterwards was successfully eradicated.⁶¹

Until 1953, immigrants were accepted irrespective of health status. Holocaust survivors were in very bad shape, often disabled. Others suffered from diseases yet not known in Israel. Rapid expansion of network of clinics and hospitals was necessary. Quick improvement in health status of immigrants was clearly a success, with no incident of epidemics and elimination of diseases such as tuberculosis or typhoid. Private health sector exists along the state-run Kupat Cholim (healthcare funds, clinics) associated with Histadrut and Hadassah (medical training and health education institution). Already in the 1950s, Israel quickly reached one of the world’s lowest maternal mortality rates and significantly cut on newborns’ mortality. Here, a particular institution (based on a French model) played a decisive role: mother and child health spots called “Tipat Halav” (“a drop of milk”). Introduced shortly after independence, due to health problems and the lack of knowledge among young mothers, they provide comprehensive assistance before, during, after pregnancy and throughout parenthood free of charge and for all.⁶²

One more resource is Israeli knowledge and experience in dealing with trauma: in immediate victims, in their older age (when traumas re-emerge), and in descendants or members of families. Among institutions specialised in aiding people with post-traumatic disorders, Amcha deals specifically with Holocaust survivors and their families; the Israeli Trauma Coalition is an umbrella organisation with a broader spectrum of engagement. This expertise is used in humanitarian efforts by Israeli organisations providing on-the-spot relief and training for local staff. Experience in working with long-term effects of violence-related traumas is used in assistance in post-conflict countries.

Still, Israeli health system suffers problems as well, most profoundly, related to staff’ working conditions and inadequate number of hospital beds.

As regards quality of life, Israel is compared with other OECD members, the most developed countries in the world. On this scale (data for mid-2010s), the rate of people working excessively long hours is beyond average, poverty rates among the highest, satisfaction with water and air quality well below average, education effectiveness is low, child poverty the highest in the OECD. On the other hand, long-term unemployment rate is significantly smaller, lifespan longer, suicide rate smaller and satisfaction with own state of health and life higher than OECD average. Notably, Israel scores high in World Happiness Reports, placed the 14th in 2012 and the 11thin the years thereafter. The 2015 survey showed Israel among the countries that scored the third in healthy life expectancy, which testifies to the quality of healthcare system and lifestyle. According to the HDI 2014, Israel was among the “very high human development” countries with the 18th location.

Youth movements

In pre-state times, youth movements were instrumental in organising immigration, establishment of kibbutzim, teaching of young migrants and in the process of formation of armed forces (through Nahal—see later). The 1969 study reported 90% of youth engaged in a political party, scouts, Gadna Youth Corps (see later) or Beyond School programmes of informal education organised by youth centres or social clubs. Participation meant taking up leadership roles at an early age (14–16) with minimal help of adults. The movements encouraged involvement in public issues and were particularly suited for those who for some reason did not champion at school, allowing them to excel in other competences, distinguish themselves and gain self-confidence. However, the movements did not include Arab youth for a long time (except for Gadna, which since 1968 has included Arab-speaking male Druze) and Arabs tended to stick to traditional social structures and were uncomfortable with co-education. However, already in 1969 a growing rift between topics tackled by the movements and the real problems of the youth was observed, coupled with high drop-out rates among adolescents.⁶³

HaShomer HaTzair (The Young Guard; equivalent of scouts) established in Austria-Hungary in 1913 until today has branches in manifold countries. In its educational work, it refers to the idea of “repairing the world” (see later) and to socialism, Zionism, humanism, peace and democracy. There are also movements like Bnei Akiva for orthodox youth. The National Youth Service programme, established in 1970, coordinates dedicated NGOs that direct those exempt from the army service for the reasons of conscience or health to various kinds of substitute service—in education, healthcare, day-care or Israeli-Palestinian cooperation. Another programme is available for those interested in volunteering for a year preceding draft. Other popular schemes encourage volunteering of secondary school pupils and university students.

Role of the army in development

As mentioned, at independence, the newcomers and the receiving nation faced challenges of housing and nutrition. Involvement of army in tasks related to absorption, including agriculture, food production and construction of temporary housing, was one of the immediate relief measures. Nahal (short for Fighting Pioneer Youth) training corps constructed roads, were numerous among the first inhabitants of Yotvata experimental farm in Arava Desert, near the Jordan border, and were also involved in the creation of kibbutz Nahal Oz near Gaza Strip (1951) and kibbutz Ein Gedi near the Dead Sea (1953). They also contributed to the protection of kibbutzim from cross-border raids. Similar role was played by Gadna corps, which emerged in pre-state times to provide pre-conscription training to men and women; it also encouraged volunteering and work in agriculture. Financed by the Ministries of Defence and Education, it remained apolitical. In 1969, Gadna was the biggest youth organisation. However, in the mid-1960s its welfare and culture programmes were slowly abandoned, as other institutions started to provide them. Today, around 19,000 young Israelis, plus some volunteers from abroad, participate yearly.⁶⁴

Popular draft into the army has important integrative and educational functions. Nation-building was an explicit task of the army since 1948. New immigrant recruits often had low motivation and skills, including in Hebrew, so initially were rather a burden to the army than an asset. The conflict between IDFs absorption and security roles diminished in the late 1950s. In the meantime, the army developed services for recruits from disadvantaged groups, youth at risk, new immigrants and those willing to catch up with education during service. Asked in 1968 about greatest successes, Ben-Gurion pointed to the educational role of the army (including agriculture training) and its integrative role, equalising abilities and self-esteem of Jews coming from various countries.⁶⁵ Arriving of groups of soldiers at the university for classes is a common sight.

Lastly, military sector, through its investment in own research and development and training it gives to the recruits, is partly behind the successes of Israeli high-tech sector (one recent example of IDF technology transferred to civilian life is a mechanisms for extraction of pure water from air, of use to developing countries and applied on several continents), while there is also an increasing competition between the military and the private sector for the brightest engineers. Of note, despite constant danger of war and ensuing close relationship between the military and politics, Israel did not become a militarised state. Civilian control over the IDF is upheld, while institutional culture prevents the army from influences of political populism. Popular service is characterised by law hierarchy and large decision-making powers of a single, low-level soldier. Innovation is welcomed and informal style dominates relationships. Time in service is used to learn about talents and to receive training. Thus, also technological skills are transferred to the civilian sphere, boosting development. Bonds created during the service last and constitute an important part of social capital.⁶⁶

The kibbutz and the moshav

Israel features two specific forms of community: kibbutz and moshav. The kibbutz based on the values of equality, modesty, collectiveness, hard work on land and labour pioneering. It also initially served certain defence purposes and provided sense of security to new immigrants, with guarantees of care to every member and to every kibbutz within the movement. By 1930, there were 29 kibbutzim housing 3900 people. Establishment of kibbutzim (and also moshavot), led not only to agricultural, but also industrial and infrastructural development, set out a model for later Israeli development movements, national and egalitarian ethos and created a role model of the Jewish pioneer. Until today, kibbutzim are the source of a large share of agriculture and know-how on planting in harsh conditions. In the 1960s, they undertook new forms of business: small industry (metal industry, irrigation equipment, textile, furniture, electronics), leisure and tourism.

In the early 1920s, a less communal mode of settlement emerged: the moshav. Moshavot are based on family farming units operating on leased state land, with shared production and marketing arrangements, without cash flows involved. With kibbutzim, moshavot share a nationalistic, socialistic and egalitarian way, stressing physical work, volunteering, community development. However, moshav distinguishes itself as it does not gather individuals, but families, with more independence for members. This particularly suited, for cultural reasons, absorption of Mizrachi immigrants which could adapt this flexible framework according to their cultures. A study of 13 moshavot established between 1948 and 1955 shows that integration was most problematic in the one that was ethnically mixed (Romanian-Persian). Another study testifies to knowledge acquired on factors determining chances of successful integration in ethnically mixed communities, evolution of family structures and customs, on women empowerment; it also underlines the roles of professional instructors and graduates of Gadna. The third form of communal living came up in 1936. Moshav shitufi is a mixed form with collective production as in the kibbutz, but individual consumption, like in the moshav.⁶⁷

The late 1970s crises of collective dwellings came with the change of the ruling coalition and move towards capitalism. Loss of state support, economic downturn, rising consumerism and individualism led many members to leave and forced kibbutz movement to reform through debt-relief settlements with the state (1989, 1996). Following members’ preferences, kibbutzim introduced different forms of individual property, differentiated salaries, loosened up limitations on education and work outside of kibbutz (designed originally to avoid brain drain) and limited communal services. As the result, not all inhabitants are now full kibbutz members. Contemporary kibbutz obliges only strong mutual responsibility and consensus around major decisions. The kibbutz network remains autonomous and united. Changes encouraged youth to remain or to join, although entry requirements are high. Reforms created economically viable structures able to provide for the inhabitants’ wellbeing, though their social status is not high as in the pioneering years.⁶⁸

The moshavot went through similar changes since the 1980s, though they did not need to be as radical. New, non-agricultural sources of income were introduced. Inflow of urban people, looking for a healthier, more peaceful and cheaper environment, often downgraded conditions and led to the growth of inequalities among members. Changes in management structures followed, with responsibility and services (like education) transferred from the moshav council to municipalities. Population of moshavot grows, as they allowed inhabitants to work in nearby towns.⁶⁹

One of the factors behind the success of Israeli collective farming, in contrast to other such experiments around the world, was that it operated within a market economy. Research indicates that collective undertakings have increased propensity towards risk-taking, which proved to be both a blessing (a source of innovation) and the curse (debts, limited responsibility). Their privatisation lowered risk-propensity. Today, around 80% of Israeli agricultural production comes from cooperatives. Kibbutzim, while housing a small percentage of the population (around a quarter million), contribute 40% of agricultural production, 10% of tourism income and almost 10% of industrial export. They still play a role in integrating new immigrants.⁷⁰

Importantly, activities of the early aliyot, especially those in kibbutzim and moshavot, were accompanied by the rise of a new image and a new role of Jewish women, gradually acquiring equal rights and duties; not without struggle, but in consistency with overall nationalistic and egalitarian ideology of the Labour Zionism. Household chores (cooking, laundry, childcare), as they were provided by the kibbutz community, started to be perceived in work- and job-related terms. However, gender disparity prevailed in access to managerial positions since gender-based structure of professions replicated itself; moreover, childcare duties were requested back to the families and again undertaken by women. Gender-based income inequalities in kibbutzim happen to be higher than in the rest of the economy, a mishap in their quest for equality.⁷¹

Agriculture

Diaspora Jews were for centuries mostly banned from agriculture. This created a strong drive towards, or even a collective dream of farming, visible in the Jewish popular culture and in the Zionist ideologies. A particular success in eradicating rural poverty can be attributed to smart state investment, creation of common agricultural resources and of other sources of earnings. Kibbutzim and moshavot concentrated particularly on agricultural activities. The centre of the country was reclaimed for agriculture, which involved repairing damages made as far as in the Roman times. In 1951, a significant undertaking aimed at populating the Negev desert and making it part and parcel of the country’s proper and development started. In fact, these territories constitute 50% of land usable for agriculture. Yet, they are also the ones which receive the least rain—10–100 ml per year. Still, in Arava Valley a desert experimental farm Ein Yahav was created, serving as a testing ground for new solutions: crops, equipment, chemicals, techniques, soil, etc. in agriculture. It used the combination of available spring water and desert climate to produce exportable fruit, vegetables and flowers in the winter season. Before that the soil had to be desalinated with water from newly discovered reservoirs and special crops planted to fertilise it. Another Arava experimental farm, Yotvata, provided “out-of-season” vegetables and flowers for foreign markets, dates and tropical fruit, which grew in irrigated strips, among the otherwise sandy and salty soil. Achievements of Yotvata were adopted elsewhere. Today, it specialises also in milk products and chocolate. In central Negev, experimental outpost Sde Boker was established in 1952 and specialised in horse and sheep. After reclamation of soil, orchards were introduced. At the Southern-most frontier, on the Red Sea shore, kibbutz Eilot, founded in 1955, managed to produce dates, vegetables, flowers and melons in winter.⁷²

Interestingly enough, Israeli archaeologists, in particular, working for Michael Evenari Farm for Runoff, and Desert Ecology Research in Avdat rediscovered various Nabatean agricultural techniques on the basis of understanding of, and accommodation to, the desert geography and ecosystem: special kinds of cisterns, fruit trees, agro-forestry (mixed plantations of mutually supporting trees and crops) and micro-catching techniques using flood water and available soils to farm around wadis (seasonal streams). With time, crops resistant to certain amount of salt in soil and water were developed. Israel was also among the pioneers in the use of thin-film plastics in soil conservation and prevention of evaporation. Examples of innovations, done in various private and public institutions, include use of insects to boost pollination and control pests without chemicals, mechanisms for protection of bees from Colony Collapse Disorder, plant varieties resistant to diseases, with longer shelf-life or more vitamins, treatment of water for agricultural use with algae. Dependence on fertilizers and irrigation led to research on impacts on health and environment and to introduction of measures limiting fertilization and dealing with agricultural waste.⁷³

Israeli farming is professionalised, capital intensive and relies on new technologies. It engages only around 2.5% of workforce (drop from 15% since the 1960s) and contributes roughly 3% of the GDP (down from 10%). Around one-third of production is exported. As regards food security, after initial years of food shortages and rationing, investment in agriculture, research and subsidizing resulted until the early 1960s in food self-sufficiency. The volume of crops produced for each cubic meter of water used grew 4 times since the 1950s. Subsidies and other forms of governmental support, including in the sphere of international trade, are maintained. Yet, Israeli agriculture is over-reliant on pesticides and the domestic production sustains only 45% of calories consumed—the rest, in particular crops, is imported, questioning the state of food security. On the other hand, in the 2010s the government have apparently sacrificed the national agricultural sector in a quest for lowering prices, with liberalisation through cuts in subsidies and import barriers. Cheaper produce from Jordan, Palestinian Authority (PA) and Turkey eliminates Israeli one from the market, tarnishing ideals related to farming and even forcing producers to destroy their hardly grown crops. Yet many features still do make Israeli farming an attractive model for developing countries. Raanan Katzir from Center for International Agricultural Development Cooperation (CINADCO) mentioned combination of market economy with state regulation; diversified ownership; organisational arrangements; promotion of exports; system of research and development; sustainable use of resources.⁷⁴

Environment

The issue of environmental protection is one of a mixed record. Initial environmentally unconscious development (water management, agriculture, industry and urbanisation) led to unexpected consequences, such as land degradation, endangerment of species, pollution of air and water sources. While various species of animals became extinct in pre-state times already, the new state curbed hunting but poisoned many species with pesticides to the point of extinction; others’ fate was sealed by conflicts with locals. Country’s waste was randomly disposed for decades; industrial polluters were exempt from supervision. No nation at the time knew of long-term consequences of certain actions, such as usage of new chemicals. On the other hand, many ecological disasters were seen in the making but ignored.⁷⁵ The Dead Sea is a particular case, ruined through Israeli, Syrian and Jordanian dams on the River Jordan as well as Israeli and Jordanian factories on the shore, evaporating water to extract minerals. The Sea’s shore receded around 2 km in few decades, the area becoming a dangerous field of sinkholes. Emission of pollutants by the factories, though tamed recently, is another concern. Laws and institutions meant for environment’s protection developed slowly. Ministry of Environment was created only in 1988 and stripped of influence. Still, civil environmental movement started already in the 1950s. The Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel quickly grew into the largest civil society organisation. It gained popular ground in the 1970s, which saw large pro-environment demonstrations. One of its achievements is the network of field schools, in which young people learn about and enjoy the nature. Recycling levels grow, though inadequately; plastic bags started to be charged in 2017. Since 2007, all animal testing of cosmetics has been banned, and since 2013 a ban on import of animal-tested ones has been enforced. Next paragraphs, while concentrated on positive (“soft power”) phenomena, signalise further tensions between development and nature.

Combating desertification

Israel’s climate is transitional between subtropical desert and wet tropical. The diversification along the longitude and latitude distinguishes the seashore, the hills in the West, mountains around Jerusalem, the Jordan valley or the Dead Sea area, with rainfalls rapidly diminishing from North (700 mm on yearly average) to South (35 mm) and with lowering of attitudes. Rain falls for 3–4 months a year. Around 60% of rainfall evaporates. A total of 95% of Israel is dry sub-humid, semi-arid, arid or hyper-arid, and these drylands are threatened by soil degradation and desertification. Climate change impacts are direct: rarer, but more intense rains that cause flooding, soil erosion and salinity; loss of biodiversity; damages to forests; rise of sea level and ensuing contamination of coastal underground fresh water. Climate change mitigation goes hand in hand with combating desertification, which combines activities related to water management, energy mix, cutting CO₂ emissions, land conservation and so on. Documents by the Ministry of Environment acknowledge a valid contribution Israel could and is ready to make with its experience in these matters.⁷⁶

First activities that could be termed as combating desertification were undertaken already by the British during the mandate (1922–48) and much of the related legislation introduced then remains in force. Israel initially had no environmental but ideological and political motivation to “fight the desert”. Also worldwide, desertification was universally acknowledged as a challenge only in 1994 (with the adoption of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification—UNCCD)—though with a different outlook: rather than projecting the human against the desert, the UN framework called for restraint, so that the desert does not progress but remains a healthy ecosystem. Some of initial Israeli policies were actually damaging the desert ecosystem and furthering desertification (although farming never was as destructive to rangelands in Israel as elsewhere). Turn towards sustainable farming and reforestation came late. Alon Tal, a leading Israeli environment researcher, characterises Israeli approach as an effective, multipronged and unique case of an intensive strategy in terms of water management, irrigation, desert agriculture, afforestation, control of erosion and grazing. Israeli success in sustainable desertification taming is connected to innovations which adapt agriculture, industry and tourism, so that human can live and prosper in demanding conditions without overburdening the ecosystem. Besides regulatory measures, educational ones are used. Persuasion; help with the choice of most soil-saving crops and management of rainwater; delegating responsibility down to kibbutz level; and economic incentives—all that motivated individual farmers to participate in soil conservation.⁷⁷ Public awareness campaigns and price policies have been effective in reducing individual households’ water usage. Updates on current Kinneret water level are part of the daily news. Researchers, academic institutions and practitioners popularize knowledge on desertification. However, diplomatic engagement in international cooperation on the issue did not always seem sufficient. Moreover, the draught that plagued the Middle East (ME) in the 2010s proved challenging even for supposedly water-abundant Israel. It disrupted agriculture and environment, in particular, in the North; caused return to water-saving campaigns and search for new solutions—while desalination answered to the needs of people, the draught caused by climate change brought natural environment on the brink of a catastrophe. It is uncertain if more desalination, which has its own challenges, can answer to this deficit.⁷⁸

Innovative water management

Early policies concentrated on drying wetlands and swamps to use their water for agriculture, human use and to fight malaria. This, together with contamination by industries, degraded or even destroyed many natural sources of water, notably rivers, and habitats of ecological diversity. The fate of Hula Valley, a cradle of biodiversity dried down to fight malaria and introduce farming, caused protests that led to creation of a natural reserve. The territory has been re-flooded and species, especially birds, reintroduced. Contrary to the initial hasty destruction, the successful multi-year programme of restoration of this natural habitat is an experience worth sharing.⁷⁹

Israel’s success resulted from an innovative approach to use and management of available water resources, including drip irrigation; use of flash floods and other forms of rainwater; making use of salty groundwater; water recycling; extended infrastructure and reforestation. Waste reduction, elaborate irrigation systems, production of water through desalination changed Israeli water scarcity paradigm into hard-earned abundance (120% of actual needs). Agricultural production grows without increasing water use, due to effective management (including choices of species) and irrigation techniques. Proportion between water devoted towards agriculture and the one for urban, commercial and industrial sectors changed from 80% for agricultural use and 20% for other sectors in 1960 to 35 and 65% nowadays, respectively. Israel exports water technologies; according to the Israel Export and International Cooperation Institute, this branch was worth 1.4 billion USD in 2008, engaging around 200 companies, 100 countries (US State of California among them), and growing fast. As in other sectors, creation of companies’ branches abroad allows to bypass political issues around the technology’s origins.⁸⁰

Basic water infrastructure

Since the 1950s, Mekorot had been a national water management company; all water resources had belonged to the state. This institutional regime was relaxed only in the mid-1990s. Early examples of water infrastructure built, upon a political decision, irrespective of the cost and effort, include a dam near Beit Zayit, storing winter floodwater; Yarkon-Negev pipeline (1955), which helped Negev development but triggered ecological catastrophe of the Yarkon river; and the National Water Carrier, built through social works programme, opened in 1964. An idea of a Carrier emerged in pre-state times. It starts near the Sea of Galilee and—through a complex systems of pipes, reservoirs and pumping stations—connects major water sources. It used to provide water for the South, allowing development, yet at a high financial and environmental cost. Heat caused high evaporation in open storage facilities, so underground ones were introduced. Since 1967, on-the-ground waters have been re-charged during winter. Farmers had to be compensated for high water costs; only contemporarily water subsidies are slowly cut down. Anew source of fresh (thermal) water came with implementation of the Shamir Drills plan (2011), involving deep drilling in the North, to the benefit of Jordan river, Lake Kinneret and the farmers. Techniques for catching-up flash-floods were also developed early, in order to make the use of millions of tons of water that suddenly fill in the river beds and desert canyons, causing danger, but not much use, as they flow at a great speed, taking away good soils. Some of the places where such water can be stopped and stored are now sealed off through dams, pumps, temporary lakes and high-absorption surfaces. From there, they are directed to the national system. In total, Israel recovers over 90% of available rainfall. Drip irrigation is a default method for agriculture, parks or gardens. Making sure that each plant gets just as much water as needed, directly to roots, was an early 1960s discovery which created Israeli agriculture and greenery. It allows for up to 80% saving in water, in particular the subsurface version. It can also be used for smart application of fertilizers. The leading company, NETAFIM, set up by the discoverer of drip irrigation, has branches and customers all over the world.⁸¹

A separate mention needs to be made on regional water cooperation. Intransigence of most of Israel’s neighbours made the most needed projects in this regard impossible. Already in 1953, Unified Water Plan, proposed by US envoy Eric Johnston to regulate the use of the Jordan river, was rejected by the Arab League (AL), and subsequently Lebanon and Syria declined any further consideration of the matter. Only Jordan expressed interest and carried out some works together with Israel. The US, seeking an alleviation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, also financed water projects of both sides.⁸² The 1994 peace treaty with Jordan provides for water transfers from Israel. Furthermore, in 2013, an agreement was signed between Israel, Jordan and the PA for a controversial, according to Israeli ecologists and economists, plan of bringing Red Sea water to the Dead Sea basin, while enlarging amounts of potable water for all parties. The prospects for plan’s implementation distanced due to political circumstances.

Water reuse

Israel is among the leaders in water recycling. The so-called grey-water (from bathrooms, toilets, washing machines) after treatment can be used for gardens and agriculture. First schemes for water reuse in Israel were introduced in 1994 in public sport halls. Large regional treatment facilities emerged afterwards. Nowadays, water treatment is compulsory for large-scale residential compounds and thus in broad use. In 2009, Israel had the highest share of recycled and reused water in the world (80%; Spain, the second, had 18%). The significance of this achievement is underlined by the UN recognition of Israel as the most efficient user of recycled water. Dan Region Wastewater Treatment Plant, using technology based on sand filtration, was recognised by the UN in 2012 as one of 30 model projects producing high-quality water for agriculture in the desert area. It is being pointed out that Israeli water recycling solutions might prove particularly promising in the context of the megalopolis.⁸³

Another example of innovative usage of available desert water resources and of water reuse is how slightly salty geothermal water from underground aquifers has been employed for fish ponds, leading to the development of aquaculture in the Negev and Arava. After being used for fish, the same water is used to irrigate the crops.

Desalination

Desalination in the Israeli context refers to the partly salty on-the-ground and underground (brackish) sources found in the Jordan valley and the Negev desert; and to seawater. The Negev is a major place for research on desalination (the Department of Desalination and Water Treatment of the Zuckerberg Institute for Water Research, located in Ben-Gurion University of the Negev [BGU] Sde Boker campus). Experiments with seawater desalination technologies started already in the 1960s; small-scale facilities were established, for example, in Eilat, desalinating a mix of brackish- and seawater. Yet the costs of actual operation of such facilities were enormous. The breakthrough came in the early 2000s when recurring heavy droughts and technological advancements triggered the government to decide that desalinated sea water shall become major source of water for the cities until 2020, and that water needs of the country at large shall be covered by desalination by 2050. First large desalination plant, located in Ashkelon, became operational in 2005. Still, desalination led to environmental challenges, related to the extraction of brine to the sea or high electricity production demands; as well as public health issues, due to the lack of certain microelements in desalinated water. In the years to come, Israel, if successful in tackling those challenges, might become a leading expert on desalination’s side-effects and vulnerabilities, such as impacts on water prices, coastal zones, sea life, energy balance. Israeli desalination systems attract foreign buyers. Israeli Desalitech (headquarters moved to the US in 2013) won the 2016 Breakthrough Water Technology Company of the Year award; ceremony was held in Abu Dhabi. Impacts on the regional situation, especially relations with the neighbours, are possible.⁸⁴

Reforestation and regulation of grazing

Another area of combating desertification in which Israel belongs to the world leaders is reforestation. Forests on territories now belonging to Israel suffered since the Roman times until the mandate. Last decades of the Ottoman Empire were particularly destructive, with trees cut out massively for the needs of Turkish industry and army; taxes were applied to those who owned trees. The results were soil degradation, disturbed water management (loss of rainwater, creation of swamps and malaria), loss of biodiversity. Forest constitutes a natural barrier for the desert, as it keeps in water, safeguards soil, produces shade and consumes CO₂. Reforestation was one of the aims that were explicitly spelled out by the founders of the state and undertaken by the Jewish National Fund (JNF), including through public works. Use of water originating from flash floods, common in Western Israel, and new water management technologies allowed reforestation of rocky, barren lands. Still the initial style of the JNF’s activities has been judged as too aggressive towards the original landscape and accused of enforcing European species. Trees are planted until today, including during the annual Jewish festival of Tu Bishvat. Since 1948, total areal of forests has grown exceptionally, from 2 to 8.5% of the land. The management of the contemporary re- and afforestation includes detailed, long-term, goal-oriented planning aimed at minimal intervention and environmental impacts, reliance upon local species and their resilience. New agro-technologies allow planting trees in areas with very limited rain. The tendency is towards diversifying species and sustainable, rather than expansionist, methods. Israeli forests serve soil and water conservation, other ecological and recreational purposes. The policy is enhanced by the creation of nature reserves (over 150) and national parks (65). Reforestation is included in the country’s CO₂ reduction schemes, although existing forests’ absorption capacity is marginal. Another related practice is called savannisation and is usually applied to areas adjacent to forests. Current discussion centres on setting limits to afforestation, so as to respect local ecology and preserve landscapes.⁸⁵

Solar energy and energy mix

In the 2000s, Israel largely concentrated investments in off-shore gas extraction: a non-renewable, global warming promoter, extraction of which from the sea-bed endangers environment and desalination plants in the case of malfunction. Still, replacement of imported coal by natural gas as the main source of electricity is an intermediate step towards a more climate-neutral economy. Israel also increasingly undertakes to promote small and large solar energy production facilities. Use of solar for domestic water heaters is common since decades and compulsory in all new housing since 1980. Against the background of still overall low share in the power-mix, testing of new solar technologies is carried out by the National Solar Energy Center at BGU as well as the Weizmann Institute. Though capacity for larger solar infrastructure is limited by restrictions on desert land use, turn towards solar energy is the key measure which Israel, with above-average per capita emission of greenhouse gases, undertakes in order to meet CO₂ emission reduction targets. Israel sees this as an economic development opportunity and manifold sectors of industry and local authorities subscribed to individual action plans. It also joined the 2016 Paris Climate Conference declaration and greenhouse gas reduction quotas. The delegation to the summit was headed by the Prime Minister himself. However, the actual target that Israel initially set for itself was limited (reducing emissions by 26% since 2005 to 7.7 tCO₂e per capita by 2030), bearing in mind population growth. With technologies and abundance of sunshine, Israel so far did not use the potential of solar; state and local legal and taxing systems blocked its development; there was no detailed plan for meeting the targets; and budgetary allocations were scarce and focused mainly on investment allowances.⁸⁶ Yet, in 2017 a plan was unveiled meant to facilitate the production of solar power on private buildings’ rooftops; in 2019, a solar tower to cover around 1% of national needs was constructed in the Negev and an Ashalim thermal solar power plant in the Negev started operations, the first of four large-scale solar power plants (each using different technologies) planned in the region.

Tradition of tikkun olam

Israel’s engagement in development aid is rooted not only in Zionist ideologies, but also in Jewish faith and mentality. The concept of tikkun olam refers to an obligation of repairing the world. It was revived together with emancipation of the European Jews, visible in the Jewish engagement in the human rights movements, and also adopted by Zionism. The term, which has subtle theological meanings and nuances, is widely used by Reform Judaism (predominant mostly in the US and less popular in Israel) and understood as social activism for justice and peace, equality of chances and ecological responsibility. Notably, Avi Beker characterized tikkun olam directly as an exercise in soft power, influencing others through ideas and values translated into concrete programme of action.⁸⁷

According to the Pew Global Attitudes & Trends 2007 poll, 77% of Israelis agreed that the wealthier nations do not do enough to help the poorer ones dealing with development, poverty and health. Another, 2008 survey conducted by Maagar-Mohot Interdisciplinary Research and Consulting Institute for Harold Hartog School of Government (TAU) showed Israeli society’s support for their country giving development aid (overall 56% see it as a must, in the Arab sector—63%), especially in some situations (73%) and proud of such activities (75%), seen as improving the country’s international standing (65%). The form of support that received most acclaim was sending of advisors, tutors and professionals (71%) along with sending food and medication; health, agriculture and education were the fields preferred. There was a strong feeling against direct cash transfers (63%). The overall perception was that Israel provides a reasonable level of assistance that has not changed from the past and should remain as it is. The support for aid was explained through Israel’s religion, tradition and heritage and Israel’s desired role as “a light unto the nations”. On the other hand, the majority also maintained that own people in need should be prioritised (63%) and never heard of the Israeli aid agency, the MASHAV (77%). Preference went for crises-related aid (44%), rather than an on-going one (33%; 17% opted for both).

References to Jewish obligations—not necessarily using religious terminology—are frequent in descriptions of development activities and in calls for volunteering, supporting aid, activism or sustainable lifestyles. Israeli response to natural disasters testifies that in emergency, wide spectres of society get mobilized for humanitarian effort. However, the general rate of individual philanthropy is not large. Several factors, like semi-socialist convictions about the role of the government, perceived burden of internal problems or self-perception as receivers of external aid (rather than givers) might explain this, leading to low pressure on the government to devote money for aid, despite international commitments and potential benefits. Tikkun olam reportedly is an important part of identity of the young Israeli Jews.⁸⁸

The IDF, rescue teams and paramedics are the cornerstones of Israeli humanitarian infrastructure. For example, since 2013 until mid-2018 the IDF used to evacuate the ill and wounded from Syria; around 4000 persons, including many children, were treated in Israeli hospitals. Operation “Good Neighbour” involved also building and supplying of two clinics inside Syria and supporting population of border towns with basic goods. In November 2016, the IDF medical corps’ field hospital (participating in emergencies world-over such as earthquakes), as the first field hospital ever, received the highest note possible from the UN-affiliated World Health Organisation (WHO).

As for the NGOs, IsraAID, established in 2001, sends healthcare staff, search and rescue teams, experts in curing trauma and mobilising local population. Its philosophy includes long-term involvement and transitional pull-out; it also has development projects. Among the recent engagements are aid to Syrian and Iraqi refugees in Europe and rapid rescue operations following earthquakes in Nepal (2015) and Haiti (2010). Save a Child’s Heart (SaCH) cooperates with Wolfson Medical Centre in Holon, a public hospital affiliated with the Sackler School of Medicine at TAU. Its paediatric cardiac team volunteers to treat the needy. About half of its patients is directed by SaCH, with large share coming from Africa and the ME (Gambia, Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, Iraq, PA). SaCH’s work, notably treatment of 4000 foreign children in 20 years, is seen as tackling stereotypes and building bridges, especially with the Palestinians; the main aim remains humanitarian.

Conclusions

Manifold Israeli developmental challenges transpire as relevant for the SSA development needs—in the fields of state- and nation-building, economic development, agriculture, health or education systems. Israeli solutions were elaborated within a particular set of natural and social conditions and within a particular l’esprit du temps of subsequent decades of the 20th century, marked by specific ideological attitudes towards governance of society and economy, and following on with technological advancement.

Nowadays, regions of the world which develop the fastest, or where the population growth (and thus demand for rapid development) is the highest, are the ones that also face greatest climatic challenges—which worsen fast as the climate change has the biggest impact on those very areas. These circumstances explain why technologies for water management, agriculture and renewable energy, alleviating the quest to meet food, water and energy demands, have both high developmental and soft power potential.⁸⁹ The table below summarises issues presented with an aim of highlighting Israel’s main advantages, disadvantages and external factors defining its soft power potential of being a model and a source of development aid for SSA countries.

The main strengths of Israel which generate its potential to help SSA countries’ development are of know-how nature. They relate to smart ways, institutions and technologies and to investment in people—human and social capital. They can be an inspiration for reforms and adaptations in SSA, based on engagement of local inhabitants and locally affordable resources. The main areas where Israeli experience is particularly suitable are desert agriculture, sustainable water and energy production, social innovation, entrepreneurship and women empowerment. The possibilities for specialisation in the future seem to emerge in the remit of smart cities, in particular management of megalopolis in the climate change era. The weaknesses and threats to the future of Israeli soft power result from years of neglect towards some issues (for example, environment); failed policies with regard to areas of social conflict (equality, status of Mizrachim, ultra-orthodox, Arabs or Bedouins); popular culture turning away from communalism and idealism and moving towards individualism and consumerism; as well as the shift towards right-wing nationalistic policies.

Table 3.1 SWOT analysis of Israeli soft power in the context of SSA countries’ development needs.

Strengths

Weaknesses

Integration of ethnically, linguistically and culturally diversified migrants

Successful state-building, inclusive of groups initially resistant to change

Establishment of new dwellings, rapid provision of housing

Success of communal agriculture and dwellings and their market reform

Overall positive balance of economy liberalisation

Culture of equality and women’s rights

Adaptability of policies and practices to changing environment and lessons learned

Experience in dealing with war- and violence-related traumas

Youth movements as a source of social capital, cohesiveness and leadership

Labour movement’s tradition of social solidarity

High levels of innovation in education

Leading higher education system and high university enrolment levels

Educational roles of the army

Successful fight against malaria, high quality of healthcare

Elimination of rural poverty

Successful agriculture in drylands

Strong agricultural research and innovations

Education for environment (among farmers, pupils, general)

Diversity of measures for combating desertification

Successful water management, water saving, reuse and desalination

Increasing use of solar power

Strong innovativeness in high technology sector, strong start-up culture

Strong democracy, rule of law and press freedom, ethos of discussion

Apolitical civil service

Resilience to corruption

Social and economic inequalities, high child poverty rates

Instances of discrimination against newly immigrated groups and Arab population; unsolved issues regarding the Bedouin

Unequal quality of the primary education system

Decreasing ideological engagement and social solidarity

Low affordability of housing, low level of ecologically sustainable housing

Loss of biodiversity and landscapes due to industrialisation and urbanisation

Polluted air and waters, insufficient waste management

Insufficient use of solar energy

High reliance on fossil fuels, high CO₂ footprint

Limited credibility to counsel on managing and solving conflicts (except for taming terror threats) due to Palestinian conflict

Protective measures for local agricultural market

Opportunities

Threats

Development of smart cities and solutions for megalopolis

Reversal of ecological losses, introduction and enforcement of new pro-ecological legislation

Export of water solutions

Export of water in the framework of regional peace process

Export of solar energy technologies

Discoveries in the area of HIV/AIDS treatment

Successful internationalisation of small start-up companies

Development of smart ways of benefiting from the potential of the Israeli Diaspora

Threats

Degradation of labour and youth movements ethos and participation levels

Spiralling demographic growth

Insufficient governmental support for start-ups to grow and internationalise

Further increase of pollution and environmental degradation, including through unresolved waste management, unexpected consequences of desalination, degradation of the Dead Sea area

Collapse of farming industry due to cheap imports from abroad

Limited interest of students to study sciences

Limited governmental financing for development and humanitarian aid

Turn away from democratic values towards post-politics

Tolerance for cronyism

Increasing government’s hold on the media market

Notes

1 IBRD 2000: 1, 10–11; Lawrence 2010: 22, 24, 26–27.

2 Fieldhouse 1986: 27, 31, 34–37, 55–56, 102.

3 Kłosowicz 2014: 30–36; Fieldhouse 1986: 233.

4 IBRD 2000: 23–24; Fieldhouse 1986: 124; Collier, Gunning, O’Connell, Ndulu 2008: 423; Bloom, Sachs 1998.

5 Leszczyński 2013: 369–385; interestingly, such was the Zeitgeist: economic planning has been endorsed by the UN Economic Commission for Africa. Chileshe 1986: 51.

6 IBRD 2000: 23–24, 53; 2008: 339–344; Fieldhouse 1986: 57, 84–89, 96, 102, 107, 118–119, 124–125.

7 Ndulu, O’Connell 2008: 5–8, 22–25, 44.

8 Anseeuw 2010: 247, 251–252, 260; FAO Corporate Document Repository 2003: 165–184; Sundaram, von Arnim 2008.

9 Stefaniak 2015.

10 IBRD 2000:53, x.

11 Aginam 2014: 17–21, 61; IBRD 2000: 41, 103, 105, 120, 159; Benedict, Ukpere 2012; Canning, Raja, Yazbeck 2015: 4, 10.

12 Pingali, Schneider, Zurek 2014: 154.

13 Lawrence 2010: 24; UN-Habitat, ICLEI, UCLGA 2014: 25, 49; IBRD 2000: 42; Domingues Torres 2012: 1, 10–12, 19, 27–29.

14 Pejout 2010: 7, 11, 31, 35, 39, 42, 48.

15 Gray, Khan 2010: 340–341; IBRD 2000: 54–55, 57, 61–62, 72–73, 118; Kłosowicz 2014: 36–58; Obadare 2016.

16 UN-Habitat, ICLEI, UCLGA 2014: 10–13, 33, 162.

17 UN-Habitat, ICLEI, UCLGA 2014: 33; Pingali, Schneider, Zurek 2014: 157, 161.

18 FAO 2011; Uneke 2008; UN-Habitat, ICLEI, UCLGA 2014: 12, 33.

19 Falola, Heaton 2009: 158–239, 275–276; Williams, Turner, Dunn 1978.

20 Chileshe 1986: 51–84, 141–179; UNDP 2016: xv–xix, 1–30.

21 UNDP 2015: 50–59; Schneider 2014: 19–45, 74–88; Green 2014: 3–10, 19, 33.

22 Panel discussion 2017.

23 Bryc 2014.

24 Rodin 1969: 4–5.

25 Interview with Tal Azran and Moran Yarchi.

26 The Reut Institute 2012.

27 Adelman 2008: 4–5, 10–11, 28–37, 43, 45; Bryc 2014: 55.

28 Tal 2013: 110; Adelman 2008: 52.

29 The great immigration started in 1948, after British limits were scrapped; it continued throughout the 1950s, but the largest wave arrived until late 1951. The 1950 Law of Return and the 1951 Absorption of Immigrants Law allowed every Jewish individual or a community to become full-rights citizens upon arrival. Aside from 350,000 European Holocaust survivors, around 650,000 Oriental Jews (Sephardim and Mizrachim) arrived. In 1948–51, 47.5% of newcomers came from Europe, 34.5% from Asia, 13.6% from Africa. In 1952–60, 47.5% were Europeans, 49.4% from Africa, 12% from Asia, 3.4% from America. In the case of many of the Jews from Arab countries (Iraq, Morocco, Turkey, Yemen, Tunisia, Algeria), they were allowed to emigrate only after abandoning their possessions.

30 Eisenstadt 1985: 155, 159, 296; Gilbert 1998: 257–263, 270–271; Smooha 2008: 8; Bialer 1990: 199; Bareli 2007; Lissak 2003; Eisenstadt 1986: 25.

31 Adelman 2008: 136–139, 180–186; Eisenstadt 1985: 233–234; Bareli 2007; Rubner 1960: 221.

32 Orenstein 2013: 100–101; Gilbert 1998: 250–251, 262.

33 Adelman 2008: 138–142, 170; Gilbert 1998: 250, 461; Sachar 1996: 942.

34 Bareli 2007: 209; Sachar 1996: 832–838, 881; Gilbert 1998: 479–480; Sachar 1996: 834–835, 941–943; Moskowitz 2001; Arlosorof 2015; Aran 2013: 25.

35 Chazan 2012.

36 Saleh 2010; Rynhold 2016.

37 Spector 2006: 197.

38 Smooha 2008: 12; Halevi 2011.

39 Gilbert 1998: 258; Eisenstadt 1986: 7, 10–11, 17; Smooha 2008; Adelman 2008:17, 49–54, 115, 135.

40 Meir-Glitzenstein 2000; Bernstein, Swirsk 1982; Eisenstadt 1985: 234–248, 275–293; Kabalo 2009.

41 Eisenstadt 1985: 15–17, 294–306, 316–320; Lissak 2003; Sprinzak 1998; Gilbert 1998: 287.

42 Bareli 2007: 209–213.

43 Bernstein 1957: 298–302, Gerlitz 2015; Nasra, Elran, Yashiv 2016; Du-kiyum 2017; Tal 2013: 124–125; Abu-Rabbia 2016.

44 Sachar 1996: 968–971; Smooha 2008.

45 Khanin 2010.

46 Smooha 2008: 1, 13–15.

47 Emmons 1997; Kogan 2015.

48 Weinglass 2019.

49 Bernstein 1957: 21–30, 35, 39, 96, 156–161, 175.

50 Bernstein 1957: 212–217, 226; Gilbert 1998: 261–262, 267; Adelman 2008: 117.

51 Marx 2008; Eisenstadt 1985: 159; Gilbert 1998: 265–269, 271–273, 286–288, 290, 296, 302–303.

52 Levin 1970: 49; Bernstein 1957: 285–310; Meir-Glitzenstein 2000; Deri 2017; Eisenstadt 1985: 5–6, 199, 201–202.

53 Curiel 2015.

54 Plunkett 1958: 156–157, 162, 171; Adelman 2008: 168; Moskovich 2012: 80–82, 88–89, 92; Preminger 2016: 62–63.

55 Bernstein 1957: 238–246; Maman, Rosenhek 2012: 342, 352–357.

56 Gilbert 1998: 265.

57 Gilbert 1998: 258, 265; Eisenstadt 1985: 254–258, 264; Eisenstadt 1986: 20.

58 Troen 1992; Belman-Inbal, Zahavi 2009: 24.

59 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1955; Adelman 2008: 6–7, 178; Belman-Inbal, Tzachor 2013: 6; Rosenberg 2018.

60 Belman-Inbal, Tzachor 2013: 6–7, 9–11; Federbush, Muys 2012: 314; Ministry of Environment 2000: 112.

61 Greenberg, Alexander 2012; World Health Organisation 1956; Klein Leichman 2013.

62 Bernstein 1957: 320–328; Ministry of Health.

63 Eaton, Chen1969.

64 Gilbert 1998: 260–263, 267; Cohen 1995; Shelly 2008; Eaton, Chen1969.

65 Azarya, Kimmerling 1980; Cohen 1995; Eaton, Chen 1969; The Montreal Gazette 1968: 44.

66 Adelman 2008: 41.

67 Galor 2014: 86; Plunkett 1958; Ben-David 1964: 11; Weintraub, Lissak 1964a; Weintraub, Lissak 1964b; Rosenthal, Eiges 2014.

68 Rosenthal, Eiges 2014; Ben-Rafael,Oved, Tope 2012.

69 Sofer, Applebaum2006.

70 Rehber, Galor, Duman 1999: 81–82; Rosenthal, Eiges 2014; Gamson 2012: 92.

71 Palgi 2012: 274; Snir 2006: 6–8.

72 Shuval 2013: 136; Shefler 2010; Amiran 1987: 295; Gilbert 1998: 263–302; Rehber, Galor, Duman 1999: 81.

73 Gilbert 1998: 272; Amiran 1987: 294; Kloosterman 2012; Friend 2013; Soil Ecology and Restoration Group 1999; Tal 2013:117; Levin 1970: 49.

74 OECD 2010: 46–47, 57; Tovias 2009; Katzir 2008.

75 Tal 2002.

76 Teschner, McDonald, Foxon, Paavola 2012: 461; State of Israel, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs: 1: 1; Ministry of Environment 2000; Ministry of Environment 2010.

77 Tal 2013: 110–113, 106–118.

78 Federbush, Muys 2012: 308. Laveea, Danieli, Beniad, Shvartzman, Ash 2013; Tal 2007.

79 Levina, Elronb, Gasith 2009; Tal 2002: 116–117.

80 Dostrovsky 1972; Shuval 2013: 133–134, 139.

81 Gilbert 1998: 266; Tal 2002: 206–207; Dostrovsky 1972; Shuval 2013: 131, 138–139; Federbush, Muys 2012: 311–313; OECD 2010: 58.

82 Gilbert 1998: 291, 352–354.

83 Federbush, Muys 2012: 313; Oron, Adel, Agmon, Friedler, Halperin, Leshem, Weinberg 2014; Feitelson, Rosenthal 2012.

84 Dostrovsky 1972; Teschner, McDonald, Foxon, Paavola 2012; Feitelson, Rosenthal 2012.

85 Tal 2002: 39, 46–47, 69–70, 103–107, 183–184; Tal 2013: 120–123; Osem, Brand, Tauber, Perevolotsky, Zoref 2014; United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs; Ministry of Environment 2010:71.

86 State of Israel, Intended Nationally: 1–4; Tal 2016.

87 Rosenthal 2005; Beker 2006: 37.

88 Fried, Bennett, Roger 2009: 82–84.

89 Belman-Inbal, Ben Yehuda, Weizmann 2012.

4Israeli development aid

SUBCHAPTER 1: ISRAEL AS A DONOR

Israeli development aid programme was launched in 1956 and officially recognised as an essential part of Israeli international cooperation in 1958, just 10 years after the Declaration of Independence of the modern State of Israel. This is also when aid agency MASHAV (acronym for Hebrew “Department of International Cooperation”; the word “assistance” appeared in the initial name but was quickly removed to avoid paternalism) came into being within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) structure. The idea was from the beginning to share Israeli know-how through training and to send experts to work on the ground. The country was just getting over its own developmental problems when numerous states in Asia and Africa decolonised. They needed Israeli development experiences, while Israel needed their diplomatic recognition.

This subchapter shows the nature of Israel as an international donor. It focuses on the motives guiding Israeli aid-giving; institutional structures of aid; operational mechanisms; main characteristics of aid, its volumes and geography of recipients; adherence to international standards and patterns of cooperation with other donors. The subchapter is wrapped up with reflecting on categorisation of Israel as an “emerging donor”. While of a general nature, for illustration, specific references are made already in this subchapter to aid devoted to sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries.

Narratives around aid-giving

Along with foreign policy and security objectives or religious motives behind the initiation of development aid programme for Africa, ideological motives cannot be ignored as the strong support for the programme among elites and citizens, as well as the projection of aid as Israel's international role, was grounded in them. Israelis believed that aid could be helpful in gaining friends and getting out of the isolation imposed by their neighbours. Israeli identity, as a developing state that gained a hard-won independence and espoused socialist-oriented modes of development, implied amoral obligation to help, in particular faced with a strong demand for Israeli expertise expressed by developing countries and international agencies. David Ben-Gurion was interested in development issues and had contacts with leaders of the developing world. Golda Meir, sharing his views on the need for Israel to engage, implemented his vision through the establishment of MASHAV. Instrumental were her travels to Africa, where she not only met with elites but also travelled in the countryside, meeting ordinary citizens. This resulted in affection for the continent and its people, women in particular. Personally engaged, she was well received; even commentators highlighting her sense of superiority towards Africans admit that there was mutual understanding and sentiment. Still she was assertive to leaders, such as Ghana's Nkrumah, demanding aid while acting against Israel. She reportedly told Nkrumah that Israel helps out of conviction rather than calculus, and the receiving nation needs to take responsibility for own development.¹ In her memoir, she devoted an entire chapter to cooperation with Africa, focusing mainly on the aid programme, of which she was particularly proud. Her exact words are as follows:

“Like them, we had shaken off foreign rule; (…) had to learn (…) how to reclaim the land, how to increase the yields (…), how to irrigate, how to raise poultry, how to live together and how to defend ourselves. (…) We couldn’t offer Africa money or arms, but (…) we were free of the taint of the colonial exploiters because all that we wanted from Africa was friendship. (…) Did we go into Africa because we wanted votes at the United Nations? Yes, of course (…) The main reason (…) was that we had something we wanted to pass on to nations (…) younger and less experienced (…) the programme was a logical extension of the principles in which I had always believed (…)”²

Back in the 1960s, the importance of technical cooperation as an inherent part of foreign policy was subject to a vast consensus in the Knesset, confirmed in the governments’ official platforms. An example from 1969 reads as follows:

“Israel regards as a primary aim for mankind the speeding up of the progress of the nations of Asia and Africa which still suffer a substantial disadvantage in the level of their development as compared with the developed countries. Israel will support to the limit of its capacity any international action to foster the social and economic freedom of the developing nations, while meticulously respecting their independence and progress.”³

In her introduction to the over 300-page report from the 1961 6-week long, Golda Meir Mount Carmel Training Centre in Haifa (MCTC) seminar “The Role of Women in a Developing Society”, Mina Ben Zvi underlined: varied ethnic backgrounds of Israeli population, relevant to the African diversity challenges; importance of showing Israeli development processes (living laboratory)’ and awareness of their various weaknesses. This shows a genuine effort of sharing useful experience and not merely making publicity for Israel's achievements. While such zeal faded with time, due to influx of new cadres and increasing bureaucratisation of foreign policy, the perception of Africa as aground for much more profound activity than just struggle for votes was getting more nuanced. The scale of aid was such that virtually every citizen had someone engaged in the programme within family or friends; this generated popular emotional engagement. The 1960s press followed the lines of dominant political discourse, with leftist papers unanimously for the programme and right-wing ones more sceptical, but still supportive. However, there was a steady increase in voices throughout the political spectrum that more loyalty should be expected from main beneficiaries in the international forums, and that aid programme should refer more to mutual interests and economic aims. Such voices appeared already when Ghana joined a 1961 condemnatory resolution of Casablanca summit. Israeli students, interviewed by Sharma in the early 1970s (the context indicates that it was before the 1973 war), were supportive of aid but saw the motives as mainly political, rather than ideological.⁴

Following the 1973 war, most of the sub-Saharan recipients broke relations with Israel. This crushed the support for the programme. While so far aid was conditioned only on maintenance of relations, at this point the programme had to be cancelled. Israeli press became highly critical of the effort. Meir underlined achievements and defended the programme, stating that it was not motivated by pure interest in some reciprocity, but a result of Jewish long-held traditions and historic instincts. As a consequence of the perceived “African betrayal”, consolidation of the alliance with the West, the turn of the Israeli politics towards more nationalist-oriented right-wing, aid was referred to much less, but when it did the motives were the same. Moshe Dayan, before the 1978 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), while also discussing vital security issues, confirmed that Israel as a developing nation identifies with aspirations of others, seeks equal economic partnership and proposes a voluntary agreement for the exchange of technical assistance.⁵

As for contemporary examples, in an address to the 2016 UNGA Debate on New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), Israeli delegate not only underlined Africa's talent and responsibility for development but also promised a continued support and recalled Israeli initiatives. Commonalities of fate, willingness to share experiences and to build relations through development cooperation and Jewish tradition of aiding the world are still mentioned. There is also observable increase in references to tikkun olam or social justice. According to Benny Omer, a former Ambassador to West Africa countries and employee of the MASHAV, the moral obligation of Jews to share their knowledge with those in need is very much in the back of everybody's minds.⁶

As for trade, already in 1967 an expectation was voiced that assisted countries will progress so they become more attractive trade partners. Nowadays, if an SSA country becomes able to trade with a developed state like Israel, it will be seen as proving aid effectiveness in bringing development; potential of contacts forged through aid for increasing economic cooperation is also recognised.⁷ In an address to the 2018, 7th International Day Conference, held in the Knesset under the theme of positive influence of Israel in developing countries, Prime Minister Netanyahu underlined that cooperation with developing countries, promoted by Israeli civil society, opens new markets for Israeli companies while improving quality of life of millions through Israeli innovations.⁸

The growing importance of commercial and political motivation behind development programmes has been confirmed also by the July 2018 government decision 4021 on Promoting Israeli activity in the field of international development and accompanying documents. They underlined that emerging markets need attention, since Israeli export is overly concentrated on developed markets. Moreover, they argued that participation in international development efforts will boost Israel's role as a developed state, actively contributing to solving development challenges of the humanity, as defined by the United Nations (UN) and in line with Israel's international obligations—thus it will also improve Israel's international standing. While Israel's comparative advantages resulting from its history of development are discussed, language related to religious motives and moral obligations is pretty absent from these particular documents. Some examples of thinking in straight terms of soft power projection can be found as well. In 2006, Ron Prosor, former Director-General of the MFA, called the MASHAV the winning formula of soft power, combining economic utility with values and contributing to repairing the world.⁹

Still, the atmosphere in the subsequent Knessets and governments, from the 1990s on, is much less concerned with aid or consensual. Proposals of a law to guarantee minimal budgetary allocation to development aid failed. No references to aid have been found by the author in the recent governments’ platforms, though since 2009 there are references to the commitment to international efforts on climate and environmental protection. As other donors’, Israeli aid is mostly extended when there is also some political leverage expected and it diminishes when there is no such prospect. Even in the 1960s, the programme was evaluated mainly as a political tool serving state interest.¹⁰

Institutional framework

Particular institutions comprise Israel's official aid infrastructure.

Ministry of foreign affairs: MASHAV

MASHAV is the national coordinator of the international development cooperation located under the Deputy Director General of the MFA. At the 1960s peak of the scale of the programme, MASHAV used to have up to 80 employees. Contemporarily, it has about 40–50, among them many diplomats with experience gained at the Israeli Embassies in SSA. The director at the time of writing, Gil Heskel, used to serve as Ambassador to Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi and Permanent Representative to United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and United Nations Human Settlement Program (UN HABITAT). Moreover, in some key countries (like Ethiopia) there was a permanent MASHAV representative posted. MASHAV structure included its Head, Deputy Head, Special Advisor on Medical Activities and Departments for planning, information and evaluation; policy and international relations, finance and budget; projects and training division. The last two oversee MASHAV extensions: MCTC, Aharon Ofri International Training Center, and the Ministry of Agriculture Center for International Agricultural Development Cooperation (CINADCO). These extensions and other organisations (selected through tenders) affiliated for purposes of trainings are described next, with 2014 taken as an example to show their activities. MASHAV is also supported by the embassies, promoting activities among potential beneficiaries and supporting trainees’ recruitment. While MASHAV finances and coordinates the aid programme (including selection of participants), the main thrust of programming and implementation is done by training centres and the ministries responsible for particular field of cooperation(agriculture, defence, health, housing, interior, labour, social welfare), some of which have or used to have separate departments dealing with development cooperation. The technical intermediary, Company for Technology Transfer (ha-Igud), is a state-owned company, the aim of which is to implement MASHAV programmes through dealing with management technicalities of trainings, expert personnel, contracts with research institutions, fundraising and partnerships. It enables cooperation with foreign entities hesitant to deal with the Israeli government directly.¹¹

Until the mid-1960s, projects were based on purely intergovernmental cooperation schemes, yet then they started to involve commercial and industrial entities belonging to the state or the Histadrut, MASHAV's foremost non-governmental partner. Research institutions and professional bodies also became common cooperators of MASHAV. At the height of development programme for Africa, some activities were also initiated at a local level, especially kibbutzim, which frequently cooperated with foreign partners, in particular on agriculture. The openness of the process testifies to the pluralistic attitude and search for quality in international cooperation. Moreover, MASHAV engages in cooperation with international organisations, in particular the UN family. In the 1990s, with renewed possibilities of cooperation, including in SSA, MASHAV envisaged that Israel would become an international training hub in matters where Israel has competences, with partial financing by international partners.¹²

MASHAV's objectives are defined as assistance for economic and social development; assistance for growth and for eliminating poverty and illiteracy in developing countries; promotion of state and political contacts; strengthening of trade and economic contacts; improvement of Israel's image among recipient states, other donors and international institutions. Importantly, these are guiding principles and not legal preconditions for aid.¹³ Israel's policy is influenced by international agreements, but it has no particular legal act devoted to aid. This might change due to the possible follow-up to the July 2018 decision creating an intergovernmental committee tasked with elaborating a strategy for Israeli engagement in international development.¹⁴

Other ministries

The Ministry of Education associates with relevant programmes, even if only through oversight of the activities of the Ofri Centre. The Ministry of infrastructure used to annually organise month-long trainings on energy management and conservation (data for the period 1995–2000 speak of over 150 graduates from more than 40 countries). The Ministry of Defence used to be responsible for the Nahal and Gadna types of programmes, including those focused on agricultural training.¹⁵

Mount Carmel Golda Meir International Training Centre for community services

The Centre, a good case study for a MASHAV-affiliated institution, was established in 1961 in Haifa on the initiative of then Foreign Minister Golda Meir. It was the first international training centre concerned with encouraging socio-economic advancement of women in the developing world and focused on women's participation in development. It emerged as a result of the1961 Haifa conference organised by Mina Ben-Zvi—delegate of the International Council of Social Democratic Women to the first UN conference on women in Ethiopia, a goodwill missionary of Israel to Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika and a close cooperator of Golda Meir. The conference gathered more than 60 delegates from Africa and Asia and adopted a declaration calling for creation of a centre in Israel which would be an intermediary for ideas’ sharing. The Centre was established through the engagement of MASHAV, Haifa Municipality and Swedish International Development Authority (Inga Thorsson, a Swedish parliamentarian and ambassador to Israel, worked with Ben-Zvi). Thus, MCTC emerged out of spontaneous, grass-roots, authentic international recognition of the need—and Israel's potential to provide. Importantly, it had been created around 15 years before United Nations Development Program (UNDP) started to reflect on the neglected and potential role of women in development.¹⁶

MCTC deals with poverty combined with gender inequality, preventing sustainable development. Its activities include trainings and international conferences regarding early childhood education (encompassing language acquisition and literacy in a multicultural society, support for children infected with HIV and integration of those with special needs), community development (for example, management of non-governmental organisations [NGOs], women's leadership, media strategies for social change) and microenterprises (youth entrepreneurship, rural tourism, ways to support small businesses). The target group are women from developing countries, although since the 1970s also men are admitted. With time, the length of a standard course was cut down from several months (up to a year) to weeks, following changing nature of the recipients’ needs. Since the 1980s, joint programmes with CINADCO and the Histadrut were offered. Participants are mainly mid-level professionals. MCTC offers training in English, French, Spanish and Russian, with courses in Arabic introduced most recently. Until 1970, the Centre hosted more than 2000 participants; at the time of writing the number of participants from SSA only surpassed 3500.In 2014, taken as an example, 20 in-house trainings were joined by 479 participants (72% of them women) from 62 countries. MCTC provides participants with full-board accommodation. Its method includes field trips to Israeli locations relevant to the topic studied (kindergartens, women's businesses, shelters for violence victims) and discussions with people there; sightseeing trips are also provided. The annual programme, planned half a year in advance, is accepted by the MASHAV, which also transfers MCTC's budget covering all expenses (including participants expenses, unless sponsored by a third party, except for flight tickets). All activities are planned in line with international development agenda, adjusted to participants’ expectations and evaluated, with feedback taken into account. MCTC organises also capacity building workshops abroad (500–2000 participants yearly). Another initiative is International Women Leaders’ Conference, picking up topical issues since the 1960s. MCTC cooperates, both for conferences and trainings, with international organisations—United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), United Nations Children's Fund UNICEF, UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), UN Habitat, UNAIDS, UN Women and Millennium Cities Initiative—on African projects on the ground, courses (participants'scholarships are sponsored by international organisations) and on the Leaders’ Conference.¹⁷

The Center for International Agricultural Development Cooperation

CINADCO, since its creation in 1983, have trained (in Arabic, English, French, Spanish and Russian) tens of thousands of participants from developing countries on water management, irrigation, fertilisation, livestock and dairy, sustainable marketing, organisation of research and development. Areas of specialisation include know-how on reducing food losses on the way from farmer to consumer and drip irrigation, including use of saline and treated water. The year 2014, taken as an example, saw 34 CINADCO courses in Israel (international as well as “tailor-made” country specific) with 575 participants from more than 60 countries. A total of 23 courses abroad gathered over 800 participants, including from Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo. Cooperation was held with such international organisations as UNESCO, UNDP, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), World Food Organisation (FAO), World Meteorological Organization (WMO), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Jordanian National Center for Agricultural Research and Extension, China Association of International Exchange of Personnel and Middle East Desalination Research Center. Total 46 short-term consultancy missions in 20 countries were conducted, also in Burkina-Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Sudan, Tanzania and Togo. Moreover, development and demonstration projects were developed, including a new Centre of Excellence for Agriculture and Rural Development (combining quality crop production, training site and pool of experts to help local farmers) in Rwanda, citrus production project (in cooperation with Germany) in Ghana and a national program to increase production and improve incomes in Senegal.¹⁸

Weitz Centre for Development Studies

Weitz Centre has existed since 1963 and trains in integrated local and regional development. It holds courses in English and Spanish. Inter alia, it offers International Rural Regional Development Planning course, with thousands of alumni since it was started in 1969. The course is divided in two stages: 5 months of learning in Israel and 2 months of preparation of a comprehensive development planning project in a developing country. Other courses, on the example of the 2014, include course on “Green Economy—Policy Measures and Implementation of Green Policies, Strategies and Support Systems for Rural Revitalization Growth” organised with MASHAV, UNEP, UNIDO and the World Bank Institute (28 participants—public officials, environmental leaders, policy makers, from 16 developing countries). A course “Addressing the Urbanization Challenge” was also held (in cooperation with UNESCO, 27 participants from 18 countries).¹⁹

Afro-Asian Institute for Labour Studies and Cooperation

The Institute was established in 1960, following requests by developing countries’ trade unionists, interested in the role of Histadrut in setting labour standards and in the surrounding system. It used to provide facilities for training and field work (in kibbutzim, development towns and worker-owned entities) for those interested in trade unionism, rural and cooperative development. A report from 1972 puts statistics on 4-month-long training programmes at over 1700 participants from 77 countries. Since 1964, due to a gap between growing interest and training spaces available, the Institute has also held on-the-spot trainings abroad. The Institute continues to train, yet on a very small scale, as the International Institute of Leadership.²⁰

The Aharon Ofri International Training Centre

The Centre, established in 1989, deals with connection between education and sustainable social development. Its international cooperators for courses held in Israel and abroad include UNESCO, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), USAID, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, International Organization for Migration, the World Bank and the Organisation of American States. Since inception, it trained thousands, transferring Israeli knowledge and experience in basic skills development, civic and special needs education. Courses last up to several weeks; accommodation, health insurance and social activities are covered by the MASHAV.

Other institutions

Many examples of research and academic institutions active in development aid programmes could be mentioned. Many students from SSA study in these institutions on scholarships. The choice is made here of those most relevant.

The Weizmann Institute of Science in Rehovot is a leading primary research institution engaging in development-related research, taking credit for launching famous international conferences on topics such as science in the advancement of new states (1960), comprehensive planning of agriculture (1963), fiscal and monetary problems (1965) and health in developing countries (1967).²¹ The Agricultural Research Organization—Volcani Center, affiliated with the Ministry of Agriculture, has six divisions dealing with plants, animals, soil, water, agricultural engineering, postharvest and food sciences. At the Ben Gurion University of the Negev (BGU), the Jacob Blaustein Institutes for Desert Research (the French Associates Institute for Agriculture and Biotechnology of Drylands; the Swiss Institute for Dryland Environmental & Energy Research; the Zuckerberg Institute for Water Research) have operated since the early 1970s. They carry out significant research on desertification, desert ecology and agriculture, renewable energy and related social sciences; oft-times co-sponsored by MASHAV and international organisations. Still at BGU, the Centre for Emerging Diseases, Tropical Diseases and AIDS, created in 2006, puts particular emphasis on research on neglected tropical diseases. Done together with MASHAV and Clinton Foundation, the Centre's deworming projects gained appreciation of the Ethiopian Health Ministry. The Negev Institute for Strategies of Peace and Development concentrates on non-agricultural sources of earnings and on sharing Israeli cooperative experiences, which are being adapted and taught to hundreds of trainees from Africa, Asia and from Arab countries. The Galilee International Management Institute, established in 1987, offers courses, sponsored by external agencies, with hundreds of participants from Africa; like agricultural trainings for former militants from Nigeria and for bank managers from Kenya.

Entrepreneurs and the civil society

Companies with developmental aims are significant and growing phenomena. Ornit Avidar says that the trend has been visible since around 2011. She calls such enterprises “social impact companies”: having development as a primary goal while doing business a secondary one and maintaining a legal form of an enterprise so as to guarantee financial liquidity. This differentiates them from “developmentally aware” companies, who “do good” while doing business.²²

When it comes to Israeli businesses’ participation in development-related activities, two strands can be distinguished. The first one can be dubbed “sustainable business” or “business for development”. This relates to business practices which, while aimed at profit, work in developmentally conscious ways, adapting the business models so that they can practically serve sustainable development needs of a given community acquiring company's products or service. On the example of activities by NETAFIM, focused on irrigation systems, the model includes not only selling irrigation sets, but also working with farmers to make sure that they know how to operate them, store additional produce obtained and checking if the farmers have sufficient opportunities to market and capitalise on this produce.²³ The second strand can be called “development market” and refers to participation in tenders launched by international development bodies for works in developing countries. Israeli companies do not participate on the scale proportional to Israel's share of global gross domestic product (GDP). In 2001–10, their average share in the World Bank procurement was 0.21%, while Israel's part in global GDP—0.34%.²⁴ The World Bank Procurement Contracts Award Summary data show that in 2000–16, Israel acquired 0.18% of procurement; in 2008–16, the indicator stood at 0.19%, confirming low participation.

A separate mention shall be made of AgroStudies, developed by the Ramat ha-Negev International Agricultural Training Centre in partnership with the government. Within it, students from developing countries (already thousands, mainly from Asia, Africa, also South America) come for a year of studying combined with paid work at farms. Afterwards, they should come back to home countries, finish studies and use their knowledge there. Due to instances of illegal overstay, applications from Africa for 2017 were suspended by the Ministry of Interior.²⁵ In 2019, Agrostudies reported again having students from Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, Uganda and Zambia. For example, there were 140 students from Rwanda on training in Israel in 2019 and a plan for 2020 was 150. From Ghana, 50 students came in late 2018 and another 70 were scheduled to come in late 2019.

There are some mechanisms of support for businesses. Israel Export Institute, the Ministry of the Environment and MASHAV, prepared a publication guiding companies active in environmental technologies on how their products might be relevant for customers from developing countries. The PEARS Challenge fellowship is operated in cooperation with the Tel Aviv University (TAU) to support emerging innovative solutions for development issues. A similar MASHAV activity, Grand Challenges Israel, was launched in 2014 together with the Prime Minister's Office and the Office of the Chief Scientist in the Ministry of Economy. It offers yearly of up to USD 140,000 to developmental innovators, especially in global health (including water and sanitation) and food security. Moreover, the Israel Innovation Authority launched Product Adaptation Programme—Africa for the adaptation of products to African needs and conditions (cultural environment, climate, infrastructure, legal requirements). The programme follows from government's approval of a strategic plan for strengthening economic cooperation with Africa, seen as a rising opportunity for Israeli enterprises. A relevant governmental decision tasks the Authority, with support of other ministries, with identifying the needs and launching a call for Israeli companies.²⁶

A 2014 report by TAU and Israeli Export Institute maps possibilities for businesses to reach markets in the poorest countries, housing half of the world's population. It encourages making use of Israeli advantages, such as technologies and geographical proximity, in areas like dryland agriculture, water management, renewable energy, information and communication technologies, medical and educational technologies and advises on typical challenges in dealing with these markets and on financing opportunities, including through clean development schemes and development-focused banks. An increased interest in these markets is projected as a big opportunity for growth of these businesses while contributing to well-being. Support for such activities by private companies seems to be the government's main line of action as far as increasing Israel's engagement in development is concerned.²⁷

Israeli civil society organisations active in development aid abroad is a very diverse group. Still, they share certain characteristics. They often engage volunteers; almost all of them affiliate with local NGOs; they refer mostly to the universal values and see development aid as a way of promoting these values. They do not get significant financing from the UN system or bilateral aid agencies.²⁸ According to Ophelie Namiech from IsraAid, the sector is full of enthusiasm but needs professionalisation. Both the public and the sector itself need to understand what true development and humanitarian work is, going much beyond volunteering and good intentions arising from Zionism and tikkun olam narrative. Furthermore, according to the interviewee, there is a great chance for unique quality of projects when Israeli hands-on approach, flexibility, innovativeness and dynamism are in some way reconciled with the professional standards and ethical frameworks of the global development community. Besides quality, it would increase scale of activities through opening of new sources of funding. Currently, the majority of financing for Israeli NGOs comes from the Jewish donors.²⁹

Civil society endeavoured to gather data on budgetary contribution of the NGOs but failed due to the lack of a legal obligation to disclose such data. There is no formal mechanism for cooperation between the non-governmental sector and the government, yet the government offices are seen as easily approachable and there is a good level of information exchange. However, there is no governmental allocation (grant programme) for NGOs active abroad. Israeli branch of Society for International Development (SID)—an umbrella organisation gathering Israeli organisations active in developmental and humanitarian work abroad—works towards the creation of such a found. Since 2016 private donations to organisations active abroad have been tax-free, as has already been the case with donations for organisations active in Israel. SID works also on re-initiating the idea of a legal act specifying minimum budgetary contribution for international development cooperation, yet it is on early stages. The main challenges observed are preparation of the necessary documents and gathering sufficient political support. SID also works as a coordination platform. There is an internal mailing network, efforts are made to trigger more work in thematic clusters (such as agriculture and volunteering) and in business involvement.³⁰

Of the 14 NGOs surveyed by the Pears Foundation, 11 are active in Africa, of which 5 concentrate on the area of development work, 4 on humanitarian aid and 2 on both.³¹ Moreover, young Israelis increasingly choose to volunteer abroad, especially while travelling in Africa, Asia or South America during gap year after compulsory army service. Opportunities for such a short-term volunteering arise, with some organisations specialising in using capabilities of this cohort; an application HelpApp enables one finding volunteering opportunities, also in Africa. In February 2017, MFA and SID organised a meeting between African ambassadors and Israeli NGOs working in SSA.

Study programmes preparing Israeli and international cadres for work in development aid are International Masters in Public Health, the Glocal Masters (MA) in Community Development Studies and MA in Nonprofit Management and Leadership at the HUJ; MA in Disaster Prevention and Management, in Migration Studies and the Manna Centre Program in Food Safety and Security at the TAU; Bachelors (BA) in International Social Work at Sapir Collage; MA in Immigration and Social Integration at Rupin Academic Centre. A non-academic training programme for future aid workers is offered by SID-Israel. Significantly, the rule for the programmes mentioned is that they require participation in a project in a developing country. Moreover, graduates of African studies at the BGU can receive grants for an internship in an African institution or organisation.

Operational mechanisms

From the beginning, Israeli assistance is based on requests from other states. At times, Israel was overwhelmed with them beyond capacities; a 1965 estimation was that it can reply to around half. Bearing in mind that financial conditions offered by Israel were sometimes less favourable than those given by large donors; this testifies to a belief in high quality of Israeli aid. Criteria used to evaluate requests included possible impacts on recipient's development; capacity of Israel to implement the project and beneficiary's ability to participate in it. The criteria were apolitical and even own economic interest sacrificed at times, in the name of knowledge sharing. What now is called “demand-driven approach” and a vast extent of flexibility allowing for adaptation of projects also during their implementation are the features of Israeli aid which were innovative then and are in the mainstream nowadays³². The 1967 Holbik's systematisation of forms of Israeli aid, remains largely valid (except joint companies):

joint companies, owned by an Israeli company and the (majority owner) beneficiary governments, run by Israeli advisors and meant to be gradually transferred to the beneficiary ownership and management;

experts working in beneficiary countries within contracts for advising, planning, running a specific project, survey and fact-finding missions establishing possible extents of Israeli aid or the UN-organised missions;

trainings in Israel, including short high-level conferences, intensive specialised courses for experts, post- and graduate studies, individual trainings.³³

To this list, trainings in recipient countries need to be added, a very popular form since the mid-1960s, when capacities for training in Israel became overstretched beyond demand. Training on-the-spot cuts down participants’ travel costs, offers studying in the environment in which they work and reaching more participants. In 1965, most trainees received such instruction in local government, administration and finance as well as agriculture.³⁴ Until today, this is the main form of engagement.

MASHAV aid is guided by a rule that every project needs to be demand driven and based on adaptation. This translates into strong partnerships with communities on the ground, cooperation with other donors present in the area, dialogue during the intervention and long-term approach. Most projects are planned for 3–5 years, with constant presence of experts to guide recipients. As part of a comprehensive approach in agriculture, attention is given to development of three chains: of knowledge—within atriangle containing research, extension and farmers; of production—to make sure that there is a distribution system allowing access to new technologies; of value—enabling transformation from guaranteeing food security to the development of agricultural entrepreneurship. MASHAV sticks to preference for comprehensive, small-scale local projects, with possibility for expansion of successful ones.³⁵

Main characteristics of the Israeli aid programme

MASHAV guiding principles are communicated as the following: focus on areas in which Israel has a comparative advantage and accumulated expertise, on human capacity building and training (“training the trainers” in particular); tailoring response to local needs and demands; operating according to international agreed standards and principles of aid effectiveness; belief in active consultation with local partners; playing a role in engaging in development policy at the global level; comprehensive and holistic approach to development, including the incorporation of cross-cutting issues such as gender and the environment; implementing small-scale activities aimed at community-driven development as a part of national programs; seeking cooperation with other national and international development organisations; belief that development cooperation can and should be used to forge bonds of peaceful cooperation between Israel and its neighbours.³⁶

The focus on technical assistance, which translates into training as the dominant type of project, is the main and most unique feature. While in the 1950s the mainstream Western development institutions believed that large financial transfers were what developing countries needed the most, already in the 1960s they realised that what is additionally required is training. However, although the share of technical aid in the major development agencies’ budgets rose, this did not translate into much training for developing countries, since the rise covered mostly the escalating salaries of experts. According to Levin, in 1972 only 10% of total global aid was technical. Israel, a very small donor, distinguished itself as its aid constituted almost entirely from technical assistance, was particularly effective and concentrated on agriculture.³⁷

Focus on technical aid and avoidance of tying of aid (obligating the recipient to spend a certain share of aid received in the donor country) are furthermore characteristic for South-to-South donors; and Israel for long saw itself as a developing country. The 1967 study by Laufer, offering an overview of the “golden era” in the middle of its implementation, describes this novel approach at the time, as he saw Israel as one of developing countries cooperating between themselves. Laufer pointed to the benefits of technical cooperation, highlighted the chain effect of programmes focused on “training the trainers” and underlined that the Israeli pioneering concept inspired nation-building of other states and generated prestige and influence. This observation is thoroughly linked to the mutuality and reciprocity in the process of learning within technical assistance, as defined at an early stage by the Israeli designers of the programme, who chose to refer to it as “cooperation” rather than “aid”. While embarking on own programme, Israel received technical assistance from the United States (worth around USD 15 million in 1.5 year till the mid-1962) and from the UN (around USD 5 million in 1950–64). Israeli transfer of this knowledge was not a simple pass-it-on, since Israeli own input, expressed in adaptation of technologies to particular conditions, was added, making solutions more apt for developing countries and Israeli experts aware of the adaptation requirements, possible challenges and solutions to them. As recipients, Israelis were also aware of practices that alienated the receiving side and could avoid these mistakes. The particularity of Israeli technical aid expresses itself also in the adoption of the so called “integrated project”, in which work of Israeli experts on the spot was reinforced by training for professionals from the recipient country. In that way chances for successful transfer of the project to the responsibility of the recipient rose significantly. An illustrative example of this approach can be the ophthalmology hospital, developed in Liberia, while Liberian cadres received years of training in Israel.³⁸

Many international experts benefit from missions’ prolongations, losing interest in the real enhancement of their recipients’ capacities. Israeli aid system, in contrast, had built-in arrangements to guarantee that no expert would limit effectiveness to perpetuate his assignment. Every project is scheduled for scaling-back and transfer of responsibility to the recipient. Experts’ comeback to their previous job is also meant at using experience gained abroad, accentuating the mutual learning aspect of their work. The rule has been upheld despite the recruitment costs caused by the lack of a stable pool of professionals dedicated solely to work abroad. Depending on the specialisation and timing, the programme sometimes helped in providing jobs to some professionals, but sometimes also strained limited human resources at home, to the point of causing delays in Israeli water management projects due to foreign engagement of experts. Some problems in recruitment were reported; yet no one was requalified or forced into joining the development programme. Contemporarily, experts come from both public and private sectors. Some public sector experts happen to be involved in many projects. New ones are recruited mainly through networking. The major challenge is matching specific profession with the knowledge of particular language. Since Israel is a country of immigrants, this obstacle is usually tackled. Experts are glad to participate, to represent their country, despite much lower salaries than the ones offered within the UN system.³⁹

One more feature is preference towards demonstrative forms of teaching. This enhances effectiveness, enabling recipients to “learn by doing”, allowing necessary adaptations to be discovered and quickly introduced and building up concrete, physical contribution on-the-spot, which can be expanded later on. For adults, teaching through demonstration is recognised as the most appropriate: un-intimidating, promoting level-field encounters and individual approach to trainees.⁴⁰

Lastly, particular features of Israeli experts are underlined, often contrasted with Western experts: willingness to integrate with the surroundings, practicality, informal style, readiness to improvise, belief that hard work will bring results and personal engagement in projects. The specificity of Israeli trainers is expressed also in the way they were expected to be role models for their trainees. This was supposed to follow on from their earlier engagement in such settings as newly created, ethnically mixed habitats in Israel and from their experiences in absorption and education of young immigrants—where they were a part of a development process that requested acting fast, using great doses of pioneering and experimentation, certain motivation, commitment and belief in capacity to rule over one's own destiny.⁴¹

To conclude, the key characteristic and part of success of the Israeli aid programme is its concentration on the human factor: investing in people and thus creating human capital, empowering beneficiaries (multiplied through “train the trainers”) to change their lives and communities. Shalom Clubs—associations gathering alumni of Israeli courses—reinforce follow-up from courses and generate local initiatives in areas of entrepreneurship, health or education.

Fields of engagement

When it comes to the fields of engagement, in the “golden era” of Israeli relations with Africa and of its development programme simultaneously, the programme focused on agriculture (comprising around half of its volume). Aid in this field was particularly sought after, as developing countries were aware of the scale of the Israeli success in the area and in dire need for improvements; appeal of agricultural cooperatives was a particular factor of attractiveness. Experts, selected from those involved in Israeli agricultural transformation, contributed to rise in production, including through convincing to and training in modern irrigation and fertilisation methods and introducing collective management of resources and marketing. Poultry (arranging farms, teaching husbandry and donating species) was among the earliest and greatest successes in the transfer of Israeli know-how to developing countries in need of simple solutions appropriate for difficult climates. Technical training also usually accompanied export of machinery. Another important sphere was mobilisation of youth, with programs modelled after Israeli Gadna and Nahal and modified according to the particular needs and wishes. All were based on the Israeli movements’ principles: nation-building above divisions, need for youth contribution, appreciation of physical work and education, teamwork and group leadership. The movements had volunteering and agricultural components; some of them had somewhat militarised nature. Israeli non-interference in their political environment could not prevent them from being misused by authoritarian African rulers. As for water supply and irrigation, Tahal and Mekorot (state-owned companies linked to Histadrut), upon the requests of developing countries, engaged in hydrological surveys, design of master plans for water supply and sewage systems and initiating large-scale irrigation. They also set up hydrologists’ training programmes together with FAO. In the field of health, not only Israeli medical teams (students, nurses, doctors) worked abroad, but also foreign trainees were accepted into Israeli medical schools and clinical hospitals (in particular to study ophthalmology). Other fields included infrastructural planning, community development, childcare, education and training, scientific and technological programmes.⁴²

At the time of writing, MASHAV defined the following priority areas for its activities: food security and agriculture; education, medicine and public health; community development, innovation and entrepreneurship for development; gender equality and women's empowerment; regional planning, rural and urban development; research and development; emergency planning and response and humanitarian aid. This choice was informed by Development Assistance Committee (DAC)/OECD recommendations and good practices as well as the will to prevent further proliferation and fragmentation of aid through intervention limited to few countries and sectors, in which Israel has comparative advantage and profound expertise.⁴³ In fact, the list roughly covers the entire spectrum of activities. Prioritisation thus means that these fields were chosen as those with which to deal and not as the major ones from the spectrum of activities. Concentration on selected countries and fields indicates concern for quality and contrasts with the earlier attempt for presence in as many countries and fields as possible.

Scale of aid programme

In the 1960s, Israeli aid programme amounted up to USD 10 million a year and constituted around one-third of the MFA budget. Due to budgetary constraints, the rule was from the beginning that beneficiaries should participate financially, at least in travel costs; usually, receiving countries bore a significant share. Expenses covered by them included transportation, housing of the incoming Israeli experts, salaries in the case of long-term experts, transport costs of trainees going to Israel; though varied arrangements were made in different cases and it happened also that Israel in the end bore all the costs. The rule (coupled with donations from other sources, mostly international organisations) allowed the tiny budget to be spent on much more technical aid than would otherwise be possible; it also made the recipient countries more conscious and respectful towards the assistance and built up their feeling of ownership. Thus, Israeli aid was more attractive to Africans than aid served, even free of charge, by other nations, in a way that justified bearing the involved costs. Nowadays, the rule is maintained, with Israeli side covering costs of expert's salary, flight ticket and insurance, while the receiving side is supposed to cover costs of local accommodation and transport.⁴⁴

A basic measurement of the scale of a country's aid programme is its absolute volume. Another one is the share of ODA within the overall national income, with the target set in 1970 by the OECD at 0.7% for highly developed countries. Israeli aid budget grew from USD 3 million in 1961 to around 5 million in 1967 at which point is stabilised due to internal budgetary problems and dissatisfaction with political results. Against the 1962 gross national income of Israel at the level of USD 3 billion, the share of aid stood at around 0.13%. Similar estimates were done for 1969–1971, when MASHAV expenses were around 0.12% of its GDP, while average DAC OECD country devoted to aid around 0.16%. Direct MASHAV expenditure was just part of the total worth of aid, as other Israeli governmental and non-governmental (most notably, Histadrut) sources added one-third approximately. Rodin estimated that every USD of Israeli aid produced USD 3 spent on development work, which sets the actual value of USD 5 million in MASHAV expenditure at USD 15 million worth of aid. Of this, half was spent in Israel itself. Another estimation said that although Israeli aid budget was not impressive in absolute numbers, per capita it was by 50% higher than the OECD average, despite Israel significantly lagging behind OECD's per capita national product. The 1975 annual UNDP report named Israel as the world's largest single contributor of expertise per capita.⁴⁵

Figure 4.1 Total Israeli ODA since 1997 (in USD millions).

The aid budget, in particular the one devoted to Africa, was drastically—by half, approximately—cut after the breaking of relations by most of sub-Saharan countries in the aftermath of the 1973 war. The shock was so deep that initially these funds were not even redirected to other developing regions. Israeli funding for development never reached back its scale. In the 1980s, the decline was compensated by external donors financing Israeli development activities, up to about 90% of MASHAV budget. This source declined during the early 1990s. The mid-1990s observed increase in MASHAV budget due to aid programmes targeted at Arab countries engaged in the peace process as well as those addressed to the newly independent former Soviet Union countries.⁴⁶

Since 1997 (when the earliest OECD Query Wizard for International Development Statistics data are available), volumes of Israeli aid were fluctuating roughly between USD 100 and 150 millions, until around 2009, from which time the trend is upwards, with a significant increase in 2015 and 2016. Notably, in 2016 and 2017, this overall budget rose by around USD 50 million, reaching above 350 and 400, respectively. Israel's absolute volumes of aid (around USD 200 million for most of the period concerned) exceeded those of the OECD's smallest economies (Iceland, Slovenia, Slovak and Czech Republics). As for OECD targets, data for 2015 speak of only 0.068% of the Israeli GNI spent on aid; in the OECD Net ODA database covering period since 2001, the highest percentage was recorded for 2002—0.12%, falling afterwards with an exception of 2011, when the indicator jumped to 0.08%. This locates Israel not only far below the OECD target of 0.7% national income, but also below OECD 2015average of 0.3%. The situation improved in 2016 and 2017 when the indicator reached 0.11 and 0.12, respectively.

Notably, the work of MASHAV is just a small part of the Israeli ODA. The question of the share of MASHAV (or MFA) in Israeli ODA was not answered by the interviewees. Only one source indicated that MASHAV's budget in 2016 was around USD 10 million—making for scarce 4% of total Israeli aid. Other ministries that have high shares in ODA are those responsible for health and immigration (financial help given in their first year of stay to immigrants from developing countries is counted in ODA, mirroring other OECD countries’ practices regarding aid to refugees).⁴⁷

It is disputable to which extent low volumes should be treated as an indicator of scarcity of Israeli aid, since it has its specific, non-material and non-financial nature. For many advocates of a larger programme, these numbers confirm that the state does not properly fulfil its mission towards the developing world. To the defence of the programme, the numbers do not tell the entire story of what it is worth, for three reasons: they do not represent the actual market value of the know-how shared; they do not account for the costs of acquiring this knowledge, contained in the country's record spending on research and development; moreover, due to its unique qualities, the programme constitutes a long-term, self-replicating investment, the overall impact of which cannot be estimated. Thus, no doubt the programme could be accounted on much higher levels if its actual worth was possible to evaluate. The growing role of NGOs, mostly using money coming from private, often foreign sources, as well as the contribution of enterprises, constitutes unaccounted for share of Israeli aid not belonging to ODA. These arguments help to nuance the discussion, yet they do not change the result of the international budgetary comparisons on the scale of aid. This picture might be changing to the better, with aid budgets growing and commitment to aid expressed by high-ranking officials. It is, however, too early to tell if this is a long-standing pattern and the government concentrates primarily on promoting private investments in development aims.

Another measure of Israeli aid volume is the number of people trained. From 1958 till 1972, about 4000 Israeli experts were engaged abroad and around 15,000 trainees from about 90 countries undertook training in Israel. The 1964 ratio of experts to total Israel population was 0.028%, almost double that of the OECD countries. As for Israeli experts delegated by international organisations, mainly specialised UN agencies and OECD, their numbers reached more than 100 every year in the 1958–73 period. The MASHAV, since establishment, has trained over quarter million people from over 130 countries.⁴⁸ This is undoubtedly a significant achievement, though difficult to compare with other countries that do not concentrate on technical aid and so do not report data on it. Moreover, Israeli MFA does not publish any data on scholarships given on the basis of bilateral agreements with developing countries. MASHAV employees seem even not particularly aware of them. This might mean an unused potential for furthering coordination and follow-up activities.

Geographical profile

The group of potential recipients of Israeli development aid is limited only by a stipulation that entities questioning the existence of the State of Israel, inciting to violence, or promoting racism or terrorism are excluded from the possibility of obtaining financing. In the “golden era”, MASHAV made efforts to respond positively to every request, irrespective of political interests and without political conditioning. Along-time diplomat Arye Oded observed that empathetic motives were predominant, despite growing disappointment with recipients’ policies in the UN; calls for conditioning aid on more pro-Israel behaviour were rejected. The presence of trainees from countries without formalised relations with Israel (in the 1960s, trainees came from such countries as Pakistan, Somalia and Mauretania; today, ones from Bolivia, Cuba and Venezuela) testifies to this point.⁴⁹

SSA used to be the main or among the main recipients of Israeli development aid throughout the first decades of the programme; while Africa received one-fifth of UN aid, it received two-thirds of Israeli aid. In 1958–64, Africans constituted between 50 and 52% of thousands of students from developing countries receiving scholarships at the HUJ; in 1961–66—between 50 and 65% at the Haifa Institute of Technology; of all foreign trainees in Israel in 1958–66, Africans constituted between 35 and 70% of participants. Africa was also the dominant field for the work of Israeli experts abroad—71% of the missions during 1958–66. For the entire “golden era” period, around 70% of expert missions headed to Africa, almost 50% of trainees came from the continent and most of the demonstration projects were located there. For aid channelled through multilateral platforms, Africa was also the main beneficiary. So SSA was definitely the dominant direction but did not have a monopoly. Since around 1962, several Latin American and Mediterranean countries have entered into agreements providing for Israeli technical cooperation. In between 1973 and 1990, resources were—due to the severance of relations by SSA countries—redirected towards Latin America and after 1993 towards Arab countries engaged in the peace process. Also in the extended period of 1958–96, Africans were the largest group of beneficiaries of trainings in Israel (23,730, Latin America and Caribbean came second with 18,408), yet this was changing with growing numbers of trainees from Arab states and former Soviet republics. In numbers totalling the cooperation since MASHAV's creation until the early 2000s, Africans constituted the largest share of trainees in Israel but were only the third continental group when it came to trainings served abroad.⁵⁰

Currently, Africa is not necessarily the main beneficiary of trainings. In 2012, of 2437 trainees in Israel, 753 (31%) were from Latin America and Caribbean, while 489 (20%) from Africa; of 3309 trainees trained abroad, 1194 (36%) were from Asia and Oceania, while 455 (13.7%) from Africa. In 2014, of 1774 trained in Israel, 518 were from Africa (29%)—the largest group this time—while of 2308 trained abroad, 877 (38%) were from Asia and Oceania and 421 (18%) from Africa. Also as regards long-term and short-term consultancies, the sources for 2012 and 2014 show that its share is matched or dominated by Asia and Oceania, although the difference between the two is not wide.⁵¹

Throughout 1997–2011, the volume of Israeli aid to SSA tended to exceed the one devoted to South America; however, at no point it exceeded aid devoted to Asia. Since 2011, even aid to Latin countries is higher than aid to Africa. While aid to SSA grew between 1997 and 2002 and stabilised until 2010, it faced a dramatic decline, while overall Israeli ODA volumes rose, thus reaching an insignificant share. On the other hand, aid to Asia has an upward trend, which can be explained not only by aid for former Soviet republics, but also by growth in the share of Middle-Eastern recipients; while Jordan is already the largest recipient since 2001, large amounts apparently started to be transferred to the West Bank and Gaza. Probably, this is a statistical effect caused not by a change of policy, but of counting methods, which might have evolved due to Israel's accession to the OECD. Since 2013,Syria is also surprisingly high located, with which Israel is formally at war; costs of treatment of wounded Syrians and other humanitarian aid to Southern Syria are likely behind the phenomena.

Table 4.1 “Top 5” largest recipients of Israeli ODA, 1997–2016.

Bearing in mind that total ODA includes expenses of other ministries, it can be concluded that large share of it covers the costs of aid for new immigrants. In 1997, aid was concentrated mostly on the Caucasus countries, with the largest beneficiary, Uzbekistan, receiving USD 10.55 million, or nearly 12% of the Israeli ODA totalling USD 89.25 million. This coincided with outmigration of Uzbek Jews due to rise of Islamic movements. The presence of Ethiopia as a large beneficiary throughout the years also can be explained by Ethiopian aliya, thus not necessarily reflecting MASHAV activities. Instances of large-scale emergency aid are also visible, as testified by Turkey among the main beneficiaries in 1999 and 2011 or Haiti in 2010, following tragic earthquakes in those countries.

Two factors need to be taken into account when analysing a somewhat puzzling picture of the share of SSA in the total Israeli ODA: ODA data do not properly reflect aid in the understanding of this work, understanding which concentrates on MASHAV activities; and probably the way of counting it changed. The question of such a possible change in methodology (related also to the above-mentioned phenomena of statistics on aid for West Bank and Gaza) was addressed by the author to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, but the answer was not found. While through most of the time in question the SSA share was between 25 and 30%, reaching the highest—32%—in 2004, the decline in 2010 is staggering, with 2015 share reaching only 1.32% in 2016 and below 1% in 2017. This low level might seem out of the international standard (the common knowledge has it that most of the development aid worldwide is meant for Africa). Indeed, in terms of per capita amounts this holds true. However, the share of 2015 aid to sub-Saharan regional grouping from overall non-DAC donors is only around 4%. For DAC countries, it reaches 18%, for DAC-EU—15%. It is only within the multilateral donors’ grouping that the share of SSA is obviously dominant and standing at 43%. On the other hand, it has to be noticed that the absolute volume of aid and share of SSA in Israeli aid jumped substantially in 2018, reaching over USD 10.86 million and almost 3% of aid.

Another dimension is multilateral aid. According to the OECD QWIDS data for 1997–2015, the share of multilateral aid in the total Israeli ODA varied, with the lowest share in 2000—4% and the highest in 2005—16.3%; in 2016, the share was 27%. In comparison, for all non-DAC donors (a group to which Israel belongs), the share in 2015 was 4.5%, while for DAC donors—28.3%. Israel traditionally donates to IDA—the World Bank's International Development Association, managing loans and grants, and to the UN agencies. Among main beneficiaries of IDAs long-term (30–50 years) non-interest credits are Tanzania, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Ghana.⁵² Thus, an undefined, additional flow of Israeli aid reaches sub-Saharan countries through international transfers.

Figure 4.2 Percentage share of sub-Saharan countries in total aid 1997–2016.

Figure 4.3 Breakdown of total aid, 2016.

Another flow that is hard to define in terms of actual recipients is through the “developing countries, unspecified” category, gathering activities that benefit several regions (continents). While still in 2010 only 0.15% of Israeli aid was categorised as such, the share jumped—again, presumably due to changes in ODA methodology—to vast 45.7% in 2010 and amounted for 30.5% in 2016. The share of this category in Israeli ODA could be associated with a spectre of programmes addressed to people from manifold countries and continents jointly. It thus could provide a partial explanation to a very low share of SSA in overall aid budget contrasting a much higher share of SSA participants in the actual trainings described earlier.

These methodological issues make answering the question of the extent to which the recent upwards trend in scale of aid translates into more aid for SSA difficult. However, due to the nature of both multilateral organisations’ policies and the profile of main recipients of Israeli bilateral aid, it can be assumed that the actual SSA share in Israel's multilateral and multiregional ODA is higher than within its bilateral ODA.

Adherence to international standards

Qualitatively, major donors’ particularistic motives for aid until the early 1990s were not conducive to coordinating efforts, taking into account real development problems, undertaking and executing measurable commitments and setting up concrete indicators of effectiveness. Aid became less political with the end of global rivalry for influence post–Cold War. Western donors put greater emphasis on accountability. Aims became more precise, and aid conditional on reforms, governance and democratisation. These priorities sometimes run contrary to another trend—of giving ownership of development processes to the beneficiaries. On the other hand, many donors cut their aid budgets, a sign of the so-called “donor fatigue”—falling commitment to aid not bringing expected results.⁵³

MASHAV communicates adherence to the decisions adopted by subsequent world development conferences and summits and refers to the global consensus around the key role of capacity building in development. Since early years—after the very initial phase when concentration was mainly on being accepted as a donor—Israeli planning included verification of own capacities to assist in a given situation; coherence with the receiving country's development vision; budget, evaluation and schedule for phase-out. Levin enumerates the following “basic guidelines” that could, from today's point of view, be treated as even somewhat ahead of time in terms of enhancing aid effectiveness:

financial burden sharing;

multiplier effect—trainees taught to share knowledge acquired with their countrymen;

trainers speaking the language of trainees and sharing boarding facilities with them;

short timeframe for mission, quick turn towards developing countries’ ownership.

Nowadays, guiding principles for projects include such rules as:

extensive capacitybuilding and training activities in Israel and on the project site;

long-term approach and follow-up activities; for example, through posting experts;

careful selection of project technologies, according to recipients’ needs and capacities;

teaching the trainers on the use of given technology;

designation of projects in cooperation with local institutions.⁵⁴

Israel's attitude towards measuring effectiveness is derivative of the special nature of its aid. Some observers point out that not much is measured and there is no long-term evaluation. There is a valid argument that MASHAV's activities have no sustainable strategy in mind, and the trainings are an aim in itself, with no long-term goals set on various levels. For projects on the ground, like experimental farms, evaluation is easier: indicators related to beneficiaries’ well-being are set up and followed, sometimes also compared with the results of those that did not participate in the programme. With trainings, many benefits acknowledged by the participants (greater self-confidence, empowerment to make life-changing decisions) would not count in an aid effectiveness assessment, yet remain important.⁵⁵ MCTC addressed projects’ impact as hard to measure, but—according to participants—pertaining to the better management of their organisations, furthering knowledge gained, initiation of new projects.⁵⁶ According to Yudith Rosenthal, Director of the Aharon Ofri Centre, to some extent, the results of MASHAV courses are inexplicable: these processes take place inside the trainees and make them change, move forward in their lives. Otherwise, on the example of Kenya, a significant beneficiary, it can be seen that Ofri's alumni are very present in Kenyan education institutions. This points to largely qualitative methods of evaluation and is confirmed by MASHAV employees interviewed. Each participant fills in evaluation form after training, but it is difficult to get additional answers from them later on. An online evaluation form has recently been introduced, which is sent to participants 8–10 months after the course. So far, around 20% of them replied. It is even more difficult to reach former participants of on-the-spot courses, but there are works on the issue underway. The difficulty in evaluating trainings is a general problem of donors; MASHAV online tool evoked interest from certain OECD members. Another measure of success is the number of people who advanced in their careers and attribute this success at least in part to their training in Israel. The number is estimated at around one-third of alumni. A new MASHAV initiative is a grant scheme for alumnis, offering USD 10,000 for the most successful projects implementing what they learned. Another method for increasing impact is follow-up on the successful participants: upon their return, local Israeli embassies are instructed to be in touch with them and see what help they might need.⁵⁷

Adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 marked a turn in the global approach to development from “development aid” to “cooperation for development”; development discourse put “human development” at the core and placed responsibility on developing countries, with supportive role for donors. Bearing in mind the Israeli philosophy of aid from the very beginning, it might be concluded, with some exaggeration, that Israel preceded a global realisation of certain facts by decades. Israeli aid is strongly oriented on the MDGs (and their successor, sustainable development goals [SDGs]); the range of its activities was already in line with MDGs when they were adopted.⁵⁸ Projects are either directly related, or a particular perspective is added to them as demanded by the given MDG. The Millennium Summit and follow-up documents, like the 2005 Sachs report Investing in Development. A Practical Plan to Achieve the MDGs, underline the need for the type of aid that Israel can extend. The 2008 World Bank World Development Report 2008. Agriculture for Development emphasised agricultural technical aid as of particular importance to SSA due to their economies’ reliance on agriculture, food security problems and potential of the sector to generate growth, thus reducing poverty. World Banks’ recommendation was to focus on smallholder farming.

Participation in international development cooperation

As shown, Israeli development aid predominantly goes through bilateral, rather than multilateral channels. Already in the 1960s, however, cooperation started with international organisations and national development agencies. A dominant model is that the Israeli side provides expertise—experts and facilities (research farms, laboratories, etc.)—while another donor participates mainly financially. The Israeli programme has been quickly recognised by international organisations, translating into support and extension. For example, since 1961, WHO has sponsored training courses in Israel for medical students, providing scholarships, while other costs have been divided between Israel and the beneficiary states. FAO, IAEA, UNICEF and UNESCO engaged in similar schemes already in the 1960s. An agricultural training centre in Upper Volta was established in cooperation with the UN Special Fund; housing in Guinea—with UN Technical Assistance Board. Another form of cooperation was dispatch of experts to the UN agencies’ projects and financial contributions to their programmes.⁵⁹

Cooperation with OECD regarding development issues started early too, with OECD using Israeli expertise in projects, including those devoted to OECD's members and inviting Israelis to conferences and seminars. In 1965, OECD's report recognised Israel as a small country with significant aid programme arising from abundance of practical experience and ability of Israeli experts to trigger enthusiasm and inspire locally workable solutions. Cooperation on development was intensified during preparations for Israel's 2010 accession. Israel does not belong to the OECD's DAC yet. It plans to join, but the process is slow due to the specific nature of MASHAV as a capacity building agency and the issues around quantifying its work. These observations are in line with a conclusion by Smolaga, who positioned Israel among those pursuing “cooperation with a spectre of own autonomy” with DAC. Still, Israel is a member of the OECD's Development Centre established in the early 1960s and open to OECD members and non-members, civil society, experts, financial institutions and private sector. Cooperating closely with the DAC, the Centre provides a forum for dialogue, experience sharing, policy analysis and link donors with recipients. It includes (data for 2015) 24 “emerging and developing economies”, including Ivory Coast, Ghana and Senegal. In 2013, a conference on developing urban water facilities was co-organised by OECD and Israel, on the margins of the water technologies fair.⁶⁰

Israel has agreements regarding technical cooperation for developing countries with such organisations as FAO, UNDP, UNESCO, WHO, the World Bank Economic Development Institute and the African Development Bank. The arrangements provide scholarships to trainees coming to attend MASHAV courses in Israel, or they fund Israeli experts’ work in those countries. In 2007, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between Israel and UNEP providing for capacity building in water and waste management, food security and agriculture, desertification. In 2011, a High-Level Expert Group on “Using Green Agriculture to Stimulate Economic Growth and Eradicate Poverty” met in Israel—70 delegates from 28 countries, WFP, FAO and UN Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs. Israel also participates in the activities of the UN Office for South-South Cooperation. Engagement includes presentations of projects or participation of experts in thematic forums. The UN Sustainable Development database documents show that Israel (through MASHAV⁶¹ and other representatives) participates actively in coalitions around a variety of joint statements during global development negotiations. Adoption of Israeli-sponsored UNGA resolutions (see Chapter 2) is also relevant. The 1967 adoption by UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) of the so-called Horowitz Proposal for increased amounts of aid can be added. On an example of a particularly important field of combating desertification, Israel has a more mixed record. Already in the 1990s, it offered trainings, demonstration projects and joint research and development programmes (data for 1999: almost 60 training and consulting activities, 15 joint research projects, 22 courses in Israel). Since the launch of UNCCD process in the 1970s, Israel used it as a convenient merit–based space to present its achievements and offer. Since the mid-1990s, there was a slow removal from the UNCCD, symbolised by low-level representation to international conferences. Recently reactivated Africa policy might trigger in a new era of diplomatic engagement—as signalised by Prime Minister's participation to the 2015 climate change summit in Paris. Overall, participation in international debates on development shows the contribution Israel makes to it and praise it is able to gather. Israel is integrated in the system, as confirmed by a nomination for its representative to join the Executive Board of UNDP in 2012. In 2013, Israel was admitted to the Development Assistance Group Ethiopia—a forum for all donors, organisations and Ethiopian government—a milestone in understanding Ethiopian needs and extending cooperation. At the time of writing, Israel was engaged as a partner in activities of Inter-American Development Bank, yet still not among the partners of African Development Bank Group, due to political constrains.⁶²

Conclusions

In the global architecture of aid, Israel, despite long history of its aid programme, is considered to be a part of a diverse (and, as some argue, a bit artificial) group of “emerging donors”. Out of the list of features distinguishing the “emerging” from “established” or “traditional” donors, the following ones can be attributed to Israel, confirming its classification as an emerging donor:

Israeli aid is a stable phenomenon, but its volume is significantly changing in time;

institutional frameworks are complex;

the strategic and normative frameworks for Israeli aid are vague;

aid is not preconditioned;

aid is openly linked to foreign policy objectives;

preferred form for aid is technical assistance;

aid is directed where it has comparative advantage over other donors;

aid depends on internal developments.

As the most of emerging donors, Israel belongs geographically to the South and concentrates on technical aid. As a member of OECD (classified also by this organisation as an emerging donor, in contrast to “providers of South-South cooperation” and “Arab donors”), it is among the emerging donors institutionally the closest to the established ones. With other emerging donors, it shares the following strengths: localisation, awareness of the needs of developing countries, solutions fitter for local needs, presence and interest in Africa, own experience in overcoming challenges to development and the weakness of limited budget for aid. Israel differs from other emerging donors through engagement in military conflicts, untied nature of aid and good coordination with other donors. Smolaga's typology of emerging donors locates Israel among “individualists with regional aspirations” with middle size aid expenditures. One of the characteristics of such countries is that they used to be recipients of aid themselves. According to Smolaga, Israel might soon become a “traditional donor”. This stays in line with observations of those who actually lament the possibility that Israeli aid would lose the special features that made it such a unique donor in the 1960s.⁶³

These projections will still need verification when the (delayed, supposedly due to December 2018–May 2020 rule of an interim government, restricted from adopting strategic measures) follow-up emerges of the July 2018 governmental decision to form a committee, comprising representatives of all relevant ministries—including those responsible for foreign affairs, economy, finance, innovation, energy, health, environment, agriculture—tasked with proposing a strategic framework for Israeli participation in international development efforts. Its deliberations were to include such crucial topics as tools to encourage the Israeli private sector to engage in international development; tools to encourage Israeli innovations’ contribution to meeting the unique needs of the developing world; financing tools that will help the Israeli private sector to enter emerging markets while promoting international development; possibilities for integrating private financing, public funding and financing from international bodies; tools to encourage private financing of development projects and the possibility of establishing of an Israeli financial institution for development; tools to strengthen Israeli assistance and to connect it with the private sector and the third sector; coordination mechanisms between the government and relevant non-governmental bodies; setting priorities and coordinating governmental works. The committee was also tasked with determining the target countries of the Israeli governmental activity in the field of international development; the areas of Israel's comparative advantage in the field, with an emphasis on Israel's potential contribution to the achievement of the SDGs; and measurable goals and their monitoring.⁶⁴

SUBCHAPTER 2: ISRAELI DEVELOPMENT AID TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

This subchapter zooms-in on Israeli development aid to SSA countries. A chronological and thematic structure is adopted, in order to analyse the scale and nature of intervention in the three general sub-periods and then to move on to reflections on the geographical distribution of the Israeli effort within the region, nature of cooperation with other donors, scales and modes of engagement of various types of non-state actors.

MASHAV programmes 1958–73

A brief recount of the spectrum of Israeli SSA activities in the period is easiest thematically, though the classification of certain activities into fields is sometimes blurred.

Agriculture

Agriculture can be treated as the prime field of Israeli engagement. Confirming its dominance are the following data: of 4482 African trainees in 1958–66, the largest number (805, or 18%) participated in agricultural courses, 664 in ones on “cooperation and trade unionism”, 537 in study tours and seminars, 493 were trained in community development, 285 in youth leadership and 211 in health and medicine (1348 were trained in undefined fields). Many youth activities focused on agriculture; it was also the dominant field of the on-the-spot experts (261 out of 1261, 21%; 234 dealt with youth and 173 with medicine and health). Work consisted not only of sharing knowledge, but also of changing attitudes (for example, through stays with kibbutz members), so that the trainees could see some mission in and gain respect for manual work. An illustrative list of scale and types of projects from 1966 contains cooperative farming schemes in Cameroon (training 500 young people), CAR (4 villages as focal points), Dahomey (2, for permanent settlement of 80 families of former soldiers), Tanzania (3 settlements); training centres in Guinea, Togo (for youth about to settle in cooperative villages) and in Upper Volta; poultry projects in Congo and Uganda. The Upper Volta case showed how financial limitations can be bridged through the engagement of an international partner (the UN Special Fund), although this diminished visibility of Israeli contribution. Another successful project was cotton farm upscaling in Mwanza, Ethiopia.⁶⁵

A particular project type was a cooperative village, building on Israeli experiences of agricultural settlement of diverse ethnic populations. The kibbutz model was considered too rigid for African culture, and, despite interest of some trainees, it was not presented as one to emulate. Based on Israeli case, moshav and moshav shitufi were seen as more appropriate to many sub-Saharan traditional social structures with strong family bonds. Cooperative villages were founded with Israeli advice in Cameroon, CAR, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Tanzania, Togo and Zambia. Reportedly, Tanzania passed on experience gained from Israelis to Uganda. In Zambia (Kafulafuta and Kafubu regions), the aim was to transform subsistence into market-oriented farming, including through provision of comprehensive agriculture-related services. They were based on moshav model of families’ cooperative; doubled an average farmer's income in Kafubu, doubled crops in Kafulafuta, provided villagers with new services (educational, medical, financial and marketing, research facility and transport). Teams of Israeli advisors were gradually reduced and projects transferred to locally trained managers. Levin called these projects a showpiece and a model for transformation of African rural living. Popularity of the scheme translated into voluntary applications to join it, beyond absorption capacities. This stays in contrast to later, compulsory projects by Tanzanian government. Another comprehensive activity was the transformation of the Ethiopian fish market: production, processing, marketing and consumption chain, from training and equipping fishermen up to promoting eating fish.⁶⁶

Activation of youth

The countries that benefited from adapting either Gadna or Nahal scheme were Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Dahomey, Gabon, Ghana (Ghana's Youth Pioneers and Builders Brigade), Ivory Coast, Malawi, Nigeria, Niger, Togo, Uganda, Senegal and Zambia. Literature differs in assessment of these projects: some call them as the most successful and an important element of African nation-building, while others are deeply sceptical. Laufer distinguished between those movements which were later used by the rulers as a support base, prone to political exploitation (Tanzania, Ivory Coast, also Ghana) and those which focused on the empowerment of rural youth (CAR). This division is not definite, since also in Tanzania and Ivory Coast the programmes focused on education, agriculture, tree-planting and infrastructure. In Ivory Coast, mobilisation of youth was not successful; building national movement was doomed to fail due to scarce resources devoted nationally. One Ivorian women educational camp was, however, exemplary in the way it succeeded in taming ethnic tensions between the participants and educating them to work for their communities. This did not work in Dahomey and Chad, where ethnic clashes shattered the project. In Dahomey, as in CAR, inadequate conditions caused volunteers’ desertions.⁶⁷

Public health

In health area, treatment of eye diseases and fostering inclusion of blind persons was most distinguishable. The programme based on Israeli experience gained after large influx of people with serious ophthalmological problems (mostly Orientals). The first programme was extended to Liberia and included teaching of its doctors, sending Israeli doctors and establishment of a small workshop producing eyeglasses. It was implemented within an integrated project scheme and served also neighbouring countries. In the first 2 years alone, Israeli doctors consulted 12,000 patients and carried out 1000 operations. The programme was quickly launched also in Tanzania, Ethiopia and Rwanda. In Ethiopia, a component for the development of education for blind children was added and a special school for them was created. Enhancement of Ethiopian research capacities started in the 1970s with the creation of academic Department of Microbiology. Ophthalmology programme is a vital example of a demand-driven aid that triggered substantial progress in research (recognised by publications in renowned journals) in eye diseases specific to underdeveloped areas.⁶⁸

Many African students benefited from complete medical studies programme designed for foreigners at the HUJ Hadassah Medical School, sponsored by the WHO and the Israeli government. Moreover, 3-year courses were organised there for professional training of nurses. Israel aided also in health emergencies—in 1971 it donated 1.3 million doses of cholera vaccines upon Kenya's request, preventing epidemic. Israel sent permanent and emergency medical teams (Congo-Kinshasa, Malawi), helped on the prevention and treatment of tubercular diseases (Congo-Brazaville, Liberia), worked on staffing and management of hospitals and clinics (Ghana, Malawi, Liberia, Ruanda, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone) and assisted planning of Nigerian medical services.⁶⁹

Trade unionism

Although the field of trade unionism might not appear vital from today's perspective, at that time it was a topic of a major importance for developing countries, thus constituting large share of the Israeli programme and one of the pillars of relationships. Ghana's Trade Union Congress was advised by the Histadrut experts for several years (despite Nkrumah's objection to strengthening of the Union). Cooperation with Kenya aimed—with not much of a success—at the establishment of union-affiliated businesses. Cooperation with Ethiopia on improving public bus transportation through adoption of the best practices of Israeli Egged (Histadrut-affiliated, at the time) is an example of a success. Furthermore, a training programme was designed under the Afro-Asian Institute, with spillover effects through graduates organising similar courses in their own countries.⁷⁰

Joint companies

Sometimes discussed as an expression of business cooperation, joint companies clearly contained development dimension in the way they allowed for a transfer of know-how and, within several years, of entire ownership and management. The partnerships involved the majority ownership of the host government, with Israeli side participating on a minority basis for a set period of around 5 years, supplying key managers and training cadres. The Israeli side—a state- or Histadrut-owned company, like Zim, Mekorot, Solel Boneh—would usually receive 10–15% of the profit. For the beneficiaries, joint ventures mainly served the quest for control over and independence of economy through gaining indigenous industrial base. Some enterprises established with Israeli participation sometimes were fragile to the hosts’ political circumstances, leading to premature cancellation of Israeli share through nationalisation. Examples of successful joint ventures were identified in Ghana (Black Star shipping line, with 40% of Israeli Zim's capital share, successfully transferred already in 1960 through a buyout, though Israeli advisers remained in place; Ghana National Construction Company, supported by 50 Israeli experts and engaged in vital national infrastructure), Tanzania, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Niger and Nigeria. Israelis benefited by getting managerial experiences, foreign salaries and market opportunities. The receiving nations benefited from investment, training, market testing and perspective of a quick takeover. Joint companies led to the establishment of services, public service buildings and infrastructure (parliaments in Sierra Leone and Eastern Nigeria, international Accra airport, tourist base and university buildings in Eastern Nigeria, roads in Western Nigeria, Volta River Dam in Ghana).⁷¹

Science and education

In the area of science and education, due to capacities limited by domestic needs for university cadres, Israel engaged in cooperation with carefully chosen countries, where possible impacts were the greatest. In the case of Ghana, cooperation included Kumasi University of Science and Technology, National Institute of Health, Ghana's Academy of Science. Exchanges of scientific personnel and their bilateral meetings were reportedly of vast benefit also to the Israeli scientists. In the case of Ethiopia, the programme had a large scale at least until 1966, with many Israelis teaching at the Haile Selassie I University. Nigerian University of Ibadan and the Kenya-Israel School of Social Work in Machakos need to be mentioned also. Moreover, Israeli secondary school and vocational teachers were engaged in Ethiopia, Guinea, Niger, Togo and Mali. The Rehovot Conferences constituted an important part of the programme, gathering development countries’ leaders, Israelis and international scientists (including the Nobel Prize laureates) around development subjects.⁷²

Other

Several other types of engagement emerged. In Ghana, Israel was responsible for planning and supervision of Accra's water supply and sewage systems. In Ethiopia (following UNDP recommendation that Ethiopia asks Israeli help), Israeli experts carried out geological surveys, engaging also in training of local experts. In Kenya, the School for (Rural) Social Workers was established in Machakos in 1962, following a period of exchanges of ideas on women empowerment. This led to the establishment of a network of community social workers and later on the project evolved towards the field of community development. The school housed several tens of participants at a time and engaged them in theoretical classes and practical work. A specific feature was that it gathered representatives of the entire diversity of tribes; the initial difficulty, successfully dealt with, was to make these ethnically mixed groups live together. Israeli aid was gradually phased-out until 1971. Courses in Israel, along the major topics discussed earlier, included also issues of public administration, police training and ad hoc courses (one for Angolan nurses or for Tanzanian school inspectors). In 1969, Israeli-led Catering and Tourism Training Institute opened in Addis Ababa aimed at professionalisation of the sector and raising quality of its services. This example is among one of those where the receiving side strongly opposed the phase-out. Monetary and fiscal issues were recognised as of interest, with aid to Ghana in arranging its taxing infrastructure. Israel was also involved in the organisation of national lotteries in Cameroon, CAR, Dahomey, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo and Upper Volta and in management of the African Continental Bank in Nigeria. Moreover, as early as 1952 Israel organised, in cooperation with UNESCO, a conference reflecting on reforming patterns of human living in the desert. Practices stopping the creation of man-made deserts were presented internationally already at that point.⁷³

Some loans and grants were extended, mainly in 1958–60, to SSA countries, despite the general inability of the State of Israel to provide financial resources. Data on them are inconclusive. Africa was the recipient of more than 90% of Israeli loans; they supposedly financed American development programmes with Israeli participation. Laufer writes about around USD 20–25 million in loans given to Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria (the largest one), Sierra Leone and Tanzania until 1966 (with decreasing trend). All had developmental purposes, were often connected to joint ventures with Israeli participation and went where Israeli assistance programmes were vast. However, Ojo gives numbers for ten countries (Mali, Madagascar, Kenya, Guinea in addition to above-mentioned) summing up to USD 199 million in the same period, with Mali the largest recipient (USD 70 million). Grants were given for agricultural, medical and educational equipment, closely associated with technical aid projects (for example, free seeds, tractors for the Agriculture Centre in Upper Volta, equipment for Social Workers School in Kenya, dental clinic in Gambia or hospital in Malawi).⁷⁴

General observations

Ideological proximity between Israeli and beneficiaries’ governments and similarities of some modern Israeli institutions to traditional African ones—like cooperative agriculture and tribal farms—might have contributed to aid effectiveness. Israel was seen as to be truly open in sharing its knowledge, compared to other donors. However, several factors limited aid effectiveness. Most importantly, low financing impacted on the scale, types of activities and their sustainability. Had the aid been more concentrated, on fewer, but larger projects, the results could have been more durable. At the beginning of the programme, experts sent abroad considered themselves inadequately prepared (a problem addressed by briefings and materials). There were also complains on poor administrative assistance by Israeli authorities. Sometimes, Israeli aid was too enthusiastic and not planned realistically. It also happened that graduates of expensive training programmes in Israel were delegated at home to jobs completely unrelated to what they were trained for. There were also cultural problems. African farmers were hesitant towards innovations; demonstrative methods had to be used vastly in order to overcome this anxiety. They were also reluctant to save and reinvest to keep up the results. Some projects were not maintained after phase-out (the case of the Ethiopian blood bank). African youth, in general, preferred migration to cities over work on farms, so desertion rates were high in some agricultural projects. Some of the norms guiding the intervention run contrary to tribal traditions and rules, steering tensions. Moreover, ethnic conflicts were hard to bridge during some projects, limiting contribution to nation-building or even causing their failure. Youth movements and joint companies fell victims to patronage and in some cases, projects that were meant to be based on voluntary participation were turned into coercive ones by local authorities. Lastly, a major difficulty resulted from the practices of planning in most of the SSA states: aid was often employed for insufficiently, centrally prepared plans which were completely unrealistic. Coupled with low levels of commitment on the part of most African rulers, these features impacted negatively on the effectiveness of Israeli aid. While adjustments were made, meant at reducing these downsides, the results of these amendments were not significant before the relationships were broken and entire programme cancelled.⁷⁵

MASHAV programmes from 1973 to the early 1990s

A dramatic way in which sub-Saharan governments broke relationships with Israel resulted in an equally dramatic cessation of aid. Speedy phase-out had devastating impact on the effectiveness of many long-term projects which were in the middle of implementation. However, around 50 Israeli experts remained in Africa, serving the UN or other organisations. Sub-Saharan trainees were still accepted in Israel, provided that they were founded by external sources. Their numbers grew from 80 (from 12 countries, the largest group from Swaziland) in 1975 to 143 (from 17 countries, the largest group from Kenya) in 1977. This displays the maintenance of contacts far beyond the three countries which upheld relations. Histadrut's International Institute's archives show cooperation lasting well into the 1970s—not only with countries that did not cease relations, but also with Congo-Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Kenya, Togo and Sierra Leone. MCTC's archive shows steady flow of trainees from Ghana, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe. The signing of a peace treaty with Egypt caused increase in experts sent to Africa (Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Kenya, Zaire and even Tanzania), in participants coming to Israel for training (from Burkina Faso, CAR, Ivory Coast, Mauritius, Togo, Zaire) and even in on-the-spot courses (in Burkina Faso, Kenya, Zaire), despite enduring the lack of formal relations. Since the early 1980s, relations started to be restored. When Zaire did so in 1982, agreements were signed providing for 60 agricultural studies scholarships in Israel, establishment of a demonstration farm serving also as an agricultural training centre and for an agricultural training programme throughout the country. Moreover, Israeli company Tahal was engaged in a feasibility study of a large irrigation project. With Liberia, agreements were reached on Israeli aid and engagement of Israeli companies in agricultural projects, including the development of rice farming, aid in electrification, evaluation of possibility of the establishment of a centre for the prevention of blindness and of an eye clinic, help in creation of a national Liberian bank, shipping line and management of a national airline.⁷⁶

MASHAV programmes: the 1990s onwards

The 1990s

After the renewal of diplomatic relations with the majority of SSA countries, MASHAV returned more vastly to the continent. Israeli aid is usually based on bilateral treaties. In 1970, their overall number stood at 30 (including 1960 deal with Mali; 1961 with Dahomey, Madagascar and Upper Volta; 1962 with Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Liberia and Rwanda; 1963 with Niger, Tanzania, Uganda; 1964 with Chad, Togo and Zaire; 1965 with Sierra Leone, 1966 with Kenya and 1968 with Malawi).⁷⁷ Additional treaties on cooperation were signed after renewals of relations, including with Kenya (1989, general agreement on technical and scientific cooperation), Togo (1990, general agreement on economic, scientific, technical, cultural and social cooperation), Mauritius (1998, agriculture), Zimbabwe (1998, long-term drip- and micro-irrigation project, including sending long-term expert, trainings on the spot and in Israel), Ethiopia (2003, science and technology), Nigeria (2007, human capacity building and rural agro-sector development—an agreement between MASHAV and Maizube Abu-Tarab Training Center), Kenya again (2010, water resource management, technologies, irrigation and capacity building) and Rwanda (2014, 3-year agreement on creation of the Centre of Excellence). As for international organisations, examples of treaties include an overall MoU with ECOWAS (signed in 2009, providing for the establishment of forums of cooperation as well as promoting assistance in the fields of economy, agriculture, education and other fields of interest), an agreement with UNDP-Ethiopia (2014, on transfer of knowledge and innovation in agriculture, entrepreneurship, private sector development and gender mainstreaming) and with the UN Women Africa Regional Office (2016 MoU, regarding cooperation with the African Centre for Transformative and Inclusive Leadership).

Due to lessons learned and limitations of the programme, which also had to cover the Middle East and Asian countries that just entered into relations (the former USSR republics, China, India and others)—MASHAV activities in SSA Africa contemporarily are less enthusiastic, more selective, focused, based on more practical, economic and political considerations. In the 1990s, delegated Israeli experts were few (2007: 4 serving in 3 African countries on long-term missions and 24 on short-term missions in 10 countries). However, numbers of trainees coming to Israel grew (505 trainees from Africa in 2007, or 20.5% of all trainees), as did the number of recipients of on-the-spot trainings (668 from 7 African countries in 2007, or 14%). Nahal/Gadna programmes were replaced by other types of youth work. New topics were added, at pace with technological development. Joint research programmes were launched: German-Israeli Agricultural Research Programs (1986–99) and the Netherlands-Israel Research Program since 1992. In 1997, 27 out of 46 studies were carried out in both frameworks that were combined in Africa.⁷⁸

Agricultural projects in Ethiopia included managerial expert advice in Kobo Valley, where yields were raised several times and led to a decision to introduce the same irrigation technology in additional areas, and joint Ethiopian-Israeli-American horticultural project, including works on varieties of seeds of manifold fruit and vegetables in a specially designed research facility. In Kenya, an experimental farm of Kibwezi was set up in 1991 in cooperation with Nairobi University, with financial contribution from USAID, to test new irrigation techniques for fruit and vegetables; the project expended by a training component and reportedly transformed entire region, allowing farmers to capitalise on their work. Youth movements’ capacity building had continued in Kenya since 1988 through courses in Israel and on-the-spot. As before, it concentrated on agricultural development and nation-building, involving joint work with manifold ethnic groups. Following a deadly 1998 terrorist attack in Nairobi, emergency medicine and disaster management trainings were upscaled. In 1994, Israel engaged in aiding Eritrea (which gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993) in the process of demobilisation and settlement of demobilised pro-independence army soldiers through the establishment of a model village with agriculture-based economy (similar projects were implemented in Angola and Mozambique). Again, Israeli contribution constituted of knowledge transferred through experts provided by MASHAV, while financing came mainly from USAID and logistical support was local. Eritrea received also support in geology, including a survey, establishment of a laboratory, courses related to desalination of underground water. Another project provided Eritrea with aerial photographic documentation of the territory.⁷⁹

2000–10

In 2000, the MDGs were adopted and from this point, categorisation of projects according to the Goals can be used, as in the table.

Moreover, Israel joined Millennium Village (agriculture) and Millennium Cities (healthcare) Initiatives. In Nigeria, it led workshops on microcredit and small business development, worked with the Kwara Institute for Labour Studies on health and welfare of workers, and with Nigeria Federation of Tourism Association in Nigeria on tourism development. An emergency and trauma unit was supervised and equipped at the biggest hospital in Uganda (Mulago; built in 1962 by Solel Boneh). Israeli training team assisted the local one after opening. In Kenya, the Israeli model of education for sustainable development was introduced.

The Conference on Drylands, Deserts and Desertification organised every 2 years by BGU gained international renown among interested scientists, with impressive, comprehensive programmes of thematic panels by Israeli and international experts. The books of abstracts are available online, allowing further spread of information shared during the panels and contact with the speakers. Combating desertification as a particular field of aid can be traced through the national reports prepared by Israel as a party to the UNCCD. The 2002 report covering years 2000–01 mentions relevant courses held in 30 African countries for almost 1000 participants, half of them in Israel. However, no topics are indicated for these trainings and, as agricultural short-term expert missions and long-term demonstration projects are also mentioned in this context, it is not clear to which extent these activities were strictly related to combating desertification. Cooperation between the Blaustein Institute for Desert Research with two African countries is mentioned, as well as six research missions in four countries, sponsored by USAID. The Blaustein Institute established an agro-forestry area in Northern Kenya, on the basis of Israeli know-how. Five students from Ethiopia, Madagascar, Uganda, Zambia and an unspecified country enrolled in Israeli universities within the Capacity building and technology transfer through studies in academic institutions in Israel programme.

Table 4.2 Israeli aid implementing MDGs in SSA.

MDG

Beneficiary

Project

1. Eradicatehunger and extreme poverty

Ethiopia

3-year training programme (joint with USAID) for enhancing food security through advanced agricultural practices, technologies and capacity building

Cooperation programme on adaptation to climate change through small-scale irrigation development activities (joint with GIZ)

Kenya

Trilateral (with GIZ) programme on bettering tilapia fishers’ livelihoods and environmental protection of lake Victoria (around 30 million beneficiaries)

Ghana

Burkina-Faso

Increasing fish production for export and local consumption

Promoting small-scale irrigation;

agricultural entrepreneurship programme

Malawi

Introduction and adaptation of efficient irrigation systems and modern horticulture, “training the trainers” on a demonstration plot

Cameroon

Mango cultivation (in partnership with GIZ); irrigation (with Agence Française de Développement, AFD); agricultural training (3-year project for design and testing of curricula, training local trainers, design of incubator centres)

Rwanda

Sub-Saharan region

Centre of Excellence in Agriculture

Encouraging Women's Entrepreneurship—small-scale agriculture; Integrated Water Resources Management regional professional training in Nairobi

Agricultural trainings in Israel (water management; horticulture; post-harvest and marketing; applied technologies for irrigation, pest management, monitoring and control systems, etc.; animal husbandry; entrepreneurship, sustainable agricultural development)

Organisation of R&D systems on the national/regional level

West Africa region

Techno-agricultural Innovation for Poverty Alleviation (TIPA)—drip irrigation and small-holder farmers’ cooperatives

2. Universal primary education

Sub-Saharan region

Action plan on teacher training capacities and education inclusion, in collaboration with UNESCO's Teacher Training Initiative for SSA

Professional training program “Educational Methodologies for Youth at Risk: Preventing Student Dropouts and Facilitating Reintegration” (with UNESCO)

3. Gender equity

Sub-Saharan region

Various trainings (MCTC), for example, Income Generating Opportunities for Women in Livestock Production

4. Reduce child mortality

Ghana

Mother and Baby Neonatal Units in Kumasi (in collaboration with American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Millennium Cities Initiative)

Ethiopia

Workshops focusing on deworming in Addis Ababa and Mekelle, installation of new latrines and water taps in 30 schools in Mekelle (with the Centre for Tropical Diseases and AIDS at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)

5. Improvematernal health

Ghana

Mother and Child Well-Being Centres based on the “Tipat Halav” model

6. Combat HIV/AIDS and other diseases

Sub-Saharan region

Training the trainers on highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART; with Hadassah-University Medical Center, Jerusalem; the Tel Aviv Sourasky Medical Center; the National HIV Reference Laboratory)

Sexual Health and AIDS Prevention among Adolescents training of trainers programme

7. Ensure environ-mental sustainability

Kenya

Sub-Saharan region

Municipal Strategic Planning Unit in Kisumu

Integrated Strategies for Slum Upgrading training programme

Sustainable Tourism as a Tool for Regional Development programme

Training on testing methods for finding pesticide residue in export products (with Inter-State Pesticides Committee of Central Africa)

8. Global partnership MASHAV

UNDP

Providing knowledge and technological abilities in agriculture, water, food, health, education (Senegal, Benin)

UN-HABITAT

Municipal Strategic Planning (Kenya), training on Integrated Rural Economic-Social development, Poverty Reduction in Cities, Gender and Local Governance

FAO

Collaboration on Forestry, Desertification and Dryland Development (Ethiopia, East Africa—regional office)

UNESCO

Development of a network of UNESCO-affiliated schools and of scientific centres in peripheral areas; teachers’ training

CGIAR-ICRISAT

UNCCD

Horticultural development

Strengthening partnership with the UNCD Secretariat to foster Israeli expertise and its transfer (preventing degradation, restoring degraded land, building resilience of communities to food insecurity and water stress)

UNEP

2014 MoU to promote professional training and exchange of experts (climate change adaptation, sustainable agriculture, food security and water management, resource efficiency, waste management, solar technologies, health, environment)

IFAD

7-year cooperation in Cameroon since 2016, including the establishment of an Agro-Business Incubator and its regional branches, based on Israeli know-how and expertise to be transferred to 5000 trainees

UN WOMEN

Economic Empowerment of WomenProject, focused on rural women and including establishment of The Africa Centre for Transformative and Inclusive Leadership (in cooperation with Kenyatta University)

Israel continues to share its experience on eradication of malaria. It has been recognised that simple methods used there in the 1920s can bring good results today—in particular, when combined with modern technologies, such as GPS, which can be used to better map out mosquito habitats. These old, basic methods can prove particularly effective in the face of the growing resistance of parasites to new medicines and donor fatigue when it comes to financing research on new drugs or vaccines. In 2013, an international conference held by the Hadassah Hospital in Jerusalem gathered experts to discuss potential of these techniques.⁸⁰

Israeli humanitarian/developmental aid during 2013 Ebola outbreak was noticeable. Israel donated medical equipment and medicines to Sierra Leone and protective clothing to the AU headquarters; it sent two doctors to Cameroon and three to Ivory Coast to teach prevention and training others; shipped fully equipped mobile emergency clinics and large amounts of medical equipment to Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea (Israeli NGO SAREL helped with the distribution). Israeli donation to the Ebola Response Trust Fund (USD 8.75 million) was the largest per capita among all the donors.⁸¹ Also in the field of health, cooperation projects (over NIS 1 million in 2016–18) were envisaged by the 2016 governmental decision on the development of cooperation with Africa. The Ministry of Health was tasked with coordination of organisation of joint projects and workshops with health administrations in African countries and with stimulating development of health projects by Israeli public and private sectors.⁸²

Loans are on the rule not offered, though one case of a loan has been identified, supporting the development of a Ghanaian medical centre in which Israeli experts are also involved.

Volumes and distribution

As for the share of particular SSA countries within Israeli ODA, no financial breakdown by recipients in the period of 1958–73 is available. Ojo mentions that while in the 1960s aid was spread all-over, in the 1970s it concentrated in Cameroon, Congo, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire and Zambia. From Kreinin's data for 1961 agricultural courses in Israel, it appears that Ghanaians and Sierra Leonians were the most numerous among the trainees. There were also courses devoted to one country: CAR (25 participants), Congo (10) and Ethiopia (20). MCTC archives for the period of 1961–73 show that of 942 trainees, most came from Kenya (155), Uganda, Tanzania (80 each), Sierra Leone (58), Lesotho (54) followed by Ghana, Ethiopia and Nigeria (over 40 each).⁸³

As for contemporary data, available through QWIDS, Ethiopia used to be among the top five main beneficiaries until 2010, being the largest beneficiary in 1998, 2000, 2003–06 and the second largest in 1999, 2007 and 2008; with Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea (and Sudan) also appearing on the top five list. In 2003, when the volume of Israeli aid to Ethiopia was at its highest, it received around 27% of the total Israeli aid. In the last two decades cumulatively (1997–2016), it definitely was the largest sub-Saharan beneficiary of Israeli ODA (total of USD 255.5 million). This must have been, however, largely due to Ethiopian immigration and not MASHAV aid. For other countries, a working assumption can be that the figures roughly reflect MASHAV activities. Eritrea was the far second largest beneficiary in SSA for 1997–2016, receiving USD 39.72 million; Kenya the third—15.91; Ghana the fourth—10.14; Uganda the fifth, with 8.22. Nigeria received USD 7.01 million, while Senegal, Cameroon and Ivory Coast between 3 and 5 each. In most of the cases of these beneficiaries, financing is stable on a low yearly level. Ethiopia saw steady rise followed by a significant decline; aid for Eritrea ceased completely after the pick of 2010. In almost all the cases, there is an ostensible decline in ODA received in 2010–17. Actual growth in bilateral aid to virtually all SSA beneficiaries can be seen from the 2018 data; the main recipients were Ethiopia (USD 1.46 million), Kenya (1.37), Togo (0.94), Cameroon (0.67), Ghana (0.64), Uganda (0.62) and Nigeria (0.59).

A typical size of an Israeli multi-year project is USD 2–3 million (a demonstration farm). USD 15-million project (for example, a hospital) is a big one on MASHAV scale. No comment was received on the proportional share of budget for trainings and projects.⁸⁴

According to the MASHAV website, Africa is a priority continent and the Horn of Africa is recognised as a priority within SSA, with Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Senegal, South Sudan and Uganda having prioritised status. A category of “special interest countries” includes the following: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ivory Coast and Togo. The list is drawn within the MFA, yet flexible—if circumstances require, cooperation with another country can also be intensified. With a limited budget not much can be done even for a small number of countries⁸⁵, yet the existence of the list proves some kind of policy and selectiveness. The list not only remains in line with strategic interests and patterns of good cooperation but also includes countries considered “aid orphans”, abandoned by the development community, or at least in danger of receiving insufficient aid. In this respect, it might be said that Israeli aid does not follow the donors whose aid goes to countries considered as “trendy”.

According to MCTC analogue archival records, 536 Kenyans were by far the largest group of recipients of MCTC's trainings in all three sub-periods analysed (155 until 1973,119 in the 1970s and 1980s and 262 since 1993). Nigeria (320) comes second, yet the majority of these trainees had arrived since 1993. Ethiopia (269) and Ghana (247) follow. As in the case of Kenya, many trainees from Ghana (59) arrived during the era of the lack of formal relations between Israel and most of sub-Saharan countries.⁸⁶ As for CINADCO, its website presents reports on cooperation since the early 2000s with the following African countries: Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Togo. The greatest number and diversity of projects regards Ethiopia (agricultural biotechnology, aquaculture, dairy cattle, fruit trees, horticulture and outreach).

As for the possible connection between aid and promotion of trade, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and to an extent also Ivory Coast are among the main trade partners and the main aid recipients. Botswana and Tanzania are among major trade partners, but not recipients; Cameroon, Eritrea and Senegal are among recipients, but not trade partners. This superficial analysis might be treated as an indication that there might be some un-straightforward relationship between aid and trade, though with no prove of causality between the two. Analyses of statistics of Israeli import, export and aid volumes with Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and Ivory Coast for the period of 1997–2015 confirm that there is no correlation between Israeli aid and trade, even for Ivory Coast—in which case, due to its small size, the expectation for such a relation could be the greatest.

International cooperation

In 1966, 38% of 84 Israeli experts acting through international organisations were stationed in Africa. Out of 32 of them, 12 worked for FAO, 7—International Labour Organization (ILO), 3—UNESCO, 1—WHO, 1—IAIA, 5—other UN projects and 3 for organisations not belonging to the UN system. The 2008 agreement with UNDP provides for transfer of Israeli technical aid in agriculture, water, food, health and education, mainly to SSA, through projects and trainings in SSA and Israel. The first beneficiaries were Benin and Senegal. Every year Co-sponsored Fellowships Programmes for courses, apprenticeships and workshops are also offered in cooperation with UNESCO, in English and French, on a variety of topics (education, youth at risk, urbanisation, irrigation, water management, entrepreneurship). They are aimed for participants from defined lists of countries, sometimes exclusively from SSA. UNESCO finances travel costs and monthly pocket money, while Israel covers training costs, accommodation, boarding, transfers and health insurance. Israel is also a vocal supporter of NEPAD. The intensification of diplomatic relations with SSA was combined with efforts towards broadening cooperation on African development with the World Bank (fields of water, agriculture and cybersecurity, to complement existing programmes regarding transfer of Israeli technologies on water, information and communication) and the 2016 governmental decision on enhancing economic ties with the continent earmarked NIS 10 million (around USD 2.5 million) for this aim. It also tasked the Ministry of Finance with researching possibilities of cooperation between Israeli institutions and international bodies to finance development projects in Africa.⁸⁷

Among regional organisations, cooperation is most advanced in the case of ECOWAS, with which new MoUs were signed in June 2017 in Liberia, expected to translate into more MASHAV activities, primarily in agriculture and related fields—seen by West African countries as key to guaranteeing food security and employment possibilities.⁸⁸ MoUs provide also for investment by Energiya Global in National Demonstration Solar Projects.

As for bilateral agencies, the 2014 MASHAV annual report mentions cooperation with USAID in Ethiopia—a multi-year programme for supply of facilities, demonstration and training in large-scale agriculture and horticulture, including nurseries and research laboratories; and cooperation with Germany: in Kenya, to promote tilapia fishing on lake Victoria (second 3-year phase); in Burkina Faso—capacitybuilding to adopt to impacts of climate change; in Ethiopia, a multi-year plan to enable 1000 small-holder farmers to tackle climate change through irrigation. Moreover, an agreement was reached on a joint Israel-Germany Africa Initiative in 2014, main beneficiaries of which are Kenya, Ethiopia and Ghana. Similarly, the 2012 agreement with USAID provides for Israeli participation of the Feed the Future initiative, with Israel contributing expert know-how and the American side—financing. Israeli programme of cooperation might be given as an example of the “invisibility” of the donor, whose input into projects is composed of know-how and experts’ participation, often unacknowledged in the information on project's sponsors. Coordination with other donors is a matter mostly dealt with by the embassies. Israel cannot participate in the local donor committees due to low financial volumes of its aid. Ebola Fund is one exceptional case when Israeli contribution was significant enough.⁸⁹

Private companies—contemporary engagement

To start with, many Israeli businesses export modern technologies responding to African development needs. Even if their activity has no element of donation, the fact that they engage in government-led investments can have positive impact. Examples include AORA developing hybrid solar-biogas energy production in Ethiopia, or a producer of storage bags enabling farmers to overcome the problem of agricultural products being wasted on their way to consumer.

NETAFIM, the most successful Israeli drip irrigation company, can be treated as an exemplary company which adapts its business models to contribute to sustainable development. Manifold activities were finalised, underway or planned in sub-Saharan countries at the time of writing, including Congo, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Senegal and Tanzania. In most cases, NETAFIM works in cooperation with local governments, which it sees as a crucial success factor. Three predicaments guide current NETAFIM approach to work in Africa: that cultural challenges, including lack of trust and fear to invest on the African side, need to be addressed; that in African conditions, state-of-the-art irrigation does not work due to poor quality of water and unreliability of water and electricity service, thus the products for this market need to be simplified; that selling and leaving customer alone means that equipment will quickly break and remain unused, or that the farmer might not have the means to store and sell produce generated thanks to irrigation. Due to these factors and a history of projects in Africa which did not work as expected, NETAFIM designed a holistic approach. Every activity is multi-year, enabling profound learning about local conditions and taking care for an entire chain of supportive activities, including training (also: training the trainers), provision of seeds, fertilisers, micro-crediting, post-harvest service and marketing possibilities. These activities go beyond commercial aims and standard corporate social responsibility and yet are crucial to make the effort purposeful and rewarding both for the producer and the customer.⁹⁰

Since 2008, NETAFIM has been a member of the UN Global Compact—the largest corporate sustainability initiative, calling on companies to “align strategies and operations with universal principles on human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption, and take actions that advance societal goals”. NETAFIM also participated in the World Bank project in Niger (joint with the International Program for Arid Land Crops of the BGU IPALAC and the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics ICRISAT).⁹¹ Company's blog contains many entries reflecting on the conjunctions between its actions and global sustainable development, as expressed by commonly agreed-upon language of the UN documents. A large section of the website is devoted to sustainability, including membership in the CEO Water Mandate—initiative of businesses and international organisations meant to better coordinate efforts. The website features positive testimonial from customers in Senegal, highlighting not only the product and good yields received, but also the service—especially the technical training.

Among the companies which “do good” only as a by-product of for-profit activity, Amiran sells individually tailored kits containing everything from seeds, through fertilisers, to greenhouses. Kits are affordable to small-holder farmers, but state-of-the-art, and farmers can choose to be regularly assisted by an expert in the course of their use. Most buyers’ investment returns and brings profits. Amiran gained praise for contributing to eradicating poverty and hunger and earned criticism for not sufficiently promoting kits containing organic solutions. Terra Verde implemented around 30 projects in SSA regarding irrigation, rural planning and development, establishment of training centres or research stations. Another example is AlefBet Planners Ltd., designing kibbutz-like communities in Angola and Nigeria, improving agricultural production and creating jobs.

Two energy sector companies, Gigawatt Globaland Energiya Global, on the initiative of their Israeli owner, orchestrated a solar power project in Rwanda. Financed by international sources, it would provide 8% of country's power needs. Another project, done in partnership with the international, US-led Power Africa initiative, is in Burundi, which might add 15% to the country's power generation capacity. Energiya Global is also behind a project bringing solar panels for women and children hospital in South Sudan, founded through crowd-founding platform Crowdmii.

The largest Israeli engagement in Kenyan development at the time of writing was 10,000 acre Galana Kulalu food-security and rural employment experimental farming project: a private-public partnership, with Kenyan government's idea tendered to an Israeli irrigation company Green Arava, working upon a loan from an Israeli bank, with MASHAV offering courses.⁹² Another company, High-Tech-Initiatives Ltd., convinced the government of Cameroon to supplement the Yaounde Polytechnic with a High- and Low-Tech Centre, designed by High-Tech-Initiatives, including supply of machines and training of teachers. Inaugurated in 2012, the centre trains up to the Ph.D. level. In 3 years, it had around 600 graduates in various domains related to robotics, computers, mechatronics, quality control and hydraulics. It signed a cooperation agreement with Israeli Technion and received the status of the World Bank's Centre of Excellence in IT and Telecommunications.⁹³

Most of Israeli innovative companies on the African market are small ones.⁹⁴ One example focused on development work is WaterWays Solutions Ltd., a consultancy concentrated on sustainable water systems, in particular, in rural areas in Africa (activities undertaken in Cameroon, Madagascar, Niger). Started out of personal passion, it subscribes to the “social impact companies” category—its main aim is to help, but the model chosen is not an NGO due to uncertainty of funding and donor-dependence. In the words of the founder, every Israeli feels that the country has the technology which could be shared, but it is important to understand what could be shared usefully; elaborate, high-tech solutions are often impractical due to the lack of local maintenance. Thus, WaterWays concentrates on offering knowledge related to long-term sustainability rather than technology. However, required coordination between various governmental departments in SSA countries is a challenge.⁹⁵

Israeli companies also participate in World Bank Group developmental projects in SSA executed through procurement contracts. Procurement Contracts Award Summary for 2008–2016 shows that of 96 contracts awarded to Israeli companies, 40 (41%) were projects in Europe and Central Asia; they were also responsible for 55.4% of the value. Africa was the second destination (31 contracts, or 32%) with 24% of the contracts’ value. An analysis of the World Bank Group data on major contracts 2004–16 shows that Israeli companies were awarded 80 major contracts in SSA. The main recipients in terms of number of contracts were Senegal (16), Nigeria (13), Ethiopia (11) and Ghana (9), but in terms of total value the major beneficiaries were Uganda (above USD 20 million) and Nigeria (above USD 10 million). Most of the contracts were low scale (39—below USD 200,000; 21—worth more than 1 million USD). The majority (26) regarded equipment, information technology or feasibility studies (19), consultant services (45) or transfer of goods (30) and were either awarded through quality- and cost-based selection (41) or through international competitive bidding (33). The main areas were transportation (22), public administration (18), water, sanitation and waste management (10) as well as industry, trade and services (10). The companies with the largest amounts of contracts, out of 26 companies listed, were Tahal Consulting Engineers Ltd. (19), MRV International (18) and Tadiran Electronic Systems (10). The largest contracts were a 2011 Magal Security Systems USD 21 million contract for East Africa Trade and Transportation Facility (supply, installation and commissioning of an integrated security system aimed at enhancing trade between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda through integrating their transport, customs, border control systems); and a 2004 Tadiran Electronic Systems USD 11 million contract for Nigerian public administration. Out of the 80 contracts, 79 were executed through IBRD/IDA. In comparison to potentially competing Middle Eastern countries, Israeli companies were able to win more contracts in Africa: there was no data for contracts awarded to Iran, Qatar and Egypt, Turkey won nine contracts (of which three in Ethiopia), Kuwait four. The scale of the difference might suggest that this results both from increased interest of Israeli companies and their capabilities to provide services under procurement. Of other OECD countries, examples include Poland with seven contracts and Mexico with two. France had 1969 contracts, the United Kingdom—1029, the Netherlands—361. Thus, Israeli involvement is far below those of the major European countries, bound with the recipients by formerly colonial relationships. However, Israeli contribution to IDA mostly comes back in the form of contracts for Israeli companies.

There are some dominating players and around 20 other companies which engaged in the World Bank's contracts just once or few times. TNM Limited deals with a variety of sectors, including transport, water, environment, construction, IT, mining and energy; it has four offices in Africa (Botswana, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique). Tahal, created in 1952 and present in Africa since the 1960s, deals with water, agriculture, waste and energy; it declares that its prospective customers could benefit from third-party financing due to company's experience in cooperation with the World Bank, the AfDB, and the UN and projects that included training, technology transfer, capacity building and institutional strengthening, rural job- and income creation. Its past projects include integrated rural development planning for the government of Angola, pre-construction planning for water distribution system in Angola, four water supply projects done for Ghana Water Company, Addis Ababa water supply project, consultancy on flood mitigation project in Kenya, a complex water distribution system in Nigeria and share in Botswana's National Master Plan for the Arable Agriculture and Dairy Development. It has offices in Ghana and Angola. Another contractor, oti, deals with cashless payments. Soli—with hybrid seeds, greenhouses and nurseries. It implemented projects in Ethiopia (creation of 12 research centres) and Nigeria (setting up tomato farms).

The new governmental support mechanisms for enterprises translate into activities such as the November 2018 conference “Africa, Climate Change and Israel's Contribution”, with participation of representatives of the UN and SSA, which discussed ways in which Israeli companies can engage in activities tackling climate change, most profoundly through the international development banks’ projects that could be proposed by the receiving countries and implemented by Israeli companies.⁹⁶ A relevant forum enhancing cooperation between enterprises, NGOs, academics and public sector is a multi-year Africa: Continent of Tomorrow Series launched by Herzog Fox & Neeman consultancy.

Non-governmental organisations—contemporary engagement

There are more than 20 Israeli NGOs active in SSA.⁹⁷ Innovation: Africa, founded in 2008 (with mainly American donors, but the majority of work done by Israelis, from Israel, based on Israeli innovations), brings solar power to public-service buildings in remote villages. Until September 2018, it had already impacted over 1 million people (Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda mainly) and had been operating in 9 SSA countries with over 200 solar and water installations. The model promotes water access, through pumps; quality of education through lighting in schools, which attract children and better teachers; and quality of medical services through lighting, refrigerated storage places for medicines and vaccines—and more doctors willing to work there. The projects are sustainable as sustenance costs are covered through fees for phone charging in the electrified buildings. Women, responsible for supply of water, benefit the most; children get better health and education. Each project is under constant oversight through remote monitoring, allowing for quick reaction in the case of malfunction—this Israeli innovation received the UN recognition. Repairs are done thanks to offices in Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda, with local staff hired full-time. Activities are carefully planned, in a process which involves networking with the countries’ ministers and first ladies and mapping out territories that according to national plans are not going to receive electrification within next 15 years. Innovation: Africa often is the only organisation active in those places. The majority of hardware installed is locally manufactured. Cooperation and coordination with other donors include MASHAV, USAID, WHO and UNICEF.⁹⁸

IsraAid, created in 2001, defines its mission as support for populations moving from crisis to reconstruction/rehabilitation and sustainable living. It not only concentrates on humanitarian aid but also has significant development projects. Among its three core values, Partnership & Sustainability refers to active pursuit of local partnerships. In Northern Uganda, since 2015 it carries out practical trainings on water issues with social dimensions related to job creation, micro-credits and reintegration of child soldiers. In Sierra Leone and in Kenya, it launched trainings on psychosocial relief for traumatised people. In South Sudan, local trauma therapists, social workers and teachers are trained, using Israeli experiences, in particular, to deal with gender-based violence and to help traumatised victims. As a UNICEF-funded project carried out by local staff trained in Israel, it lasted through the civil war which broke out in 2013. Overall, 172 local social workers and other professionals working in communities were trained. The programme continues, adapting to the circumstances. IsraAid also works with the University of Juba, contributing to the establishment of the Center for Science Technology Engineering and Mathematics.⁹⁹

At the time of writing, IsraAid was restructuring itself and becoming an established, internationally recognised organisation able to work with major donors. The inspiration came from the successful model it worked out in South Sudan, from a small project to an internationally recognised large programme funded by the UN family, USAID and other donors. IsraAid provides capacity building and technical support for comprehensive development of community services done by local organisations, which first obtain training and then get money channelled by the donors through IsraAid as well as robust IsraAid technical support; finally, in few years, they become able to obtain funds from the major donors directly. Thanks to IsraAid efforts, other donors saw the benefits of building the capacity of local organisations: while no local organisation was a part of the 2014 UN South Sudan Emergency Response Plan, nowadays they constitute around 60% of partners. The example also shows the crucial role of (Jewish, in this case) donors with flexible terms of funding (seed funding in particular), which enabled IsraAid to establish itself at the beginning and build trust of the communities through a constant presence. The UN funds, focused on fast implementation and frequently discontinued, would not allow for this.¹⁰⁰

In the area of health, the Jerusalem AIDS Project, active on all continents, focuses on prevention. Its main achievement in Africa (in cooperation with Hadassah Medical Organization) is the Abraham Collective project promoting and delivering male circumcision—as a practice limiting contraction of diseases—through equipment and capacitybuilding. It started in Swaziland (Eswatini) and spread to other countries. NALA Foundation created in 2011 by Prof. Zvi Bentwich focuses on Ethiopia, where it carries out deworming, health education and drug distribution in different locations and social groups. An Eye from Zion provides sight-saving operations; it recently started to operate in Ethiopia. SACH offers comprehensive training in Israel (coordinated with MASHAV) in a whole spectrum of paediatric cardiac care; of over 100 of beneficiaries, one-fourth came from Africa. Moreover, SACH extends doctors’ training missions to a number of countries, most constantly (since 1996) to Ethiopia and (since 1999) Zanzibar.

Fair Planet, supplying quality seeds and training, operates in Ethiopia with an aim of reaching over one-fourth million of people. Yad Sarah, the largest volunteer organisation in Israel, extends aid abroad, including Cameroon and Angola, by helping to set up medical equipment service points similar to those in Israel, yet adapted to local needs and cultural environment. Eden Aid cooperates with kibbutz Yotvata in organising medical and educational volunteering and agricultural training in Ethiopia. Tevel b’Tzedek relies on volunteers for projects like community-building, demonstration farms and a solar-powered information centre in Burundi. OLAM is an Israel-based umbrella for Israeli and Jewish organisations, aiming at sharing information on volunteering opportunities, creating partnerships between NGOs and advocating for engagement, in the spirit of tikkun olam. The African Hebrew Development Agency (AHDA) is an organisation with highly religious motivations. Its most popularised project called Regenerative Health and Nutrition Training was launched by the Ghanaian Ministry of Health, with the support of AHDA's experts to promote local, healthy and low-cost diet in the country, so as to prevent various diseases. Engineers Without Borders Israel, Israeli branch of an international network, brings students from Israeli universities (BGU, TAU, HUJ and Technion) to install water and solar equipment in African countries. A relatively new initiative is Fighters for Life (Fighters without Borders in Hebrew). It engages young people who travel to developing countries during the “gap year” following their army service to volunteer for local communities. In Ethiopia, the aim is to work with blind and mute children, teaching them and renovating one of the shelters.

Of note, there are instances of Diaspora Jewish aid organisations that could be perceived as Israeli. One of them is UK-based Pears Foundation, which acts also from Israel, so it shall be mentioned. It founds scholarships for people from developing countries (including SSA) to study at Israeli universities (agriculture and public health in particular) and then use the know-how acquired in their home countries. Pears Scholars programme had reached around 60 students by 2015. The Foundation also aims at supporting development of Israeli aid sector and popularising Israeli development offer among international entities.

There are also examples of individuals, whose expertise and passion led to significant developmental work, institutional recognition and support. One of them was Dov Pasternak, an expert in desert agriculture (including crops’ species, irrigation and saline watering). His career included IPALAC, which shares relevant Israeli experiences in fighting desertification, ICRISAT and Eliminate Poverty Now schooling project called Farmers of the Future. Results include popularisation of saline water irrigation, techniques linked to greenhouses and non-chemical pests control, distribution of 2500 small-holder’ irrigation kits in several countries, research in plant's species. Pasternak's expertise was behind MASHAV programmes in Senegal, which grew from BGU African Market Garden initiative developed in 1999 with NETAFIM, up to MASHAV's pan-African TIPA and trilateral Israeli-Italian-Senegalese programme. The scheme is now replicated in Senegal by other organisations, including the Millennium Village Initiative.

Conclusions

Israeli development aid programme emerged out of idealism originating from Jewish, Zionist and socialist beliefs, while it also answered political interests. Though the programme is more pragmatic and realistic nowadays, a genuine willingness to share knowledge and experience is still commonly present. The institutional make-up of Israeli aid can be described as a network with MASHAV at its centre. Cooperation of other actors (other ministries, training centres, research institutions and universities, businesses, NGOs) is fundamental in fostering engagement of the best resources. The operational structures are flexible and adaptable to the needs.

Interventions are based on dialogue with prospective recipients and on evaluation of ways for addressing needs through the adaptation of Israeli solutions. The programme is based on comparative advantages, where Israeli knowledge and experience is unique and related to challenges faced by others. The most important characteristic of the programme is that it concentrates on technical aid, contributing most profoundly to the human resources of the recipients. The potential for multiplication of knowledge and solutions is generated thanks to a dominant “train the trainers” approach and demonstrative methods. The small scale of projects is meant as a testing ground for expansion of solutions which prove successful. The Israeli trainers are—along with know-how and technologies—the greatest asset of Israeli aid. They are esteemed for commitment, hard work, professionalism and openness. Israeli aid was innovative in the way it addressed gender and rural development.

The following spheres of activity are the dominant ones throughout the Israeli programme, with the strongest role today, in particular, in the case of SSA: agriculture and rural development, including water management; women's socio-economical empowerment; health. The non-governmental sector is engaged mostly in agriculture and health; in renewable energy field, it greatly exceeds governmental sector's input.

MASHAV is doing impressive work bearing in mind its budget.¹⁰¹ High in per capita numbers in the 1960s, the net volumes experienced fluctuations. Despite rise since 2006, aid represents a tiny share of the Israeli GDP. While it is far from OECD targets, additional external financing and the nature of Israeli aid make the volumes underestimated. Another measure of input—the number of people trained—is more impressive, with around one-third million beneficiaries around the world.

While until 1973 SSA used to be the main recipient, measured either through share of bilateral aid budget, multilateral aid budget, trainees in Israel and in situ or delegated Israeli experts, it lost its position in the 1970s. Nowadays, sub-Saharans constitute a significant share of individual recipients, while the formal share of SSA in the overall volumes of Israeli ODA is low. Within the continent, aid is no longer equally spread. Focus is on countries where pragmatic engagement promises results, most notably, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Senegal, South Sudan and Uganda. The list of the largest recipients reflects the list of priority and special interest countries, characterised by geographical proximity and patterns of good relations. This unique set includes “aid orphans” such as Togo. Economic relations are unrelated. Around 10% share of multilateral aid is typical for non-DAC donors.

Israel, not yet a member of OECD's DAC, actively participates in international discussions on development, influences solutions and cooperates with engaged entities. It adheres to international aid standards, in particular thematic prioritisation through MDGs and SDGs. Israeli expertise is widely recognised, translating into partnerships with bi- and multilateral agencies, which serve gaining financial support and extension of outreach.

Non-governmental sector's contribution grows, fuelled by governments’ commitment, young generation's drive for social justice and engagement of former diplomats or businessmen with experience in Africa. Enterprises integrate sustainability thinking into their business models. Purely for-profit companies are aware that for their African clients, acquiring foreign solutions is linked to questions of human well-being or even survival. Therefore, they try to ensure that their produce remains operational and makes sense in the context of their clients’ socio-economic realties. Moreover, an entirely new segment emerges “impact companies”, whose primary aim is fostering development. Engagement in the World Bank contracts is focused in terms of participating companies and recipients.

As for the civil society organisations, activities of several of them reached the scale of significant impacts. They are a very diversified sector, usually combining Israeli capacities with various forms of support from abroad. Thinking in terms of sustainability, they are characterised by launching strong partnerships with recipients.

Notes

1 Belman-Inbal, Zahavi 2009: 9, 21–22; Meir 1975: 312–313; Bar-Yosef 2015; Levey 2012: 31.

2 Meir 1975: 306, 308.

3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1969.

4 Ben Zvi 1961; Decalo 1998: 109–110; Sharma 1976: 368–385, 398–401; Levey 2001: 103; Levey 2003b: 164. Yacobi 2015 acknowledges these motives and also underlines the role of activities in Africa for the process of shaping of Israeli identity. Still, his critical analysis of these activities seems to this author—representing positivist traditions of research, rather than a postmodernist methodology—sometimes too detached from the historical context and too quick in putting diverse phenomena under unified semantic umbrella.

5 Ojo 1988: 56–57; Decalo 1998: 123; Meir 1975: 307; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1978.

6 Interview with Benny Omer.

7 Ajami, Sours 1970: 407; Interviews with Paul Hirschson, Adam Levene.

8 Netanyahu 2018.

9 Prime Minister's Office b; Weinstein, Fried 2006: 84.

10 Belman-Inbal, Zahavi 2009: 10; Rodin 1969: 144–145.

11 Laufer 1967: 216–217; Interviews with Shulamit Kurzon van Gelder, Leo Vinovezky, Adam Levene; Levush 2012: 151.

12 Levin 1972: 39; Belman-Inbal, Zahavi 2009: 35–36; MASHAV 2014: 56; Agenda 21; Rodin 1969: 24–27; Oded 2009.

13 Library of Congress.

14 Agenda 21; Prime Minister's Office b.

15 Ministry of Environment 2000: 122; Laufer 1967: 40.

16 MASHAV, HAIGUD 2011: 2–4; Belman-Inbal, Zahavi 2009: 23.

17 MASHAV, HAIGUD 2011:10, 15–17, 34–38, 43–46; Levin 1970: 46–52; MCTC, Haifa, archival research. MASHAV 2014: 42; Interviews with Shahar Re’em; Rodin 1969: 68.

18 CINADCO, MASHAV 2012A: 4–7; MASHAV 2014: 41–42.

19 MASHAV 2014: 45–46; MASHAV Empowering: 35.

20 Laufer 1967: 159; Levin 1970:47–48.

21 Rodin 1969: 68–69.

22 Interview with Ornit Avidar.

23 Interview with Danny Ariel.

24 Belman-Inbal, Ben Yehuda, Weizmann 2012: 7.

25 Interview with Benny Omer.

26 Agenda 21; MASHAV 2012b:8; Prime Minister's Office a.

27 Tel Aviv University, Israeli Export Institute 2014; Belman-Inbal, Namiech 2018; Prime Minister's Office b.

28 Belman-Inbal 2009: 5–7, 14.

29 Interview with Ophelie Namiech.

30 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017a; Interviews with Dana Manor, Adam Levene.

31 Belman-Inbal 2009: 11–12.

32 Holbik 1967:204; Laufer 1967: 31–33; Interview with Adam Levene.

33 Holbik 1967: 202–203.

34 Laufer 1967: 174–180.

35 Ben-Matityahu 2012; Oded 2009.

36 MASHAV guiding principles.

37 Belman-Inbal, Zahavi 2009: 31; Levin 1972: 38.

38 Laufer 1967: 3–10, 25–30.

39 Laufer 1967:60–61; Rodin 1969: 95–96; Interview with Leo Vinovezky.

40 Laufer 1967: 34–35; Interview with Shulamit Kurzon van Gelder.

41 Laufer 1967: 53–55, 65–77.

42 Laufer 1967: 84, 111–112; Levin 1970: 48–49; Levin 1972: 37–39; Eaton, Chen 1969.

43 MASHAV Guiding Principles.

44 Laufer 1967:43–45; Levin 1972: 39; Rodin 1969: 31; Interview with Leo Vinovezky.

45 Belman-Inbal, Zahavi 2009: 11, 16–17; Rodin 1969: 44–46. Holbik 1967: 203 puts the actual budget on USD 5 million already in 1962, with three-fourths spent on exchanges of experts and trainings. Levin 1970: 39–40 wrote of USD 10 million annually, half of which was spent in Africa.

46 Library of Congress; Belman-Inbal, Zahavi 2009: 10.

47 Belman-Inbal, Namiech 2018; Interview with Shulamit Kurzon van Gelder.

48 Levin 1972: 37–39; Laufer 1967: 79; Oded 2009.

49 Library of Congress; Oded 2009; Belman-Inbal, Zahavi 2009: 19; Mayal 2017.

50 Rodin 1969:36–37, 41, 60–61, 80; Belman-Inbal, Zahavi 2009: 18, 42, 47; Levin 1970: 48; MASHAV Empowering: 6–7.

51 MASHAV 2012b: 16–17; MASHAV 2014: 18–21, 24–26.

52 Bagiński, Czaplicka, Szczyciński 2009: 105.

53 Gibson, Hoffman, Jablonski 2015; Bagiński, Czaplicka, Szczyciński 2009: 65–69.

54 Laufer 1967: 81–82; Levin 1972: 39–40; Levin 1970: 50; MASHAV Empowering: 8.

55 Interviews with Lynn Schler; Aliza Belman-Inbal; Ophelie Namiech; Shulamit Kurzon van Gelder.

56 MASHAV, HAIGUD 2011: 60–61, 69.

57 Interviews with Yudith Rosenthal; Shulamit Kurzon van Gelder; Adam Levene; Benny Omer.

58 Szydzisz 2015.

59 Laufer 1967: 46–47.

60 Laufer 1967: 46–47; The Montreal Gazette 1968: 51; Smolaga, 2014: 267; Interview with Adam Levene.

61 For example, in 2012, in the 18th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNCCD (Doha); the Final Meeting of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (Paris); the Annual OECD Development Communication Network Meeting (Oslo) and DAC network on Development Evaluation (Paris); Commission on the Status of Women (New York); the 12th Alliance against Trafficking in Persons’ Conference (Vienna); the 3rd UNECE Forum of Women Entrepreneurs (Baku). MASHAV 2012b: 15–16, 47.

62 Agenda 21; Adam 2013: 275; UNDP 2013: 17; Oden 1970: 264; Ministry of Environment 2000; Tal 2007; Shamir 2012; Interviews with Leo Vinovezky; Adam Levene.

63 Smolaga, 2014: 12–13, 78, 84, 97, 191, 222–223, 233, 244–245, 251, 283; Interview with Yael Abessira.

64 Prime Minister's Office b.

65 Rodin 1969: 77–78, 164–166; Laufer 1967: 85–92, 103–107.

66 Saran 1974: 13; Rodin 1969: 53–54; Carol 2012: 99, 107–113; Schler 2017; Levin 1972: 39, 40–42.

67 Rodin 1969: 52–53, 64; Holbik 1967: 203; Carol 2012: 124–125; Laufer 1967: 111–125; Decalo 1998: 112.

68 Levin 1972: 39; Laufer 1967: 127–130; Carol 2012: 149–150; Mooreville 2016.

69 Laufer 1967: 188–191; Levin 1972: 37–38; Rodin 1969: 54–55.

70 Laufer 1967: 24, 131–134; Carol 2012: 164.

71 Laufer 1967: 140–149.

72 Laufer 1967: 134–136; Rodin 1969: 55; Meir 1975: 320; Carol 2012: 155.

73 Rodin 1969: 56; Laufer 1967: 130–131, 167–174; Carol 2012: 129–138; 155–157; Tal 2013: 109–110.

74 Rodin 1969: 74–75; Ojo 1988: 22; Laufer 1967: 137–140.

75 Dreher, Minasyan, Nunnenkamp 2015; Holbik 1967: 201; Alpan 1976: 104; Laufer 1967: 61–64; Oded 2009; Kreinin 1976: 67; Carol 2012: 119–120, 151–154; Decalo 1998: 75–77, 146.

76 Belman-Inbal, Zahavi 2009: 39; Peters 1992: 68; Lavon Institute archive; MCTC archive; Peters 1992: 95–97, 121–122, 127–130.

77 Levin 1972: 46; Holbik 1967: 204. Ojo 1988: 19.

78 Oded 2009.

79 Carol 2012: 310, 337, 341–343, 362–363.

80 Knols, Kuvin, Malowany.

81 MASHAV 2014: 9–10.

82 Prime Minister's Office a.

83 Ojo 1988: 34; Kreinin 1964: 72; MCTC archive.

84 Interview with Benny Omer.

85 Interviews with: Leo Vinovezky, Lynn Schler.

86 MCTC archive.

87 Prime Minister's Office a.

88 Interview with Adam Levene.

89 Rodin 1969: 79; MASHAV 2014: 25–26; Dagoni 2012; Interview with Adam Levene.

90 Interview with Danny Ariel.

91 Zwarteveen 2015: 437.

92 Green Arava.

93 Interview with Benny Omer.

94 Panel discussion 2017.

95 Interview with Ornit Avidar.

96 Beher 2018.

97 Interview with Dana Manor.

98 Interview with Genna Brand; statistics updated 27.09.2018 through correspondence.

99 Interview with James Alau Sabasio.

100 Interview with Ophelie Namiech.

101 Interview with Naomi Chazan.

5Israeli public diplomacy

SUBCHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW

With the evolution of foreign policy and due to changing external realities, the role of soft power within Israeli power mix is growing. Conversely, there is more recognition of the role of public diplomacy. Global trends—globalisation, including globalisation of information market due to media revolution (satellite television, the Internet, social media), democratisation and ensuing growth of engagement of individuals and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in international relations, have contributed to this process at least since the early 1990s. This subchapter concentrates on Israeli public diplomacy: needs and measures taken, including analyses of institutional make-up, common practices and contents. Importantly, the topic is highly debated, emotional and politicised, as seen particularly in the subchapter's first two sections, meant to present various Israeli narratives, rather than one objective picture of the situation.

Israel's public diplomacy needs

Public opinion polls, even if their methodology can be challenged, are often testimony to a poor state of Israeli public relations (PR). For example, the 2012 BBC World Service poll located Israel among countries like North Korea, reflecting mostly negative assessment of its influence, with proportion between respondents with negative and positive opinions at around 50:20. Negative assessments are motivated primarily by Israel's foreign policy, while positive ones—by Jewish tradition and culture. They reflect a reality with which Israeli policymakers need to deal. Attention devoted by media to Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, wildly seen as disproportionate, coupled with such general tendencies in journalism as sensationalism and infotainment, often leads to a biased and out-of-context media image of Israel. Israeli analysts underline that Arab media and textbooks propagate distorted image of Israel, including the history of its creation; Protocols of the Elders of Zion, Main Kampf, belief in Jews adding Muslim blood to matzo and other stereotypes are widely propagated. Contemporary mass media vastly adopted pro-Arab perspective, which Gilboa explains by attractiveness of standing for the seemingly weaker side. Manipulations include “Pallywood”—visual propaganda, particularly staged pictures and films, shot in places or circumstances radically different than claimed or otherwise distorted in order to vilify Israel—and misleading language. In the case of Gaza, foreign reporters depend on Hamas, which decides what they can see or say—and expels the disobedient. According to Diker, Israeli 1990s negligence of Palestinian incitement and own PR (closure of Information Department of the [Israeli] Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA]) are also to blame for the fact that—as many would say—Arab nomenclature on the conflict was adopted and the image of Israel started to be shaped by its enemies. In the 2000s, channels for spread of anti-Israel propaganda multiplied; Arab and Muslim minorities in the West mobilised politically and radicalised. While maybe not impacting on Israeli overall security directly, a phenomenon which is often described as a campaign of delegitimisation, dehumanisation and demonization of Israel contributed to rise of anti-Semitism worldwide, eruptions of anti-Jewish violence (especially in Europe), lone-wolf terrorist attacks inside and outside of Israel and consolidation of the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement.¹

Israeli PR deteriorated due to the historical occupation of Sinai and prolonged and continuous occupation and settlement of other lands conquered during the 1967 war, particularly the Gaza Strip (conquered from Egypt and occupied until 2005 disengagement) and the West Bank (conquered from Jordan). The late 1970s rule of Likud contributed to deterioration of Israel's image, which in turn improved in the 1980s era of national unity governments. Internal aspects notwithstanding, the scale of Israel's enemies’ engagement with the world media and of incitement, demonization and deception employed was evaluated by Israeli policymakers as demanding reaction, as it started to undermine national security. In the 1970s, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) designed a strategy of psychological and media warfare based on methods used by Vietnamese and Chinese communists, combining terrorism with propaganda (including through international NGOs) aimed to convince international public opinion that terrorism is justified. The 1973 defeat of the Arab armies emboldened the Palestinian movement, which sought independence from Arab patrons. The tendency was strengthened with the 1970s Israeli-Egyptian peace process and the 1980s Israeli-Jordanian negotiations. Thus, the image of the conflict has been reshaped: from the Israeli-Arab to the Israeli-Palestinian one; with the Palestinian victimhood narrative more credible than the overall Arab one, this turn made anti-Israeli propaganda more digestible. Moravchik underlines the continuum of thinking since Arab alliance with the Nazi Germany (traced to Haj Amin al-Huseini's collaboration and his role in Arab politics after the Second World War) and the deep anti-Semitism within the Palestinian national liberation movement. Aside from ideological sphere, according to Moravchik, Palestinians effectively blackmailed the Europeans by the 1970s campaign of planes’ hijacking. Another blackmail was the 1973 oil embargo, which allegedly secured pro-Palestinian stance of the than European Community. The highpoint of anti-Israeli efforts was the 1975 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution dubbed “Zionism is Racism”. Until and despite 1991 revocation, it brought large damage to Israeli image, its leitmotiv adopted by anti-Israeli movements.² One manifestation of its durability was the 2001 UN (United Nations) World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in Durban and its follow-up. The conference, and particularly its NGOs Forum, was taken over by anti-Israeli countries and organisations, enforcing language that equalled Zionism with racism and Israeli treatment of Palestinians with apartheid. Several Western countries and NGOs withdrew due to this anti-Semitic agenda, yet the damage was done.

An earlier decisive moment was the First Intifada. It caught the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) ill-prepared, as any army would be, to do policing activities. The result—in terms of the international image—was pictures of youth armed with rocks and Molotov cocktails confronting heavily armed soldiers, capturing imagination of the Western audience. Palestinians actively approached foreign journalists who sought attractive, simple and low-risk stories, while Israeli information structures were understaffed and undertrained. Until today, the media coverage, in Gilboa's words, damages Israeli image, since false accusations gain high media exposure while results of independent inquiries, displaying the less “attractive” truth, come late and gain little attention. Reut Institute recommended abandoning the old doctrine, based on such assumptions as threat's military nature; need for military and technological superiority; secondary role of diplomacy; placing Israel among the West; belief that improvement in public diplomacy and resolution to the conflict with the Palestinians would bring an end to delegitimisation. Rather, the threat has apolitical and economic nature and can be existential; its nature cannot be addressed by military superiority; public diplomacy isn’t a sufficient response to delegitimisation, which turned into an ideology; no peace accord with the Palestinians would appease the delegitimisers. Still, Reut proposes some actions which can be classified as public diplomacy: creating and training pro-Israel networks led by local leaders; strengthening ties with Diaspora; rebranding Israel (by association with innovation, creativity and contribution to the world); entering ties with delegitimisation circles; engaging those critical of Israel. The recommendation to reactivate the international cooperation branch of the Histadrut matters in the context of relations with developing countries. Importantly, Reut advises that humanitarian and development actions get a special place within rebranding efforts and fight against delegitimisation.³

Internal discussion

Public diplomacy is a relatively new term, used by governments and political scientists instead of “propaganda”, “information policy” or “communication policy” (and “psychological warfare” in times of conflict). It also has a broader meaning and is perceived as neutral. In the Israeli practice, all those terms have been in use. In Israel's early years, in line with the phraseology employed by other countries at the time, “propaganda” was the term used. In the 1970s, when Israelis realised that an answer to the Arab propaganda has to be worked out, word hasbara was adopted, meaning “explanation” and usually referred to PR concerned with the complicated reality of the conflict. In the opinion of many, hasbara embodies defensive, even apologetic policies. Currently, civil servants working for the MFA's Public Diplomacy Department distance themselves—and their work—from the term, saying that its use had devastating effects and they prefer the term “public diplomacy”. If used, hasbara refers to a narrow part of public diplomacy related to explaining political issues. Another term increasingly in use is “advocacy”, relating to proactive, “before they ask” activity done not only by—or rather then by—diplomats. For the sake of clarity, “public diplomacy” is used in here unless the other term was used historically.⁴

The issue of soft power has been for a long time largely omitted by Israeli scholars, despite attention devoted by public opinion and decisionmakers to Israel's image. Similarly, Israeli academia does not seem to reflect much on the concept in the Israeli context. It is largely believed that soft power, a power of attraction, might not have much influence on political views—wearing jeans does not cause Iranians to love America. People-to-people diplomacy, most profoundly through social media, is seen as something that works despite of, or even thanks to, the Israeli soft power resources of multitude of narratives, democratic spirit and innovative capacities.⁵

According to Cummings, the issue of public diplomacy is a constant impediment to Israel's external relations’ goals, a paradox due to its persistent struggle for support. Gilboa enumerates difficulties in implementation of Israeli public diplomacy: democratic (polemic, not projecting a unified message) nature of the society, limited resources and officials’ recognition of the role of public diplomacy, media hostility and international domination of anti-Israeli states. Schleifer claims that while these impediments in the face of the Palestinian PR’ monolith are real, the reasons for deficiencies in Israeli public diplomacy are rooted in fundamental patterns of Jewish thinking: the attitudes towards external world during 18 centuries in Diaspora and of the early Zionists. Thus, the Israeli public diplomacy inherited the legacy of easily evoked fears, conviction that the environment is hostile and that only self-reliant, close-knit Jewish community can provide security.⁶

Cummings also observed that in the Israeli political culture, things associated with “propaganda” were seen as cheap, primitive and not serious. Aware of the role of propaganda in the Nazi incitement and war industry, upon creating own state, Jews rejected this element of warfare and instead half-heartedly adopted a policy of explaining (hasbara)—underfinanced and disconnected from policymaking. Improvised, incidental, thematically unsuitable, inconsistent and defensive, it had to tackle campaign of incitement, delegitimisation and open questioning of Israel's right to exist. The Molad Centre is among the rare voices claiming that Israeli public diplomacy improved into one of the best systems in the world, and that the real issue is failed foreign and security policies. However, Molad's argument is basically that because the “anti-Israel lobby” is not centrally organised, it is inferior to the state-supported “pro-Israel” one—with no actual proof for the lesser effectiveness of the former. The media bias is not discussed at all by Molad, and there is little comparative perspective. Bachar, Bar, Machtiger recommend redirecting Israel's public diplomacy to aim at breaking the automatic majority at the UN, including through engaging developing countries; emphasising Israel's contribution in fields like medicine and agriculture; employment of legal measures, including underused anti-incitement paragraphs in existing peace treaties and encouraging reforms in global antiterrorism laws; and alleviating foreign media access to accurate information from the Israeli side.⁷

Institutional issues

Early forms of institutional structure of Israeli public diplomacy existed already in pre-state times: Association of Foreign Press Correspondents within the Palestine Zionist Executive and multilingual weekly News from Eretz-Yisrael in the 1920s, enhanced in the 1930s by the Palestine Correspondence Agency and a PR office. Under Ben Gurion, convinced that action is more important than “words” and journalists only run after sensation, the issue was marginalised. However, international press office was on the run already during the War of Independence. In 1950s, three entities dealt with the subject: the Government Press Office (responsible for foreign and domestic press), the Broadcasting Service (Kol Yisrael radio) and the department responsible for domestic information policy. MFA was responsible for spreading information to foreign audiences and took care of foreign journalists in Israel. In 1966, under Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, a separate cabinet member was appointed to deal with hasbara. Yet he had no control over external information policy and no real interest in the foreign audience. In the run up to the 1967 war, foreign correspondents had hard time gaining access to the highest officials but were free to report on the civilian life and join army units in their operations; overall, their access to and reliability of the Israeli side was notably better than of the Arab states. They gained an image of Israel as a state of pioneers and were impressed by its institutions. The consequences of the 1967 war not only worsened the foreign public's opinion of Israel but also caused confusion internally. Organisational chaos was observed without clarity on hasbara's importance, goals, audiences or means. Serious and intensive, yet unsuccessful reforms lasted until 1975. In 1968, television was eventually introduced, inter alia to influence publics in neighbouring countries (broadcast in Arabic initially took three-fourths of the air time), in reaction to aggressive propaganda broadcasted from Arab states onto Israeli territory. In 1969, a commission of enquiry on information efforts targeted at foreign audiences, created by the Ministerial Hasbara Committee, concluded that institutional dispersion, especially division of foreign and domestic communication, impeded coordination. It also observed that Israel lost its image of egalitarian pioneers concentrated on swamp-draining, road-paving and defending young independence while Arab propaganda was characterised by romanticised content and large financing. The Commission advised creation of an Information Authority within the Prime Minister's Office (PMO); constant assessments of Israel's perceptions abroad; devoting appropriate resources, including analytical capacities and properly trained officials; and engagement with foreign students. The report was quietly shelved, among other reasons, due to opposition of the MFA against weakening its competences. In turn, the Ministry was even bolstered as issues of foreign students, volunteers, Israeli students abroad and growing numbers of foreign journalists were transferred to it in 1970. This triggered in a period of consolidation, conscious planning and better budgeting of public affairs within the Ministry, positively assessed by the 1971 State Comptroller's report on hasbara. After the shock of 1973, for the first time a (short-lived) unified ministerial entity was created to deal with information issues. Though support for Israel grew and its image was said to improve, as it came back to the status of “the weaker one”, with IDF seen as a brave “people's army”, a post-war report on information policy concluded that coordination and resources were still inadequate.⁸

Fast forward to the present times, a unified entity to deal with information issues re-emerged also in 2009–13 and (inconsequently) since May 2015. Yet throughout the history of the modern state, the leading role in public diplomacy has tended to be played by the PMO and the MFA, which has used to house a Media and Hasbara Department. Various other ministries, agencies and the IDF are also engaged. The early 2000s reports by National Comptroller pointed to weak coordination and lack of strategy of communication, including towards the Arab world. There was an increase in public diplomacy activities by Ehud Olmert's (2006–08) and Benjamin Netanyahu's (since 2009) governments, with introduction of coordination, fast reaction mechanisms and use of new media. Recognition also grew of the fact that financial and human resources devoted to work with global public opinion used to be inadequate and ill-managed. Reportedly, in 2005 the relevant budget amounted to New Israeli shekel (NIS) 45 million out of total NIS 1.342 billion devoted to diplomacy, with $0.04 devoted to diplomacy and $0.00125 to public diplomacy for every dollar for defence. In 2009, the Ministry of Public Diplomacy and Diaspora (also translated as Ministry of Information and Diaspora) was created, yet with limited competences. In 2010, MFA's budget for “branding” went up to 100 million NIS, assisted by a new focus on the Internet. At the time of writing, MFA's operating budget was around NIS 14 million, allowing for meagre activity. In 2012, the issue was transferred into the PMO, and policymaking and coordination entrusted to the so-called National Hasbara Forum.⁹

At the time of writing, the government structures included the PMO's Media Department responsible for relations with the local and foreign press and containing the National Information Directorate (known also as National Communications Headquarters) created after the 2006 Lebanon war. The Government Press Office was responsible for coordination with foreign media and an inter-ministerial coordination forum. A new post was created in 2016 within the Office, called deputy minister in the PMO and head of public diplomacy. Within the MFA, the Public Diplomacy Directorate had a comprehensive structure including Media and Public Affairs Division (with press relations, communication in Arabic, digital diplomacy, PR and branding and contacts with civil society units), Division for Cultural and Scientific Affairs, Spokesperson's Bureau and Bureau for World Jewish Affaires and World Religions. Under the MFA, 78 embassies and 23 consulates operated, a network considered insufficient bearing in mind international challenges (Iran has 142 missions, the Palestinian Authority [PA]—101). Moreover, MFA had no dedicated minister for many years of Netanyahu's governments—as the Prime Minister used to hold this function—limiting MFA's voice within the government. The Minister of Information (of Hasbara in Hebrew), Gilad Erdan of Likud, was entrusted with particular tasks, particularly combating the BDS, to be implemented through the Ministry of Strategic Affairs (held by Erdan as well, as was Internal Affairs ministry). Despite its mission and a budget of NIS 120 million, the Ministry did not have its own website. The IDF has its own press officers; Knesset plays a role in discussing the frameworks.

The PMO, MFA, the Ministry of Information, the IDF Spokesman and individual diplomats run Facebook (FB), Twitter, YouTube, and Flickr accounts. MFA staff and volunteers monitor websites, social media and comments. Israeli MFA ranked 8th in the 2016 Digital Diplomacy Review. MFA's Israel Arabic FB proved particularly successful. Yet accessing pro-Israel content can still be difficult due to poor positioning of such sites. Limited functions are played by the state-owned media. The Israel Broadcasting Authority, existing under different names since 1948, operates national TV and radio channels. It produces radio and TV programmes in Hebrew, Arabic, Farsi, English, French, Russian, Spanish, Hungarian, Romanian, Georgian, Ethiopian Judeo-Moroccan Arabic, Ladino, Yiddish and Aramaic accessible from its website. Yet the reforms in the system of public media introduced by the government at the time of writing endangered the flow of content in this variety of languages. Some use is also made of private PR companies and media counsellors.

In the spirit of the new public diplomacy theory, several other elements of Israeli public diplomacy infrastructure need mentioning. A new institution, Israel Innovation Centre, was launched in 2016 by late President Shimon Peres together with other leaders and meant to show the history of Israel as a “start-up nation” and document the most breaking innovations. An exhibition will be combined with a research platform for solutions enhancing innovation, coexistence and knowledge sharing. Located at the Peres Peace House, it shall contribute to gathering Middle Easterners around development and peace building. The Centre could be a positive input into public diplomacy, building on good reputation it has already gained through work on peace education.

Public diplomacy instruments used include encouragement of foreigners, particularly opinion-makers, to visit the country. One example could be the 2016 visit of a group of 11 ambassadors to the UN (including Liberian, Tanzanian and Equatorial Guinean ones), during which they visited a kibbutz near the Gaza border, a hospital where wounded Syrians are treated, Agricultural Research Organization's Volcani Center and a water desalination facility in Ashkelon. In the realm of generating pro-Israeli activism, the state tries to engage the Jewish Diasporas, own nationals travelling abroad and social media. The North American Diaspora hosts almost half of the 14 million Jews outside of Israel. Some part of it would be active irrespective of the state's encouragement or lack thereof; yet there is much talk of passivity of its youth, especially in confrontation with anti-Israeli campaigns at universities. Large share of Diaspora criticises Israeli right-wing governments, with Israeli interests—as it understands them—in mind. The Jewish Agency is the main institution connecting Jews worldwide and spreading information among them, including through seminars, trainings for young leaders, emissaries, tours in Israel and social activism at home and abroad (also volunteering in some African countries). The Faces of Israel 2011 aimed to engage the Diaspora on campuses through delegations of volunteers representing diversity of Israeli society and follow-up activities.

The question of preparedness of Israeli citizens to play a public diplomacy role has been evaluated and a public diplomacy curriculum for secondary schools prepared by the Institute for Zionist Strategies. It drew attention to Israeli achievements in agriculture, technology, health and culture. Due to limitations on the numbers of available elective subjects, the curriculum was not introduced at schools. Still, some classes in public diplomacy take place, initiated by the NGOs, as part of informal education. As for higher education, there is a public diplomacy programme at the University of Haifa and elements are included in the programmes of Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya (in cooperation with MFA), Bar Ilan University (Center for International Communication), Sapir and Netanya Academic College.¹⁰ Examples of actual citizens’ activities included We are All Ambassadors aimed at training Israelis for contacts with foreign media, The Young Ambassadors programme of sending young people abroad and ISRAELikers.

Several—particularly Israeli and American—independent advocacy groups and actions neither inspired nor financed by the State of Israel also have to be taken into account. For example, Israel21c (non-profit publishing an online magazine) since 2000 has shown positive Israeli contribution in the areas such as healthcare, environment and technology; its newsfeed includes news about Israeli humanitarian action and development aid to Africa. The Brand Israel group of experts who gathered to investigate how Israel can improve its image, endorsed by the government in 2005, was based on an assumption that a different narrative of the conflict is needed. The group (as well as The Israel project) clashes with Israel21c, as it does not refrain from the topic of the conflict, considered by the other group as a passé issue. The North American public is also targeted with such programmes as Hasbara Fellowships, which brings students to Israel so they become “educators about Israel” back home. The World Union of Jewish Students produced a Hasbara Handbook for young Americans. The Israel Public Diplomacy Forum is an initiative by academics from various backgrounds—also African studies—meant to foster international academic debate about Israel and the ME.

A number of NGOs monitor anti-Israel activities: UN Watch, NGO Monitor or MEMRI (for the Arab media). Neither is solely concerned with Israel; however, they demonstrate in an informed way the environment in which Israel functions. United with Israel is a grassroots project set up upon belief that hasbara cannot be affective since people do not trust the governments. It provides information, carries out campaigns and connects people, especially youth. No Camels webpage is run by the School of Communication at Interdisciplinary Centre in Herzliya. According to Noam Lemelshtrich Latar, among its 150,000 FB followers, many are from Muslim countries—Gaza Strip, Iran, Malaysia—who, searching for solutions, encountered Israeli innovations.¹¹ A Good News from Israel blog since 2010 has republished press news on positive contribution of Israel and Israelis. Another initiative by the same person is a news-gathering website Israel Active.¹² More indirectly, Crowdmii (Crowd Made in Israel) promotes and crowdfunds Israeli start-ups, particularly those that have connotation to development aid; one example was a project by Energiya Global concerning establishment of solar panels for a hospital in South Sudan.

An example of a business engagement in public diplomacy is the El-Al Ambassadors programme, implemented by a national carrier in cooperation with the Jewish Agency, MFA and Stand with Us. Within the programme, crew members, previously trained, meet with publics—mostly Jewish Diaspora—at their flights’ destinations during their free time.¹³ No indication has been found of involvement of this programme with sub-Saharan African (SSA) publics at the time of writing.

Target audiences

In terms of target states and populations, Israeli public diplomacy is traditionally concentrated on Europe and the United States (US). Africa is not a major direction due to the limitations in available resources, interest in SSA and perceived influence of SSA's public opinions. Following the failure of Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the Internet revolution and the Arab Spring, calls emerged for greater attention to be devoted to Arab countries’ populations. Arabic version of Kol Yisrael radio was created already after the 1956 campaign. It used to broadcast 34 hours weekly (including local dialects) meant for Arab citizens of Israel and the inhabitants of neighbouring countries. During the 1967 war, it was also used to undermine the enemy's morale. Israeli Arab and Farsi radio broadcasting were assessed as very popular among foreign audiences, judging from the amount of letters send (through European post boxes) to its editorial team. In 1960, Kol Yisrael started broadcasting to Africa, matching the rising Israeli presence on the continent. This was countered by Egypt by such means as a 1965 widely distributed pamphlet “Israel, the Enemy of Africa” depicting Jews as villains through anti-Semitic rhetoric. Israeli television started Arabic broadcasts in 1968 and aimed at countering content spread by stations based in Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. However, the main viewers were Israeli Jews originating in Arabic countries and Israeli Arab population, with some Arab population of the Golan, West Bank and Gaza. Recent years have witnessed upgrading in information projection in Arabic. Foreign Ministry's Arabic Twitter account has run since 2011 with around 65,000 followers. Messages are targeted at groups of influence.¹⁴

Prof. Lemelshtrich Latar advises concentrating public diplomacy efforts on the “grey zone” of those without firm opinions on Israel and unbiased. SSA is a particular region where such a population constitutes a large share. Beyond populations, who may be in the end relatively indifferent, in his opinion, reaching to countries’ elites through soft power is very effective. Still if African leaders are pushed by stronger powers against voting with Israel, they abide.¹⁵ It remains to be seen to what extent the Israeli public diplomacy will refocus on other continents, particularly Africa. Such a shift would be logical bearing in mind Israeli diplomacy's drive for new allies.

Content

According to Hassman, Israeli national narrative evolved away from the one of pioneer's kibbutz, work in agriculture, making desert bloom, melting pot and new technologies. This was replaced after 1967 war by a narrative of the “Holy Land”, concentration on history, romanticism and appreciation for military power, which degenerated in the 1990s with a growing individualism and pursuit of material wealth. He perceives this evolution as destructive to the national brand and partly explaining the downturn in popularity of Israel. For Hassman, Israeli brand in the US is dominated by the notions of orthodox religion, machoism and militarism. Israeli narrative seems to him a difficult go-between ultra-orthodox Judaism and nationalism, epitomized by Jerusalem, and openness, tolerance and liberalism, symbolized by Tel Aviv. He recommends a new narrative for the state, based on its technological advancement combined with the tradition of self-help and solidarity, tikkun olam, help and aid to others.¹⁶

Schleifer says that public diplomacy of the state's creators was concentrated on a moral argument that Jews deserve their own state just as any other nation; it did not contain elements mobilising Jews against the British or Arabs. It also tried to create an image of Israel as small and weak—successfully, until the 1967 war proved otherwise. Moral argument of the need to defend itself dominated and there was no demonization of the enemy (which also had a context of efforts to integrate Arab Israelis). The policy failed due to lack of consensus regarding the moral dimension of instances of expulsion of Arabs during the 1948war; failure to engage Arab public through displays of Arab regimes’ violence, corruption and fatal consequences of policies; and due to failure to target world Christians. Israeli public diplomacy remained on the defensive, focused on public opinion of countries which are far away and uninvolved in the conflict, with inadequate training of officials and overconcentration on verbal and rational materials, instead of visual and emotional ones. Schleifer deconstructed Israeli narrative during the First Intifada as twofold. On the defensive, it underlined world's lack of knowledge of the events’ historical context: pointed out that Israel is a democracy, acts according to the law, contributes to the development of the occupied territories; showed Israel's achievements in technology or culture. On the offensive, it showed Palestinian two-facedness (talking peace to Western audiences and war in Arabic contents), depicted them as evil and demonstrated media faults and manipulations in reporting. The IDF soldiers were shown as presenting cautiousness and control. Yet the response was incoherent, due to internal rivalries within the government, lack of a clear information policy; and of an overall policy on what to do with the territories. Moreover, there was no consent to use graphic images of Israeli civilians’ suffering—content which could have had the strongest impact on foreign public opinion. Contemporarily, Schleifer says that Israel's public image is boastful and bombastic but ineffective in contributing to security.¹⁷

Israeli public diplomacy intensifies around each escalation of the conflict, each time on a greater scale. Messages are concentrated on explaining the aggression which Israel faces, presenting scale and modes of reaction and justifications for it. Aside from producing own materials, Israeli public diplomacy is busy with depicting distortions of reality found in Arab media and materials directed at Western audiences. IDF's large-scale employment of online information tools during the 2012 operation in Gaza is believed to have drawn international media attention to the fate of Israeli civilians under rocket fire and to the use of Palestinian civilians as human shields for military installations and arms storages by Hamas. Similarly in 2014, the way in which Palestinian suffering is a part of Hamas strategy was exposed. Yet it is believed that while Israelis invest in defence, put on a bold face and try to live as usual through rocket alarms, so as not to give satisfaction to Hamas, on the international media front, only more deaths and carnage on the Israeli side should trigger change in the patterns of coverage. Just as there is no agreement on posting information on Israeli civilian suffering, there is also no consensus on the extent to which Israel shall engage in negative advertising of its adversaries. It is seen as effective since it engages emotions, yet many see countering negative Palestinian messages with positive Israel-related stories as more appropriate.¹⁸

Some experts claim that possession of knowledge prevents emotional attitudes driven by negative coverage. This assumption stands behind such efforts as 2014 The Land of Creation campaign centred on presenting Israel as booming with creativity and diversity. The Creative Energy concentrated on audiences not interested in politics and without strong opinions, by presenting Israel as a fun and tourism destination and promoting it through culture, lifestyle and economy. It was criticised for not dealing with problematic issues. “Start-up nation” and “Innovation nation” slogans possibly have a role in affecting attitudes of those not opinionated. Some suggest that instead of hasbara centred on explaining and presenting Israel, an approach based on personal stories should be used, showing Israel as a place with plenty to relate to, connect with and care about. Another view is that branding based on highlighting innovation is not working, as people are mostly interested in factors related to democracy, human rights, freedom and equality; so Israel should highlight that it wants peace while the Palestinian leadership steers incitement. In the opinion of Gadi Wolfsfeld, the hope that news about Israel's achievements could improve country's image is unrealistic: just like hard and soft power, one can talk of hard and soft news, with the latter not impacting Western audiences. Could it work differently with audiences from developing countries? Some claim that campaigns on Israel's advantages bring only commercial results. Politically, they do not deal with the main issue. Consequently, according to Fishman, Israel's legitimacy requires forceful pursuit of its historical claims, barring others from defining Israeli identity and distorting its past; the religious aspect of the conflict needs underlining as well. Some argue that without peace process, Israel is “boring” and that the process is necessary for branding it as stable, democratic and developing; others say that only a complete change in Israeli policies in the territories could trigger a real improvement. A similar view holds that instead of complaining on a replacement issue of poor public diplomacy, supporters of Israel should concentrate on the real problem: the multitude of approaches making effective policies towards Palestinians impossible. To this, some reply that irrespective of Israeli policies, the slander industry will continue to feed itself on the escalation of demands.¹⁹

As the previous paragraph shows, the main point of contention is whether and how Israeli public diplomacy content should refer to the conflict, and what other topics should be prioritised. Irrespective of the varied assessments of its effectiveness, reliable beyond-the-conflict information (also on the history of the region) seems to be fundamental for any policy influencing perceptions. Building of a positive image should include branding Israel based of the values it stands for, its achievements, what is has and does share with the world, including through humanitarian and development aid. Limiting the spectre to tourism and parties was rightfully criticised as inappropriate.

The MFA Public Diplomacy Directorate designed an overarching strategy informing contents and actions. Works undertaken in 2004 brought a paradigm shift, from traditional one-sided model towards a new one, based on Israeli brand and dialogue. Aim changed away from gathering international support through supply of information and arguments influencing on an intellectual level towards a broader aim of performing better as a country: consequently, effectiveness of public diplomacy is measured by increase in tourism, investments and consumption of Israeli culture. Instead of asking the audience to make opinion, it asks it to act. It concentrates on entering various discussions—such as those related to finding solutions for global problems—so that Israel is known and relevant; when confronted with the news on the conflict, exposed people are supposed to be less quick in judgments and more prone to investigate the truth, since they would not see Israel as one-dimensional. The personified image of Israel presented in the strategy results from work with all minority groups of the society. It proposes three core narratives, within the “Creative Spirit” idea: vibrant diversity (ability to celebrate differences—a notion most commonly cited by Israelis as an asset), building the future (Israeli's willingness to be part of a solution of global problems) and entrepreneurial zeal (Israeli action-oriented, culturally vibrant and democratic character). These narratives, as well as the core values standing behind them, inform public diplomacy activities, like the “Open the Door to Israel” travelling exhibition. Development aid is part and parcel of the second narrative; yet it is said that it is hard to raise interest on the part of the foreign journalists in this topic.²⁰ The 2010 reform reportedly aimed to concentrate the content on six thematic areas: environment (with an emphasis on desert agriculture), science and technology (medicine, Internet, high-tech), arts and culture, diverse population and traditions, lifestyles and leisure culture and—notably—tikkun olam.²¹

The September 2016 UNGA speech of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu contained the main messages which Israeli policymakers highlight abroad:

Israel's unfair treatment by the UN is so obvious that it no longer hurts Israel: it hurts credibility of the UN itself; UN political bodies became “a moral farce”;

the UN's excessive preoccupation with Israel does not bring regional peace any closer and does not address any of the real-world problems;

activities by the Palestinian authorities, concentrated on unilateral moves within the UN and on incitement against Jews, lead to nowhere; Israel will defend its right to exist;

Israel's status in the UN is changing: states warm up relations with Israel, seeking aid against Islamic terrorism and willing to benefit from Israeli technologies and development solutions (in agriculture, health, water, cybersecurity); even some Arab countries cease to treat it as an enemy;

the threat presented by radical Iranian regime, sponsoring terrorism and seeking nuclear weapons, is still valid.

The Prime Minister disagreed with the State Comptroller opinion that lack of a separate person to serve as the Minister in the MFA impacts negatively on anti-BDS efforts. In his opinion, the extension of Israel's trade and cooperation ties with manifold big and small nations, as well as quiet ties with many Arab nations, prove Israel is not isolated. This upbeat tone was maintained by Eli Groner, Director General of his Office, who maintained that vast majority of both Western and developing world countries want cooperation with Israel since they see Israel as part of the solution to their needs. The Deputy Foreign Minister Tzipi Hotovely (2015–20) spoke in favour of lauding Israeli position regarding the conflict, seeing efforts to brand Israel as a high-tech nation as an avoidance strategy which does not address the core issue through which Israel is perceived. Her message speaks strongly against delegitimisation, underlining 3000 years of Jewish connection to the land, including Jerusalem, and focusing on telling the story instead of highlighting complexities and pointing to the history of Palestinian avoidance of offers which could have given them the actual state.²²

Conclusions

Inherited suspicion of the outside world was for a long time behind Israel's approach to public diplomacy. Combined with Israel's political structure and unstable external environment, the results were limited. Israeli foreign policy reactiveness, the nature of its democracy, favouring polyphony over united voice and small scale of the state are further factors making PR difficult. Yet judging from the contemporary tone of officials, cited previously, the rhetoric changed. With the international situation in friction, turmoil in the ME coupled with renewed tensions between the superpowers, Trump administration in the US and internal shake-up within the European Union, the time might have been seen as just right for a new language. Yet the messages need to be carefully tailored. One also needs to be realistic regarding possible range of outcomes of whatever public diplomacy in confrontation with hardcore interests, contradictive facts on the ground or deep-rooted prejudices. Delegitimisation of Israel's right to exist became an ideology—neither rational arguments nor change in policies seem to tackle it; a strong counter-movement could however be built to sideline and marginalise the delegitimisers in the discourse. Simultaneously, with radicalisation of politics and polarisation of public debate around the world, including in Israel under the Netanyahu governments, there is a growing risk of excessive politicisation of messages, at the expense of promoting understanding, addressing legitimate concerns and concentrating on positive news. This would be detrimental to effectiveness of public diplomacy, which should be a tool for dialogue with both friends and adversaries, using persuasive power of credible facts and evoking emotions based on values. As for the content, the biggest discussion regards the way in which the public diplomacy should (or should not) approach the issue of conflict. Here, balance needs to be found and messages tailored to various audiences, with regard for their prior knowledge and interests. According to Yoram Morad, the mission is to allow people to see the broader picture, of which the conflict is a part but by far not the whole.²³

SUBCHAPTER 2: ISRAEL'S DEVELOPMENT DIPLOMACY

A crucial question emerges about the role development aid, and development aid for SSA particularly, plays in Israeli public diplomacy. This is analysed through a closer look at contents of messages sent by the key Israeli public diplomacy institutions regarding development aid; through analysis of self-perceptions of people engaged in development work on the ground; and of manifestations of recognition of the value of Israeli development aid by external, particularly international, actors.

The final part of this subchapter contains an analysis of overall effectiveness of Israeli public diplomacy as reflected in the rankings measuring international public perception of countries’ soft power and of its components. Particular attention is devoted to development aid and aspects related to identified soft power resources relevant for aiding SSA as elements of Israeli soft power.

Internal discussion on the need for development diplomacy

Hassman recommends strategic branding of Israel through tikkun olam: combining a narrative of Israel as having excellent higher education, new technologies and science serving human well-being and health (accentuating comparative advantages in fields like pharmaceutics, biotechnology, water, desert agriculture, quality environment, education, assistance in emergencies, social organizations) with a narrative of mutual help extended in line with Jewish values. He considers using soft power tools, including development aid, as an appropriate public diplomacy for Israel towards Arab states.²⁴ Hassman's analysis of target audiences does not include SSA besides South Africa.

The 2009 report by the Israeli MFA and the Neaman Institute for National Policy Research at Haifa's Technion recognises “new” public diplomacy and presents a framework of analyses based on soft power. It mentions (Israeli) Department of International Cooperation (MASHAV) activities in the context of public diplomacy efforts under the “Life in Israel” category, among accomplishments in the area of technology and knowledge, health, culture, society and lifestyle. It refers to the 2008 jubilee of MASHAV, which gathered international attention. It recommends to combine first-hand experience of foreigners visiting Israel (for example, on MASHAV courses) with exposure to Israeli culture and “direct or indirect explaining” of its policies. Further on, agriculture and drip irrigation (where Israel has comparative advantage and good fame) are mentioned as a possible “soft power” point of departure for public diplomacy activities in the framework of “smart power”. Target audiences are not defined geographically but through their level of knowledge and opinion of Israel; yet the study is based on research made in a developing country, India (along with Denmark). Adjusting public diplomacy works to local circumstances is advised.²⁵

A proposal for a public diplomacy curriculum refers to “Israel's contribution to the fields of culture, technology, high-tech, health and agriculture for the benefit of global society” and the necessity to include knowledge on “Israel beyond the conflict”, “start-up nation” and humanitarian aid. NGOs and companies involved are recommended as destinations for study tours.²⁶ Yet higher education programmes dealing with public diplomacy usually do not contain much information about development aid; academic public diplomacy experts interviewed by the author generally do not have much knowledge on aid and do not pay much attention to it or to developing countries as target audiences. Still, the Bar Ilan University (in cooperation with the MFA, Israel-Africa Chamber of Commerce and the Israel Export and International Cooperation Institute) organised a 2016 semester course “Africa: Politics, Economy and Diplomacy” with around 30 participants of differing backgrounds, to alleviate their work in Africa.²⁷

A position paper by Grinstein and Kaufman, illustrated by a picture of Haitian children next to an IsraAID tent, calls for broadening of the third sector's contribution to Israel's foreign policy in the context of tackling delegitimisation, as the challenges exceed government's capabilities. It states that Israel needs to commit to seriously address needs of world's poor with its unique capabilities and be able to get credit for its contribution. Salman, while studying Israeli relations with East Africa, located humanitarian aid among the main pillars of soft power.²⁸

More practically, the role of aid in building bridges and enhancing cooperation has been recognised within the peace process: the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)-financed Middle East Regional Cooperation Program was created in 1979 for Israel and Egypt and enlarged later on to cover many Arab countries, engaging them in research cooperation.²⁹ Another example was the Israeli development aid programme for the PA, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania lasting since the Oslo process until the early 2000s. In his 1999 speech to UNGA, Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy underlined that in 1998, 820 of 4000 trainees were Palestinian. However, many of the Israeli-financed projects were realised covertly. In such circumstances, it is difficult to expect any public diplomacy function of the programme. Contemporary efforts to engage professionals from Egypt, Jordan and PA in solving transboundary problems in water or agriculture through cooperation and exchange of experiences did not impact the actual participants, who risked being condemned for cooperating with a neighbour, despite existing peace treaties.³⁰

Assessments of effectiveness of development diplomacy are rare. Schleifer observed that information about Israeli contribution to development was not enough to confront images of Palestinian child victims of the First Intifada. Gilboa commented, “long-term aid to Africa may have contributed to the relative favourable Israeli reputation in states such as the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Ghana.” Lemelshtrich Latar sees some capabilities of development aid's soft power in the sphere of image-building. Though they cannot overrun the negative perceptions emerging from the lack of clear and convincing actions on the Israeli side aimed at solving the conflict, they can attract and positively influence relationships with nations and individuals interested in Israeli solutions.³¹

Israeli development diplomacy in practice

The practical side of Israeli development diplomacy includes state institutions’ use of relevant content in bilateral and multilateral settings, as well as non-governmental development aid actors’ perception of own engagement as related or not to Israeli public diplomacy. This analysis is limited to contemporary affairs, since information on publicity of Israeli aid before the communication revolution is scarce. One example is the 1960 report from Ghanaian capital, where Israeli contribution was advertised in highly visible posters.³²

Prime Minister's Office

Prime Minister Netanyahu frequently refers to how Israeli technologies, desired across the world, heighten Israel's international standing. This is part of his narrative on the legitimacy and strength of relationships, also beyond the West. Moreover, willingness to intensify development cooperation in fields of Israeli achievements was the leitmotiv of statements he made during the 2016 tour of East Africa, which featured visits to Israeli development projects there. Capabilities in sharing technological solutions for healthcare, agriculture, education and other areas have also been highlighted by him during the September 2016 UNGA side event, addressed predominantly to African diplomats. Michael Oren, the deputy Minister in the Office responsible for public diplomacy (2016–20), attached great importance to connecting Israel with positive emotions and underlined that while doubling efforts towards Western Europe would not amend European policy, doubling the 4% of MFA budget for relations with Africa (“literally lining up” to strengthen relations with Israel, possessing needed resources) would lead to significant changes. According to Oren, this should also be recognised by Europe, since without solving African problems, Europe will face even more migration.³³

The Ministry of Information

Available speeches by Gilad Erdan, the Minister of Information 2015–20, show that he did not focus on Africa as a target audience (at times spoke to the diplomatic corps, thus also African representatives) or on development aid, though he highlighted the contribution Israeli innovations’ make to development of others; and linked the BDS, aiming at annihilating this contribution, to potential harm to millions depending on Israeli innovation. However, when serving as Interior Minister, Erdan was among those behind the controversial decision to “voluntarily” expel African asylum seekers to Uganda and Rwanda.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs —an overview

Regarding the MFA, the Public Diplomacy Department, following its mapping of identity of Israel, recognised contribution to solving world problems as one of the three core narratives of Israelis and by extension—one of the core features for its public diplomacy. Although in practice it was concluded that foreign journalists are not really interested, the Ministry's spokesperson's staff attach importance to the issue, as in their opinion it allows building bridges with people, even when the relationship with their governments is difficult. According to Yoram Morad, just as artists’ joint creative process brings better results than simple importing and displaying individuals’ works, aid in the form of training might bring more lasting relations than transfer of goods. In that way, among other benefits, it contributes to public diplomacy aims, defined as building engagement and collaborations. In 2006, then MFA Director General, Ron Prosor, called MASHAV activities a “winning formula of soft power”, combining “economic utility with the values of the state” and conveying “Israel's contribution to ‘healing the world’”. Daniel Carmon, former MASHAV director and ambassador to India, used the term “development diplomacy” to refer to cooperation build on aid.³⁴

However, public diplomacy and development aid are in separate MFA Directorates, which limits their cooperation. This is assessed as a good solution. Aid is extended “because it is the right thing to do” and is not seen as a tool for state branding. MASHAV is granted autonomy from direct influence of politicians and from demands of other departments. In the MFA, it is believed that independence and professionalism are key to fulfilling MASHAV's mission. Aid needs to be a genuine effort to be perceived as such.³⁵

According to Noam Katz, donors often use development aid as a tool of hard power. Only when it reflects a mutual, meaningful relation and conversation, it can be treated as soft power—the power of attraction, generating willingness of one to be like the other. So if a contribution is well-tailored and appropriate audiences are informed, aid can have aspects of public diplomacy; yet no amount of aid can guarantee any public diplomacy results. In SSA, it is most important to reach intermediaries—traditional leaders, who can influence decisionmakers but also have constituencies of their own. Israel's relations with SSA always had a strong people-to-people component, forming a background for relations. Israeli aid is remembered, appreciated and sought after, but the state has smaller possibilities than in the 1960s, when most of the economy was state-owned. Thus, aid needs to be creative and engage private companies, NGOs and local resources. The success definition through public diplomacy lens is that the recipient wants more cooperation, more expertise, sends students to study in Israel.³⁶

An overview of speeches of officials representing Israel in international forums quoted at the UN Sustainable Development website shows a coherent narrative in which Israeli achievements at home and abroad are duly described, based on merits rather than political discourse. This style of speeches, statements and reports is distinguishable and dominant. Cases of a more self-assured position and open self-praise (like the 2007 statement during the Intergovernmental Preparatory Meeting 15th Commission on Sustainable Development) are rare.

The author's January 2017 analysis of MFA's digital diplomacy showed that Ministry's English-language homepage, below the “current events” banner, had sections seemingly reflecting soft power resources: Innovative Israel, Israel Experience, and MASHAV, each featuring one current information piece. Other language versions had a different structure, adjusted to their likely audiences. Development cooperation was underlined in MFA materials as the centre of bilateral relations with African countries. Several such entries on bilateral relations were prepared during Spring 2016, probably in preparation of Prime Minister's visit to Africa. For example, entry on Kenya started with a declaration on the developmental goals of Israel in Kenya, related to several fields of trainings and featured short descriptions of relevant projects. Entry on Rwanda referred primarily to the Centre of Excellence in Agriculture established to support Rwanda's national plan of modernisation and poverty alleviation, while an article on Uganda featured MASHAV upgrading of the emergency trauma room at Kampala hospital. The Ministry had English-language channels on You Tube (over 8000 subscribers; subsections: Israel Experience—Humanitarian Aid; Innovative Israel—Agriculture; Israel Experience—Coexistence), Twitter (125,000 followers; presented Israeli foreign affairs in their diversity, including humanitarian and development aid; the newest information related to development aid at the time of checking was 3 days old) and FB (almost half a million followers, dense with posts featuring current affairs but also greetings to other nations on their national days, Israeli development and innovation, development aid, tourism promotion and so on; the newest information related to development aid was 20 days old). Apparently, FB was treated as the main information tool rather than the websites.³⁷

MASHAV

As mentioned, improving Israeli image is one of MASHAV's aims but not a precondition for development aid. MASHAV website, hosted by the Ministry's domain, obviously has development aid as its absolute focus. When the analysis was done in late January 2017, the upper banner featured recent news, all not older than 2 weeks, with diverse focus (Israel-Italy-Ethiopia memorandum, Israel's election to the UN Women Executive Board, programmes on other continents). The site also contained an interactive map of MASHAV activities; pictures’ gallery, divided in thematic sections; mission statement; general and in-depth information on MASHAV's history and philosophy; systematisations of types of activities, activities by field, by continent; various kinds of publications; offer of courses; the latest news and contact options. In an unused opportunity, links to other language versions referred back to the MFA homepage. MASHAV runs the English-language FB account, regularly and professionally updated, with more than 31,000 followers, gave a full picture of activities in Israel and in recipient countries.

MASHAV also publishes many printed and online materials. Introductions to MASHAV materials present its philosophy and priorities as one of the oldest development agencies in the world and underline that Israeli aid, based on own experiences, is characterised by fast response, flexibility, pragmatism and practicality. Examples of MASHAV publications include,

yearly activity reports—more than 50 pages on key activities in different countries, statistics, partner institutions and Shalom Clubs;

a 40-page report on MASHAV entitled Empowering through Knowledge;

publications of up to 20 pages on specific country (Israel-Ghana Partnership for Development) or topic (Sharing Israeli Innovations for Global Sustainable Development; Food Security in Africa—How?), not necessarily dealing with aid as such;

special reports, like the 80-page one prepared for the Jubilee Year of MCTC;

Shalom Magazine of about 40 pages, published since the 1960s, twice a year initially and now yearly, with alumni of MASHAV courses as a target group;

leaflets: Israel-Africa. Principles and Approaches to Sustainable Development or Combating Desertification and Dryland Development in Africa.

Publications are primarily sent to embassies for further distribution among interested audiences and as a tool for work of embassies’ staff.³⁸ They have high quality of content and layout, with much on the merits of cooperation and little empty self-acclaim. They are drafted mostly by directly engaged experts or line directors, rather than policymakers or high-rank officials. Their range of readership is difficult to assess since they are mainly distributed through mailing lists and websites. For example, a 2012 Shalom magazine covers Asian women entrepreneurs, sustainable agricultural development, Israeli participation in the Rio+20 Conference, value-chain concept within MASHAV tripartite aquaculture food security project in Kenya, Israeli drug reduction strategy and its extension, intellectual property rights and innovation for local development (related training for Asia), news from Shalom Clubs, news from MASHAV (Africa related: agreement with USAID on food security cooperation, start of early childhood education programme with Ghana, establishment of emergency and trauma unit in Uganda and of dialyses unit in Sierra Leone, eye treatments in Ethiopia and Cameroon), an essay by an Israeli nurse who served in Haiti and letters from the readers.³⁹

Already Laufer commented on the Shalom magazine as a PR instrument (at the time published in English, French and Spanish) professionally promoting Israeli achievements and aid programmes and playing a role in up-keeping personal relationships build during the courses, including through establishment of Shalom Clubs (the first one—in 1962 in Central African Republic) and through a major opinion poll among alumni that resulted in amending MASHAV programmes. On the other hand, the paper did not become a prominent journal for experience exchange due to its limited budget. These observations remain largely valid: the magasine and the Clubs (over 70 at the time of writing) are relevant platforms for the participants but with a limited impact beyond them. Their primary function is networking and maintaining professional contacts between alumni and with the Israeli side. They also support the alumni in organising activities, such as trainings, on the ground and by themselves. While the last function is crucial to aid effectiveness, the two former also play an important role in popularising knowledge of Israeli aid among directly interested audiences.⁴⁰

On the other hand, MASHAV communication activities do not deal with the actual cost (official development assistance [ODA] volume) of aid, giving only information on the numbers of trainees; and do not reflect the scale of ODA to particular regions. While the main ODA beneficiaries in 2013–16 were Jordan, Syria, West Bank and Gaza, the information was not contained in the yearly MASHAV reports and the MASHAV website Where we work section referred to the ME only through a very short entry not mentioning any country except for the PA while it gave a three-paragraphs-long description of the priority countries in Africa. This might be logical to the (unknown) extent to which aid for Middle Eastern countries is not channelled through MASHAV but creates an unbalanced impression bearing in mind the actual distribution of ODA, even if it might be in fact accurate in terms of MASHAV budgets. A serious question on communication remains: why the difference between overall ODA and the MASHAV's engagement is not discussed in publications that can be seen by readers as the actual reports on Israeli official aid; and why no mention of (neither MASHAV nor ODA) finances is made in them. Amounts are small but could be presented as doing lots with little. If a decision was made to present ODA, not only MASHAV, many transfers to Jordan resulting from the peace treaty could be promoted while health treatment for Syrians could be highlighted as a unique gesture towards the enemy state. Asked about the issue, one interviewee said that the reason might be a delicate nature of these activities for the Israeli public, which is not of united opinion about the matter.⁴¹ Moreover, it seems that presenting ODA rather than MASHAV could be detrimental to the image of MASHAV works by the mere association with whatever activities in the region—not because of the merits of these activities but because of the nature of the anti-Israeli propaganda industry, which is ready to abuse any fact in order to generate more conspiracy theories and hateful content.

Importantly, MASHAV popularises its activities within the development community. For example, to mark 50 years of Israeli development aid, an international conference was organised on Israel and the African Green Revolution, with speakers coming from the UN (on the level of Assistant Secretary-General), International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (Director General), United Nations Development Program (Director of Regional Office in Africa), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and a key-note speech by professor Jeffrey Sachs (former director of the UN Millennium Project). The rank of the speakers is a testimony to Israel's integration with development community, recognition it gives to Israel's efforts and a measure of promotion. A side event is a relatively popular measure used. Examples from 2012 include one on green agriculture and its role in enhancing growth, food security and eradication of poverty during the 2012 Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development Cooperation (joint with Canada, Germany, Kenya, Panama and the US) or event on Rural Women: From Vulnerability to Sustainability, during the 3rd UN Economic Commission for Europe Forum of Women Entrepreneurs (with Italy and Senegal).⁴² Moreover, MASHAV is a member of the OECD Development Communication Network, serving exchanges between experts and between them and public opinion.

The presumptions of the new public diplomacy require asking about specific hands-on features of MASHAV programmes. One core example is MCTC. While not espousing any PR aims, during the courses in Haifa and especially during the field trips and open discussions with the Israelis, the participants get opportunity to acknowledge the achievements and problems Israelis deal with in the particular fields. The courses encourage development of people-to-people professional relationships. A practical face of Israel that they show promotes credibility and trust.

Israeli embassies

Israeli embassies based in SSA are another channel to popularise Israeli aid, first and foremost among local audiences. A content analysis of their websites, Twitter and FB accounts was carried out, covering the period from mid-January 2016 to mid-January 2017. Internet penetration in many SSA countries is limited, which curtails the outreach of digital diplomacy, although it reaches the most engaged and influential cohorts. Of eight Israeli embassies in SSA at the time of writing (in Angola, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria and Senegal), except for the outdated website of the embassy in Senegal, websites presented varying degrees of frequency of updates and content related to development. In the case of embassies in Cameroon and Ethiopia, aid was covered in News sections. Separate MASHAV bookmarks were frequent; they usually contained general information, information on Shalom Club and a calendar of courses and/or details of an application process. Moreover, in most embassies (five out of eight), there existed a separate department devoted to MASHAV activities and recruitment of courses’ participants.

All embassies run own FB profiles with professional content. Replacing website with FB was most evident for the embassy in Senegal. The embassy in Angola account was the most frequently updated. The numbers of followers did not exceed 5000 for Angola, Cameroon, Ghana and Senegal and were highest for Nigeria (16,155) and Ethiopia (26,436). Most of the embassies’ FB accounts frequently reported on development-related issues: Israeli new technologies and discoveries, development projects or MASHAV trainings. This involved also posting on activities taking place in other SSA countries and reposting MASHAV's posts. Embassy in Ivory Coast seemed to post the most on development, though this account was relatively less updated. A fair deal of information about Israel's soft power resources, development and humanitarian aid, as well as on projects implemented, certainly reached audiences of FB accounts of the embassies’ in Angola, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana and Kenya. The accounts’ content was linguistically approachable, frequent and professional. The amount of information regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was limited, with information emerging in the case of terrorist attacks against Israelis; at the time of a more violent conflict, this proportion would probably change, yet at the time of quiet, its scarcity and lack of negative propaganda was telling. Four of the embassies also run their own Twitter accounts, of which three were active—Ghana, Ivory Coast and Nigeria. Numbers of followers ranged from 188 (Ghana, to the largest extent focused on development-related issues) to 7098 (Nigeria, branded Israel as a country of innovation).

As for the Israeli Permanent Mission to the UN, at the time of writing, the website had not been updated since half a year. In Campaigns section, it featured new technologies for people with disabilities. No particular stress was seen on development aid or relations with Africa. Its Twitter account was updated with the UN-related news. There was also no focus on development aid on the websites of Israeli embassies in three major Western powers: France, United Kingdom and the US. Nevertheless, materials on technologies useful for development and on Israeli development aid, including non-governmental one, featured on their FB accounts.

As for the local press (newspapers, televisions), in the opinion of an Israeli diplomat, due to the way the media function in SSA, the coverage is frequent, and when needed, it can be arranged; yet one issue is that the pictures of Israeli aid—people being trained—are not an attractive material; another is that the African public is tired with the news of donors’ projects, since many of them were unsuccessful. Still, there is some belief that articles in local, private press are a good measure of the recipients’ interest and effective in spreading the news. It is challenging however to have a good understanding of the local media market.⁴³ It transpires that online activity is a default action, while contacting the local press and organising events is carried out depending on the local circumstances. Less easy to quantify, these activities nevertheless need to be perceived as the backbone of communication with the local audience, at least as important as online activities.

Beyond state institutions and direct publicity

Periodical reports are a good venue for presenting information on state's achievements to the audience of world experts. In the case of Israeli development aid, this is done in a professional manner, with public diplomacy happening incidentally during fulfilling a legal requirement. One example can be the 2000 First National Communication to the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. In the International Activities section it refers to Israel's experience in dealing with difficult climate and lack of water as a model for developing countries shared through MASHAV. It highlights the fact that Israel was among the first to ratify the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) and launched cooperation and assistance programs of training, joint research or experts’ exchanges; it also recalls activities done in order to help other countries in development of solar and other removable power resources.⁴⁴

As for non-governmental sector, its activity abroad contributes to Israeli image even if this is not the aim of this activity. Mapping done in 2009 showed that the majority of Israeli and Jewish organisations active abroad have some PR aims, improvement of the Israeli image among them. Moreover, as most of Israeli organisations are sponsored by Jewish donors, their supporters might fund them as part of their own agenda to assist activities improving Israel's image even if these organisations have no such aims.⁴⁵

An example of an openly “Israeli” organisation is Innovation: Africa, which frequently uses the slogan “Bringing Israeli innovation to African villages”. Its webpage section The Israel connection underlines that Israeli solar, water management and agricultural technologies can save lives in Africa, thus organisation's mission is to share Israeli knowledge and expertise. Organisation's communication aims (which in itself are not the main focus) include (the main one) fundraising and (secondly) giving new narrative about Israel to American students. Urban youth in Africa is another audience, reached mainly through newspaper articles. The organisations’ FB page has a significant following, which comes, according to the interviewee, mainly from Africa. Friendliness towards Israel informs the choice of countries of activity. Yet the organisation's representatives in these countries are rarely drawn in conversations on political matters. When they are, they try to come back to the topic of development. There is not much reflection on how their interactions with the locals influence their knowledge on Israel. The relationships are rather characterised by Israelis asking questions and learning the local culture than the other way round.⁴⁶

IsraAID has the country of origin in its name and could easily be taken for an official humanitarian aid organisation, though it is entirely non-governmental. It has no PR aims, yet it is proud to be recognised in the UN system and to fulfil what it sees as an Israeli duty to provide assistance, while being perceived and acting as a full member of the donors’ community.⁴⁷ Improving Israel's image is among the aims of the Eden Aid farm project in Ethiopia. Tevel b’Tzedek defines itself as an Israeli NGO aiming at Israeli and Jewish leadership in local and global tikkun olam. Fighters for Life think in terms of improvement of Israel's and IDF's image.⁴⁸ Energiya Global refers to the willingness to mobilise Israeli and Jewish innovativeness to deliver humanity new, clean sources of energy. The representatives of Israeli NGOs interviewed for this work were not trained in presenting Israel or explaining its situation and politics. They worked professionally in other countries mostly without underlining where they are from and wanted to be recognised and feel proud for what they can contribute.

Of note, the Israeli Agriculture International Portal plays a role of presenting information on agricultural technologies, research, discoveries, achievements, events, possibilities of cooperation and news related to participation of Israeli agricultural companies in development-related projects. Israel21c publishes many information pieces and prepared an interactive map of Israeli aid. Mainstream English-language Israeli press also plays a role in informing about Israeli aid.

Examples of international recognition

An additional layer needs to be included: the way international recognition is gained by Israeli development aid. Although this recognition comes for the merit of these activities and not for their publicity, the issue can be discussed under public diplomacy for three reasons. First, recognition can come only when there is knowledge of the action, and this depends on publicity; second, recognition confirms soft power function fulfilled by its subject; third, it brings more publicity to the action in question, furthering the aims of public diplomacy.

A particular field of recognition are trilateral schemes in which Western donors engage Israeli expertise in projects they finance and participation of Israeli experts in international organisations’ activities. Yet, joint projects, while testifying to the value which other donors see in engagement of Israeli experts, often impede visibility of the Israeli contribution, unless the local ambassador effectively publicises it. Efforts are made to alleviate this through inclusion of Israeli financial contribution to gain more external visibility and also more influence on the projects.⁴⁹

When it comes to international organisations, an early example of recognition was the praise of a model developed by Dr. Kligler expressed by the Malaria Commission of the League of Nations after a visit to then Mandate Palestine in 1925. In 1963, a Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of Less Developed Areas was organised along the patterns of the Israeli development conferences at the request of the UN Secretary-General U Thant and featured numerous papers presented by Israeli panellists.⁵⁰ The 1964 UNESCO Major Project on Scientific Research on Arid Lands featured a section on Agricultural Planning and Village Community in Israel presenting a case of rural settlements in a pluralistic ethnic setting, testifying to the recognition of viability of Israeli experience in this area.⁵¹ CINADCO International Rural Regional Development Planning Course has been recommended by the UN Social and Economic Council in line with the resolution 1086 (1972). Contemporary examples include participation of high-ranking officials in development-related events organised in Israel. Alongside those already mentioned, the 2011 50th anniversary of MCTC, in which the Director-General of UNESCO and the Deputy Secretary-General of the UN participated, can be highlighted.

Israel's participation in efforts to preserve environment and combat climate change is an important example. Although most of activities are carried out on the national level, they contribute to searching for solutions for developing countries. Israel participated at a high level in the 1972 UN Conference on Human Environment, cooperates with the agency created thereafter (UNEP) and joined major environmental conventions. Israel's role in the global environmental cooperation was impeded by Arab states’ tendency to put issues related to the Israeli-Arab conflict on the agenda and by a long-time exclusion of Israel from regional groupings. Yet Israeli standing within environmental forums results largely from the fact that it is represented by independent experts with great academic credentials. Simultaneously, the government supports their efforts, for example, by organising international events (such as capacity-building workshops). The UNCCD is a case of a treaty to which Israeli government attests vital political role; therefore, its participation in this regime is overseen by the MFA. The function of a focal point was entrusted in 1996 to a respected expert, Prof. Uriel Safriel, former chief of the Jacob Blaustein Institutes for Desert Research. Professor Safriel was elected the chair of the Conventions’ Committee on Science and Technology in 2013 and remained at this function at the time of writing. He was behind numerous international events in Israel, like conferences: on synergies among the Convention on Biological Diversity, the UN Convention on Climate Change, the UNCCD, and the Forest Principles (1997), on Deserts and Desertification: Challenges and Opportunities (2006) and on Drylands, Deserts, and Desertification (2010), attended by hundreds of representatives of over 50 countries with dryland conditions. At the 2011 High Level Expert Meeting on Using Green Agriculture to Stimulate Economic Growth and Eradicate Poverty organised by MASHAV and the UN, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs praised Israel for being a leader in agricultural technology for development and a valuable advisor on integrated water management, drylands and sustainable crop production.⁵² Furthermore, international recognition came for Israeli programme that compensates farmers for sustainable land management, treated as a model policy. Israel is among six countries whose achievements were highlighted in the UNCCD 2014 publication Desertification. The Invisible Frontline. Israeli MFA's website refers frequently to issues related to UNCCD, highlighting it as an Israeli contribution to global wealth. Thus, the MFA understands the opportunities created by an active engagement of Israeli experts, sharing their knowledge for the sake of solving global problems and projecting a positive image, improving Israeli international standing.⁵³

As for the international recognition and popularisation of Israeli NGOs’ activities, one notable example is Innovation: Africa, granted a Special Consultative Status to the UN Economic and Social Council in 2012. It was also appreciated in the 2013 UN Secretary-General report to UNGA on South-South cooperation⁵⁴ and won the UN Innovation Price at the 2013 Global South-South Development Expo. IsraAid is recognised for its work within the donors’ community in South Sudan and by the UN family, translating into UN funding and frequent references to IsraAid activities in respective documents, such as the Multi-Country Real Time Evaluation of UNICEF Gender-Based Violence in Emergencies Programmes—South Sudan Country Report. SACH was distinguished by the 2018 UN Population Award.

Development actors as public diplomacy actors: the question of effectiveness

The question of effectiveness of Israeli development diplomacy is a puzzling one. Any realistic assessment must acknowledge that the prime environment for observing the results should be the recipients and the development community; the international community coming as a second, broader of the “concentric circles” and as the actual main target of the development diplomacy efforts; with global civil society coming as the third, broadest potential target group.

Some reflections were definitely made. Laufer reported in 1967 that short-term courses in Israel, which lasted 3–4 months were considered by the organisers as more effective than the long-term ones. In the latter cases, trainees tended to develop psychological problems related to homesickness and detachment, impacting negatively on their overall image of Israel. Shorter courses were more intensive, the participants’ time was filled with learning and extracurricular activities showing attractive sides of Israel, which left them with better impressions; nevertheless, most trainees deemed such courses too short. Dacalo took note of the interest of the European and American press triggered by the Israeli entry into Africa and the beginning of the technical aid programme. However, he also concluded that this interest vastly diminished by the end of the 1960s, as Israeli aid was no longer “a news”, its scale reached its limits, started to be overshadowed by other donors and also because limitations of its effectiveness emerged. Belman-Inbal, Zahavi observed that although direct political rewards were hard to win in the 1960s–70s, aid brought other benefits, attracting attention and acclaim of Israel's accomplishments internationally; professional journals and reports frequently referred to Israeli experts’ work; and its quality translated into significant external financing for the programme.⁵⁵ In the new public diplomacy terms, this is exactly the result sought after by development diplomacy. Today, alumni of old and new MASHAV programmes can be encountered in SSA. This greatly eases up communication for Israelis coming to SSA, particularly in the field of agriculture. The alumni are even believed to be “ambassadors of good will”.⁵⁶

Recalling indicators assumed by the MFA for measurement of its overall public diplomacy strategy, there is no strong indication that Israeli aid promotes trade, and it would be hard to expect it, at least short-term. Regarding tourism, SSA countries are too poor to produce noticeable waves of tourists, and tourism promotion is hardly related to any genuine development activity. An impression one gets from the press is that SSA tourism to Israel grows. A particular case is Nigeria, as Christian pilgrimages to Jerusalem (and Muslim to Mecca) are co-sponsored by the state. However, confronted with hard data, the patterns are not stable. Just as aid is not related to these numbers, they certainly cannot be interpreted as a failure of Israeli public diplomacy in SSA. The prime indicator of development diplomacy success is when the recipient wants more of it. Israeli aid is technical; thus, it contributes to people-to-people relations, allowing acquaintance with the other and engagement in personal relationship. Moreover, the added value it brings—neither goods nor services, but know-how—is crucial to developing countries. For many more reasons, public diplomacy results of the Israeli aid have to be measured against more complex set of indicators, quantitative and qualitative ones.

Position of Israel in soft power rankings

The American Interest Eight Great Powers of 2017 includes Israel as “a rising power with a growing impact on world affairs”, reflecting Israeli innovations in water management and praising its newly strengthened relations with SSA and India. It thus testifies to the broader recognition of the influence gained by Israel through projection of its soft power resources related to development. This part provides quantitative analysis of impact of soft power resources and public diplomacy on Israel's international image, as reflected in the major international rankings comparing countries’ soft power, their components or related concepts, such as international presence or strength of a country brand. Israel is taken into account by numerous rankings, even those reflecting on a selected group of states only (in which case, also the fact of selection for measurement has certain significance). On the basis of results of polls quoted in the first subchapter, showing negative perception of Israel in questionnaires regarding war and peace, one might expect that Israel would be ranked very low in soft power. Interestingly, this is not always the case. The rankings testify to Israel being in the middle, with certain indicators for which it ranks high but with manifold fields for improvement too.

Elcano Global Presence Index

Elcano Institute Global Presence Index does not measure states’ power as such, but their global presence, understood as an ability of projection beyond their borders. The Index contains a “soft presence” sub-index, with many variables related to aid or soft power resources important for it (number of international patents, articles in scientific journals, foreign students at universities and gross flows of assistance). It also contains indicators related to public diplomacy potential: exports of audiovisual services and projection of information on the Internet. The analyses need to be limited to reports for 1990–2014 due to the subsequent change in methodology and the range of data published, which makes the later reports incomparable. In 2014, Elcano ranked Israel at the overall 51st position in global presence among 70 countries surveyed; the 49th on the economic presence, the 40th on the military and the 41ston soft presence index. The report characterised Israel as using its limited global presence effectively to exercise power and mentions it among the “emerging and/or regional powers”.

Israel's relative global presence varies with best scores recorded in the late 1990s. There was a shift in the make-up of Israeli presence, with constant and significant rise of economic presence, from 26 to 53% share, soft presence (which used to be a dominant one) decline from 67 to 45% share and military presence decline from 7 to 1%. Relative Israeli soft presence in 1990–2014 was at its highest in 1995 and 2000, when Israel obtained its best or almost best positions in migration, tourism and culture and was also visibly high on science, education and development cooperation. Decline in immigration at least partly explains decline in the share of soft presence in the overall make-up of Israeli presence. In the period under consideration, Israeli position declined in terms of science and education and rose on the technology variable.

Elcano's development cooperation index is defined as total flows of ODA. Importantly, the weighing factor for development cooperation variable, resulting from international surveys carried out by Elcano—4.40—is among the lowest: other variables’ weights range between 4.10 and10.10. This testifies to limited recognition of development aid as an element of outside presence but also questions whether the ranking actually reflects preferences of developing world. As for results, aid never was a particularly important factor in Israeli global presence, and its overall small role varied in quite a significant fashion, with 1.75% in 1990, 0.69% in 2005, 1.47% in 2000, 0.79% in 2011 and 0.93% in 2014. The place of Israel in overall ranking of aid varies between the 25th position in 1990, the 28th in 2000 and the 37th—38th from 2005 on. Especially in the 1990s, Israeli position in the ranking for development cooperation was significantly higher than its overall position on the global presence ranking, GDP and population scales. Although relatively high score for aid at the time could have been related to financing of Russian immigrants and development programmes in the neighbourhood, this might be nevertheless taken as testifying to the potential importance of aid in Israeli global presence.

Reputation Institute Ranking

The Most reputable countries ranking prepared by the Reputation Institute takes into account the G8 countries’ citizens attitudes towards 50 (for 2011–13) to 55 (2014–15) countries, while linking it with the evaluation of: effective government, advanced economy and appealing environment (thus combining “emotional” with “rational”). The Responsible participant in the global community and Important contributor to global culture factors can be treated as related to aid. Other factors present various soft power resources crucial for development aid to be part of public diplomacy.

In 2015, Israel ranked 42nd, just after Turkey, South Africa and Egypt and ahead of Qatar, Romania and Columbia and was among those of weak reputation. It does not seem that Israel ever was among top 10in any of the three main “rational” categories, nor among the top 10 in any of the subcategories. The 2013 comparison between reputational data and real-world data revealed a gap interpreted by the ranking authors as a “communication opportunity” (contrary to “reputational risk”). In the 2014 and 2015 rankings, the UN World Happiness Reports are cited, with Israel's 11th position. On the contrary, the state of peace is described as low in line with the Global Peace Index and frequency of corruption as medium according to the Transparency International Corruption perception Index. In the 2015 report, Israel scored relatively high on education, brands, technology, quality products and services and culture. Aid-related data for Israel did not transpire in the rankings.

The Best Countries

The USNews ranking overviews global public opinion. However, it is not concerned with development aid, so it only deals with other aspects of Israel's image. In 2016, Israel scored 30th, in between Greece and Poland. It received the highest rank (8th) for Power (strong military, alliances and political influence). It was also high on Movers (19th) for being perceived as distinctive and unique; on Entrepreneurship (25th, for educated population, skilled labour force, connectedness, technological expertise) and Heritage (27th—rich history, many cultural attractions). Its lowest rank (74th) was in the Adventure category focusing on such aspects as pleasantness and fun (confirming the failure of branding concentrated on beaches and parties). It also scored low on Openness for Business due to perceived high bureaucracy. Within the Citizenship category, Israel scored high for progressiveness but low on perceived state of human rights and freedom of religion. Other positive results were influential culture, well-developed education and public health systems.

KOF Index of Globalisation

The ranking by KOF Swiss Economic Institute, presenting countries’ level of integration into world affairs, is of limited use due to the nature of indices and difficulties in interpretation of results. Israel ranks the 38th on overall globalisation scale, the 32nd for Social Globalisation (representing volume of communication, number of tourists and foreigners), the 42nd for Economic Globalisation (for volumes of trade, trade barriers), the 104th for Political Globalisation (for number of embassies, participation in international organisations, UN SC missions, treaties signed).

The New Persuaders

Coming to rankings focused on soft power, The New Persuaders Institute for Government/Monocle reports by Jonathan Mc. Clory list Israel as the 18th in 2010, the 26th in 2011 and the 29th in 2012. The results are not easy to interpret since the number of states ranked changed from 26 in 2010 to 30 in 2011 and 40 in 2012. Moreover, detailed profiles of states are not disclosed. Reportedly, Israel ranked relatively high on the Business/Innovation and the Government categories (that reflects efficiency and effectiveness of domestic management).⁵⁷ Yet it did not reach top 10in any of these categories.

Portland Communications Soft Power Ranking

The Soft Power 30 ranking prepared by Portland Communications also reflects combined international opinion polling and objective measurements of countries’ resources. It does include international aid dimension (in Engagement sub-index) measured by volume of ODA. In 2015, Israel was the 29th on engagement index. Its overall rank was the 26th, just after Brazil, Poland and Greece and ahead of Czech Republic, Turkey, Mexico and China, with overall score of 44.51 (the 1st was the United Kingdom with 75.61). Israel was the 4th on the digital, the 14th on enterprise, the 17th on education, the 25th on culture and 23th on government indices. Yet the polling results located Israel at the last, 30th position. The report pointed to the significance of high location on the digital index for the overall position of Israel and underlined that it was one of the few so actively engaged in digital diplomacy. In the 2016 ranking, Israel was not included as it fell out from the top 30 countries; the report explained Israel's fall through lowering scores in Education, Digital and Government sub-indices, combined with worsening international polling score.

Country Brand Index

The FutureBrand Country Brand Index prepared by the FutureBrand consultancy is based on opinions of influencers, frequent travellers and a panel of experts in fields including politics, security, environment or media. According to this complex, multidimensional survey of up to 120 countries (only 75 in 2014–15), Israel scored as the 30th in 2010 (11 positions up), the 28th in 2011–12, the 27th in 2012–13 and the 26th in the 2014–15. According to the 2014–15 edition, Israel was not among the first 10 in any of the major categories (value system, quality of life, good for business, tourism, heritage & culture, made in). It was however distinguished as “the one to watch”—moving forward, strong on business and innovation. Israel is usually high in the heritage & culture, advanced technology, good for business, skilled workforce and education system categories.

Noam Lemelshtrich Latar points out that this index regards an image of a country among experts and opinion leaders, not the general population. As a result, it investigates a sort of a commercial branding, which in the case of Israel, inter alia thanks to its economy, is significantly better than its overall or political image. According to Latar, this Index shows that Israeli soft power does work. However, Latar warns that it is the political image that matters most for international legitimacy, reflected, for example, in the UN votes, and that negative political image can also badly affect the economy.⁵⁸

To conclude, Israel usually ranks around the 30th location in soft power rankings. It ranks better where both public opinion and objective criteria are accounted for or in rankings based on opinions of experts. The rankings which include the role of global engagement or development diplomacy show that the issue could potentially play a larger role in Israel's soft power.

Conclusions

Institutionally, Israeli public diplomacy, despite coordination problems, seems well predisposed to professional functioning and is supported by many civil society organisations at home and abroad. However, its capacities are focused predominantly on the Western audiences and thus in need of finding means of connecting to those in the rest of the world. The scale of the problem it faces is enormous: what is perceived as an industry of hate and delegitimisation without respect for truth or merit and which established itself through decades of terror and propaganda. On the other hand, Israel cannot ignore the fact that the failure of the creation of the Palestinian state (irrespective of which side is more guilty of this) leads to a prolonged state of occupation of easily radicalised populace—a threat in itself but also a threat to Israel's image even in the eyes of many of those who are otherwise positively predisposed. Lack of clear policy on this issue and polyphony of voices on every subject, typical for the vibrant Israeli democracy, add up to the complexity of communication challenge. Public diplomacy efforts have shown so far that—at least with regards to Western audiences—campaigns ignoring the conflict bring limited results, while engaging people through very specific topics that matter to them is more promising. Israeli 2010s diplomatic activism, with a renewed sense of self-assurance, has led public diplomacy to search for new, effective narratives. There is increasing awareness of the existing Israeli soft power resources and the ways they might matter to various audiences, like the youth.

One such resource is Israeli development aid and possibilities for development posed by Israeli technologies. Aid is frequently recognised in the reflections made on Israeli public diplomacy as a source of a meaningful content. However, doubts remain as to the effectiveness of such content, particularly in relation to the major target group—the West. Among Israeli political echelons, some change in thinking was visible at the time of writing, with diplomacy's pivot turned towards non-Western states. Some officials believed in importance of development aid in building relations with African states and called for increase in relevant budgets. While significant development aid programmes addressed to Arab states in the framework of peace process largely failed to build positive attitudes (due to geo-political and cultural realities and lack of publicity or indeed undercover nature), this negative experience is not projected at contemporary SSA.

Development aid has been included in the Israeli public diplomacy strategy, though it is not a dominant issue. Israeli contribution to public global goods is underlined in speeches and reports addressed to appropriate forums. It is also quite well positioned within the Israeli digital diplomacy, yet not overexposed: it reflects real-life, on the ground activities. Lack of French (used vastly in West Africa) language versions of major sites should be addressed in this context. Needless to say, there are of course limits to the effectiveness of any form of digital diplomacy in sub-Saharan countries, particularly when it comes to overall populations. Information on development aid is published on FB accounts of embassies to major Western powers, while it could be better positioned by the one to the UN. MASHAV's publications are professional, informative and constitute a good material for interested audiences. The tension between the impression one gets from MASHAV publications and the actual financial distribution of ODA, which results from the manifold non-MASHAV inputs to ODA, is inadequately addressed.

Shalom Clubs play a large role in networking alumni of MASHAV courses and cementing good relations built during traineeships. Inclusion into these structures of students who attended scholarship-based studies can be recommended. Various international conferences and side-events relating to Israeli technologies, capacities and aid reach out to the most relevant and interested constituency—the development circles. Israel participates actively in the workings of world development bodies, which also serves image-building. Israeli representatives and experts are an asset. As for the Israeli NGOs, they often think in terms of building positive attitudes towards Israel, but it is never their main aim. They are usually openly Israeli and/or Jewish and refer to relevant moral and ideological precepts, including tikkun olam. On the other hand, they mostly do not have any specific strategies for “communicating Israel” nor undergo trainings—the idea is that the nature of their presence and workings on the ground speak for themselves.

These efforts are positively recognised, primarily among the international development community. Instances of such resonance in overall non-developmental global forums or among the global civil society as reflected in the rankings are less visible, though the question arises to which extent it would be realistic to expect them at all. Development aid is also not particularly well predisposed to influence such indicators as trade or tourism, which does not mean it does not play an important role. Most profoundly, the role of aid as a public diplomacy can be understood and qualified through positive reactions within the receiving countries and communities, translating into willingness to expand cooperation.

Notes

1 Friedman 2015; Asa-El 2017; Gilboa 2006: 722–724; Gilboa 2014; Diker 2002; Hassman 2008b: 6–26; The Reut Institute 2010: 43–48.

2 Steinberg 2006; Muravchik 2014: 7–11, 20, 36–65; Fishman 2012: 16–17.

3 Schleifer 2006: 25, 68, 91, 93, 109–110; Gilboa 2006: 731; The Reut Institute 2010: 59–60, 68–73.

4 Cummings 2012: 4–13; Schleifer, Snapper 2015: 13, 39; Schneeweiss 2017; Interview with Yoram Morad.

5 Interview with Noam Lemelshtrich Latar.

6 Cummings 2012: 48–50, 254, 257–258; Gilboa 2006: 735–736; Schleifer 2003:123.

7 Schleifer 2006: 108, 191–192; Molad 2012; Bachar, Bar, Machtiger 2010.

8 Cummings 2012.

9 Benziman, Romm 2014; Gilboa 2006: 737; Sheizaf 2011; Hassman 2008b: 18–19;Molad 2012: 26–27, 32, 36.

10 Institute for Zionist Strategies 2004; Interview with Adi Arbel.

11 Interview with Noam Lemelshtrich Latar.

12 Electronic correspondence with Michael Ordman, November 2016.

13 El-Al 2015:25.

14 Interview with Yoram Morad; Cummings 2012; Schleifer 2006: 79, 111; Asa-El 2017; Brecher 1969; Molad 2012: 36, 39–40.

15 Interview with Noam Lemelshtrich Latar.

16 Hassman 2008a: 133–134; Hassman 2008b: 51–54.

17 Schleifer 2003: 131–145; Schleifer 2006: 71–76, 117, 174, 178, 192; Schleifer, Snapper 2015: 5.

18 Schleifer, Snapper 2015: 32–33, 57–63, 73, 87.

19 Michlin 2010: 3–4; Lemelshtrich Latar 2014; Simkovitz 2016; Lipman 2016; Interview with Gadi Wolfsfeld; Fishman 2012: 18–19; Eyal 2016; Interview with Noam Lemelshtrich Latar; Rosenblatt 2004; The Reut Institute 2010.

20 Apfelbaum 2017.

21 Molad 2012: 32.

22 Puder 2016; Ahren 2017; Harkov 2014.

23 Interview with Yoram Morad.

24 Hassman 2008a: 6–7, 136–139; Hassman 2008b: 48–49.

25 Samuel Neaman Institute for National Policy Research 2009.

26 Institute for Zionist Strategies 2004: 13, 22, 24.

27 Interview with Eytan Gilboa.

28 Grinstein, Kaufman 2014; Salman 2019: 95.

29 Mock 2013.

30 Interview with Aliza Belman-Inbal; Interview with Benny Omer.

31 Schleifer 2006: 73; Gilboa, Shai 2010: 39; Interview with Noam Lemelshtrich Latar.

32 Lengyel 1960: 22.

33 Ahren 2016b; Oren 2017.

34 Interview with Yoram Morad; Fried 2006: 50; Udasin 2015.

35 Interview with Yoram Morad.

36 Interview with Noam Katz.

37 Interview with Yoram Morad.

38 Interview with Benny Omer.

39 MASHAV 2012a.

40 Laufer 1967: 184; Interview with Leo Vinovezky.

41 Interview with Tal Azran and Moran Yarchi.

42 MASHAV 2012b: 13, 47.

43 Interviews with: Paul Hirschson; Leo Vinovezky.

44 Ministry of Environment 2000: 27.

45 Belman-Inbal 2009; Interview with Ophelie Namiech.

46 Interview with Genna Brand.

47 Interview with Ophelie Namiech.

48 Keinon 2016e.

49 Interview with Benny Omer; Ben-Matityahu 2012.

50 Knols, Kuvin, Malowany 2013: 6; Dacalo 1998: 39.

51 Ben-David 1964: 7.

52 MASHAV 2012a: 10.

53 Adam 2013.

54 UNDP 2013: 17.

55 Laufer 1967: 156–157; Dacalo 1998: 71–72; Belman-Inbal, Zahavi 2009: 11.

56 Ben-Matityahu, 2012.

57 Correspondence with Jonathan Mc. Clory.

58 Lemelshtrich Latar 2014.

6Geopolitical considerations affecting Israeli relations with sub-Saharan African countries

Interests of great and non-Arab powers

Major traditional powers

The impact of the Cold War great powers’ engagement in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) on Israeli relations with the continent is mainly indirect, as the Cold War rivalry took place through the proxies. Furthermore, relations between great powers and SSA countries is a very vast topic, discussed by manifold specialised publications. Thus, the issue is discussed here only as far as deemed necessary to explain the nature of the overall impact of great powers’ interests and rivalries.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)'s aims in Africa can be summarised as limiting Western bloc's influence and enhancing its own, with Arab states as the main proxy. Soviet engagement in SSA started in the late 1950s. It supported Ghana, Guinea and Mali and involved itself in the conflict in Congo. During the 1960s, the USSR's influences in Ghana and Guinea diminished, but its overall engagement on the continent undertook more strategic shape, including through establishment of the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow, devoted to students from developing countries. The Soviet bloc (except Romania) broke relations with Israel already in 1967, signalling to the SSA countries, interested in alignment with the USSR, the necessary political choices. Interestingly, the Soviets took note of the Israeli aid programme. Soviet publicists described it as an extension of colonialism and American imperialism. The USSR's policy towards Africa brought successes in the 1970s. Angola and Ethiopia joined the Soviet system and cooperated militarily, while close relations were built with Benin, Congo-Brazzaville, Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Tanzania. The USSR played a major, active role in SSA until the 1980s. In late 1980s, with the demise of its power, including financial aid capacities, and with gradual quenching of confrontation with the West, Soviet interests and influence diminished. Military presence was vastly reduced while SSA reformed away from socialism. After a period of virtual absence, Russia came back at the beginning of the 2000s with investments and military engagement. This trend has gained pace since 2017, with growing Russian engagement in infrastructure investments (notably, in strategically important mining, transportation and energy sectors), arms deals and proliferation of Russian private military contractors, assisted by efforts in the spheres of diplomacy and propaganda.¹

The Western bloc, led by the United States (US), aimed at containment of the Soviet power in SSA, particularly through limiting Egyptian influence. The US tried to make up for the diminishing role of France and Great Britain. Israeli intelligence and knowledge of Africa were a worthy asset. In the 1960s, the US occasionally supported financially—in a very modest and irregular manner, though—MASHAV activities in Africa, seeing them as “anti-Soviet” and thus in line with American interest. The end of the Cold War relieved the US from the “containment doctrine” against the USSR, which for 40 years dominated American agenda. This new opening initially resulted in lack of a clear strategy, diminished diplomatic presence and lowered aid volumes for SSA, to turn later on into support for democratic transformation, regional integration, African peace-keeping missions and for solving transboundary issues, such as proliferation of weapons, international terrorism (particularly Islamic fundamentalism), drug trade, environmental hazards and illnesses (especially HIV/AIDS and malaria). Despite trade alleviation mechanisms, SSA's share in the American trade is tiny.² As for the link to Israeli engagement, Israeli cooperation with SSA countries on fight against terror clearly converges with American interests; some limited Israel-US cooperation on African development also takes place (for example, within the Power Africa initiative).

France never abandoned its influences in Francophone Africa, despite decolonisation. Its main rival was Egypt, but France saw Israel's overtures in the region with some disapproval as well. One example is Israel's cooperation with Ghana, which in the late 1950s run contrary to French policy of weakening Ghanaian government, suspected of expansionist plans against Togo. While alliance with Israel was said to somewhat even facilitate French political re-engagement with Francophone Africa, already in 1967 France adopted strongly anti-Israeli stance, courting the Arab regimes. France has maintained great interest towards states participating in Francophonie (“policy of faithfulness”); since the mid-1990s it cultivates “policy of openness” which includes all SSA states into close cooperation. Aside from the history of inspiring government overturns, French military is constantly engaged in interventions or peace and enforcement missions in Africa (almost 20 operations in the 1990s, later diminished). In one case—French intervention in favour of the Muslim rebels in Ivory Coast (2002–11)—French interests collided with Israeli, supportive of the Christian-led government. More recently, in Mali, French and Israeli interest converged against the Islamic movement. Criticising the US for insufficient involvement, France nevertheless cooperates with the Americans (and Great Britain), including on the capacity-building of West African armies. France also became a leading donor for SSA (even if at times its aid largely comprised of debt reduction), while the region's share in French trade was marginal.³

As for Great Britain, another major former colonial power, its policies towards one-time colonies and other SSA countries has been less intrusive, although links were nurtured through the Commonwealth. It is however noted that the UK feared what it perceived as Israel's competition for influence. Still, it had even stronger reservations towards growth of Egyptian (pro-Soviet) power.⁴ Both France and Britain remain important players. Their influence, particularly in the former colonies and following the demise of the USSR, is grounded so well that it cannot be compared with Israel, Libya, Iran, Egypt—or even Russia. This leverage is further enhanced by the collective might and institutional power of the European Union (EU), the major destination for SSA export and the major donor of development aid. The EU develops structured cooperation with African countries and their organisations. At the time of writing, this cooperation increasingly concerned taming immigration from SSA to the EU. Geopolitically, the EU competes for influence in SSA with China in particular. The question arises of a possibility of European stakeholders’ recognition of the input Israel could make to the European development efforts.

Iran

Several other non-Arab powers’ presence provides a relevant context. A rising regional power of Iran increases its efforts on the African continent since the mid-2000s, with diplomatic offensive of official visits in 2009 and 14 embassies on the continent. Since 1979, Iranian foreign policy has revolved around a broad ambition of exporting Islamic revolution, although Iran declares that its goal in SSA is rather limited to “strengthening Islam”; this is realised through information activities (Iranian embassies in Africa are very active also in anti-Israeli propaganda), conferences and meetings. Iran offers sub-Saharan countries cooperation in trade and technology as well as agricultural and health aid. Its main aim is gathering support in its struggle against the US and the West—including Israel. It also distributes messages against Christians and Jews, termed “missionaries and Zionists”. However, rhetoric is country-specific (radical in Zimbabwe, avoiding condemnations of Israel in Kenya or Uganda). Particular focus is on supporting Shia denominations—the Twelvers and Ismailis in West Africa and Shi’a Lebanese immigrants (particularly in Senegal)—for example, through establishment of cultural centres, institutions related to religion and education and distribution of local newspapers. Iran also cultivates ties with Senegal, which nevertheless temporarily cut off relations with it for arming anti-government rebels in 2011. As regards East Africa, Iran deployed marine forces at Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. This was meant to give it a leverage over marine trade routes as well as save passage for weapons smuggling through Sudan to terror groups in Gaza and Yemen. Amicable relations with Eritrea were also key in this effort. Such encircling naturally constituted a strategic challenge to Israel's interests.⁵

Access to markets, taming isolation and gaining votes in the United Nations (UN) in the context of international sanctions imposed on it due to its nuclear programme are important Iranian aims. Iranian efforts, even if brought limited results, often disturbed the Western world. While Iranian soft power in SSA is said to be weak, Iran was able to destabilise the Middle East (ME) through weapons’ smuggling, thanks to alliance with Sudan which lasted until Sudan broke relations with Iran in 2016. Zimbabwe signed a deal providing Iran with Congolese uranium through Tanzanian ports; the same ports were used to transport Iranian oil in breach of international sanctions. Iran gained strong presence in Nigeria, consisting of a Hezbollah cell trading in conflict diamonds, involvement in large illegal arms shipments and a growing domestic radical Shiite movement. In June 1995, Iranians were behind assassination attempt against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak during his state visit in Ethiopia. Several terror-related activities have also been exposed in Kenya throughout the years. Hezbollah is active in Congo, Guinea and Senegal, collecting funds and spreading propaganda. Israeli press sometimes links enhanced Israeli diplomatic activities in the region to growing Iranian engagement and some of the Iranian efforts are directly aimed at countering Israeli development diplomacy. Reportedly, in 2009, Iran intervened against Israeli aid, taking over a hospital project in Nouakchott, Mauretania and a water and sewage system project in Touba, Senegal. The Economist observed at the time that a first-in-decades Israeli foreign minister trip to Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda was partly a response to Iranian efforts. Understandably, it is hard to get a reliable confirmation of these reports. Asked about the issue, Noam Katz observed that good relations are built through being genuine, cooperative and not overly concentrated on self-interest. Confrontational behaviours do not serve relation-building in the long run. He added that Israel seeks to cooperate with other donors as much as possible. While the picture described remained relevant for the core period subject to this book, it appears that in the late 2010s, Iranian efforts in East Africa have been successfully countered by Saudi Arabia. Iran focused on West Africa in turn, hoping to develop ties based on Shia Islam.⁶ No Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Query Wizard for International Development Statistics (QWIDS) data on Iranian aid is available.

Turkey

Yet another Middle Eastern non-Arab power, past Israel's ally which turned into an adversary (although much later and with no such intensity of enmity as Iran—ties are maintained and trade and tourism function normally) is Turkey. It is also among countries which, drawn by prospects of economic benefits from cooperation with a fast developing continent, intensify their presence in Africa, including through development aid. Turkey's political and military expansion is however seen mainly in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa region, which is largely not subject of this book. Still, according to its Foreign Ministry, Turkey considers itself an “Afro-Eurasian” state and has intensively developed ties since 1998. In 2008, it was labelled by the African Union (AU) as a strategic partner, and it joined African Development Bank and launched recurrent Africa-Turkey Partnership Summits. Most sub-Saharan countries backed Turkish bid for non-permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for 2009–10. High-level visits, including by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, are frequent and with vast geographical coverage. The number of Turkish embassies grew significantly, as did trade and investment. As for development cooperation, there are significant health, agriculture and education projects. Interestingly, regime's conflict with the Güllenist movement, one of the architects of Turkish opening to Africa, which used to run tens of schools in SSA, created tensions with some SSA countries. Technical aid is an important part of efforts. Aid is channelled through Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) and international organisations (the UN family, Red Crescent). As for Turkey's volumes of aid, QWIDS data show a significant increase from 3.3 in 2005 to 21.53 United States Dollar (USD) million in 2006; the volume reached 13,616 USD million in 2017 (representing mainly costs of acceptance of Syrian refugees). SSA (including countries not counted in this work as SSA) share in Turkish official development assistance (ODA) is fluctuating significantly (3% in 2006, 16.5% in 2011, 1.6% in 2017). While almost all SSA countries receive some Turkish aid, the dominant recipients are Somalia and Niger; large sums used to go to Sudan as well. In 2015, Somalia received almost 80% of all Turkish aid for SSA (44% in 2017). Djibouti, Ethiopia and Ghana need to be added to the list of main recipients in the case of 2017. An interesting, from a comparative perspective, evaluation of the qualitative side of Turkish aid was proposed by Donelli, which characterised it as emerging from a particular Turkish predisposition as a country in-between democratic liberalism and authoritarian capitalism, promoting a narrative combining the notion of South-South cooperation with “Islamic humanitarianism and Third-Worldist discourses”.⁷

Importantly, Turkish activities in Africa, and particularly development aid, are analysed by many authors through the lenses of soft power. Cool relations with Israel notwithstanding, Turkish activities in Africa are mainly motivated by its national economy, global standing needs and rivalry with Arab powers, thus so far they were not seen as targeted against Israeli interests.

China

Another new player in SSA is China. It rivalled Israel in Tanzania in the early 1970s, when it offered aid of a similar profile to the Israeli one (in the fields of agriculture, youth) and demanded limitations on contacts with Israel. The rivalry did not develop further probably due to the overall debacle of Israeli influence and moderation of Chinese foreign policies in the 1970s, leading to the 1980s improvement in relations with Israel—first unofficial, born out of Chinese needs for Israeli water solutions.⁸ Nowadays Chinese presence in Africa manifests itself in large-scale investment, projection of culture and diplomatic engagement. It might not be seen as a major geopolitical factor in terms of Israeli power projection, due to the immense difference of scale of capabilities and due to Israeli-Chinese rapprochement—including technical development advice coming from Israel to China and Chinese companies’ engagement in infrastructure investment projects in Israel.

However, the nature of Chinese engagement in Africa, oft-times described as application of soft power, justifies a closer look on the phenomenon, if only for comparison with Israeli aid. Without a specialised aid agency and concentrating mostly on investments in infrastructure, agriculture and mining, according to King, China deployed one of the biggest short-term training programmes for participants from SSA, incoming and on-the-spot; sponsors scholarships and academic cooperation; sends teachers and volunteers; builds and equips schools and health centres. Chinese foreign policy documents say this is neither aid nor assistance, but cooperation, although development aid policy documents refer to aid. It is underlined that China sees itself as a developing state, highlighting mutuality, but on the other hand, a strong drive for visibility and image-building is apparent. This however is assessed as not contradictory, as soft power projection can go together with ethical reasoning. Importantly, development aid is seen as a soft power tool as such, also without being mediated by publicity, and as mutually beneficial and not manipulative one. Chinese development budget for 2005 constituted 0.03–0.035% of its gross domestic product (GDP). Difference in aims to Israeli aid is visible in the way Israel refers to Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), while China to South-South cooperation.⁹

India

India is a very important partner for many, especially East African, countries, for trade and incoming investments, although it lags behind Chinese expansion. It leads diplomatic efforts, has interests in food imports from SSA and in securing marine trade routes from pirates. India's influence is quite visible, at least due to the history of the Indian immigration to Eastern sub-Saharan states. Its overall aid budget was assessed in 2005 as between USD 100 and 200 million, representing 0.01–0.02% of its GDP. Among the motives for aid-giving, gathering support for India to obtain a permanent seat at the UNSC and attracting investment were mentioned. A total of 60% of Indian aid is said to be in the form of technical assistance, with projects much more frequent than cash grants. Main sub-Saharan recipients were Burkina Faso, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Mali and Senegal.¹⁰

Moreover, dissatisfied with Arab stance on its conflict with Pakistan and interconnected terrorism, India rapidly improves its relations with Israel. Israel's relations with India were particularly good at the time of writing, with the first ever visit of Indian Prime Minister in Israel—Narenda Modi—in July 2017 (revisit took place in January 2018, with several cooperation agreements signed); and pragmatic cooperation, foremost on agriculture (with a vast programme of demonstration farms already in place) and innovation (establishment of Israel-India Industrial R&D and Technological Innovation Fund), developing.

Arab diplomatic efforts in sub-Saharan Africa: main players

Overall, the Arab states can be treated as a bloc, due to foreign policies alignment—particularly in terms of voting in international organisations—achieved through the Arab League (AL). The bloc consolidated slowly as a pro-Soviet one, with some exceptions. The turning point in terms of Arab unity and policy was 1964 when the AL decided to establish the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO); divert the waters of the Jordan River to inhibit the Israeli plan to pipe water to the Negev; and establish a Unified Arab Command. The two latter decisions were not implemented, but the PLO rose to power and became a unifying, pan-Arab issue, irrespective of anti-Palestinian politics implemented by some governments. Gulf states remained American allies while aligning with Arab bloc policies. There were also instances of deconsolidation, like in 1979, due to peace which Egypt signed with Israel, and contemporarily, due to rise of the divisive Iranian power and wars in Syria and Libya. Arab diplomatic efforts in SSA during the Cold War need to be discussed also in the broader context of their activities within the non-aligned movement and within the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), of which some are members.

The initial direction of Israeli quest for recognition was Asia. The “Bandung debacle”, which triggered Israeli pivot to SSA, was caused by the AL Council letter addressed to the organisers of the Afro-Asian conference (Burma's and India's leaders particularly), stating that no Arab country would participate in case Israel was invited. During the conference, they actually tried—and failed—to put through a resolution condemning the mere existence of Israel (calling it “an illegitimate state and aggressor”). The resolution adopted was nevertheless a milder version: supporting the Palestinian rights and calling for implementation of relevant UN resolutions. A provision stating that this implementation would be “peaceful” was accepted by Arab delegates only after 3 days of negotiations. To make matters worse, Haj Amin al-Huseini arrived at the conference uninvited and engaged in tirades accusing Israel of expansionist plans “from Nile to Medina”. While the initial aim of the non-aligned movement was discussing the world order rather than particular conflicts, Arab states made related forums a platform for anti-Israeli activities. Although most radical drafts were initially rejected by the majority of the movement (Belgrade, 1961), the Arab perseverance slowly led to change of language and perceptions, with subsequent resolutions getting more frequent and radical (for example, ones adopted in 1966 in Havana, calling for sanctions against Israel and its exclusion from the UN). Israel was also not allowed into the group of 77 developing countries, which in 1964 created UNCTAD. The culmination was reached in 1973. In September, a non-aligned countries’ resolution welcomed severance of relations and complete boycott of Israel. Days after Yom Kippur war broke out through a surprise, open and boasted-about Arab military attack against Israel, another resolution came out condemning… Israeli aggression.¹¹

Arab states’ ties to SSA were initially limited. Historically, Islamisation and slave trade were the two major sources of contact. In the 20th century, however, Arab states tried to play a larger role. Trade relations were particularly developed by Egypt and Lebanon. Somalia, with its Greater Somalia ideology, challenged territorial integrity of Ethiopia and Kenya. Ghanaian independence celebrations were boycotted by Egypt and Syria, its Black Star Line (joint company with Israel) was not allowed to pass the Suez Canal, while Jordan boycotted products of joint companies established by Israel in Nigeria and Ghana. Politically, the leadership was claimed by Egypt under President Gamal el-Nasser (ruling: 1956–70) and subsequently—by the Libyan leader, Muammar al-Qaddafi (ruling: 1969–2011). In The Philosophy of the Revolution, el-Nasser described Egypt's international role in Africa as engaging in a battle between Whites and Africans, as the guardians of the continent's northern gate responsible for extending knowledge and civilisation in African “virgin jungles”.¹²

El-Nasser's claims for leadership were initially blocked by conservative African states, since he ran the platform of radical liberation movements, challenging not only colonial powers, but also indigenous national elites. El-Nasser's efforts to enforce Arab view of the Middle Eastern affairs upon the sub-Saharan states stumbled also upon lack of inter-Arab coordination, resulting from the rivalry between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Western Sahara issue which antagonised Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria, and the war in North Yemen, where Jordan and Saudi Arabia stood on one side and Egypt on the other. El-Nasser gained more influence in the late 1960s, when the demands of pan-African unity generated more alleviation towards Egyptians. Yet first diplomatic successes were often fruit of blackmail. Among several examples, the 1960 resolution of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference was adopted only after Egypt threatened that otherwise it would not back resolution condemning South Africa. In 1965, during the OAU summit, Ghanaian host was told that if the Israeli ambassador attended, Egyptian president would not appear at a banquet. Israeli ambassador was subsequently asked not to come.¹³

Egypt became a refuge for members of some sub-Saharan leftists opposition movements banned in their home countries. They were supported institutionally and through distribution of their messages in other countries. Moreover, African Service of Radio Cairo broadcasted in several languages widely spoken in Africa. Nascent development aid programme was also in place. Ethiopia was among the priority countries due to its control over Blue Nile; South-eastern part of Ethiopia was included in an Egyptian plan for “greater Somalia” and the northern parts were subject to Eritrean irredentism supported by Egypt, caused partly by Israeli ties to Ethiopia. Egyptian intelligence led operations meant to steer local population against economic cooperation with Israel. Criticism was also voiced of the Israeli aid programme, mirroring language used by the Soviets. After a period of isolation, imposed by other Arab countries following the peace treaty, Egypt rebuilt its position in the pan-African movement and was elected to chair the OAU in 1989.¹⁴

As for al-Qaddafi, he was more concerned with pan-African unity than with a pan-Arab one, particularly after failed efforts to create a union with Egypt and then with Morocco—and as he antagonised other Arab regimes. In Islamic radicalism, al-Qaddafi is said to have been more radical than the rulers of Saudi Arabia; yet this radicalism estranged other Muslim leaders, as it called for fundamental return to Islamic origins and militantly pursued expansion of the Libyan model. Among al-Qaddafi's aims, destruction of Israel and creation of an Islamic commonwealth stood high. With Egypt boycotted after it signed peace treaty with Israel, al-Qaddafi's chances for leadership grew. However, he conflicted himself with the Saudis, as he called for the Saudi monarchy to be overthrown. The conflict manifested itself, for example, in support for opposing parties in Sudan. In turn, Muslim scholars, encouraged by Saudi rulers, declared al-Qaddafi a heretic, which led to attempts at his life and emergence of an internal, illegal Muslim fundamentalist opposition. Characterised by Decalo with “fanatical hatred of Israel”, al-Qaddafi was behind mass influx of related propaganda on the African continent. Moreover, although he did not have experts that could replace Israeli ones, he had credibility to make promises of vast loans and grants, based on the new Libyan oil wealth. He also offered money for construction of Islamic schools and mosques. In terms of hard power projection, al-Qaddafi supported Islamic rebels in Chad (with annexation of Aouzou region, promotion of own candidate as Chad's president and interference in the civil war following this president's 1983 demise), Eritreans against Ethiopia and militias in Guinea Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone. He stood strongly behind Uganda's Idi Amin, in exchange for termination of ties with Israel (but was not able to prevent a coup which overthrown Amin in 1979). In May 1973, al-Qaddafi pressured Ethiopia to break ties with Israel, threatening that otherwise the OAU headquarters would be moved to another country.¹⁵

To his credit, Al-Qaddafi was behind some successful mediations in sub-Saharan conflicts and played a role in pan-African integration, including the reform of the OAU and its transformation into AU. The 2001 establishment of AU in Addis Ababa was the result of work and programmes championed by several sub-Saharan leaders. However, the decisive 1999 summit was sponsored and hosted in Sirte by al-Qaddafi. He created much publicity around himself as the unifier of the continent, despite rejection of his proposal for “United States of Africa” and adoption of alternative solutions proposed by Nigeria and South Africa; al-Qaddafi antagonised major leaders in the process but convinced others (Zambia) of the sincerity of his efforts.¹⁶

The 1980s economic crises and the 1990s end of Cold War triggered substantial changes in what used to be a non-aligned movement and in the pan-African one. With key states rising fast out from underdevelopment and claiming independent foreign policy roles, acts of bloc solidarity were less needed than engagement in productive relations, which limited Arab diplomacy's outreach and translated into rebirth of ties with Israel. The turmoil caused by a series of events dubbed as the “Arab Spring” worked towards further limiting of Arab influences in the SSA. Libya, devoid of its strongman al-Qaddafi and torn apart by the civil strife, ceased to be atone-setter. Egyptian foreign policy concentrated on fluctuating relationships with regional powers, foremost Turkey. Still, Egypt remains profoundly concerned with the issue of Nile sources, on which it negotiates with states involved: Sudan and, particularly, due to construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Ethiopia. This led to a 2015 signature of a Declaration of Principles on the GERD, which however did not lead to a breakthrough in the dispute. The issue becomes of an existential nature for Egypt due to the impact already exerted by climate change and human-made disturbances on the flow of the Nile. Egypt's interest in SSA, on the rise again, is further confirmed by active diplomacy as well as economic and media initiatives. In 2017, Egypt had 35 embassies in sub-Saharan countries. Its policy is mainly concerned with East Africa, as far South as Tanzania, and concentrates on water issues: both in terms of working on securing its share of the Nile and in terms of development of pragmatic cooperation. This to some extent could be analysed in terms of competition with Israel, specialising in water technologies. The Egyptian Internet presence as of January 2017 was rather low (with dominance of Arabic rather than local languages and low numbers of followers of embassies’ social media). As mentioned, overall nature of relations of major Arab powers with Israel is changing quickly. Egypt maintains cooperation with Israel on security, particularly on terrorist groups on the Sinai (economic development of Sinai being among the most vital long-term endeavours of Egyptian government) and on energy (joint membership in the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, import of gas from Israel); peace is otherwise quite cold, which manifests itself also in the UN, reflecting conflicting interests of Egypt.

Saudi Arabia increases its presence in Africa in the context of rivalry with Iran. Its security interests concern mainly the Red Sea and Horn of Africa countries. Saudis successfully mediated (together with other GCC members) between Ethiopia and Eritrea, leading to the 2018 Jeddah peace agreement. With Saudi food production endangered by climate change, East Africa became a fertile ground for a programme consisting of land purchase and investment in production meant for Saudi market. These activities, however, raise concerns as they limit productive capacities for the local African markets of countries themselves fragile in terms of food security. Saudi religious diplomacy regards mainly West Africa. Saudi network of diplomatic outposts expands. Internal crises within the GCC, with Qatar, very active in Africa as well, sidelined and sanctioned within the Group, is reported to have negative effect on the standing of these adversaries in SSA.¹⁷

Morocco also gains greater foothold in SSA, with membership in the AU renewed in 2017 after 33 years of absence caused by the Western Sahara conflict. Its interest in SSA, particularly West Africa and Sahel, mainly regards economic partnerships (trade, investment), gaining support for Moroccan foothold in Western Sahara and lobbying for Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) membership. Fields of cooperation include security (counter-terrorism, internal stability, training for military officers), religion (education of religious leaders, in a bid for deradicalisation of Islam and positioning Morocco as a leader of moderate Islam), culture and development.¹⁸

Moroccan diplomacy engages also against Israeli influences, encouraging others to limit cooperation with Israel. Gestures of symbolic nature against Israel in Africa, with undertones of boycott, occur. For example, in 2016, Algeria cancelled a football game which it was supposed to host against Ghana, in order to prevent Israeli coach of the Ghanaian team from entering. In March 2019, the AL reportedly discussed countering Israeli expansion in Africa.¹⁹

Arab diplomatic efforts at sub-Saharan African multilateral forums

On the African multilateral forums, the Arab diplomatic offensive against Israel used tactics of patient, recurrent re-enacting of condemnatory proposals. Since early 1960s, Arab states oft-times conditioned their support on issues important to SSA countries on sub-Saharan acquiescence to their demands regarding resolutions on Israel. Such a leverage was used on the issues of French nuclear tests, the crises of Congo and White regimes in Southern Africa. This resulted in two-facedness of African governments, voting for anti-Israel resolutions while questioning their importance. The systematic Arab campaign started during the 1958 1st Conference of the Independent African States, where, however, Arab states did not manage to have Israel mentioned for condemnation next to Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa. They met with better resonance within the Casablanca group (Algieria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Libya) of radical states, which adopted, in 1961, a resolution calling Israel a tool of imperialism and colonialism, also in Africa and Asia. Ghana, apparently, backed the proposal in exchange for Egypt's support for its position on the issue of Congo. Yet overall, the African forums were initially not interested in discussing ME issues and el-Nasser abandoned the idea of raising them during the first meeting of OAU in 1963.²⁰

The situation changed in 1967, when the OAU first discussed the ME conflict. Another precedent appeared in 1968, when an anti-Israeli OAU resolution was adopted, though with breach of the Rules of Procedure; and yet another in 1970, when a separate agenda point was devoted to the conflict. The 1971 OAU summit resolution calling for complete withdrawal of Israeli forces and dubbing occupation a threat to African security, and then the follow-up of the 1973 war, marked a complete overturn and a success of Arab efforts to shape the agenda and voting patterns. The success was in part emerging from a more subtle diplomacy: underlining common interests vis-a-vis Israel rather than simply demonising Israel; unprecedented unity within the Arab world; and charm offensive—aid and high-level visits; as well as skilful exploitation of Islam. At the same time, the Arab states increasingly used the Palestinian issue to gain support for the overall Arab cause and stressed similarity between the Palestinian and the South African causes. While loudly condemning South Africa—as a “solidarity” gesture which demanded the SSA to condemn Israel in return—Arabs did not curtail their trade with South Africa even at the peak of the sanctions and other international efforts against the apartheid. Abu Dhabi, Bahrain and Dubai in the 1970s and Iran, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE) throughout 1980s were the main sources of oil to South Africa (around 80% of its imports). Lebanon, due to the interests of its Diaspora in South Africa, was cooperating openly and maintained an interest section in Pretoria throughout.²¹

Evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict

An important element of the Arab-Israeli conflict which influenced adversaries’ relations with SSA is the issue of rights of navigation, a lifeline for Israel's trade with Africa and Asia; another, interconnected one—the issue of Sinai. In 1956, following nationalisation of the Suez Canal and effective blockade for the Western shipping at large, the tripartite intervention led to stationing of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) on the Sinai and confirmation of rights of free shipment. In the run-up to the 1967 Six-Day War, Egypt requested the UN peacekeeping forces at the Sinai to withdraw. Secretary-General gave immediate approval to this request (possibly due to oral and physical threats to the corps), vacating peacekeeping upon rise in tensions; the Sinai was instantly filled up with Egyptian forces. The Egyptian blockade of the Strait of Tiran for Israeli shipping followed, and thus blockade of Eilat and closure of the Gulf of Aqaba—a window for Israel's ties with SSA. Israeli Foreign Minister appealed to the British one, protesting being cut off from trading partners in Africa and Asia. To no avail, as no major power, including the US, was ready to react, except for a plan for a vague declaration of maritime powers. After this victory, el-Nasser declared the next step to be Palestine. Following the 1967 war, arrangements were made in the UNSC reserving one seat for an Arab state, from either Asian or African pool. The Arab world, despite defeat, even hardened its position, formalising (AL's Khartum summit) its refusal to consider peace (“three times no” policy: no peace, no recognition, no negotiation). On the other hand, Egypt limited its support for Eritrean separatists, giving temporary respite to Ethiopia. However, in 1969, it already started the “war of attrition”, targeting Israeli outposts on the Sinai, which Israel occupied following the war. It was the period of Israeli rule over Sinai when its sailing rights were the most secure. It is sometimes overlooked that the Israeli control over the Peninsula theoretically enabled Israel to apply a blockade to the Strait of Jubal in retorsion in case the Arabs blocked Bab el-Mandeb. On the other hand, the fact that Suez Canal had remained closed until 1975 hit the Eastern African economies through rise of trade costs and pit them even stronger against Israeli occupation of the Peninsula.²²

Some Africa-related aspects emerge also in the run up to the 1973 war. The Arab world paid attention to the expansion of Israeli export to African countries, development of the port in Eilat and of its land connections (pipelines and roads) leading North to the Mediterranean Sea for transit of goods exported by African and Asian countries to Europe. In 1971, a Liberian ship chartered by Israeli company was ambushed by a Palestinian guerrilla while crossing the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.²³ Use of oil prices as a weapon employed by Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) following the war was among the causes of the two-decade-long crises in sub-Saharan development.

Strong stance and interest the US already had in the ME triggered talks which led to gradual withdrawal of Israel from the Sinai peninsula starting in 1974, largely ending by 1978 and completed in 1982, paving the way for Egypt's recognition of Israel and the 1979 peace treaty. The Treaty led to rise of Libya, replacing Egypt as a leader of pan-Arabism and pan-Africanism. Egypt, despite its peace with Israel, continued to work against sub-Saharan countries re-entering into relations with the Jewish state. The explanation given by Egypt to SSA partners, which used to ask why they were demanded to withhold relations with Israel while Egypt established them, was that Egypt did it only in order to receive Sinai back.²⁴ Another justification was the Palestinian cause.

Politics of the Palestinian issue

Within the Arab diplomacy, particular place needs to be devoted to the Palestinian presence and influence in sub-Saharan countries. The upward trend until 1990 was analysed in detail by Arye Oded²⁵—a veteran Israeli diplomat who used to serve in manifold sub-Saharan countries, and thus, his perspective aptly reflects what the activities discussed meant for Israeli policymakers. He summarised the aims of the PLO as gaining recognition for the PLO as a sole representative of Palestinians and support for creation of independent Palestine; damaging Israel's image, limiting its influences, increasing isolation or blocking return to Africa; consolidating Arab support for the PLO through support gained in SSA; consolidating Yassir Arafat's position as PLO's leader. The instruments used, as described by Oded, were,

Diplomatic missions

PLO established, mostly during the 1980s, 31 diplomatic outposts in SSA, half of which were embassies. They were effectively used to expand and maintain contacts and presence, build up influence and carry out the policy. For example, the PLO would always make sure that OAU resolutions contain clauses associating Israel with South Africa or underline continued severance of relations. It would than use them as an argument in relations with countries getting closer to Israel and for sanctioning those that did. Interestingly, the Palestinian diplomacy in SSA claimed that the Palestinian issue was the main reason for their severance of relations, so Israeli peace with Egypt is irrelevant. Moreover, Palestinians would argue that Arab lack of relations with South Africa is motivated solely by the need for Africa to reciprocate in case of the conflict with Israel—which reaped Arab policy off moral standing. During the First Intifada, a diplomatic campaign was launched to secure PLO's image as a driving force behind it.

Aside from gaining an observer status in the OAU in 1979, which gave it a forum for meeting heads of states and speaking in plenary, PLO participated in and influenced the agenda and final documents of manifold African organisations: for lawyers, students, members of parliaments, trade unionists as well as international meetings taking place in African states, such as the International Women's Conference in Nairobi (1985).

Visits by Yassir Arafat

PLO took care that the well prepared and frequent visits of its chairman got a full diplomatic protocol, equal to that of the heads of state, and were well publicised (speeches to large audiences, special editions of newspapers, signatures of joint communiqués reflecting the Palestinian narrative of the conflict). They were also well timed—usually before the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and other international meetings or in cases when Arafat's position within the PLO was challenged. While posing as representing other Arab states, the visits also used to underline how rarely other Arab officials go to SSA. In 1986 alone, Arafat paid visits to 21 countries, assisted by large delegations.

Cooperation with liberation movements

PLO branded itself as a liberation movement supporting similar movements in Africa. This provided the basis for cooperation: mutual pronouncements of support, visits and participation in each other's gatherings. Moreover, PLO extended military training to African counterparts, most notably from Eritrea, South Africa and Western Sahara, carried out in the PLO's camps in Lebanon. Training was also offered to such movements in Tanzania and in Mozambique in the 1970s and 1980s.

Public relations

The PLO arranged for articles to appear in the local press, published own bulletins in local languages, send officials to speak at universities, established “solidarity committees” and “friendship societies”, launched commemoratory events, exhibitions, public assemblies with ruling parties, conferences and workshops. On the last point, the UN Division for Palestinian Rights was of much help and generated additional publicity (such seminars were documented as the UN events). The messages of the PLO were a constant set (Palestine as the core issue of the ME conflict, PLO as the sole representative, need for a state, association between Israel and South Africa), whose repetition turned them into unchallenged clichés. In some countries, they were more radical, pronouncing that the only way for Palestinian liberation is through armed struggle (as stated in the PLO Charter). The UN 1975 “Zionism is racism” resolution was also an important propaganda tool. Oded described the Palestinian content as omnipresent in the African media.

Economic and technical cooperation

The PLO encouraged Arab states to increase development assistance to SSA. Own PLO's effort included branches of Samed agency, focused on small industry, opened in Congo, Mali, Guinea, Tanzania and Somalia; and Palestinian professionals serving as experts, for example, in Mozambique, Togo and Ghana. In Guinea, a large poultry farm and a pineapple plantation were set up. Similar projects are recorded also in Congo, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Mali, Uganda. A hospital was reportedly opened by PLO in Sierra Leone. There were also economic agreements signed, but with little follow-up.

Other

PLO undertook efforts towards military cooperation with states. Uganda under Amin became its base for attacks on Israeli targets in neighbouring countries. In 1976, Kenya caught armed PLO members preparing an attack on an Israeli aircraft, and Uganda requested them back. Also in 1976, Palestinian terrorists landed a hijacked French airplane with Jewish passengers on board in Entebbe, Uganda. Moreover, PLO fighters fought on Amin's side in the war with Tanzania and on the side of Libya in Chad. Notably, decrease in Arab aid for Africa, conflicts between the PLO and Arab governments and fear of Palestinian terrorism weakened PLO's influences.

Nowadays, media campaign against Israel reaches urban Africa, connected to global information networks. Palestinian Authority (PA) maintains 17 embassies in sub-Saharan countries. Not all of them have a website or a Facebook (FB) account, and it is quite difficult to get information on their actual activities. There exist FB pages backing the Palestinians (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions [BDS] Senegal, Friends of Palestine Kenya) with some following. Mahmoud Abbas travelled to Israel-friendly Rwanda shortly after the 2016 trip by Netanyahu and coordinated with the Sudanese government on containing Israeli influence on the continent. Palestinians have an observer status at the AU, which Israel does not. It gives it a comparative advantage, with its voice being heard directly in this crucial forum, including Summits. Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is also used: Nigeria was condemned by the Palestinian representative for abstaining in the 2014 vote establishing a deadline for creation of a Palestinian state.²⁶ Within the ME subsystem, Palestinians remained the gatekeepers—Sunni Arab cooperation with Israel could not develop openly or lead to full normalisation of ties without a just solution to the Palestinian issue.

Arab aid to sub-Saharan African countries

Arab countries had extended aid to sub-Saharan fellows since the early 1970s. In the years 1974–94, Arab donors’ total aid volumes were around 1.5% of their GDP, more than twice the OECD recommended threshold. Overall, according to the OECD data, Arab aid constituted about 30% of global aid budget in 1970s and around 20% in the 2000s. The initial influx of Arab generosity was closely related to the surges in oil prices in the years 1973–74 and 1979–80. Volumes used to go down when oil prices diminished. Notably, data on Arab aid needs to be treated with some caution since the available datasets speak of commitments rather than actual disbursements, and the latter are oft-times far below the former (as far as only 15% of commitments for the years 1975–83). Moreover, vast share of Arab aid was in the form of loans, which impacted negatively on sub-Saharan economies. Institutionally, first came a fund meant for compensating Africa for high oil prices through loans, Special Arab Assistance Fund for Africa (SAAFA); second, a fund devoted to compensating for the lost Israeli technical aid; third, a more profound credit and technical assistance institution: the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) and lastly—bilateral aid agencies.²⁷

Of the major Arab donors, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE created dedicated aid agencies, while Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Qatar did not. Examples of bilateral institutions include the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, which has given loans to finance development projects in non-Arab countries since 1974. Until 2009, 237 projects were either completed or launched in SSA, mostly in West Africa, with Burkina Faso, Senegal and Mali the largest beneficiaries. The Saudi Fund for Development has financed investments in developing countries since 1975, with more than half of its activities directed towards Africa, mainly in transportation, agriculture and social infrastructure. Though Saudi Arabia is the largest Arab donor, most of its aid is not channelled through the Fund. What is more, it does not disclose full data on the recipients. The Libyan African Investment Bank has operated since 1981, investing petro-dollars.²⁸

As for multilateral bodies, there are ones focused solely on the Arab world and those with a broader scope. OPEC Fund for International Development since 1976 has financed projects and given grants for technical aid. The Islamic Development Bank (IDB), established in 1975, aids only countries which are members of OIC. Aside from financial aid, it also carries out conferences, seminars, trainings and expert missions, mainly in support of small enterprises. Most notable, BADEA, created in 1974 by the AL, provides non-Arab SSA with aid in the form of loans, incentives for investments and technical assistance. Until 2009, the sum total of its operations in the region reached USD 3.5 billion (though again, BADEA commitments were not always matched by disbursements).²⁹ According to Kwarteng, Arab states,

“polarized the OAU into ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ (…) denied economic assistance to countries that were not prepared to support the Arab position on the ME conflict. The increase in Arab concessional aid to non-Arab countries, after the 1973 war, could be seen as the economic lever of Arab diplomacy of winning Black Africa's support.”³⁰

Despite much publicity, according to Ojo, in 1973–79 only 5.8% of total Arab aid went to SSA. At the peak of oil crises (1973–75), almost 90% of all OPEC aid for African continent went to members of the AL. All BADEA's disbursements until 1983 amounted to USD 275 million, while Egypt alone received USD 234 million from the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development over a shorter period. The technical assistance fund, operative until 1978, concentrated on sending teachers of Islam and Arabic and on construction of mosques and Islamic centres. In the first 10 years of the programme, African members of the OIC received 57% of all Arab bilateral aid, within it—70% of Saudi aid, which focused on moderate Muslim countries (Cameroon, Mali, Senegal). Writing in 1983, Ojo observed decline in Arab aid volumes to SSA since 1977 (according to other authors, the trend was observable already in 1975 and attributable to little influence gained through aid on recipients) and then observed a rising trend since the first signs of improving relations between those beneficiaries and Israel in the early 1980s. This was coupled with threats of cessation of aid to those who would renew relations (BADEA suspended aid for Zaire following its 1982 renewal). Already on January 23, 1973, an Egyptian newspaper Al-Jumhuriyya warned African states of political circumstances limiting Egyptian possibilities of assistance. The documents guiding Arab aid designed in the late 1970s speak openly about political criteria for aid in the context of their desired political position towards Arab-Israel conflict. This is confirmed by Neumayer's calculations showing that in the period 1980–84, non-Arab Africa was the major beneficiary of Arab multilateral aid (50.6%), while bilateral aid was directed mainly to other Arab countries (51%). This shifted quickly afterwards: for 1985–89, other Arab states were already the major beneficiary also of multilateral Arab aid (52.5%; non-Arab Africa share falling to 35.8%) with trend solidifying in 1990–94 (61.7% of bilateral and 73.5% of multilateral Arab aid going to Arab states). Arab donor's preferences went to countries that did not maintain relations with Israel and whose UNGA voting followed Saudi Arabia. Bilateral aid went mainly to Islamic countries, while multilateral—to those of amicable voting patterns. Neumayer concluded that donor interests played a visible role.³¹

At the same time, institutional and financial mechanisms in the Arab aid schemes excluded SSA participation in decision-making and ignored demands made by African forums. Ojo described this policy as one of minimum of engagement, on own terms, limited to what was necessary to perpetuate African backing for Arab anti-Israeli policies.³²

As for the main individual sub-Saharan recipients of Arab aid, the picture is blurred. Regarding bilateral aid, constituting the dominant share of Arab aid overall, the OECD QWIDS data showed high share of countries not counted in as sub-Sahara in this book—Somalia and Sudan as beneficiaries of Kuwait and UAE. Otherwise, Mauritania and Senegal were significant recipients. For Kuwait, Ethiopia should be added, and for the Emirates—Eritrea. SSA constituted 12.6 and 5.9% of their aid, respectively, but in the case of UAE, half of it went to Sudan and Somalia, so the actual number for the purpose of this analysis was around 3%. As for Saudi aid, Kragelund placed Ethiopia, Gambia, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Togo as the main African non-Arab recipients in 2005. QWIDS only started to present some relevant data; according to it, the total volume of Saudi aid to SSA is between 10 and 20 USD million (2015–17) and around 2% of its aid; yet since there is no details on individual recipients, this number cannot be interpreted. Existing research and QWIDS data also show Arab aid still fluctuating, as testified by multiple cases of negative aid flows. Shushan and Marcoux, pointing to problems with establishing a true picture of Arab aid, notice stability of absolute volumes, but a visible decline in share of aid in the GDP of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait since 2010. Contributions to multilateral aid platforms were on the slight rise since the 1980s. The main sector remained infrastructure (transport, energy and water; there is no specific data on sub-Saharan recipients). Aid is still directed mainly to Arab countries, most profoundly—neighbouring Israel. Arab aid is mostly untied. It is characterised by financing of grandiose projects with huge budgets. All in all, their practices are far from the OECD donors.³³

Since the 1990s, Arab investments in sub-Saharan economies, including telecommunications, financial sector, mining, tourism, infrastructure and agriculture, grew; still it forms just a small part of Arab foreign investments. Development aid, most profoundly BADEA's, is also used to a great extent as a measure promoting Arab states’ exports. As for smaller, emerging Arab donors, Egypt develops aid programmes for SSA mostly concentrated on health: tackling hepatitis C, malaria and eye diseases. These 2019 efforts were linked to Egypt's AU Chairmanship and cementing bilateral ties with recipients. Moroccan development cooperation is concentrated on institutional capacity building in development-related sectors, particularly in West Africa. Of note, its strategy involves remarkable engagement of the private sector. Hundreds of students from West Africa receive scholarships in Morocco; there are also trainings for professionals. As for the Sahel, priority is sharing expertise in water management and clean energy.³⁴ No QWIDS data is available for Egypt and Morocco. Yet undoubtedly they do expand on their development aid in SSA fast.

Islam as a policy tool

Yet another platform of Arab endeavours in SSA is politicisation of Islam. The issue of Jerusalem as a holy site has been raised repeatedly as a “Muslim solidarity” cause. Also Arab development aid has often been directed to projects centred on promotion of Islam. Moreover, since 1974, loans from the Saudi Development Bank have been reserved to the members of OIC only. Examples of promotion of Islam in Africa include establishment of Islamic culture centres with mosques, clinics, study centres, sport facilities; sending clerics; publishing bulletins and newspapers in Hausa and Swahili; opening Islamic universities in Uganda and Niger; creation of Islamic schools, scholarships to study in al-Azhar and al-Medina universities. Al-Qadaffi exploited Islam as a political tool and even convinced some African leaders to convert or Islamise their names; also Saudi king made efforts to link cooperation under the banner of “Islamic solidarity” with cessation of ties with Israel. Importantly, Islamic expansion was also motivated by inter-Arab or inter-Islamic tensions. Saudi Arabia and Libya used to be the main competitors over different versions of Sunni Islam; after demise of Libya, the dominant contenders were Saudi Arabia and Iran, representing Sunni and Shia Islam.³⁵

Politicisation of Islam in Africa has, as a result, also a sectarian face. Nigeria is an illustrative case. Here, politicisation of Islam meant: expansion of shari’a law; marginalisation of moderate Sufism by more radical Salafism; endangering Christians and secular legal system; emergence of Boko Haram militia, terrorising the North; and rise of Shia Islam, backed by Iran, and discrimination and even instances of large-scale state violence against it. State policies towards these phenomena used to change, with current (often unsuccessful) focus being on guaranteeing safety to all citizens. Boko Haram and associated radical Sunni militias linked to al-Qaida are under scrutiny also due to the fear that they might want to dominate territory combining Northeastern Nigeria, Northern Cameroon, Southeastern Niger and Southwestern Chad. Sudanese government in the 1990s applied shari’a law to all its citizens, including Christians, and started to uproot the Christians who did not want to convert. In Algeria, fundamentalists are said to have killed around 100,000 people in the period 1992–2000. This is seen by the SSA countries. Yet while 22 SSA states are among 56 OIC members, OIC's resolutions are anti-Israeli to the extreme.³⁶

Overall, in 2012 Pew The World's Muslims: Unity and Diversity poll, African Muslims overwhelmingly—and more than other Muslims—declared religion is important in their lives; in their majority, they subscribed to the vision of one possible interpretation of religion and adherence to the literal reading of the Quran. On the part of Israel, there are thus efforts to boost interreligious dialogue. In 2013 and 2014, delegations of Senegalese Muslim clerics visited Israel. In 2016, a delegation of Muslim clerics from Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Zambia was hosted in Israel, meeting officials and sightseeing. It is hoped that their influence would help in projecting a more balance picture of Israel among these countries’ Muslim populations.³⁷

Evolution of relations between Israel and South African Republic

From the beginning, Israeli relations with South Africa were complex. Despite South African overall friendliness, expressed in its vote for the partition resolution and Israel's membership in the UN, and some common interests, prospects for cooperation were blurred by the history of SouthAfrican anti-Semitism and support for Nazism. Moreover, the system of apartheid was in direct opposition to the principles that guided the founders of the State of Israel. For a long time, bilateral trade was barely noticeable. On the other hand, existence of a significant Jewish Diaspora required engagement to secure its rights. South African Diaspora, originating mainly from Lithuania, was the second largest source of donations for Israel in its early years. During apartheid, the community was largely split into those cooperating with the regime, those that engaged in opposition movements and the silent, fearful majority.³⁸

Until 1961, ties were correct but not warm. During the 1960s, however, Israel adopted policies which strongly distanced it from South Africa. Based on the ideological convictions emanating from the principles of the Labour Zionism and in line with the policy of alliance with SSA, Israel went further than some Black African countries themselves. In response to Israel's 1961 support for sanctions (as the only Western state to do so), Diaspora cash and goods’ transfers to Israel were blocked. South African Prime Minister linked fluidity of relations with Israel to its behaviour in the UN and announced that the fact that the majority of Jewish population votes for the opposition should not go unnoticed. After this threat, Israel slightly toned down its UN statements. Despite large hesitation, however, in 1962, Israeli representation to the UN was instructed to support economic sanctions. Although Golda Meir claimed that the move was in the interest of South African Jews, who needed removal of discriminatory regime as well, the impression was that the Jewry's safety was compromised for ideology. This move also represented a departure from the policy of désintéressement in the internal regime of other states. Meir took a stand against racism again when she refused to take part in a trip organised by the regime of Southern Rhodesia, which did not allow non-White participants. Israel's backing for resolutions against South Africa infuriated its rulers. Israeli diplomatic presence in Pretoria was reduced to consulate.³⁹

However, in 1965, Israel and South Africa signed an agreement on uranium cooperation. The period between 1967 and 1973 was a transitional one, characterised by decreasing passion Israel would devote to condemn the Republic. Still, Israel's main aim was to maintain the sub-Saharan alliance and criticising apartheid was one of the conditions. In 1971, after Israel proposed (though it was not accepted and later withdrawn) a donation to the OAU's Liberation Committee, South Africa reprised again with blockade on money transfers. The Arab attack in 1973 followed by what was perceived as a “treason” of African states led to profound changes in Israel's policies, including ties to South Africa which were one of the very few paths it could tread. It knew that the issue was not the only determinant of its relations with SSA and decided that the potential benefits outweighed the costs. Moreover, faced with regional instability and high prices of oil, Israel sought coal for electricity production and South Africa was a good potential supplier.⁴⁰

Israeli outpost in Pretoria was upgraded to an embassy in 1974; South African consulate in Tel Aviv, established in 1972, was upgraded to an embassy in 1975. In departure from former policies, Israel abstained from a decision to grant the African National Congress (ANC) observer status at the UN. In 1976, already after the “Zionism is racism” resolution and among controversy, South African Prime Minister was received for a visit to Israel. Several agreements were signed, mostly regarding military equipment and training, largely expanding initial contacts triggered by the 1967 French cessation of military cooperation with Israel. Israeli-South African cooperation supposedly included works on the South African atomic weapon. Relationship was pursued by Israel, isolated and cash-stripped, despite fears that it might estrange the US and other remaining supporters, who voted against the “Zionism is racism” resolution. The case for South Africa grew further after the 1979 Iranian revolution, putting an end to Israeli periphery doctrine. Even when the Israeli Ambassador in Pretoria openly and repeatedly condemned the apartheid, it had no impact on the substance of the relationship. Asked on the matter in 1976, an Israeli diplomat expressed dislike for the South African regime, but pointed to existence of manifold regimes which are disliked due to their internal policies; yet he observed it would be difficult for a state to have normal international relations if all such regimes were to be omitted. Moreover, he pointed to the South African Jewry, which had to be taken care of. He highlighted that at least Israel did not pretend not to have these relations, as many other African, Arab and communist states did.⁴¹

As regards trade, it grew by 75% between 1981 and 1985 to fall by 12% in the period of enhanced sanctions—1986 to 1990. In this pattern, Israel was no different from Kenya, whose trade with South Africa grew by 158% in the former period and fell by 78% in the latter. Similar pattern was observed with Malawi (58% growth and 28% decline, respectively) while for Zimbabwe, there was 17% fall in 1981–85 and 1% fall in the period of 1986–90.⁴²

The 1970s saw a wave of emigration of South African Jews to Israel. While pull factors (positive sides of living in Israel as a Jew) were dominant in their decisions, “dissatisfaction with political upheavals” was cited by 49% of those emigrating in the 1961–79 period, with 46% quoting “opposition to apartheid government”. These reasons remained dominant also for the 1980–89 wave, with “concern for the future under a Black government” on the rise (30%).⁴³

At the same time, the 1980s Israeli diplomacy was split between the (Israeli) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and (Israeli) Ministry of Defense (MoD), pursuing own policies. Contacts with representatives of Black opposition were slowly developed by Israeli diplomats and Histadrut trainings offered to hundreds. Internal criticism against relations with South Africa grew in Israel. Increasing concern among the politicians, feeling that Israel was on the wrong side, and fear of cuts in the US aid if Israel continued to arm South Africa, led in 1987 to adoption of a law banning any new cooperation.⁴⁴

Failure of the attempts of political system reform, increasing tensions and divisions, economic problems, international pressure and diminished external (USSR) financing for the Black opposition's ANC, leading it towards negotiations—all this had brought gradual abandonment of the apartheid system since 1990. Namibia gained independence and entered relations with Israel in 1994. After 1994 elections, South African Republic reintegrated fully with international community; among other organisations, it joined OAU. The ANC-led governments were strongly critical of Israel, on the grounds of support for the Palestinian cause. Nelson Mandela visited Israel in 1999, in a private capacity, after the end of his service as a President. During the visit, he endorsed two-state solution based on Israeli withdrawal from territories and Arab recognition of Israel. The legacy of Mandela is a subject to debate in Israel. Though he had some South African Jews among friends and supported Israel's right to exist within secure borders, in international politics, he used to be closer to Israel's adversaries. Mandela did not abandon its friendship even with rulers that proved to oppress own populations, such as those of Cuba, Iran, Libya or PA. This was explained by some through his financial indebtedness towards historical ANC supporters.⁴⁵

The relations reached a low point in late 2010s. South Africa was highly critical of Israel and campaigned against Israel having an AU observer status. It was also a breeding ground for the BDS. The movement itself calls the situation of Palestinians a new apartheid, a large distortion which, despite rights’ violations taking place, doesn’t stand the appropriateness test. Interestingly, such comparisons are largely born out of a rhetoric of White South Africans, used by them at the beginning of relation with Israel, highlighting supposed similarities in both nations’ history to affiliate themselves with the just Jewish cause and thus whitewash their own one. Israel did not counter these claims early and strongly enough. Jewish emigration from South Africa, including to Israel, continued with slight drop in the 2000s and rise again in the 2010s. “Personal safety concerns” became the main push factor (36% in the 1990s and 43.4% between 2000 and 2008).⁴⁶

Still Israel carried out diplomatic efforts to alleviate the situation. Some pragmatic cooperation was also taking place, including in the field of development. In 2016, a visit was paid by Israeli MFA's Director General, paving the way towards expansion of cooperation in trade, science, water or agriculture. There is also a significant amount of positive interest in Israel on the part of some South African Christian movements.

Evolution of sub-Saharan countries’ regimes

In the 1976 interview, ambassador Yaakov Shimoni made direct link between sub-Saharan dissatisfaction with the results of the first decade of independence and growing left-wing radicalism of SSA governments. Military takeovers and coups from the 1960s on often supported externally and mono-party systems led to authoritarianism and economic collapses. Israel suffered by association with developed, industrialised, successful world, which started to be resented by states facing crises at the beginning of the 1970s. More directly, Israel was hit by the choice of the radicalising states to seek development solutions in various forms of Marxism, which moved them towards the Eastern bloc, while Israel chose to be aligned with capitalism and the West. As a consequence, SSA countries’ rhetorical radicalism that used to be assisted by actual conservative policies changed into radicalism throughout. This involved aversion towards foreign experts, nationalisation of assets and emotional tirades against the US—neither in Israel's interest, nor in style of its policymakers, thus impossible to join. Moreover, highly ideological “African socialism” projects, like Tanzania's ujamaa, rendered development cooperation ineffective, while instances of open alliances with Israel's enemies or wars, civil or international, made it impossible. To the contrary, moderate internal and external policies of the Brazzaville group countries or—moving on to the late 1990s—some of the more genuine democratisation processes and rise to power of leaders truly concerned with development—served approximation between Israel and sub-Saharan countries. Increasing international terrorism on African soil—in East Africa primarily—against domestic or foreign (including Israeli) targets⁴⁷ is another internal policy issue encouraging cooperation with Israel, not only in security, but also in the development, preventing radicalisation by giving opportunities and diminishing poverty.

Initially, sub-Saharan states framed their foreign policies as independent from the East-West divide and were not taking sides in Arab-Israeli conflict, happy with ties and aid from both the sides, allowing promotion of their own interests. Close relations of such states as Ghana, Guinea or Mali with the Soviet bloc affected their internal and external affairs. Example of Ghana gives a picture of foreign policies’ inconsistencies: at the peak of relations with, and aid from Israel, Ghanaian ambassador to the UN pursued good relations with Egypt and used to vote against Israel, contrary to his capital's instructions. In a manifestation of his country's policy options, he was reportedly reprimanded at home in the presence of Israelis, yet soon afterwards promoted to Foreign Minister.⁴⁸

The consequences of the fact that Israeli diplomacy in SSA is very much based on personal relationships are also important. In the reality of more or less democratic processes, by keeping good relations with both government and the opposition, Israel can secure its interests. This works unless the internal politics of a given country turn undemocratic and violent, when personal relationships can be exploited against adversaries; particularly when one of the opposing sides holds anti-Israeli convictions. Personal nature of politics in many countries cast shadow on relations when the rulers were overthrown.

Another evolution was the emergence of cases of alternation to the established SSA borders, most notably—independence of Eritrea (1993) and South Sudan (2011). A taboo on changing African borders was breached, after prolonged fighting, yet upon a mutual agreement of sides concerned. Moreover, while conflicts in SSA during the Cold War used to predominantly take shape of civil wars, those that broke afterwards gained regional dimensions. These two issues called for new functions to be played by pan-African forms of organisation.

Evolution of pan-Africanism

Pan-African ideals had existed before the decolonisation process, therefore, were quickly translated into practical steps when the African states started to gain independence. Already the first (1958) African conference of independent states adopted an informal mechanism for coordination of positions taken in the UN. Early efforts were manifested also in creation (1961) of a Union between Ghana, Guinea and Mali. Prior to the establishment of OAU, two main regional blocs emerged. The Brazzaville group gathered 12 countries from French-speaking Africa (Cameroon, Central African Republic [CAR], Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mauretania, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta) representing conservative agenda based on non-interference and compromise-seeking. While Brazaville (joined by English-speaking countries and Libya and renamed Monrovia) gathered most of SSA and was closer to the Western powers, the Casablanca represented the interests of the Arabs and the Soviet bloc. Rift between them (with Casablanca boycotting pan-African meetings) lasted until solving the conflict in Congo and Algerian independence paved the way towards creation of a joint organisation, OAU, during the 1963 Heads of States meeting in Addis Ababa.⁴⁹

With flexible structures and assumption of gradual integration, the OAU provided African states with vital mechanisms of collective representation, including in the UN—and this was its prime function during the Cold War. OAU aims related to many issues discussed above. Pursuing unity and solidarity asked for unanimity on issues such as Israeli-Arab conflict. Co-working for better life invited development cooperation. Defence of territorial integrity pitted OAU members against Israel as an occupier of African territory (the Sinai Peninsula). Elimination of colonialism hardened positions on South Africa and on some Israeli behaviours. Support for international cooperation in line with the UN Charter bound SSA international positions to those of the UN. Still, primary aim was promotion of full decolonisation. This was realised through—not always very consequent or unified—policies of sanctions and isolation of colonial regimes as well as support for independence movements. It primarily targeted Portuguese colonialism (which lasted until 1975, notably in Angola and Mozambique), Rhodesia's racist regime and apartheid in South African Republic. Yet, despite anti-colonial rhetoric, most of the countries willingly joined structures of Francophonie and Commonwealth. OAU can also be said to have petrified political status quo to the detriment of African development. Doctrinal non-intervention resulted in helplessness towards civil wars and violent takeovers of power. The logic of the Cold War rivalry implicated SSA states in power struggles beyond their interests and control and often paralysed the Organisation. This had started to change since 1981, when a commission was formed, charged with oversight of implementation of the OAU Charter's provisions. Moreover, OAU defined pan-Africanism in territorial, continental, rather than racial categories, fully integrating North African Arab countries. However, the North African countries, simultaneously belonging to the AL, not always attached high priority to OAU workings. Since the 1980s, divisions had grown between North and SSA, due to, among others, increasing religious tensions.⁵⁰

End of the Cold War triggered changes in the structures of pan-Africanism. Revision of OAU aims included turn towards promotion of democracy and human rights as well as alleviation of internal conflicts in member states through mediation, observer and peace-keeping missions. In 2001, OAU was transformed into AU with strengthened institutions and budget and concentrated more on social and economic questions. In 2001, New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was adopted, reforming attitudes towards use of foreign aid: mutually beneficial cooperation with the donors is to be pursued and responsibility taken for own development. Notably, this goes together with Israeli development aid philosophy.⁵¹

Moreover, regional organisations were recognised as major promoters of growth through integration and conflict resolution—in stark contrast to earlier times, when they were treated as a threat to African unity. Now, they are seen as helpful on the way towards African Economic Community to be achieved in the 2030s. Their scope of aims extended beyond facilitation of trade, including also political issues (conflict solving) and development-related transnational issues, such as water management, energy and environment. They contribute to overcoming problems caused by artificiality of the borders and help in finalising their demarcation.⁵² Yet their multitude and differences in the depth of integration they profess is not conducive to deep integration. Among eight organisations seen by the AU as a basis for eventual community, two distinguish themselves: ECOWAS with the West African Economic and Monetary Union and free trade zone of the South African Development Community (SADC).

One more issue is the struggle against weapons of mass destruction, particularly anti-nuclear activism on the African continent. African states were opposed to French atomic tests on Sahara desert announced in 1958 and launched in 1960–66; they feared being dragged into Cold War nuclear arms race or own regional race; and opposed the South African nuclear programme developed in the 1970s and 1980s. Initial endeavours resulted in adoption of the UNGA Resolution 1652 (November 24, 1961) calling on all member states to refrain from nuclear activities on the continent; and the 1964 OAU declaration on denuclearisation of Africa. A series of UNGA resolutions followed in the 1970s. Many of them were particularly concerned with South African programme. Israel, which initially backed non-proliferation resolutions, started to abstain in the second half of the 1960s, due to reservations on their reliability and own security concerns. More concrete steps were undertaken on creation of a nuclear-free zone after the Cold War. In 1992, South Africa acceded the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, triggering negotiations on proclamation of African continent as anuclear-free zone which led to the 1995 Treaty of Pelindaba, signed next year in Cairo and in force since 2009.⁵³

Israel maintains a policy of ambiguity: it is widely believed to possess atomic weapons, yet it neither denies nor confirms that. Although Israel does not accede to treaties banning possession of such weapons and signed, but not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), in April 2015 it hosted a CTBT Organization workshop on detection of nuclear tests, serving evaluation of results of field exercises in on-site inspection held earlier on in Jordan. Both activities were attended by around 30 delegations, including Muslim countries without relations with Israel. On the occasion, Israel was visited by Lassina Zerbo—executive secretary of the Organisation, national of Burkina Faso.⁵⁴ Simultaneously, Israel works against Iranian armaments, particularly nuclear programme.

Conclusions

While the previous chapters tackled the proactive side of Israel's attraction, this chapter located Israeli development endeavours in the mostly passive context, identifying factors, related to the geopolitical situation of Israel and SSA, which potentially impacted on the effectiveness of development aid as an instrument of soft power (and thus, foreign policy) in Israeli relations with SSA countries.

It appears that the overall balance of external powers in SSA vis-a-vis Israeli interests used to change. The initial non-aligned status of the continent (until the mid-1960s) evolved into one increasingly under influence of the anti-Israeli powers, the USSR and its proxy—Egypt (mid-1960 till the late 1970s). The 1970s also saw rise of presence on the African continent of another anti-Israeli actor—the Palestinians, who succeeded in promoting their agenda. During the 1980s, decreasing power of the USSR and Egypt's shift to alliance with the West allowed for the rise of the influence of Libya under al-Qaddafi, and—to some extent—of Saudi Arabia, both having Islam on their agenda. Throughout the decades, Arab states aimed at cutting Israel away from trade routes with Africa and Asia and exerted collective pressure on sub-Saharan countries to break relations with Israel and to join them in their anti-Israeli activities at the UN, conditioning on it their backing for struggle with apartheid and development aid.

Consequences of oil and internal crises contributed to sub-Saharan countries move away from socialism and to reinvigorating their relations with former colonies and the US. Pan-African structures also evolved pragmatically, assuming greater responsibility for development.

Since the mid-1990s, influences of new actors have been on the rise. For Israel, most important among them is Iran, which courts SSA with business and development opportunities, while it also supports Shi’a Islam and uses SSA territories for illegal activities. Iran's growing ties with the continent ring alarm bells not only in Israel, but also in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Chinese presence is overwhelming. Interestingly, China's aid programme contains strong technical assistance component, openly designed as a soft power and public diplomacy tool. India is another state whose influences grew. Interests of China and India might be convergent with Israeli ones in development-related aspects. South Africa is another strong actor, which moved from a pariah status to one of the major—powers on the continent.

Notes

1 Johnson 1992: 36; Carol 2012: 199–200; Solarz, Slaski, Menkiszak 2002: 121–132; Czerep 2018.

2 Johnson 1992: 35, 38; Levey 2004: 80; Lizak 2012: 85; Solarz, Slaski, Menkiszak 2002: 108–120.

3 Johnson 1992: 36; Levey 2001: 98; Decalo1998: 53; Navon 2013; Solarz, Slaski, Menkiszak 2002: 96–107.

4 Johnson 1992: 36.

5 Berman 2005: 15; Interview with Arye Oded; Oded 2011: 206–211;Dakar, Nairobi correspondents 2010; Stratfor Analysis 2012: 10.

6 Dyer 2015; Berman 2005: 15; Keinon 2016a; Dakar, Nairobi correspondents 2010; Interview with Noam Katz; Czerep 2019.

7 Shinn 2015; Çağlar 2015; Dost-Niyego 2018; Donelli 2018: 58.

8 Carol 2012: 211; Weinglass 2015.

9 Swedlund 2017; King 2013; Kragelund 2008: 568.

10 Jenkins, Edwards 2006; Taylor 2010: 89–90; Kragelund 2008: 568, 574.

11 Nadelmann 1981: 186; Oded 1990: 9; Kochan 1976: 251–258.

12 Peters 1992: 22; Akinsanya 2010: 9.

13 Oded 1990: 7; Decalo 1998: 57, 60; Levey 2001: 106; Levey 2003b:170.

14 Rodin 1969: 176; Carol 2012: 201, 204–205; Oded 1990: 79.

15 Kumetat 2013; Decalo 1998: 93–98, 118–119; Bury 2002: 289, 292–293; Solarz 2002; Kwarteng 1992.

16 Akinsanya 2010: 10–11; 42–45.

17 Todman 2018; Feierstein, Greathead 2017.

18 Alaoui 2019; El-Katiri 2015: 2–3; Fakir 2019.

19 Keinon 2019.

20 Carol 2012: 202; Oded 1990: 7–8; Levey 2003b: 163.

21 Kochan 1976: 260–263; Ojo 1988: 43–45; Oded 1990: 11; Bishku 2010; Osia 1983: 89.

22 Carol 2012: 209–210, 213–215; Draper 1967; Laqueur 1967; Hatuel-Radoshitzky 2016; Polakow-Suransky 2011: 46.

23 Polakow-Suransky 2011: 213–215.

24 Interview with Arye Oded.

25 This entire section summarises observations made in Oded 1990.

26 Haaretz 2015.

27 Neumayer 2003; OECD 2011: 10; Ojo 1985: 3, 17–18.

28 Neumayer 2004: 282; Busari, Osinubi 2009: 31–33, 36–37, 74; Neumayer 2003.

29 Busari, Osinubi 2009: 35–38; Interview with Arye Oded.

30 Kwarteng 1992.

31 Mertz, MacDonalds Mertz 1983: 16; Ojo 1985: 5, 11–17; Oded 1987: 23, 71; Carol 2012: 218; Neumayer 2004: 291–292.

32 Ojo 1985: 9.

33 Kragelund 2008: 565–566; Neumayer 2003; Neumayer 2004: 288, 296; Shushan, Marcoux 2011: 1974–1978; Carroll, Hynes 2013.

34 Busari, Osinubi 2009:22–30, 46; Mogire 2008:566; Gomaa 2019; El-Katiri 2015: 2–3, 6; Fakir 2019.

35 Kochan 1976: 263–265; Ojo 1985: ii; Oded 2016; Tipp 1989.

36 Sampson 2014; Alao2013; Tanchum 2012: 76; Solarz 2002: 270–272, 276; Oded 2010: 133.

37 Laval 2016.

38 Oden 1970: 250; Shaw 1976; Polakow-Suransky 2011.

39 Gilbert 1998: 290; Bishku 2010; Nadelmann 1981: 212; Navias 1986: 7–8; Decalo 1998: 8; Oden 1970: 257.

40 Bishku 2010; Navias 1986: 9–10; Shilon 2014; Ojo 1988: 123.

41 Bishku 2010; Sachar 1996: 946–947; Burnett 1978; Polakow-Suransky 2011: 100–103, 132; Africa Report 1976: 54–55.

42 Kaempfer, Ross 2004: 242.

43 Raijman 2013: 265.

44 Peters 1992: 167; Polakow-Suransky 2011: 155–156, 185–202.

45 Linde 2013; Bishku 2010.

46 Benjamin, Gruzd 2018: 191; Regan 2008; Osia 1983: 15–17, 93; Raijman 2013: 265.

47 Africa Report 1976: 53; IBRD 2000: 53; Decalo 1998: 114–115; Levey 2003b; Shinn 2003.

48 Johnson 1992: 44; Levey 2001: 97–98.

49 Deska 2002: 70–74.

50 Deska 2002: 74–77, 80; Lizak 2012: 139–142; 436.

51 Lizak 2002: 233; Lizak 2012: 263, 361–362.

52 Deska 2002: 81–89.

53 Tabor, Chudzik; Oden 1970: 264.

54 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation Newsroom 2015.

7International behaviours of sub-Saharan beneficiaries

SUBCHAPTER 1: BILATERAL RELATIONS

The golden era—overview

Literature identifies manifold reasons for the 1960s positive predispositions of sub-Saharan countries towards Israel and for reluctance towards the Arab states. Since the early 20th century, African nationalists had been modelling their movements on Zionism, seeing similarities in the Jewish and African history of persecution, discrimination, eradication from the homeland (“Black Zionism” of African Americans hoping to return to their fatherlands in Africa) and struggle against a Western colonising power. These analogies were well grounded in the African liberation movement and influenced perceptions of Israel of many early African leaders (Ivory Coast, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia and Madagascar). Memory of slave trade by Arabs (and Swahilis) and of economic exploitation by wealthy Arab minorities (particularly in Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, Southern Sudan and Zanzibar) weakened impact of Arab lobbying against ties with Israel. Moreover, Chad, Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, Liberia, Tanzania and Uganda were weary of the expansionist plans of Egypt and its patronising attitudes. Egypt was treated with suspicion, seen as over-focused on own interests, at the expense of African unity; moreover, it hosted radical anti-government organisations. Egyptian aspirations towards Ethiopian territory created commonality of interest with Israel on access to the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Arab-Israeli conflict was not a point of interest for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA); instances of Arab politics polarising sub-Saharans were treated as undermining African unity. On the other hand, small size of Israel reassured African countries that no threat of dependency will come from cooperation; thus, it promised support in reducing dependence on the former colonial powers without making them dependent upon itself. Israeli non-alliance was also viewed positively: Israel was seen as a neutral source of aid, focused on recipients’ needs. Israeli socialism was perceived as a “third way”, apt solution for a developing country, which avoided the undemocratic hazards of the Soviet model. Furthermore, Christianity of many sub-Saharan nations, based on careful reading of the Bible, created a strong connection and attraction to the Land of Israel.¹

Upon these reasons for affinity, warm relations had been built up. A period of geopolitical respite for Israel which followed from the 1956 campaign and securing of the border with Egypt by United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) coincided with a wave of African decolonisation, to which Israel reacted in a competent and friendly way, establishing personal relationships even before independence, inviting leaders, granting recognition and offering assistance. Overall, six African heads of state visited Israel in the course of 2 years only, 1960–61, and more visits followed. Sharma shows that throughout the 1960s relations with Congo, Dahomey (Benin), Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Malagasy (Madagascar), Sierra Leone and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) were cordial, based on development aid and understanding of Israel's security needs.²

An over-cited quote from the 1962 Manchester Guardian article refers to how the Israeli motivations were seen: “not just part of its defence line against the Arab world, but also of a genuine desire to help. Africans respond because they recognize this”. Levey points out that African authors analysing Israeli aid during the 1960s were uncritical of the Israeli messianic approach to aid programme and regretted that such an approach faded with time. President Joseph Kasa-Vubu of the Republic of the Congo joined the 1960 (Israeli) Department of International Cooperation (MASHAV) Rehovot conference on development 5 days after Congo's independence, testifying to enthusiasm, based on conviction that Israel is a model to follow.³ Felix Houphouet Boigny of Ivory Coast said in The Israel Digest of August 03, 1962:

“This dispersed people which suffered so much throughout the ages has foregathered once again in its ancient land which it found devastated, neglected, infested with mosquitoes and (…) every conceivable disease. Without losing heart in the face of implacable nature and more than hostile neighbours, Israel took up its task courageously and after less than ten years, it can be considered a modern state. We also must follow this path.”⁴

Julius Nyerere of Tanzania spoke of great contribution by Israel as possible due to its similar conditions and challenges: of building the nation and of changing the physical and economic landscape. Tom Mboya of the Kenyan labour movement claimed to be impressed by Israeli accomplishments in a short time and difficult circumstances and eager to apply these experiences in Africa. President Kaunda highlighted cooperative nature of Israeli development and appreciated Israeli successful projects in Zambia. Israeli experts were praised as physically working, engaged on-the-spot in the agriculture, cooperating with the trainees and treating them as equal. Moreover, the scale of Israel and the kind of innovations it was using was seen as appropriate; Liberian Ambassador observed that Western experts get frustrated with African conditions, while Israelis know how to adapt to them even without advanced equipment. Ghanaian Ambassador to Israel, in turn, spoke of the similarity of geographic conditions between Israel and Ghana, responsible for productivity of Israeli experts. Courses were praised for high quality, well designed for practitioners without much education, motivating them to work and proposing apt solutions.⁵

In the field of nation building, Yomo Kenyatta (Jeune Afrique, April 10, 1966) referred to Israeli example of building the country out of world Jewry as to be emulated in the case of Kenya's tribes. Similarly, Kenyan Minister of Defence in 1969 attested to his admiration for the way Israel integrated people of so many different backgrounds, giving Kenya hope that it too will succeed in nation-building out of different ethnic and religious groups. Prominent Kenyan leader Tom Mboya praised Israeli programmes engaging youth in state-building. The units formed on the basis of the Israeli Nahal model remained loyal to the central government during the 1964 Tanganyika rebellion, for which they won appreciation in surrounding countries. The International Union for Child Welfare organised a seminar for its African and Asian members in Israel in 1961, recognising that—in the words of Mullock Hower, Secretary of the Union—Israel successfully merged theory with practice, Eastern culture with modern techniques, being an example for Africa how young can start using Western invention while still honouring the patriarchs.⁶

On operational mechanisms, a Senegalese Foreign Ministry official is quoted as saying in 1972:

“Israeli aid is the cheapest and least conditional (…). Saudi Arabia offered us aid with so many strings that we had to do without it (…) the possibilities of the Arab countries are too limited for them to be able to give us any aid”.⁷

The programmes were well received for lack of heavy bureaucracy, quick response and efficiency of small projects. Israel was seen as a “living laboratory” for finding solutions in natural and social conditions very close to African ones. This was a mobilising factor: Israel's accomplishments looked as achievable in Africa. Israeli middle way between Western capitalism and Eastern communism responded well to their development visions. Israeli cooperatives represented ideologies close to African “humanism” of equality between the people. Israel was also respected for not engaging in large-scale “prestige projects”, which often resulted in a costly failure. As Sharma observed,

“rapid Africanisation was welcome (…) and increased the demand for assistance. This assistance, even though sometimes limited in results, had a feeling of sincerity. (…) the Israelis seem to start from the basic assumption that all the races have the same potential.”⁸

In the similar vein, modes of cooperation within joint companies, including rapid phase-off, were seen as transferring skills while almost disinterested. Moreover, African trainees are said to, in the vast majority, felt welcomed in Israel and praising hospitality, although there were some unpleasant incidents too.⁹

While the authenticity of manifold quotes of praise cannot be questioned, it is hard to evaluate to what extent they present entire picture. On the other hand, towards the 1970s there was a growing awareness of the limits to the Israeli aid impacts on development. Spill-over of the demonstration projects was too weak and cultural differences too large. The initial overenthusiastic coverage of aid in the Israeli press, blowing its size out of proportion, annoyed and offended the SSA recipients, who did not want to look as dependants. Still in the hour of scaling-down of Israeli engagement, Kenyan Sunday Nation (quoted by Jerusalem Post, October 29, 1973) wrote of great contribution by Israel to the continent and effectiveness of Israeli programmes in comparison to other donors’. A matter of perception which somewhat benefitted Israel was that it was seen—due to its many embassies, activism and personal character of relations—as a much bigger and powerful state than in reality.¹⁰

Sub-Saharan states towards Israel until 1973

Most of the SSA countries built their foreign policies around certain precepts including independence in decision-making, non-alignment and support for decolonisation. The respect for the postcolonial borders was adopted as an international law norm already in 1964 at the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Cairo summit. SSA foreign policies were to serve internal socio-economic development without falling in the trap of dependency. Thus, Israel was attractive as a donor, a mixed economy model, a country striving to maintain non-alliance and supportive of independence movements. Many SSA leaders spoke firmly for non-alliance and against divisions into blocks. Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta (in power 1963–78) promoted “African socialism” as a third way between capitalism and communism, a line taken also by Julius Nyerere of Tanzania (1960–85) and subsequent leaders of Uganda (except for Idi Amin). The 1960s cases of anti-Israeli blackmail by Arab countries were met with disdain by African leaders (anecdotally, Ivorian diplomat replied to a Saudi speech in the United Nations (UN) through referencing back to Arab trade in Black slaves, declaring these times over); yet they did not react collectively against them, except maybe for the short period of existence of the Brazzaville group.¹¹

However, the foreign policy towards Israel was sometimes double-faced or at least inconsistent, endeavouring to keep good relations both with Israel and the Arabs. President of Mali signed a joint declaration with president el-Nasser in 1961 stating that Israel is a bridge for imperialism and a threat to security, while in 1964 he called Israel an “object of study for African peoples who seek inspiration (…) a human approach to building a new society”.¹² Zambian President Kaunda, at first, resisted Arab pressures and deepened relations with Israel through aid. He requested Israel to make emerging Zambian communal agriculture profitable, which Israelis achieved through introduction of small-holders’ cooperative models. However, while Kaunda bilaterally lauded Israel's contribution, internationally, especially since 1967, he had condemned Israel's role in the Middle Eastern (ME) conflict. Zambia's international environment contributed—Kaunda feared that the White regimes would claim legitimacy by the virtue of their longevity—but it also served him as a vehicle to garner more influence in Africa and to cement alliance with Tanzania. Zambians voted against Israel and initiated anti-Israeli resolutions, in meetings with Israeli counterparts spoke against occupation of Arab lands, but also praised and requested more of agricultural aid, chose an Israeli as a Bank of Zambia's Deputy Governor, and used Israeli-run cooperative villages as a showcase of Zambian development.¹³

In 1970, ten sub-Saharan countries had diplomatic missions in Israel; of seven embassies, six were located in Jerusalem: Central African Republic (CAR), Ivory Coast, Gabon, Liberia, Upper Volta and Zaire. The choice of location testifies to the natural identification made between the Jewish nation and its holiest city and to the recognition of Israel's decision on where to locate a capital. The only embassy in Tel Aviv was the Ghanaian one. Moreover, there was an Ethiopian consulate and charge d’affaires of Congo and Madagascar in Jerusalem.¹⁴

The overall trade was not substantial, yet in the late 1960s, Israeli companies started to more actively pursue purely commercial interests, which was not received well by radicalising local policymakers. The image of Israel started to change, due to its increasingly capitalistic and less socialistic character.¹⁵

Impacts of internal and geopolitical factors, 1958–73

Decalo lists the following factors that led to diminishing presence of Israel in SSA in the late 1960s: growing awareness of difficulties with applying Israeli development solutions; more aid coming from new donors; growing opposition of French and British to what they saw as Israeli competition; end to Israeli alliance with France; end of rule of some of the friendly leaders (CAR, Congo-Brazzaville, Republic of Biafra); Egyptian expansionism; growing unwillingness of the governments to be identified with either side of the ME conflict; and revision of pro-Israeli stances taken by Dahomey, Togo and Upper Volta around 1972, changing the balance within the OAU. These events affected Israeli trust even before the 1973 war and contributed to Israel's rising interest in other regions.¹⁶

As regards impact of the change of governments, it was initially not obvious. Levin gives an example of Ghana, where regime had changed three times until 1973. Ghana's distancing from Israel resulted from a power game Nkrumah played with Egypt. For Ghanaian leader, pan-African unity was the major issue. He saw himself as a pan-African leader and in this regard competed with el-Nasser, yet also tried to build bridges with Egypt, which led him to weakening ties with Israel. As a result, Ghana shocked Israel with its participation in the Casablanca group; relations normalised quickly after Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966 coup. Israel also managed to have good relations with various Ghanaian ethnic groups, which cemented relationship, though there were also (1959) instances of anti-Semitism in Ghanaian parliament.¹⁷

Later on, however, the impacts of internal issues became clear and mostly negative. One radical example is Uganda under Idi Amin: adopting anti-Israeli positions, openly declaring that nothing can be expected in return for military and civilian aid, then suddenly breaking relations despite overall population's positive view of Israel. Also Congo under Mobutu Sese Seko (1965–97) demanded military aid, while its interest in development, trade and diplomacy sharply declined; it joined anti-Israeli voting. In the case of Nigeria, Israeli aid was not accepted in the Northern, Muslim-dominated region, which also had blocked opening of an embassy in Israel until 1966. In 1967, relations again deteriorated due to supposed Israeli aid to Biafra.¹⁸

The geopolitical impacts were mainly felt at the multilateral level and linked to policies of particular countries. Since 1969, Palestinian cause has been gaining attention, first championed by radical states, then picked up also by more moderate ones, concerned with Palestinian fate after the 1967 territorial gains by Israel. Sharma grasps the possible essence of the appeal of the Palestinian narrative to the SSA—the Palestinian quest for a (one) “multi-racial, multi-religious, democratic, secular State”. Most profoundly, the acquisition of territory by force was anathema to sub-Saharan countries due to their strong interest in maintaining own territorial integrity despite challenges. Fear of invasion by a neighbouring state was also strong and so was attachment to the rule of inadmissibility of occupation. Moreover, many sub-Saharan countries shifted to anti-US positions, identifying themselves as disadvantaged, while Israel was perceived as pro-West since its cooperation with the United States (US) in the Congo in the early 1960s and as a strongman following the 1967 war. Otherwise good ties with Eastern Africa were strained by the fact that occupation of Sinai blocked hopes for the resumption of shipping through the Suez Canal.¹⁹

As for the Islamic factor, until 1969 its influence had been limited. Muslim-majority countries of Gambia, Guinea, Niger, Mali and Senegal maintained good relations with Israel. Where there were Muslim minorities, there was a common interest in cooperation: for Israel, to prevent addition of religious undertones to the conflict; for sub-Saharans, to prevent politicisation of African Islam, which was generally separated from the state, liberal and incorporated many elements of indigenous custom; and to prevent addition of another, religious layer to the already existing ethnic divisions within the societies. In many cases, the Islamic factor actually steered tensions between sub-Saharan and Arab countries (particularly Libya and Saudi Arabia). Yet, there was no religious reasoning behind decisions to break relations. In Kenya, the 1973 call by Muslim minority leaders to pray for defeat of Israel was met with condemnation by the country's press and the president. Many authors, however, see correlation between the countries’ religious make-up, or the shifts in the confessions of subsequent presidents, and relationships with Israel.²⁰

Lastly, it is pointed out that Israel did not vote with Afro-Asian bloc in support of the independence movements in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia and that it had abstained from condemnation of South Africa until 1961, thus was disloyal to the African interests.²¹ Yet, the argument that Israel's relations with France and South Africa were factors in worsening of relations with SSA does not stand the test. It was actually when Israel still had good relations with France and only started to distance itself from South Africa, when its relations with sub-Saharan countries were at their best. When relations with sub-Saharans started to deteriorate, Israel's alliance with France was bygone while its anti-apartheid stance—at its highest.

Reasoning behind breaking of relations

As a result of manifold economic and political factors, Israel could not compete with the influence of Arab states in SSA already before the 1973 war. Guinea followed the Soviet bloc in breaking off relations with Israel in the aftermath of the 1967 war. Six most radical states—Burundi, Chad, Congo, Niger, Mali and Uganda—broke before the 1973 war. Niger and Chad explained the step through Libyan military pressure on their internal affairs. Libya promised to stop support of the rebels for Chad's break with Israel; similar proposal was extended to Niger, and refusal followed by border clashes, until it also broke. The break-up coincided with a visit by the Saudi King to these countries. Chad, Niger, Senegal and Uganda were all offered large loans by either Libya or Saudi Arabia. In the case of Uganda, which broke in 1972 (and resorted to staggering anti-Semitic language, praising Hitler and 1972 Munich terrorists), it was the result of Idi Amin's personality coupled with al-Qaddafi's skilful bargaining, although its voting pattern turned anti-Israeli already following the 1967 war. Congo's (Zaire) surprising decision was meant to strengthen its role in pan-African affairs and influenced the others due to the role it already had. Levey explains in detail diplomatic manoeuvring initiated by Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Rwanda and Togo between May and September 1973, which is telling of their feeling of increasing pressure and nervous weighing of the benefits and liabilities flowing from relations with Israel against those that came with Arab overtures. They were unhappy with the process, followed by Arab attack on Israel, above all because they had no control over it, losing grip of their own foreign policies.²²

All the other states except Malawi, Mauritius (until 1976), Lesotho and Swaziland (dependent on South Africa) broke relations after the 1973 war, citing solidarity with Egypt. The fact that Israel violated the UN ceasefire during the war was raised by Nigeria and Senegal. Those that did not break so far, did after OPEC's announcement of rise of oil prices. Liberia mentioned its small size which did not allow going for isolation against the majority; fear of oil supplies; and assassination attempts against the president and his brother. Nigerian leader's room of manoeuvre was limited as he served as President of the OAU. Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya for long excluded the possibility of breaking with Israel (Sunday Nation, October 21, 1973: “Our only enemy is the one who might dare to play about with our hard-won independence (…) following one side today and the other side tomorrow will be tantamount to prostitution”) and eventually did break on the grounds of the continuation of occupation (same reason as Ethiopia). Behind the scenes, Libyan and Saudi “bribes” might have played a role in the case of Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Zambia, and broadly understood Muslim pressure—in Ethiopia, Gambia and Nigeria. Foreign minister of Dahomey assured the Israeli side that majority of Africans meant no harm but were tied by pledges to Arab states and had to adhere to a cumulative result of international resolutions, backed by SSA. Upper Volta's foreign minister reportedly complained on Arab “pressure and humiliation” behind this “distasteful” decision. Succumbing, African states were aware that the move ends their quest for a role in bringing peace in the ME and allows radical Islamic and communist influences to gain ground. Having met the ultimate demand, they also lost their leverage in relations with the Arab states. Simultaneously, Israel's image changed into that of a powerful state, while Arab media branded it as guilty of war due to its non-implementation of resolution 242, and highlighted that the US planes, which came with aid, refuelled at a (colonialist) Portuguese island. Israeli media additionally harmed their country's image by printing a picture of own soldiers on the Sinai under the banner of “going back to Africa”. Widely distributed, it caused uproar.²³

The unprecedented massiveness of break of relations seems under-explained to many, despite trace of Israel's losing its position and image since 1967, particularly due to the occupation of Egyptian territories. Levey poses a vital question: why wasn’t it preceded by a gradual process of demands, sanctions, increasing isolation? Still in 1972, sub-Saharan states were concerned with peace-making and in their majority had no intention of limiting ties with Israel, though their increasing displeasure with occupation countering UN resolutions and an effective international order transpires from accounts of bilateral diplomatic meetings. While many observers—mostly those concentrating on the Israeli perspective—explore reasons related to SSA relations with Israel and the ME conflict (as seen from Tanzanian note on break of relations, citing Israeli stubbornness in refusal to withdraw, interpreted as a “continuous aggression”), Akinsanya looks towards a wider geopolitical consideration: disappointment with the West seen as not championing African independence.²⁴

There is no apparent correlation between the amount of Israeli aid and the timing of breaking of relations. In fact, among those countries which had the largest number of programmes in 1972 (Ethiopia—7, Cameroon—5, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Malawi and Togo—4 each and Liberia and Upper Volta—3 each²⁵), there is one which broke already before the October war (Togo) and one which did not break at all (Malawi). The rest broke at various points between October and November 1973. Among the countries with the largest absolute numbers of participants of trainings, Congo broke relations before the war, CAR early in October, Sierra Leone later in October, while Ivory Coast and Ethiopia in November. It is in the case of the last two that there can be some talk of causality, yet there is no proof that their reasoning was determined by civilian aid factor.

In 1976, Israel still maintained several buildings that used to serve as its embassies, reportedly advised by (unspecified) host governments not to sell them, as they argued that the situation was temporary and they were doing all they could to quickly bring relations back. Yet, some of these buildings were allocated to the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). Until the late 1980s, majority of sub-Saharan states recognised PLO as the representative of the Palestinians and backed their right to establish a state in West Bank and Gaza, supporting also the idea of an international conference on the Israeli-Arab issue with PLO's participation. They also vastly recognised the Palestinian statehood declared in 1988. In 1989, PLO had resident ambassadors in Angola, Benin, Congo, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe and non-resident ones in Burkina Faso, Burundi, Rwanda and Togo. Decrease in Arab aid, conflicts between the PLO and Arab governments and fear of Palestinian terrorism weakened these influences on the other hand. Importantly, sub-Saharan states, acting alone or in group, never challenged Israel's right to exist. They also refused to join Arab boycott of Egypt introduced after the 1979 peace treaty, although they saw the treaty as insufficiently dealing with the Palestinian issue. The 1970s arms deals with African regimes strongly harmed Israel's image. Israel's growing cooperation with South Africa was increasingly an issue as well. Yet despite rhetoric, Angola, CAR, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, the Malagasy Republic, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Zambia and Zaire all maintained significant trade and business ties with South Africa.²⁶

The way towards restoration: motives and geopolitical impacts

Already on May 06, 1976, Times of Zambia ran the headline Bring Back the Israeli Experts—MPs, citing calls made during a parliamentary debate, such as this one by MP Valentine Cafoya:

“for lack of guidance, flourishing farms and gardens have been reduced to arid wilderness and poor villagers, formerly self-sufficient, are now cutting down timber and destroying (…) natural resources in order to eke out a livelihood (…) why should we waste vulnerable funds enlisting expatriates? Egypt is not a land of food growers. How can they teach us farming when they import most of their own fresh food. (…) They don’t go out to the fields (…) as the Israelis did. (…) Arabs and Asians (…) for three years on good contracts have profited and prospered, while our villagers have learned nothing and are starving”.²⁷

By the mid-1980s, press in other countries also called for re-establishment of relations. Dissatisfaction with Arab aid in the face of the oil crises (Akinsanya estimated SSA oil net-importers bill in 1974 as 2.5 times larger than in 1973) has been laud. Its scale was far too small to compensate for oil prices, and recipients had no say in its administration. Sub-Saharans felt they are treated as unequal: “idea of being a beggar to the Arabs is not acceptable to the Africans”, Senegalese foreign minister reportedly said. The dominance of Muslim states among recipients was visible and resented. In Muslim environments, the kinds of projects funded (such as mosques and Islamic centres) were also often criticised. Carol cites numerous voices from East Africa, calling severance of ties with Israel harmful and regretting the related OAU decision, even challenging its right to issue resolutions on such matters. Reportedly, in 1974, Joseph Nyerere, influential brother of Tanzanian leader, even suggested that Nile basin countries divert tributaries or charge Egypt for using the water in response to oil prices—a proposal that testifies to the desperation.²⁸

Around the mid-1980s, many alumni of Israeli courses reached positions of influence, increasing calls for restoration of ties. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)'s demise, changes in South Africa and fear of Libyan extremism (especially in Cameroon, Chad, Ivory Coast, Liberia and Togo) contributed to the moves towards resumption, yet official justifications referred mostly to another issue: the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement and Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. It was cited by the first country to renew relations (in 1982), DR. Congo (Zaire) and those that followed, Liberia in 1983 and Ivory Coast in 1986. Zaire's decision and undertaking military, economic and agricultural cooperation casted it temporary break in relations with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, revocation of Arab aid and condemnations by Arab countries. Zaire responded by pointing out that there is no Israeli occupation of African land anymore and protested Arab interference in its foreign policy: claiming that it will not be led by an oil barrel, comparing those African states that did to slaves being led by Arabs and calling Afro-Arab solidarity a trap for fools. At the same time, Zaire didn’t diminish its support for the Palestinians. Liberia's move towards renewal was motivated by willingness to anchor itself more solidly in the Western camp while distancing from Libya and the Soviets.²⁹

In Kenya, which openly voiced disappointment with the treatment by the Arab side, news of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty triggered immediate declarations on the need for renewal, based on all Israel had to offer, though the actual process took time. Similarly in Ghana and Nigeria, the discussion started right after the treaty, as the justification for the state of non-relations disappeared. Babatunde cites numerous examples of Nigerian press, both pro-government and pro-opposition, calling for cooperation with Israel focused on transfer of successful Israeli agricultural solutions. In press and parliamentary discussions in manifold countries, as highlighted by Oded, past Israeli aid was praised and expertise called upon as needed to help with agriculture, desertification and health. Countries which received Israeli technical aid in the period preceding the renewal were mostly among those which renewed relations early, testifying to correlation between aid and good relations in the long-term, yet with no indication of causality. Tanzania was a reverse case: it received aid already in the early 1980s, after a request by a vocal critic of Israel, President Nyerere, for Israelis to contribute to medical training and rural development. Fighting fundamentalism and hoping for Israeli assistance against malaria, Tanzania resumed relations only in 1995.³⁰

The pattern of reactions to the Israeli-Egyptian treaty widely followed the Cold War divide, with countries seeking relations with the US welcoming the deal and those in the Soviet orbit—condemning it. Polarisation within the SSA grew in the early 1980s, with economic malaise leading to hunger crises in many countries, lack of unity over issues of Chad and Western Sahara and growing great powers’ rivalry on the continent. In its efforts towards resumption, Israel sought support from the US and France. In the late 1980s, Israel's relations with South Africa turned into a major obstacle towards resumption of relations (cited by Ghana and particularly strongly by Nigeria). There were some voices calling for thinking in terms of national interest and pointing out that SSA countries did not cut relations with entire Western and Arab world maintaining contacts with South Africa. Still, there was huge level of honest contempt with the scale of Israeli involvement, its military aid seen as sustaining the regime. To some extent Israel was a scapegoat; condemning and punishing the powers that broke arms embargo since the 1960s (France most prominently, but also Great Britain, the US, Italy and the Eastern bloc to a lesser extent as well) and Arabs who traded extensively in oil would have been much more difficult.³¹

Other reasons slowing down the process were the fear of loss of Arab aid and the Palestinian issue. Arabs promised more aid to Niger, Sierra Leone, Zambia and others in order to dissuade them from renewal. Fear of losing Arab aid or markets was voiced by Kenya and Ghana. As for the Palestinian factor, some states (Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Mozambique) declared in 1986–89, after being approached by the PLO, that they do not intend to resume relations with Israel. The PLO was very active also in Niger, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. On another end of the spectrum, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Liberia and Zaire did not openly recognise the PLO as a sole representative of the Palestinians (though in a way all did, through OAU recognition). In Uganda, which until 1979 had remained the most ardent supporter of Palestinian terrorism, PLO offices were closed after demise of Idi Amin and remained so until 1986. In Kenya, PLO office was opened only in 1980 and closely monitored, especially after a Palestinian terrorist attack in the same year on a Jewish-owned hotel in Nairobi, which killed 16 Kenyans. In Nigeria, such office was opened only in 1984. Ethiopia protested the fact that the Palestinian movement supported Eritrean irredentism. Malawi, which never broke with Israel, was treated by PLO as hostile and PLO supported and trained Malawian anti-government forces. African recognition of Palestinian state went to a state to be created alongside Israel, not instead of it. This aspect was strongly underlined by Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo. At the end of the decade, countries most hostile to Israel were Tanzania, Senegal, Zambia and Zimbabwe.³²

The fact that many countries had restored relations already before the Madrid process testifies to the indecisive nature of the Palestinian issue, although 1988 restoration by Kenya was officially justified by the Palestinian acceptance of the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 242, 338 and of the principle of direct negotiations. For those which restored in the years 1990–92, the main factor could be the fall of the USSR, cementing the trend that started already in the 1980s: to approach the US in hope for more aid, with Israel seen as an enabler. Adding to dissatisfaction with Arab aid, other factors worked against continued alliance with the Arabs: awareness of strong conflicts within the Arab camp and between various Palestinian factions (most visible during the civil war in Lebanon), displeasure with the fact that Arabs required more OAU time to be devoted to their issue with Israel than to genuinely African issues, plus an increasing fear of subversive acts (especially in Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria). The peace process between Israel and the PLO and the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty were another triggers, adding to the momentum. Eritrea, whose independence movement used to be fought by Ethiopia with Israeli support, had demanded Israeli development aid in agriculture, health and education already before independence and afterwards entered into relations. This is inter alia ascribed to the personal experience of its leader, Isaias Afewerki, treated in Jerusalem for malaria.³³

Contemporary behaviours in bilateral relations

Crucially, development aid again can be treated as the major field of Israeli overt cooperation with the majority of sub-Saharan nations. Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf said in 2016 that Liberia “has gained a lot of experience from Israel in regards to our development goals”, praised the “extraordinary developments” in the fields of agriculture and water and thanked for help with Ebola outbreak. This 2005 statement by the Ghanaian tourism minister looks as if uttered in the 1960s: “Taking Israel as a model, Ghana hopes to persuade the descendant of enslaved Africans to think of Africa as their homeland—to visit, invest, send their children to be educated and even retire”.³⁴

Sub-Saharan leaders were aware of cooperation in various fields, including security, which Israel has with Egypt and Jordan and of growing, although not publicised ties with other Sunni Arab countries. Moreover, the 2011 fall of al-Qaddafi removed a strong anti-Israel actor, while the civil war in Libya impacted negatively on stability of Mali and Chad, mobilising their neighbours to seek precautions. Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda already struggled with Islamist extremists, an issue Rwanda was afraid of as well. Kenya and Uganda have cooperated with Israel on tackling extremism since years, as confirmed during 2009 and 2014 trips by the Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman and visits by African leaders in Israel. In 2013, Mali's president confronted Arab members of the OAU (citing feeling of betrayal) for their refusal to condemn Islamist terror groups which destabilised his country. Domestic affairs sometimes intertwined with Islamic factor: relations with Nigeria warmed when a Christian president, Goodluck Jonathan, was in power; after 2015 elections, with a Muslim president, Muhammadu Buhari, elected, relations took a negative turn. Relations with Tanzania improved after the 2015 presidential election was won by a Christian to replace a Muslim predecessor.³⁵

As for Arab aid, due to its nature and large investments by China, it presumably loses importance. Regarding SSA relations with Iran, there are certain benefits that the African leaders are willing to draw, yet they are cautious due to their internal and external policy concerns. Eastern Africa countries allied with Saudi Arabia—Comoros, Djibouti, Sudan and Somalia—cut relations with Iran in 2016 while relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia warmed. Sudan and Somalia (confidentially) entered into relations with Israel.

Before the 2016 African tour of Prime Minister Netanyahu, many sub-Saharan leaders actually expressed dissatisfaction with lack of high-level visits and overall low responsiveness to their signals of readiness to intensify ties with Israel—a series of visits since 2009 was apparently not sufficient. The 2016 Netanyahu's trip to East Africa showed a trend towards active pursuit of relations in issues related to development and security. An unprecedented joint meeting with leaders of Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Zambia, South Sudan and Tanzania took place. Rwandan President attended in spite of commemorations related to the 1994 genocide being held on that same day. According to Keinon, “That meeting sent a message that those who attended were no longer afraid of bringing ties with Israel into the sunlight, no longer afraid of the reaction of Arab states, the North African states or South Africa”. Keinon quotes an Israeli diplomat as saying that the African priorities in the meetings were “how to grow more crops, how to more efficiently use more water, and how to use Israeli technology to fight terrorism” rather than the Palestinian issue, addressed by East Africans in a way which is in line with the Israeli stance—that there should be negotiations.³⁶

The list of countries whose highest officials have visited Israel on the newest wave is long and includes Uganda—2003, 2011, Kenya—2011, 2016, Liberia—2007, 2016, Togo—2016, Rwanda—2008, 2013, 2016 and Ghana—2016. In the first half of 2017, Israel was visited by heads of state of CAR, Sierra Leone and Zambia. A total of 15 SSA states maintain embassies in Israel (including South Africa; all in Tel Aviv). The number rose from 11 in 3 years (2013–16), during which Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia opened outposts. This is a significant sign of interest in developing relations. In the case of South Sudan, enthusiasm was demonstrated by the country's politicians and media; the perspective of establishment of relations with Israel was framed in terms of independence from Arab political dictate and pursuit of religious freedom, there was even some talk of opening an embassy in Jerusalem. Israel was perceived as a source of solutions in security, economy, technology, education and agriculture.³⁷

In the recent years, there are also cases of African politicians joining events organised by an Evangelical organisation the International Christian Embassy Jerusalem. It views Israel as a Holy Land to Christians, the younger brothers of Jews and runs annual pilgrimages. It speaks for intensification of ties between Israel and West Africa, which it sees as tired of Arab domination and export of jihad. The organisation's webpage reacts to events such as adoption of the UNESCO resolution seen as denying Jewish and Christian heritage of Jerusalem.

Case studies

Ethiopia

Haile Sellasie found refuge in Jerusalem, fleeing from Mussolini, in 1936—at the time of Arab revolt against the Jews. During the Second World War, Orde Wingate's brigade including Jewish soldiers fought in Ethiopia against Italians. At Israeli rebirth, Ethiopia was one of the two independent SSA countries. Ethiopian attitude towards Israel was a mixture of trust resulting from unique religious (Ethiopia is largely Christian) and cultural bonds traced back to the times of the King Solomon and Queen of Sheba, and fear of an Arab attack or retaliation for ties with Israel. Ethiopia abstained from the 1947 vote and had been cautious with pro-Israeli standing until 1950, when it achieved international confirmation of its federation with Eritrea (during the key vote on 1950 UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 390, Israel backed Ethiopian interests). Diplomatic missions were established only in 1957. Relations warmed up later, including cooperation against Eritrean secessionists. Before the 1963 pan-African conference, Egyptians demanded expulsion of all Israelis from Addis Ababa for the time of the summit and ban on Israeli press and diplomats from entering the meeting. Ethiopia rejected these requests, yet Egyptian president attended nevertheless. Until 1967, development had been the main field of cooperation, encompassing possibly all fields and operational mechanisms, including cooperation between universities, support for tourism sectors and infrastructure contracts. Israeli experts were appreciated and trusted. During the 1967 war, Ethiopia was a member of the UNSC, where it struggled to maintain position which would not isolate it neither from Arabs nor from Israelis, although some of its delegates’ speeches were rather pro-Arab. In UNGA, it projected an image of a neutral state.³⁸

After the Six-Day War, Ethiopian interest in military cooperation with Israel rose; yet, to the displeasure of Israelis, Ethiopians, in a constant fear of Arabs, wanted to keep the works on alliance secret. Another important issue was Ethiopian competition with Egyptian Copts regarding access to the Deir al-Sultan monastery in Jerusalem; Israeli intervention secured Ethiopian interests. At the beginning of the 1970s, Ethiopia started to be critical towards Israel on international forums (explained to Israelis as a “cover up”) in a quest to dissuade the Arabs from supporting Eritreans; Algerian president reportedly promised Ethiopia to talk to other Arab leaders on toning down this support, but requested break with Israel first. Ethiopia's position in the OAU was challenged by Libya, which threatened to move the seat of OAU from Ethiopia and to launch jihad against it. Another vital issue was Somalia's territorial claim to Ethiopian Ogaden, backed by Algeria, Libya, Tunisia and radical African states. Israeli support didn’t help Ethiopia to get sufficient American backing to fend off such threats.³⁹

A note by the Ethiopian ambassador announcing break of relations (during the 1973 war) backed Israeli just effort wishing it victory, yet referred to Ethiopian interests under stress from radical Arab states; it expressed hope for a quick restoration of relations. Simultaneously, the official note cited Israeli failure to withdraw from the occupied territories and conditioned restoration on eventual withdrawal. The news of a break-up shocked Ethiopians, reportedly undermining backing for the Emperor. Subsequent Mengistu Haile Mariam dictatorship broke with the tradition of informing Ethiopian policy by its Christian identity. Unofficial relations were however established, triggered by Israeli efforts to save Ethiopian Jews, persecuted by the new regime, from war and hunger. Ethiopian authorities allowed for their rescue in exchange for humanitarian and military assistance sustaining the regime while Israel was still willing, in its quest for safeguarding access to the Red Sea, to aid Ethiopia against pro-Arab Eritrean rebels. Mariam reportedly regretted lack of relations and perceived actions by Arabs as designed to destroy Ethiopia. Ethiopia abstained from the “Zionism is racism” resolution. Since 1977 Djibouti's independence, Ethiopia's had been the only ports available to Israeli shipping in the area.⁴⁰

The 1989 renewal of relations seems to have followed largely from the Ethiopian search for Western allies during the fall of the communist bloc (the Israeli side was reportedly reluctant, unwilling to deal with Mengistu). Following Mariam's fall (1991), Israeli aid was extended and positive relations slowly built, up to the level of intensive and warm cooperation. In 2018, Ethiopia was the first sub-Saharan country to be visited by President Reuven Rivlin; the visit highlighted the dynamics of Israeli growing engagement, including new patterns of cooperation between political echelons, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and Jewish communities in Diaspora. In spite of good bilateral relations, due to its geopolitical fragility, Ethiopia at large did not change its voting behaviours, waiting for progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front.⁴¹

Rwanda

Rwanda, unimportant to Israel in the past, is currently among the closest friends of Israel and encourages others to follow suit. A special relationship from the Israeli side is based on joint experience of being a victim of genocide: Israeli leaders remind of the dangers of denial of genocides, of the media incitement that proceeded the Rwandan massacre and of uselessness of the UN troops stationed in the country when it started. Rwanda views Israel as country which, alongside commemorating horrors of the past, developed a modern economy. Rwandan Foreign Minister visited Israel during the 2014 war with Hamas to demonstrate solidarity—and in line with Rwanda's own standing on the right of self-defence in the face of indiscriminate mortar attacks by the DRC-based Hutu rebels (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda). Rwanda held a seat in the UNSC at the time and usually abstained on Israel-related matters. President Paul Kagame sees Israel as a model for Rwanda's development as a “start-up nation” of Africa; Israelis play significant role in the Rwandan boom for start-ups and pro-development innovations and advice Rwanda in the context of its aspirations to join the OECD.⁴²

In March 2017, Kagame became the first African Head of State to address the annual conference of AIPAC—the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, one of the biggest pro-Israeli organisations in the US. During his speech, he referred to friendship to Israel and the joint experience of genocide—and underlined that no place is truly safe for anyone until genocidal ideologies exist. He called for renewed solidarity against those who deny genocide or trivialise its victims. He underlined Israel's right to exist and to be a full member of international community, and that this right does not infringe on the rights of any other people. He explained Rwanda's abstention in the 2014 vote on the UNSC draft resolution, imposing 12-month deadline for establishment of Palestinian state, by saying that it was prejudicial in setting up the solutions without letting the parties talk; contrary to Rwanda's experience that things cannot be imposed from above. Kagame uttered words of appreciation for Israeli achievements gained, despite hostile environment, thanks to continuous investment in people. He said that Israeli experiences on agriculture, energy, telecommunications could be shared while African businessmen could engage in cooperation projects.⁴³

Cooperation is concrete and realistic: for example, Rwandan communiqué after a 2012 visit by Israeli Ministry of Agriculture, with little diplomatic talk, focused on cooperation agreement to be signed for further aid particularly in irrigation, postharvest, horticulture, animal diseases and feeds, agriculture research and the expected launch of the Center of Excellence.⁴⁴

The relations were put to test in 2018 during the crises related to African asylum-seekers in Israel. Rwanda was referred to by the Israeli authorities as one of the countries which agreed to accept in persons deported from Israel, but it denied readiness to accept anyone travelling involuntarily. Despite relatively low number of people in question, the issue burdened relations exactly when Rwanda chaired the African Union (AU), limiting probability that Kagame would push for changes in the AU's stance towards Israel during his chairmanship.

Senegal

Senegal is often described as a bridge between Black Africa and the Muslim world (Sufism, not immune to, but struggling against extremism, being the dominant strand), moderate, stable and democratic. Its first president, Leopold Senghor, was a Catholic. He attached great importance to the politics of colour, excluding “White” Arabs from the Black African community and opposed Arabisation and islamisation, while highlighting Judaeo-Christian roots of Senegalese culture. Senegal was and is secular, though there are thousands of Quranic schools financed by Arab states. Despite close bilateral relations, on multilateral forums, Senegal was from the beginning critical of Israel; while at first this was explained as a matter of policy vis-a-vis Arabs, after the 1967 war it became very outspoken. Oded elucidates this by internal and external Islamic pressures, French positions, along with multilateral policies of OAU and the UN. After severance of ties, Senegal carried out quite radical policies and was among the last ones to renew relations. Second president of Senegal, Abdou Diouf, ruling at the time, was a Muslim, but upheld secularism, tried to contain radical Islam, had a dose of restraint towards Muslim and Arab worlds and a Catholic wife. Straight after renewal, ministerial visits and agricultural MASHAV projects were launched. Senegalese stance on the multilateral level did not change, however. Since 2000, the third president, Abdoulaye Wade, tried to modernise Senegalese society, including through promotion of women's rights. This was met with resistance of religious leaders. Senegalese protested during the 2008 Israeli operation in Gaza. According to Oded, these internal dynamics were behind strictly pro-Palestinian stances Senegal took in international affairs (though still in 2001, Wade proposed to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians). Moreover, Senegal received large—larger than other states—aid from Muslim countries, including Iran. Nevertheless, it welcomed growth of Israeli incoming tourism.⁴⁵

The contemporary relation with Israel is often described as a model one, in a large part due to the successful drip irrigation programme for small-holder farmers (TIPA). Shared fears of radical Islam made inter-religious dialogue a particular feature of cooperation between Israel and Senegal, with Senegalese imams visiting Israel. However, in December 2016, Senegal (at the time seating on the UNSC and chairing the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People) took upon itself (notably, after Egypt withdrawn) the role of co-sponsor of the UNSC 2334 resolution declaring Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories illegal. This triggered a decisive reaction from Israel. Israeli ambassador to Senegal was called off, planned visit by the Senegalese Foreign Minister in Israel cancelled, as were all Israeli development programmes in the country (similar decision was made with regard to Angola, which backed the resolution—here however the extent of development aid was much less significant). The behaviour of Senegal was in line with its long-held positions and active engagement in the Palestinian issues, although promoting the resolution displayed a new level of activism. Senegal probably did not expect such a definite Israeli response. Another explanation is the power dynamics within the AU. Senegalese and Egyptian memberships of the UNSC were proposed by the AU and thus they were considered its representatives. When Egypt dropped, Senegal might have felt obliged to take over. While Senegal might have been under external pressure (the Arab League and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation could have played a role) to propose the resolution, subsequent prolonged freezing of relations was also interpreted as damaging and actually serving anti-Israeli powers.⁴⁶ Ties were restored after a meeting between Prime Minister Netanyahu and Senegalese President on the sidelines of the June 2017 ECOWAS summit.

SUBCHAPTER 2: MULTILATERAL FORUMS

Voting behaviours 1958–73

In the early 1960s, with an exception of Casablanca group, pro-Israeli sentiments were on the rise. In the UN, until 1967, the Arab-Israeli issue had not been raised frequently. Rodin shows that while until 1962, three new states had joined the Arab camp in their voting patterns, seven had joined pro-Israeli group, tipping the balance from 48 to 58% votes cast in a pro-Israeli way. This again dropped to 48% in 1965, which Rodin associated with decline in number of Israeli development experts. Still, most of the countries almost automatically had voted in a pro-Israel way until the mid-1967. SSA countries joined the Israeli effort of convincing Arab states to enter into negotiations. A 1961 initiative by 12 countries, including CAR, Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Niger, Sierra Leone and Upper Volta (Togo signed-up initially, but later withdrew), for a UNGA resolution calling for negotiations was however rejected by Arabs, Soviets and the US alike, as was the 1962 draft (proposed by 21 states—12 from Africa). Subsequent drafts were even not allowed to be voted upon. Still, Israelis were elected to several UN posts as representatives of the Afro-Asian block. In the run-up to the 1967 war, Nigeria and Uganda were among the six initiators of a UNSC resolution calling Syria to take stronger precautions against border incidents (draft vetoed by the USSR).⁴⁷

On the multilateral African forums, instances of anti-Israeli language were rare. Sub-Saharan states consequently refused being drawn into Arab-Israeli issues. In the 1958 First Conference of Independent African States, they declined to include Israel on the list of condemned, racist and imperialist powers. Egypt, sensing the trend, even at times resigned from proposing certain drafts. At the OAU, the issue of Arab-Israeli relations was seen as polarising. African states refused to deal with it at the 1963 summit. Even if mild anti-Israeli resolutions were adopted, this was followed by African diplomats’ assurances to Israel that this did not affect their relationship. At the 1964 Cairo Summit, the Arab League members made comparisons between Israel and South Africa and between the Palestine Liberation Army and African liberation movements—with no positive reaction from sub-Saharan states. At the 1967 summit following the Six-Day War, there was strong opposition against raising the issue, with some sub-Saharans threatening that they would not attend the meeting if the point was raised. It was raised, “by trickery”; yet the eventual resolution was not condemnatory and caused protests as voted against the rules.⁴⁸

With sub-Saharan countries comprising 32 of 122 UN members and only 4 of them openly pro-Arab, Israeli position came June 1967 was strong. Indeed, already before the 1967 war, Cameroon, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria and Togo expressed concern with the closure of the Strait of Tiran. When the war broke out, Guinea and Somalia proposed an emergency meeting of the OAU, yet it was rejected. In the UNGA discussions following the war, countries had the choice between mostly pro- (by Latin American block) and anti-Israeli (Yugoslav) drafts. A total of 20 out of 32 SSA countries backed the Latin draft, linking Israeli withdrawal from territories with ending Arab hostility and Arab agreement to negotiations aimed at peace. The contrary Yugoslav proposal called for a unilateral Israeli withdrawal. According to Rodin, the bunch of votes taken on the occasion reflected East-West competition, and most of the drafts wouldn’t pass the two-thirds majority test even if African countries had voted against Israel. Still, the votes testified to non-existence of Asian-African block and to a good diplomatic position of Israel on the African continent, as 15 states were subsequently classified as pro-Israeli, 5 as neutral and 11 as pro-Arab.⁴⁹

A similar analysis was done by Kochan, Gitelson and Dubek, who calculated behaviours of 33 sub-Saharan countries in 34 draft resolutions voted by 39 roll-call votes. The most pro-Israeli countries turned out to be Liberia, Malawi, Lesotho and Madagascar with above 50% of votes in line with Israeli interests. The most (over 90% votes) anti-Israeli ones were Mali, Guinea, Tanzania, followed by Burundi, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia (above 65%). Since abstentions were in practice countering Egypt, the countries like Gambia, Ghana, Gabon, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Togo, Upper Volta and Zaire were described as moderately pro-Israel. An analysis of factors behind states’ voting patterns showed that the most anti-Israeli ones were those with strong relationships to and neighbouring Arab states, with weak or none relation to Israel, Muslim populations and radical foreign policies. Pro-Israeli ones were those which had good ties with Israel and the West, moderate foreign policies, small or politically inactive Muslim populations, led by Christians, with embassies in Israel. As regards Israeli development aid, it is concluded that it had no significant impact on voting behaviour.⁵⁰

The 1967 votes showed decline of Israel's status in Eastern Africa, with Tanzania (already under Chinese influences) and Uganda moving to the Arab camp (backed the Yugoslavian proposal and opposed the Latin American), Kenya undecided (backed both) and only Ethiopia presenting pro-Israel stance (backed Latin draft, abstained on Yugoslavian). Many countries underlined Israel's right to exist, but having own borders challenged, were fearful of any precedents of the acquisition of territory by force. Tanzania's position, which was a displeasing surprise in Israel since it was among the main receivers of aid, was explained by the wish to project revolutionary image, as was Uganda's; Senegal's—by its willingness to align with neighbouring, radically pro-Arab countries. Nigerian government's anti-Israeli stance was reportedly criticised by the press.⁵¹

The 1967 war, resulting in change of Israel's image “from David into Goliath” and most importantly, emergence of the question of occupied Egyptian territories, led to slow corrosion of Israeli stance on the continent. The issue of occupation of Sinai—a territory of an African country—could not be ignored by SSA, although Arab-Israeli conflict was still not of its interest. Demanding Israel to end the violation of a principle which was basic for SSA did not automatically translate in support for Palestinian demands. During September 1967 Heads of State meeting in Kinshasa, the issue was discussed openly for the first time. A “last minute resolution” passed, referring the crises to be solved by the UN, but also reaffirming principle of territorial integrity and voicing concern with the situation in Egypt. Egypt failed in a1967 effort to brand Israel as an “aggressor”, which it however accomplished already a year later. From that time, the snowball started to roll, although not all resolutions had harsh anti-Israeli language, rather resorting to expression of support for Egypt; those which had, were often adopted with breach of rules of procedure. In 1968, a Council of Ministers’ resolution called for Israeli immediate and unconditional withdrawal from all the occupied territories, thus went beyond the purposely ambiguous English version of the UNSC 242 resolution, which did not specify the extent of the withdrawal. Adoption did not take account of protests by Ghana and Ivory Coast, demanding that the call for withdrawal should be accompanied by a demand that Arab states recognise Israel and its security needs. Notably, the resolution was rejected by the subsequent Heads of State summit, which adopted a significantly milder wording. In 1970, Arab efforts to brand Israel as “racist” and to finance Palestinians as “African liberation movement” were blocked. Yet later on that year a resolution passed, drafted by Senegal, as a part of a separate agenda point, calling on Israeli withdrawal. The harsh 1971 summit resolution adopted in the context of calls for pan-African unity, followed by a similar one in 1972, was a prelude to what happened in 1973.⁵²

The turning point might have been the failed 1971 mission of the African leaders, meant to reinvigorate the process led by the UN special envoy Gunnar Jarring. The mission of four heads of state (Cameroon, Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire, selected out of a ten-member committee, which included also Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mauritania, Liberia and Tanzania), delegated by the OAU and supported by both the US and the USSR, was seen by its participants as a genuine effort of mediation. The available sources state that the report presented by them after return from talks in Egypt and Israel was balanced, recommending achievement of secure borders through the UN-mediated negotiations, with safeguards such as demilitarised zones and peacekeeping forces and terms of Israeli withdrawals included in peace agreements. This did not satisfy Arab demand for immediate withdrawal and as Israel's distrust of Jarring persisted (he didn’t treat the 242 resolution as a package deal, as it was intended, but tried a piece-meal and inflexible approach requiring Israeli unilateral withdrawal to proceed any gestures of the Arab side), the mission did not bring sides’ agreement on resumption of Jarring's mission. Moreover, some committee members—particularly Mauritania—promoted own, much less balanced draft, accepting major demands of the Arabs. It went unopposed by other members, increasingly disappointed with Israel's stiff position and passed as the UNGA resolution 2799—thanks to Arab call for the “Third World” unity around it, a unity which African states needed in cases more directly related to their interests. In the long run, it was the moment when Arab-Israeli conflict in its entirety started to matter to SSA; including its Palestinian dimension, which became a dominant one, associated with—due to the way Arab states were portraying it and playing it diplomatically—to the issue of South Africa. Another push was when Libya threatened Ethiopia, and Algerian president called for collective break of relations with Israel as an act of continent's unity. Kenya's opposition (Daily Nation, May 15, 1973) argued that once the OAU became a tool for anti-Israeli action, it would cease to be a unifying force helping to connect the people.⁵³

A study by Gitelson on the entire “golden era” period showed no correlation between amounts of aid and voting patterns, with some countries voting with Israel despite drops in aid, while others voted against it while aid was rising—and instances of aid rising despite worsening voting patterns. Some correlation was found only during the very last years of relations. Since this was already the time of gradual rationalisation and related scaling down of Israeli engagement, it can be assumed that the correlation resulted from crystallisation of the strongest bonds, where aid and political proximity went together, yet cannot be said to be causal either way. In the period under consideration, aid was conducive to good relations but not a decisive factor. Manis's detailed study of bilateral relations and foreign policies showed no correlation between aid and international behaviour in the case of Ghana. Somewhat more relevance was found in the case of Ethiopia, yet the study omits the Christian factor, so the conclusion might be overestimated. Malawi did not receive much aid, but was very pro-Israeli; Liberia was pro-Western anyway. In the case of Nigeria, aid had no effect at all on its anti-Israel position. Tanzania was from early on politically close to Arabs and China and aid did not change it. Yet it could be observed that Israeli development aid was a substantial part of foreign policy efforts, and without it, relations could have been much different.⁵⁴

International behaviours following events of 1973

Around 1973, the following factors gained ground: Libyan expansionism (seducing Uganda, blackmailing war-ridden Chad and bankrupt Niger); growing indebtedness of sub-Saharan states that led them to seek financial aid rather than capacity building; sensitivity to the instances of intrusion of foreign military powers; radicalisation of SSA rhetoric and politics; Israel's refusal to back expulsion of South Africa from international organisations.⁵⁵

The resolution adopted by the OAU in May 1973 points to the occupation of territory of Egypt and of other Arab states, condemns Israeli intransigence, declares any changes on the territories void and calls on Israel to withdraw. It says that there is no guarantee for peace and progress when any part of the continent is under foreign occupation. It does not however contain a call for breaking of relations: it “declares that the attitude of Israel might lead the OAU Member States to take, at the African level, individually or collectively, political and economic measures against it, in conformity with the principles contained in the OAU and the UN Charters”.⁵⁶ It was only after the Yom Kippur war and actual severance of relations that another resolution was adopted—at the extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers in November 1973—that called for maintenance of the state of no relations until the demands were met. Of note, literature tends to simplify this by saying that the rupture of relations was caused by the OAU resolution calling for severance of relations, which is thus not exactly the case. The resolution also contained harsh language of struggle against colonialism, apartheid and Zionism. The case was a precedent as the will of the OAU dominated sovereign foreign policies of the states, contradicting interests of many. Some influence could have been exerted by the OAU Chairman, Muslim Nigerian Yakubu Gowon, who had uneasy relations with Israel. Interestingly, many accounts testify that the African leaders did not treat breaking of relations as something serious. While some quickly expelled Israeli experts, others expected aid programmes to continue—and were genuinely surprised that it was not possible. The only case when a plea for experts to stay was accepted was CAR. At the same time, 1974 and 1975 OAU summits hosted Yassir Arafat and declared Israel a racist regime originating in imperialism, as the South African one. Still there existed some opposition; Zambia Daily Mail on March 25, 1975 asked rhetorically “when any of the leaders of African liberation movements was invited to address the summit of the Arab League”.⁵⁷

Pushed this far by Arab demands, sub-Saharans were tested to go further. The 1976 adoption of a UNGA resolution which mentioned Zionism as a form of racism crushed all remaining hopes for restoration of relations and understanding for African diplomacies on the Israeli side. The phrase regarding Zionism was added at the latest stage of the works on the resolution. A total of 72 countries voted for the resolution, including 27 African ones. Importantly, 17 states did not support the resolution. CAR, Ivory Coast, Liberia and Malawi voted against; Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Sierra Leone, Togo, Zaire and Zambia—abstained. Again, some countries’ votes were informed mostly by the confrontation over American ambassador's comments on Idi Amin (the OAU Chairman at the time), others—to make sure that anti-apartheid resolutions would be backed by the Arabs. Sierra Leone and Zambia unsuccessfully asked for the vote to be postponed, backed by Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Swaziland, Togo, Upper Volta and Zaire, with Cameroon, Ghana and Lesotho abstaining. Liberia, Kenya and other states spoke against the haste and lack of an objective study to justify addition of Zionism; complained that there is no definition of Zionism in the resolution and that the text was detached from history. During the OAU summit earlier that year, Arab quest for a resolution calling for expulsion of Israel from the UN did not go through (to an extent, due to opposition of Egypt, already in negotiations), yet a call for suspension of Israel within the UN did. Still, Ghana and Zaire opposed this while Liberia, Senegal and Sierra Leone put forward reservations.⁵⁸

Israeli cooperation with South Africa drew much contempt expressed at multilateral forums (OAU, UNGA). In 1983 and 1984, the OAU resolutions called members not to renew relations with Israel as a supporter of a racist regime of South Africa. To an extent, Israel was put to a higher standard due to its former commitment against apartheid.⁵⁹

As regards Arab aid, according to Oded, during the OAU summit in Mogadishu in 1974,sub-Saharan states threatened that if they did not receive more aid from Arabs, they would re-establish relations with Israel. During preparations to the Afro-Arab 1977 summit in Cairo, they claimed that unless Arabs increase aid to USD 1 million (from 300,000), they would not participate in the conference. While Arab states refused to work on oil prices and aid, the economies of sub-Saharan states were collapsing. Disappointment was expressed even by countries which Islamised themselves on the “solidarity wave” and were among the few to receive aid, as Gabon. Notably, when Nigeria wanted to reduce oil prices, it met with OPEC opposition. Resentment grew since aid was going mainly to Muslim countries (Guinea, Mali, Somalia, Senegal, Sudan, and Uganda, which pretended to be Muslim under Idi Amin); because it supported Muslim minorities(Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Sierra Leone); as a result of unmet commitments; and since Arab development agencies lacked experience and devotion.⁶⁰

Israel-Egyptian peace treaty contributed to worsening of the Afro-Arab relations as Arabs boycotted many institutions in which Egypt was present. Yet President Sadat was welcomed to the July 1979 OAU summit with a standing ovation (while some Arab representatives left the room). Most countries blocked the proposals to discuss expulsion of Egypt from the OAU and Non-Aligned Movement and refused drafts that condemned Egypt (Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire were particularly active here). SSA also mostly abstained or voted against a paragraph in a UNGA resolution stating that provisions of Camp David accords relating to the Palestinian issue are invalid. Benin, Burundi, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali and Senegal voted with radical Arab countries and for this paragraph, opposed by Egypt.⁶¹

Arab oil powers’ investments in Western assets, support for South Africa through oil sells, economic and military cooperation caused further resentment. Absence of officials at important pan-African events contributed to a growing feeling of being treated in a patronising and exploitative ways. The October 1988 article Let us recognize Israel by Baffour Ankomah in New African complained that Arab states sold Africans oil at the same prices as to its Western enemies, and after states’ coffers run empty due to these prices, all they offered were loans.⁶²

Already in May 1979, Ivory Coast and Senegal tried to table an OAU resolution calling for renewals. In the early 1980s, some change in SSA voting patterns, positive for Israel, was observed in International Labour Organisation, Inter-parliamentary Union, the UN Decolonisation Committee, OAU, UNESCO and UNSC (notably, Togo's and Zaire's 1982 abstention from a Soviet draft calling for military sanctions on Israel for its actions in Lebanon).⁶³ In 1991, UNGA revoked resolution 3379 on Zionism as a form of racism. Among the move's numerous sponsors, including both the US and the USSR, there were (only?) 10 sub-Saharan nations: Burundi, CAR, Gambia, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Swaziland. A total of 111 countries backed the resolution, among them, aside from sponsors,: Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Namibia, Nigeria, Togo, Zaire and Zambia. Among the 25 opposed were Mali and Mauretania, while Angola, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania and Zimbabwe abstained.

Contemporary behaviours in international organisations

In November 2012, the UNGA resolution 67/19 granting Palestine non-member observer state status passed with 138 for, 9 against and 41 abstentions. Kenya, considered one of the friendliest towards Israel, was among its sponsors, even though since the 1990s, it had tended to abstain or not be present during votes on Israeli-Palestinian issue; other SSA sponsors were Angola, Djibouti, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mauretania, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Zimbabwe. All sub-Saharan countries voted in favour, except three which abstained: Cameroon, DR. Congo and Rwanda and three which were absent: Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, and Madagascar.⁶⁴

The case of UNESCO resolutions oblivious to Jewish heritage of Jerusalem is another example. Sub-Saharan nations are a part of a trend of diminishing support for such resolutions. During the April 2016 vote, Chad, Guinea, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo approved. Togo's vote was received by Israel as surprising; Nigeria's signalised a negative change of direction after the 2015 elections. Otherwise, abstentions of Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Kenya and Uganda were taken as a positive development, proving that investment in relations can bear fruit. Angola and Burkina Faso were seen as those that could be persuaded to not approve such resolutions in the future, as both had a history of abstentions effectively supporting Israel in diverse UN bodies. During October vote, among the ten countries which switched from approval to abstention, three were from SSA: Ghana, Guinea and Togo. This can be attributed to the diplomatic efforts, most notably Netanyahu's visit, and restoration of relations with Guinea. Other “friendly abstentions” came as previously from Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Kenya and Uganda. Nigeria and Senegal again approved the resolution. In the World Heritage Committee, Angola voted for, Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe abstained, Tanzania voted against. In fact, Tanzania, along with Croatia, were behind the surprise change in the way the resolution was adopted—by vote, not by consensus, allowing for expression of dissent.⁶⁵

Most significantly, Rwanda and Nigeria were key in preventing the passing of the 2014 draft UNSC resolution on unilateral creation of a Palestinian state in 2017. Togo abstained from the 2009 UNSC endorsement of the Goldstone report following the war with Hamas, from the 2011 UNESCO vote to admit Palestine as a state, from the 2012 UNGA debate on granting Palestine non-member observer status, and from the 2015 resolution allowing waving of a Palestinian flag at the UN. Thus, sub-Saharan countries do not support Israel openly; all Israel does count on at the moment are abstentions. It is believed that the bloc mentality dominates the reasoning, and countries find it difficult to stand out from what has solidified as a standard voting pattern. In more technical forums, situation is a bit better from the Israeli point of view. For example, in the September 2016 vote in the IAEA on international inspections of nuclear facilities, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Togo voted in line with Israel and 15 other African countries abstained. In the IAEA vote in 2014, Mauritius, Namibia, Niger and Zimbabwe voted for the resolution (and against Israel); DR. Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Togo and Uganda voted against it (with Israel) and Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Tanzania all abstained (neutral to pro-Israel stance).⁶⁶

As for the OAU, it never revoked the resolution calling on member states not to resume relations with Israel. Pro-Palestinian resolutions are adopted every year. In 2016, after Prime Minister's trip, it was hoped that Israel would be invited to the AU summit in Kigali, as other non-African diplomatic corps accredited to the hosting country. The invitation did not come, despite the fact that the summit was organised by a very friendly country (Rwanda). According to Oded, behind-the-scenes Arab influences must have been the reason; possibly their threat of non-participation. However, Kenya and Ethiopia openly supported granting Israel AU observer seat. Such a call was also included in the final document of the 2016 summit between East African countries and Israel.⁶⁷

Cooperation is easier on more pragmatic and development-oriented regional level. The works on the MoU with ECOWAS translated into an international conference on Enhancing Sustainable Agricultural Productivity in Arid and Semi-Arid Regions (December 2016, Jerusalem). In attendance were foreign ministers of Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Togo as well as senior officials from Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal. The conference included visiting agricultural research and training institutions. The guests spoke of agriculture as a vital field for cooperation, both with Israeli businesses and the government, with Israel having answers in terms of new agricultural technologies seen as key to diminish food imports and create jobs. Marcel Alain de Souza, President of ECOWAS, pointed to essential nature of getting training in agriculture and medicine, especially for oncologists, and that Israel's cooperation in energy and drinking water was also sought after. Yet Prime Minister's Netanyahu plan to attend ECOWAS summit in Nigeria in December 2016 was abolished due to the opposition by the host government. Nevertheless, he joined the ECOWAS summit in Liberia in June 2017. He was also invited to attend an Africa-Israel summit initiated by Togo, which would go beyond ECOWAS members and include all African (also Arab) countries wishing to participate. Reportedly Togo's president addressed the possible negative reactions from Arab states by saying that risks are low as Togo does not receive much money from Arab powers and has only a small Muslim population. Development, security, business and the role of NGOs were the planned subjects of the summit, which eventually was postponed.⁶⁸

An analysis of contemporary voting behaviours as an amalgam poses certain difficulties. The votes considered important are taken at various forums with a varied representation of SSA countries. They are also separated by a significant flow of time. An analyses of votes on a selection of ME-related UNGA votes from 2009 (beginning of Netanyahu's premiership) to 2016 is presented next. Abstention or being absent was treated as a generally pro-Israeli behaviour as in practice it worked against adoption of anti-Israeli drafts; though since draft needs two-thirds of votes cast to pass, a more effective measure to block an adoption is to abstain. Resolutions on the most contentious aspects of the conflict were chosen: Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory including East Jerusalem (accepting detailed reports presented by the Special Committee on the matter); Situation in the Middle East—Jerusalem (condemning imposition of Israeli laws and administration in Jerusalem); and Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan (demanding cessation of all settlement activity, deploring it in the context of Geneva conventions and of viability of the future Palestinian state).

An analysis of votes shows that proportion of countries abstaining or not casting vote grows both on the level of all the states and in terms of SSA states. The growth among SSA is similar or a bit higher than among other states. The most visible growth in abstentions and non-votes on the part of SSA is in the case of a resolution on Jerusalem—from 17.7% in 2009 to 46.6%. Speculatively, it might reflect concern over Christian rights in the city, seen as better guarded by the Jewish administration than it could be under Muslim rule. Persecution of Christians and destruction of holy sites in the ME in the 2010s might have contributed. Except for Cameroon, which cast abstention vote, 21 states chose not to vote on this resolution at all in 2016. Thus, almost half of SSA states did not want to participate in a process which questions Jewish rights in the Old Town. This can be interpreted in two ways: as a choice of a more neutral behaviour that casting abstention or questioning legitimacy of the draft. The states which changed their voting behaviour on the resolution on Jerusalem from support to non-vote were Botswana, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Gambia, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Swaziland and Uganda. Cameroon abstained already in 2009, while Burkina Faso, CAR, Congo, DR. Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda and Sao Tome and Principe and Seychelles did not cast vote both in 2009 and 2016. The group contains both Christian-and Muslim-majority Burkina Faso, Gambia and Sierra Leone or mixed (Ivory Coast) states. Of note, SSA countries which delegated representatives to the May 2018 ceremony transferring the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem were Angola (though in breach of the country's official position), Cameroon, Congo, DRC, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia.⁶⁹

Regarding the resolution on settlements, share of abstentions and non-votes grew from 24.4 to 33.3% and on Israeli practices—from 28.8 to 40%. The 2016 resolution on practices “enjoyed” the largest number of active SSA abstentions—7. The countries which abstained in 2016 on Israeli practices, aside from non-votes, were Cameroon, CAR, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Liberia, Malawi and Togo. Cameroon, CAR, Ivory Coast and Togo actively abstained also on settlements. More pro-Israeli stances were taken in 2016 than in 2009 on both practices and settlements by Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Swaziland and Togo.

The results are slightly correlated with the volumes of Israeli aid. Of the above-mentioned, Cameroon, Ghana and Uganda were in the second half of the top 10 recipients in the period 2009–15, followed by Burkina Faso, South Sudan and Togo. Net amounts of aid in the last three cases were meagre, although aid might have been relatively visible due to these countries’ relatively small populations. This also might be the case of the “aid orphans”—Gambia, Malawi, Madagascar and Togo. Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ivory Coast and Togo are the “special interest countries” for the MASHAV action (Ivory Coast used to receive more aid, but in the period considered, the volumes actually went down), while Ghana, Uganda and South Sudan are among the priorities. Most of these countries participate in MASHAV courses at high levels. This slight correlation does not mean causality, rather testifies to a general process of build-up of positive relations.

Interestingly, no country moved away from abstaining to supporting resolutions in question. Among the countries discussed (aside from Uganda, whose pro-Israeli move on votes is anyway meagre), there are no East African countries, concerned as Israel's key geopolitical allies, developing security cooperation and also benefitting from numerous trainings. Kenya is the most striking example (maybe reserving abstentions for more crucial votes), followed by Ethiopia. Asked about the issue, representative of the Kenyan embassy in Israel declared that decisions on every vote are issue- and merits based. Abstentions come sometimes on the country-specific resolutions, which often have hidden agendas. There is no pressure from the Israeli side on the votes and the UN realities often turn friends to vote against each other. Multilateral and bilateral relations are in separate silos. According to the interviewee, Israeli diplomacy has only recently started to be active with regards to the voting patterns. The trigger was the Palestinian decision to quit the negotiations and follow a unilateral way to statehood through proclamations of international organisations. A wake-up call might have been the admission of Palestine to UNESCO (2011).⁷⁰

Comparing these results with the 1993 UNGA session following the Oslo accords does not lead to clear conclusions. The resolutions were similar, yet different, with the one on practices split into four parts (the most radical one was chosen as a subject of an analysis) and the one on settlements concentrated on economy. Botswana, Burundi, Eritrea, Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria abstained or were not present, while in 2009 they voted for resolutions. The negative impact of the failure of the peace process can be assumed with some probability as a cause.

The official accounts of the 2016 UNGA discussions and deliberations of the committee on the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people show very limited participation of SSA. The one active actor was Senegal, member and president of the UNSC at the time and also the Chairman of the Committee, on which behalf he introduced some of the Palestine-related resolutions. His speeches can be assessed as balanced and devoid of harsh rhetoric used by speakers from radical countries, who dominated the debate. Same during the discussion over the resolution on Israeli practices; here, besides Senegal, also a representative of the AU spoke: condemnatory of Israel, undemanding towards the Palestinians.

SUBCHAPTER 3: PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE RELATIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION

Overview

The appreciation for Israeli achievements and aid was not limited to leaders. Early sources on Israeli development aid highlight other stakeholders acknowledging positive impacts of their coming to Israel or working with Israeli trainers. The following merit reproducing, although it is impossible to fully verify the exact sources and contexts of the quotes:

“Israel has gave me more in eight days than I could obtain from two years in a British university.” (Secretary General of Ghana Trade Union Congress, 1957).⁷¹

“My prayer and hope is that Nigeria, too, ten years after independence, will prove a land into which many flock to hear and learn another success story. To Nigeria the story of Israel gratifies the soul” (renowned Nigerian journalist Ebenezer Williams, quoted in 1960).⁷²

“Had I not come here to see things for myself, I would still be in the belief that the Jews are enemies of Africans, aggressors and exploiters, as they were said to be by the enemies of the Jewish nation.” (visiting Nigerian, 1960).⁷³

“It seems logical (…) since we are small we can learn more from a small, efficient country than from a big efficient country” (official from Senegal, 1960).⁷⁴

“Israel has bestowed many gifts upon us. Most valuable for me (…) atmosphere in the Centre, the human contacts in Haifa and elsewhere.” (Ghanaian trainee, 1973).⁷⁵

Recipients identified a range of special qualities of Israeli experts: devotion, innovativeness and flexibility. Another issue is the heritage of the 1960s Israeli development projects (with opinions that emerged at the time often lasting until today) from the African point of view. This matter hasn’t been sufficiently researched and only at the time of writing first results of a specific research regarding cooperative villages established in Tanzania and Zambia, done by the Africa Centre at Ben Gurion University, emerged. The results are mixed and conclusions difficult since other donors intervened in the same places and subject fields after Israelis left. Observations on the common people's memory of and attitudes towards Israeli presence include their awareness that nice houses were built during the time and impacts in terms of health and competences gained. Good memories of the profitability and lasting legacy of cooperative thinking and working are also mentioned. On the other hand, afterlife of the mistrust towards Israelis is often encountered. Examples include a fertiliser's storage facility which remained unattended by the locals after Israeli enforced, rapid departure, which led chemicals to penetrate the soil and made it uncultivable (which now is blamed on Israelis); or examples of rumours, like those that Israeli project was a cover-up for gold digging, or that the Israelis actually hid a treasure somewhere in the fields.⁷⁶

Sub-Saharan embassies in Israel

In order to approximate the attitudes of SSA countries’ officials and citizens towards relations with Israel and Israeli development aid, representatives of four embassies of SSA countries in Tel Aviv were interviewed. The embassies were chosen so as to represent a diverse profile of countries, in terms of geographical location, history of development, historical record and the current nature of relations with Israel. A record of opinions expressed follows.

Ghana

Minister Counsellor at the Embassy of Ghana Kwasi Asante underlined technology transfer and capacity building that takes place as a part of cooperation with Israel at various levels. Israelis have done significant projects in the spheres of neonatal care, early childhood education and water and sanitation. There are also transfers of knowledge in agriculture, gender issues, ICT and public administration. Israel takes the actual needs of the recipient in due consideration. In the field of agriculture, Israeli technologies are key to raising yields and youth employment in agriculture, which is mostly sustenance agriculture so far. But there are significant transfers also through a private sector, active in the fields of agriculture, ICT, energy and construction. Ghanaian law demands a minimum share of local workers to be employed by each foreign business, thus enhancing knowledge transfer. According to the interviewee, the feedback from trainees who went through training in Israel is excellent. He cited one speaking of “pragmatic, flexible, practical and hands-on solutions for Ghanaian development”, which he would bring home. The material impacts are hard to measure, yet they are visible in the way a person reapproaches work, duties, lifestyle, searches for solutions and application. Attitude towards Israel is very positive in Ghana, with every Ghanaian Christian craving to visit the Holy Land. This is also a platform for bilateral cooperation on tourism and culture.⁷⁷

Kenya

According to Jon Chessoni, Chargé d’Affaires of the Kenyan Embassy in Israel, both MASHAV and the Israeli non-governmental sector have a role to play; he described Kenya as “hungry for Israeli technologies” and lauded Kenyan goodwill towards Israel. While agriculture is still important, Kenya wants to move forward with other sectors; moreover, it moves from aid towards trade as a source of development; thus, joint ventures are needed.⁷⁸

In an interview with the Embassy's political attaché, Anthony T. Mathenge, development was assessed as the largest sphere of cooperation between Kenya and Israel. There are three main areas: agriculture, food security and water and sanitation, while there is also some cooperation in education and justice. Galana Kulanu is the largest, most visible project. While agriculture will still be important for Kenyan economy for a long time, services sector is growing very fast and effort is made to create jobs for young people within it. Thus, cooperation with Israel is sought after also in innovation and entrepreneurship. IT companies bring in their employees to learn from Israel themselves. As for Israeli private companies, Agrostudies was mentioned, and its cooperation with Kenyan higher education institutions for the purpose of identification of potential students.

According to the interviewee, Israel is assessed as doing efforts to align as much as possible with recipient's needs. Galana Kulanu is an entirely Kenyan idea, within which MASHAV responds to concrete needs for training. Israeli cooperation with stakeholders is commendable, wide also includes good ties with the Kenyan ministries. There is no possibility to follow-up on every trainee or student after coming back from Israel and the interviewee acknowledged that the Kenyan side needs to do more to fully use that potential. The new programme offering seed money for alumni through Israeli embassy is an idea that can bring results. Moreover, people are trained in Israel in very specific fields, in which there are not many professionals in Kenya—like neurosurgery, where each additional doctor that is trained and practicing makes a big impact. So the process should be seen in an accumulative way, as capacity building for more and more people, which changes their lives, work and output.

Trainees leave with very positive view of Israel, they assess the content and the delivery methods as excellent; courses are engaging and condensed, which is good, but also does not give much time to see the country. Interactive way of teaching is different from the Kenyan one and eye-opening to Kenyan educators. These methods are to be adopted by the Kenyan Ministry of Education within the sustainable development curriculum. This is a concrete example of a long-term impact. Some Israeli NGOs are present: SACH treated more than 30 Kenyans already. After 2016 presidential visit in Israel, there are efforts to develop a scheme for training cardiologists—bringing children to Israel for treatment is an emergency solution for some, yet Kenya needs its own capacities in the area.

Israel is commonly associated by Kenyans with security, agriculture and water. Joint challenges are seen and the fact that Israel overcomes them is appreciated. Addition must be made of the religious association, as majority of Kenyans are Christian. Pro-Palestinian attitudes happen in some more educated circles, concerned with issues of nationalism and self-determination, rather Muslim than Christian, but do not take an organised form.⁷⁹

Nigeria

The representative of the Embassy of Nigeria Emmanuel Edugwo highlighted the importance of aid in agriculture, where Israel has lots of expertise needed for industrialising Nigerian farming. The 2015 MoU provides for transfer of technologies on drip-irrigation, aquaculture, livestock, sustainable land management, mechanisation; Israeli water management is seen as a miracle. Israeli aid is fully in line with the government's development plans which include engaging its massive youth population in agricultural work on vast areas of unused arable land. Together with development of an entire chain for storage and transport and work on standards, it will diminish unemployment, bring food self-sufficiency and allow for export. Israel is seen as delivering what it promised, and on time. It responds to challenges which are commonplace in Africa and its engagement is sought after, particularly in the face of increasing draught and desertification.⁸⁰

An additional insight into realities of Israeli aid to Nigeria was gained in an interview with former Israeli ambassador Noam Katz. In his opinion, ties with Israel depend much on internal matter of the balance between Nigerian Christians and Muslims. Still, Christians identify Israel with the land of the Bible, while Muslims appreciate Israeli technologies and aid. They are profoundly interested in enhancing own well-being and much less in world politics. Israel works with both communities, for example it used church-related networks to promote an agricultural project, and on another occasion, it funded a mosque before developing a water project. Care is taken to base aid on local needs and common values and to limit changes to communities, so as not to create socio-economic tensions. Ties with leaders from both communities are good, and visibility of Israeli projects is provided by local media—at least because they are interested in what local politicians are doing.⁸¹

Zambia

Zambian president visited Israel in the early 2017, accompanied by “ministers for foreign affairs, agriculture, trade, energy, tourism, water development and environment, transportation, health, and industry and employment” and argued for a stronger cooperation with Israel as a “pace-setter in survival instinct, because it has a desert; but they have a thriving education, agriculture and information and communication technology sectors and we can explore and learn from them”.⁸²

Zambian Embassy in Israel was established in 2015, testifying to the rise of interest in cooperation. In turn, since its opening, relations have gained on scale. There is a strong desire to benefit from Israeli expertise and experience in agriculture, water, health and renewable energy. In the opinion of the Ambassador of Zambia, Martin Mwanambale, Israeli side prefers the development cooperation to take place between non-governmental entities, particularly businesses, rather than through governments. Still, such interactions are also seen as good for knowledge transfer. The most important field for cooperation is agriculture, due to large unused arable lands in Zambia. Diversification of energy sources is also very important—the country depends on hydropower, which is not always reliable due to climatic reasons, hence the need to develop alternative sources of energy such as solar power.

According to the Ambassador, there were 15 Zambian students in Agrostudies programme at the time of the interview and there were hopes for more. Students and trainees were impressed by Israeli innovations and experts, who are practice-oriented, experienced and do the work themselves, irrespective of their place within the hierarchy. The Embassy maintains contact with students. While the first months are difficult for them, later on they appreciate their stay enormously. Cultural issues they tackle are not only related to the Israeli environment but also to the diversity of countries of origin within the group of students. MASHAV is flexible to offer trainings on what is actually requested. Flexibility is also required to adjust the level of advancement of the technology transferred to the particular Zambian recipient, as Israel has both state-of-the-art and simple technologies. SACH and Doctors Without Borders are the NGOs that could operate in Zambia soon. Zambia is a Christian-majority country with populace generally sympathetic to Israel and only a small minority opposing cooperation. As for the media, it is mainly the state-owned press that shows interest in development cooperation issues.⁸³

Participants of courses and projects

Questions related to overall perceptions of aid and experience of sub-Saharan trainees were addressed to people involved in Israeli programme. Paul Hirschson, as many others, says that in SSA, Israel is identical to drip irrigation and agriculture. According to his experience on-the-spot, Israeli solutions are the ones that work, contrary to many Western ones. This is due to the similarity of natural environment and fact that Israeli agriculture is based on small family- or community-based units, just as in sub-Saharan countries (and unlike in the Western farming, where the dominant model is a huge farm belonging to one person or a company and hiring contracted workers). Together with equality between the donor and recipient, this is a perfect mix. Of course the Arab-Israeli conflict is a topic of conversations. Yet for a village with no electricity and water, the priority and a huge step forward is to get solar panels, water pumps and drip irrigation. The way Israel is received is sometimes even a bit unfair towards the West. Due to the history of exploitation and decisive roles in international order, Western aid is seen as fulfilment of obligation while Israeli one as purely voluntary. Aid extended in 2015 during Ebola outbreak created lots of goodwill towards Israel also due to these reasons. Hirschson echoes Golda Meir saying that knowledge is the one thing that cannot be taken away from people and much more important than infrastructure. This is a broader issue connected to a general problem of exit strategies for projects. Israel has no financing to forever run the clinic it established. Africa saw too many donor-funded hospitals and schools standing empty. Knowledge empowers a person to establish own business, proceed and even hire people. Israeli aid is seen, in his opinion, as fostering independence of recipients.⁸⁴

In the opinion of the MCTC staff, built upon talks with participants, knowledge of Africans coming for courses in Israel is limited to associations with conflict and the Holy Land. After their stay—including discussions with Israeli professionals (who often have very self-critical attitudes), some sightseeing and private interactions—they usually modify their outlooks, mostly in a positive way. They particularly appreciate openness of the Centre's staff, take note of lack of hierarchy and informality in relationships and are very attracted to the communal farming models. Still, particular reactions are a very individual question.⁸⁵

According to Yudith Rosenthal, developing countries look at Israel as a country which developed very quickly and believe that they can find the answers here. However, there are limitations, since results in the field of education take years. Moreover, there is a shift in methods all over the world. Beneficiaries’ motives for coming are related to professional framework, ongoing transformation of education system or eagerness to visit the Holy Land. The motives to some extent impact on the actual experience. To many trainees from SSA, an encounter is shocking, as they come across a very different culture, with informal, open structures, where, however, certain boundaries do exist. A course participant of the Ofri Center's course gave a positive feedback, concentrated on the willingness to bring the experience home. The interviewee was impressed by Israel's ongoing development despite lack of natural resources and by the education system. Treating foreigners with suspicion was noticed as one negative phenomenon. Sagiv's research engaging former course participants in Tanzania brought similar observations with participants’ underlining: sensitivity of the Israeli staff to the needs of course participants; attitudes that promote mutual knowledge exchange; cultural differences and knowledge gaps that are obstacles to success; religious motives in and spiritual satisfaction from visiting Israel; positive impact of the visit on perception of Israel; enhanced knowledge, high motivation to change own life and even empowerment to, for example, set up an own business as a result of course participation.⁸⁶

The founder of WaterWays feels welcomed in SSA countries, Christian or Muslim. Israeli experience in dealing with problems that SSA faces is the fundamental argument. African people are usually aware of the Israeli-Arab conflict but do not react to it emotionally. The interviewee, at the time of writing, was engaged in advising a new Ugandan business, set up by young people who studied agriculture in Israel and wanted to implement what they learned in their home country.⁸⁷

In the experience of Innovation: Africa, gaining knowledge of Israel or discussing political issues is no point of interest for the recipients, living in remote villages with no infrastructure. According to Ophelie Namiech from IsraAid, in the case of South Sudan, the appeal of Israel (for those who happen to have any associations with it) emerges from three factors: Israel being appreciated for its help in achieving independence; religious connection through Christianity; and the inclusive and community-driven approach of Israeli organisations operating in South Sudan. Contact with the organisation generates some interest in Israel, yet by far, the main subject of the relationship and conversation is the activities on the ground. Some communities even tell donors that they will engage only if the IsraAid leads the project.⁸⁸

It may well be that Biblical connotation is the strongest and sometimes the only one; it is also often mentioned in press reports. In Ghana, where Evangelical churches grow in strength, visiting Israel is seen as a big achievement but can also be difficult when it emerges that Israel is a state like others. Some misunderstandings also arise when it turns out that Judaism differs from Christianity in such issues as the nature of Christ. The same occurs in Ethiopia, where there is enthusiasm for people coming from Israel and locals want to know as much as possible about it as the “land of milk and honey” and of Bible and Jesus.⁸⁹ Sub-Saharan Christianity features an extent of conflation between Judaism and Christianity, which has been lost in the European culture.

The case of sub-Saharan students

Some limited quotes from sub-Saharan students studying in Israel contemporarily are available—for example, personal stories told on Agrostudies website concentrate on their individual development path and professional plans and are not a commercial for studying in Israel—yet no systematic analysis was found. Thus, a limited survey was carried out, based on interviews with the help of asemi-structured qualitative questionnaire. The interviews were carried out in December 2016 at the Sde Boker campus of the BGU and in March 2017 at the Rehovot campus of the HUJ. The process of reaching the interviewees in Sde Boker was informal, in the case of Rehovot mediated through an academic coordinator; participation was voluntary. The pool of interviewees consisted of eight persons (seven men, one woman; five studying at Sde Boker and three at Rehovot) from Ethiopia (onestudent), Ghana (two), Kenya (three) and Nigeria (two). Most interviewees had rural background. They studied environmental studies, water management, aquaculture biology and microbiology in agriculture; one student studied Israeli studies. Four of them were in Israel on MFA-founded scholarships; three on scholarships by the PEARS Foundation and one on a joint scholarship of the African Development Bank and Israeli Chemicals Ltd. For most of them, this was not their first year of stay in Israel, as they enrolled in multi-year programmes leading to graduation, or continued studies after graduating from a previous programme in Israel.

As for their way into Israel, the most common path was through a local teacher, expert, colleague from work or a friend. It usually was after recommendation of such a person that endeavour was made to apply for a programme and scholarship. Most of the interviewees wanted to study abroad at some point; for some, Israel was the second choice (after another Western country), but for the majority, Israel was the first choice due to high esteem it has for its expertise in the fields they study. Some of the interviewees cited religious reasons as a subsidiary factor that made them interested.

As for the expectations before arrival, most were not particularly interested in the country as such, aside from its achievements in fields related to their subjects of interest. They were usually afraid of the conflict, which they said was very visible in the media. Yet these reservations were quickly verified after arrival, as they saw a normally functioning country; they had no feeling of insecurity, maintained standard rules of behaviour and in some cases perceived Israel as safer than home-countries. They had great admiration for the way the state is organised, citing agriculture, irrigation, transportation or heritage preservation. They underlined that the people they worked with at the University are hard-working, professional, timely, eager to share knowledge and demanding but approachable, ready to explain and to learn from the students, able to see what is the best in every person and to motivate.

On the other hand, the interviewees admitted that they faced challenges, of which some were common to foreign students in alien countries in general (not specific to stay in Israel); some a common experience of foreign students in Israel; while some specific for African students in Israel. The first challenge is language: not all Israelis know English, while for the students, it is difficult to master good command of Hebrew on top of their studies. The second is a sense of boredom or tiredness of life being defined only by studies for a long time. At the Rehovot campus, the issue is connected to the very tight, packed programme of studies, while at Sde Boker—to scarcity of social life and entertainment options. The third difficulty is cultural clash, Israeli culture being Western, individualist, while SSA cultures tend to be more communal. The impression is that Israelis, although mostly helpful, do not want to become friends or engage in joint activities and that the rules of hospitality in Israel are much less embracing then in the students’ countries of origin, leading to a sense of alienation. The fourth trouble, reported by some of the interviewees, was what they perceived as manifestations of ignorance, superiority or racial prejudice by common people on the street or in the shops. There are instances of unpleasant behaviours—refusals to respond to greetings, other measures of avoidance. One interviewee cited being frequently picked up for unnecessary checks of documents, possibly out of suspicion that he might be an illegal migrant. An impression is that people know little of Africa, of how diversified it is; it is treated as a one big country and in a very (negative) stereotypical way. Lastly, some students mentioned lack of a perspective for staying in Israel, resulting from country's preference for people with Jewish background. Still, most of interviewees declared willingness to stay if granted another scholarship or planned to apply to another programme abroad.

All of the students interviewed were convinced that learning in Israel is an enormous opportunity for their personal, academic and professional development and that it would not be possible if not for a scholarship; a situation often referred to as a “blessing”. They say they benefit a lot, get cutting-edge knowledge and competences. So they were very satisfied with the content of their studies, despite it being challenging for them sometimes, and most of them were satisfied with material conditions offered by the scholarships (varying depending on the donor).

The students were impressed by Israeli achievements won in conditions similar to, or even worse than, those in their homelands; they would like to see these solutions replicated in their home-countries, and many of them hope to work in that direction. Apart from technical solutions, what they admire is the Israeli attitude: thinking above the problem, actively trying to find solutions, refusal to depend on anybody or on the government, strong sense of willingness to contribute and responsibility for tasks. The possibilities for an actual transfer of their knowledge to Africa, however, were seen as limited. Their studies in Israel were not framed by the state-of-origin, and after coming back, they will need to look for a job with little chance of finding one matching their expertise (though two of them started some development-related activities in their home-countries, which they hoped to expand). On the other hand, a diploma from agricultural studies in Israel is recognised as coming from the country having the best expertise and viewed with admiration, so it increases chances of employment. The most frequently cited possible opportunity for graduates of agriculture studies in Israel was working for Israeli companies active in students’ countries of origin. Some informal mechanisms already seem to exist which enhance graduates chances to get such a job and most of the interviewees were aware of other students from their country who used to study in Israel. In the case of Kenya, some sort of networking between them emerges (they were even summoned to meet the President of Kenya when he visited Israel in 2016 and he motivated them to proceed and bring knowledge back to Kenya). Otherwise they did not see much particular interest in their studies from their home countries’ governments or embassies.

As for the Israeli governmental or non-governmental presence in their countries of origin, the interviewees were able to name several Israeli companies, profoundly those linked to agriculture (Amiran, Dizengoff, NETAFIM). By those closer to the issue, the companies were appreciated for providing trainings alongside selling products and for providing jobs to alumni of studies in Israel. The students usually could not mention a particular MASHAV project, though they had an overall impression that people trained by MASHAV or MASHAV incoming experts do wonderful things in their countries; they also referred to humanitarian projects implemented in times of crises. They would like to see more and better structured cooperation between the governments, so that Israeli solutions are more systematically adopted. There are obstacles to this, however. Cultivation of old ways and lack of linkage between knowledge centres and communities in need, for example farmers, was pointed at, along with the overall inefficiency of governments in home countries, with political elites said to be interested mainly in supporting own stay in power and lacking commitment to work systematically enough.

Public opinion polls and civil society organisations

Analysis of SSA public opinion is difficult since there is very limited number of polls done, they are rare and do not cover all the countries. One historical poll concerned 300 students from West Africa studying in Paris and asked in 1962 about the most admired country. Israel popped up third (12.4%), after the USSR and China, ahead of Cuba, the US and France.⁹⁰

The 2007 Views of the Middle East Conflict Pew Global Research Centre poll showed that populations of Ivory Coast, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Ghana (descending order) sympathised more with Israel than with the Palestinians (with quite high percentages of those for “both” or “neither” in Kenya and Ethiopia). The most dominant preference for Israel was demonstrated by the inhabitants of Ivory Coast. Tanzania's population was the most divided, while in Mali and Senegal pro-Palestinian attitudes were dominant (with a significant share of those not preferring any side). SSA respondents were divided as regards their trust in the Palestinian leader Mahmud Abbas and predominantly critical of Hamas. Apparently, these countries’ UN voting roughly reflects popular sentiments. Simultaneously, the 2007 Pew polls: Views of the US and American Foreign Policy and Global Unease With Major World Powers proved that there was no deep divide between sub-Saharans and North Africa Arabs. The opinion that “Arabs and Africans can live together peacefully” was prevalent in Ethiopia (both among non- and Muslims) and backed by the majorities in Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Kenya and Senegal. An opposing view was dominant in Tanzania and Uganda (also among Muslims). SSA perceptions of South Africa changed with the fall of apartheid, with positive opinions in all countries polled, ranging from 91% in Ivory Coast to 66% in Uganda. Overwhelmingly positive attitudes towards the US, the American ideals, ideas and business style in eight out of nine SSA countries (except Tanzania) polled in 2007 might be also taken as an indication for positive attitudes towards Israel. In Ethiopia and Nigeria, opinions on the US were divergent between non-Muslims and Muslims. Positive attitude remained dominant also towards American policies in Africa—except for Ethiopia and Senegal. In the 2007 Pew Allies and Threats in Africa poll, al-Qaida and related terror groups were among the top 3 biggest threats in the opinion of respondents from Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Senegal, Tanzania. Iran was mentioned among the top 3 threats in Nigeria and Tanzania.

In the 2012 BBC World Service Nation Branding Poll covering a limited number of countries, respondents most positive towards Israeli policies were found, inter alia, in Nigeria and Kenya. Respondents in Ghana were more divided. In the 2013 edition of the survey, opinions of Israel among respondents from these three Sub-African countries further improved. The 2014 edition witnessed overall improvement in perception of Israel (50% negative, 25% positive) with Ghana and Kenya again among those rating Israel most positively (respectively 54 and 47% respondents having positive attitude towards Israel). However, the attitudes in Nigeria evolved towards negative opinions.

As for pro-Israeli organisations in Africa, Oded mentions Ugandan Abayudaya—a tribe formed by people who self-declared themselves as Jews around 1920.⁹¹ However, it is hard to trace any pro-Israeli activity of the group, concerned mostly about own safety and gaining recognition from Israel. African Voices for Israel, started by American Voices for Israel, represents American Jewish organisations and concentrates on bringing opinion-makers for visits to Israel (governors of African banks, Christian pastors, etc.). Otherwise, the pro-Israeli movement in SSA is driven mostly by Evangelical Christian Churches and related organisations. Examples include South African organisations: the Institute for Christian Leadership Development (focused on promoting African development adherent to Christian values, including through Jerusalem conferences and tours) and the Africa-Israel Initiative (which promotes economic and Christian development in Africa and right-wing stances on Israel, for example, backing its possession of the West Bank). The International Christian Embassy of Jerusalem, a global Evangelical organisation particularly supporting unity of Jerusalem is increasingly active in SSA, though its impact on-the-spot is hard to evaluate. The conservative, faith-based Israel Allies Foundation, founded in 2007, expands into SSA as well, with parliamentary Israel Allies caucuses established in Congo, DRC, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria, Uganda, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Zambia.

Conclusions

The dominance of the “trans-Saharan Pan-Africanism” (led by Kwame Nkhrumah, backed by Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda), embracing North African Arab countries in contrast with “Sub-Saharan Pan-Africanism”, exclusively Black, fearing Arab internal divisions and imperialism plus the ensuing diplomatic trade-offs, coupled with the Cold War confrontation logic, impacted on the geostrategic environment of Israeli African policy.⁹² However, peace between Israel and Egypt, end of apartheid in South Africa, the ME peace process leading to creation of the PA and Israel's peace with Jordan dissolved the major arguments that had served the Arabs in their efforts against Israel—at least until early 2000s, when the peace process died down. This provided space for renewal of relations with SSA and opened doors for Israel to present its perspective on the events.

Contemporary Israel's bilateral relations with sub-Saharan countries bloom, while multilateral ones are still problematic. Voting behaviours of sub-Saharan countries result from overall state of their external relations. In the past, geopolitical considerations had mostly negative impact on voting patterns. At the time of writing, these considerations had a neutral (weakness of Arab states) or positive impact (struggles with extremisms). The issue exerting a negative impact is the unresolved conflict with the Palestinians, yet it has varied degree of importance for SSA states. There is no causal relation between voting patterns and the extent of aid received, although aid programmes usually go together with better relations on various levels. Though there was no correlation between amount of Israeli aid and the voting pattern in the early 1960s, the countries which were the largest beneficiaries in 1972 all behaved in a more or less pro-Israeli way in 1967. In 1973, however, aid did not play significant impact on the timing of their decisions to break relations.

Contemporary SSA countries’ positions seem to reflect overall growing tiredness with unproductive proliferation of anti-Israeli UN resolutions. They increasingly refuse to participate in the most controversial votes. Some correlation of these behaviours was found with the dominance of Christianity and the levels of Israeli aid received, but none factor can be seen as decisive. In the case of each country, there is a unique amalgam of factors determining relations with Israel and voting behaviours. These factors are not necessarily interrelated, as seen from the example of Kenya.

Significantly, even “in the darkest hour”, sub-Saharans did not question the right of Israel to exist, were against its expulsion from the UN and strongly reserved towards branding it in the same way as racist South Africa. Nevertheless, lack of diplomatic relations and SSA overall harsh attitudes on the international scene was received by the Israeli side as deeply offending and trust-breaking. SSA states remain committed to the two-state solution and see it as in line with developing relations with Israel.

From the point of view of SSA countries, relations with Israel stand firm on three pillars: religion—Christian linkages; development cooperation—appraise of Israeli achievements and aid; and geopolitics—as a counterweight to Arab and Muslim influences. These reasons stood behind close relationships in the 1960s and are valid also today. Interviews showed that the first two reasons are most important. Contemporarily, Israel is associated in most countries with two things: the Bible and the agriculture.

Israeli development aid is the most visible and broadly appreciated factor in relations. It engages leaders and common people. On the political level, it is rather a dependant factor than a decisive one: internal politics, external pressures and sub-Saharan countries’ foreign policy interests proved over the history to be the ones that determine the temperature of relations with Israel. On the other hand, when development programmes can be pursued, they serve building meaningful, reciprocal relationships. Memory of Israeli programmes was among significant factors that steered renewal of relations. Relationships built in the process of training create large amounts of goodwill towards Israel. Israel is perceived as reliable, professional and bringing what is needed. This is well reflected in bilateral and people-to-people relations. The process applies to governmental and non-governmental sectors alike, with non-governmental sector, particularly enterprises, the most visible to some interviewees.

Notes

1 Oded 2009; Holbik 1967: 201; Rivlin, Fomerand 1976: 327; Neuberger 2009: 34; Ajami, Sours 1970: 407; Neuberger 2009: 34; Rodin 1969: 174–176; Decalo 1998: 59–60; Oded 1990: 6–7; Reich, 1964: 20–21; Kreinin 1964: 3–5; Saran 1974: 13.

2 Rodin 1969: 173–174; Decalo 1998: 35; Sharma 1976: 270–328.

3 Mayer 2013; Levey 2001: 102.

4 Sharma 1976: 262.

5 Oded 2009; Peters 1992: 3; Schler 2018: 108; Kreinin 1964: 8, 10, 74.

6 Carol 2012: 42, 123; Bishku 2017; Mboya 1963: 90; Carol 2012:123; Kreinin 1964: 107.

7 Levin 1972: 40.

8 Rivlin, Fomerand, 1976: 338; Saran 1974: 11–12; Alpan 1976: 104; Sharma 1976: 487.

9 Kreinin 1964: 10, 137.

10 Kreinin 1964: 178; Decalo 1998: 111–114; Gitelson 1974: 6–7.

11 Lizak 2012: 35; Nadelmann 1981: 188; Bishku 2017: 78-79; Peters 1992: 23; Levey 2001: 106; Kreinin 1964: 177.

12 Rodin 1969: 194.

13 Schler 2018: 97–98, 109–119; Levin 1972: 39–40.

14 Ojo 1988: 17.

15 Ojo 1988: 26, 36.

16 Decalo 1998: 61–62.

17 Levin 1972: 39; Peters 1992: 58; Sharma 1976: 270–280; Gitelson 1980: 111; Levey 2012: 30.

18 Levey 2012: 98–157; Levey 2003a: 30; Nadelmann 1981: 193; Gitelson 1980: 107–108.

19 Sharma 1976: 291, 505; Ojo 1988: 38; Rivlin, Fomerand 1976: 340, 345–348; Levey 2012: 72.

20 Peters 1992: 48; Oded 2016; Carol 2012: 228; Neuberger 2009: 29–30.

21 Sharma 1976: 482–483.

22 Rivlin, Fomerand 1976: 346; Decalo 1998: 143; Nadelmann 1981; Peters 1992: 46; Kwarteng 1992; Oded 2010: 134–135; Sharma 1976: 299; Levey 2008: 206, 209.

23 Levey 2008: 206, 209, 218, 220; Ojo 1988: 165; Neuberger 2009: 19–20; Peters 1992: 51,218–219; Nadelmann 1981: 200, 205, 207; Carol 2012: 229, 231.

24 Levey 2008: 206, 209; Schler 2017; Gitelson 1974: 12; Carol 2012: 227; Akinsanya 2010: 22.

25 MERIP Report 1973:18.

26 Africa Report 1976: 54; Decalo 1998: 148; Oded 1990: 1, 21; Nadelmann 1981: 218; Peters 1992: 105; Interview with Yael Abessira; Osia 1983: 71–86.

27 Decter 1977: 124.

28 Akinsanya 2010: 29; Ojo 1985: 8, 14–15; Carol 2012: 292–294.

29 Decalo 1998:162; Neuberger 2009: 34; Oded 2010: 136–137; Kitchen 1983; Oded 1986: 15–17.

30 Carol 2012: 357, 399; Peters 1992: 97–99, 127; Babatunde 2017: xci–xciii; Oded 1986: 2–5, 7–8, Bishku 2017: 87–88.

31 Ojo 1988: 86–88, 91–93; Kwarteng 1992; Oded 1986: 9–10, 19, 22; Osia 1983: 36–59, 98.

32 Ojo 1988: 97; Oded 2006: 65–79; Oded 1990: 33–34, 42–50, 65–73,79.

33 Peters 1992: 137–138; Decalo 1998: 166; Ojo 1988: 3; Joyce 2000: 77; Neuberger 2009: 33.

34 Eichner 2016; Taylor 2010: 11.

35 Bishku 2017: 90, 92; Oded 2016; Bishku 2017: 92; Navon 2013; Keinon 2016b.

36 Keinon 2016b.

37 Wel 2011; Sudan Tribune 2012.

38 Erlich 1994: 165–166; Kreinin 1964: 55; Peters 1992: 1–2, 8; Sharma 1976: 283–284, 414; Patten 2013: 116–140.

39 Nadelmann 1981: 207; Erlich 1994: 167–173; Levey 2008: 210–212.

40 Erlich 1994: 173–178; Bishku 1994: 46; Ronen 2013:161–162; Carol 2012: 62.

41 Bishku 1994: 50; Patten 2013: 144–145; Joyce 2000: 69, 93.

42 Beloff 2016: 104–109; Bob 2018.

43 Kagame 2017.

44 Office of the President of Rwanda.

45 Oded 2011: 319–325.

46 Interview with Anthony T. Mathenge.

47 Rodin 1969: 226, 239–242, 245; Oron 1961: 236; Decalo 1998: 108, 128, 197; Draper 1967.

48 Nadelmann 1981: 188; Kochan 1976: 259–260; Sharma 1976: 414–418; Decalo 1998: 110; Akinsanya 2010: 20.

49 Rodin 1969: 245, 252–257; Decalo 1998: 42–43, 50, 53, 56.

50 Kochan, Gitelson, Dubek 1976: 290–293, 304–309.

51 Carol 2012: 212–213; Decalo 1998: 50, 56.

52 Oded 2010: 8, 10; Kochan 1976: 260; Carol 2012: 220; Peters 1992: 28; Kochan 1976: 260–262.

53 Carol 2012: 221, 225; Akinsanya 2010: 22–24; Peters 1992: 32, 34; Oded 1990: 10; Oded 2010: 132.

54 Gitelson 1976; Manis 1970.

55 Akinsanya 2010: 51-52; Decalo 1998: 141–142.

56 Organization of African Unity 1973.

57 Ojo 1988: 55–59, 63, 75; Clapham 1998: 113; Levey 2008: 213.

58 Decalo 1998: 106, 123–124; Ojo 1988: 60, 65–66; Nadelmann 1981: 216–217; Oded 1990: 13; Peters 1992: 76.

59 Peters 1992: 164; Ojo 1988: 68–69.

60 Interview with Arye Oded; Ojo 1988: 62; Kwarteng 1992; Akinsanya 2010: 46–49.

61 Nadelmann 1981: 218; Peters 1992: 88–92; Ojo 1988: 89–90; Peters 1992: 103.

62 Ojo 1988: 62; Akinsanya 2010: 36; Kwarteng 1992.

63 Peters 1992: 99; Ojo 1988: 96, 98, 10

64 Mogire 2008: 563; Bishku 2017: 92.

65 Keinon 2016b; Keinon 2016c; Lazaroff 2016.

66 Keinon 2016a; Keinon 2017b; Salman, 2019: 99–100.

67 Interview with Arye Oded Interview with Anthony T. Mathenge; Keinon 2016b.

68 Ahren 2016a; Udasin 2016; Cashman 2016; Keinon 2016d; Behar 2017.

69 Landau 2018.

70 Interview with Anthony T. Mathenge.

71 Decalo 1998: 3–4.

72 Lengyel 1960: 23–24.

73 Holbik 1967: 204.

74 Reich 1964: 19.

75 Saran 1974: 15.

76 Gez 2016.

77 Interview with Kwasi Asante.

78 Chessoni 2017.

79 Interview with Anthony T. Mathenge.

80 Author's phone interview with Emmanuel Edugwo, May 2017.

81 Interview with Noam Katz.

82 Keinon 2017a.

83 Interview with Martin Mwanambale.

84 Interview with Paul Hirschson.

85 Interview with Shahar Re’em.

86 Interviews with: Yudith Rosenthal, James Alau Sabasio; Sagiv 2015.

87 Interview with Ornit Avidar.

88 Interviews with: Genna Brand, Ophelie Namiech, James Alau Sabasio.

89 Interviews with: Dikla Rom, Dana Manor.

90 Levey 2012: 210.

91 Interview with Arye Oded.

92 Akinsanya 2010: 9–14.

8Development aid to sub-Saharan African countries as an element of Israeli softpower

The theoretical framework

The theoretical framework of neoliberal paradigm—underlining extended reciprocity rule, the role of international organisations and non-governmental entities—proved its usefulness for explaining the phenomena analysed. Relations between Israel and sub-Saharan African (SSA) states, built around Israeli technical assistance programme reflecting Israeli soft power resources, are in line with observations on aid being an example of a foreign policy tool serving non-confrontational pursuit of national interest, a voluntary process of soft power resources workings, a policy that requires grounding in foreign policy values, the role of policy coordination, crucial value of legitimacy and perceptions in the process, as well as of delayed and indirect results. It was observed that hard power resources and indirectly related soft power resources are an essential support line for soft power to work and confirmed that development projects are an effective soft power measure, in particular when they are small, anchored in local conditions and populations and collaborative. They also help to build networks enabling cooperation in other fields. Moreover, Israeli development aid is a good example of the three composites of attractiveness: benignity—as it builds friendships, brilliance—as it is based on desire for Israeli solutions and beauty—as during the “golden era” Israel and SSA countries shared many foreign and economic policy values and aims. Israeli aid can for many reasons be treated as “development cooperation”, for the developing status of this country until the 1970s, the non-governmental actors’ share of the contemporary aid and the way beneficiaries’ interests are taken into account. Dialogical nature of aid, involvement of non-state actors and its basing on soft power resources and short- and long-term outlook—all these characteristics make Israeli development diplomacy (which has certain aspects of educational and social diplomacy) a good example of a new public diplomacy. Israeli development diplomacy works mainly through direct impacts, with certain role for communicating aid to broader audiences; it can indeed be classified as of a relational type (building unique one-to-one encounters), although there are also some aspects of strategic communication (tailored messages and modes of their spread) observed. Political dimensions of Israeli aid were shown, with the United Nations (UN) voting aspects highlighted, yet no direct causality emerging.

Thus, the soft power approach proved to constitute a most appropriate umbrella to explain processes from a qualitative point of view, within highly contextualised and subjective frameworks of actors and relationships. At the same time, certain analytical weaknesses of the soft power approach were highlighted: most profoundly, lack of a clear structure of agreed-upon indicators that would enable systematic and objective measurement of soft power and observations of its influence.

Role of identity in Israeli development aid

The involvement of the State of Israel in SSA is motivated both by security interests and strong ideological considerations. These two go together, cannot be separated and quantified against each other. In the “golden era” of relations, it could be cautiously evaluated that the ideological motives dominated, or at least that interests were not consequently pursued; while contemporarily, the foreign policy aspect of aid is more straightforward on the level of policymakers, although people directly engaged in aid (the non-governmental sector in particular) are rather focused on strictly development-oriented goals and motivated by altruistic convictions. While SSA can be seen as included in what is often called “new periphery doctrine”, it seems that the main interest Israel currently pursues in its relations with SSA is related to the UN voting. This aim, while an important foreign policy consideration, is only indirectly related to hard-core security, hence the case for strong practical meaning of ideological motives. Changing SSA UN voting patterns will be difficult due to the nevertheless strong role of the African Union (AU) as a collective representation as will be realisation of another goal of receiving the AU observer status. Trade-related motives are limited and refer to the overall goal of SSA countries’ development and boosting their ability to trade with Israel, on the policy level, and building trust of the customers, thus enabling future deals, on the level of businessmen.

In a mutually reinforcing way, these idealistic motivations and demands of national interest pushed Israeli foreign policy in the same, sub-Saharan direction. On the level of identity, altruistic motivations resulted from three ideological sources: the messianic-religious beliefs (tikkun olam narrative), the Zionist ideology and the socialist convictions, all of them intermingling in statements, documents and articles explaining the reasoning behind development cooperation. The majority of strands of Zionism contained thinking not only on the Jewish nation, but also on others. In the search for development and peaceful coexistence, they found economic, social and political solutions which were useful for other nations. Their ideas resonated in the rhetoric of the creators of the state, inspired its foreign policy and shaped the development aid programme offered already in the late 1950s. Thus, they also contributed to the Israeli self-image and self-subscribed international role. Laufer points to gladness of no longer being just aid recipient and of having a new national mission; the programme increased pride and was somewhat preventive of the decline of pioneering spirit.¹

Labour Zionism, highlighting the role of agriculture, hard work, collectivism, social activism and voluntarism, proved successful in building the foundations of the state; contrary to similar efforts elsewhere in the world, it provided for a key mix of values adapted to circumstances. Labour Zionism also provided the ideological background for many Israeli achievements constituting the identified strengths and opportunities of Israeli soft power in the context of SSA needs. These potential and actual resources for Israeli development aid programme most profoundly include agriculture, ingenuity in dealing with water resources, integration of diversified population, care for living standards and public health, various modes for citizens’ activism, participation and responsibility, value of education. Importantly, the very nature of Israeli development aid derives from the specificity of the Israeli state-building movement, of the worldview of Labour Zionism, and the history of the rise and development of the State of Israel. Israeli aid programme distinguishes itself from other donors on the level of motivations, grounded in unique ideological precepts. Its technical character is the result of this spirit, identity and of practical considerations on what Israel has to share. At the same time, there is awareness and even conviction that although Israeli history was a success story and many solutions can be employed by others, Israel's re-emergence and evolution was a unique occurrence and technologies, not to say social policies, need to be adapted to local conditions (material, social, cultural).

Simultaneously, the state's history reflects slow turn away from Labour Zionism and towards conservatism grounded in capitalism and certain interpretations of Judaism. While market-based competition boosts innovation, the expansionist zeal resulted in weaknesses and threats to Israeli soft power such as environmental degradation, overuse of resources, political corruption and high birth rates, leading to fall in quality of life, education, social relations (lower cohesiveness and sense of mutual responsibility, more inequalities), health and democracy in general. An example of divergent philosophies on desertification (combating it—Israel vs. exercising restraint—the UN) is demonstrative of this larger trend which can be destructive to the very essence of the nature of the state, its appeal and soft power. While tackling desertification is an important asset for development aid, as are experiences with dealing with immigration, education, health, nation-building and innovative social structures, it is uncertain to which extent current and future Israeli practices will still be a useful model. Israeli society is growingly divided, a phenomenon brought about, inter alia, by problems caused or neglected by the Labour establishment, and the contemporary global tendencies of divisiveness and growth of the nationalistic and religious currents. While Labour Zionism, which shaped Israeli aid programme, was a progressive, forward-looking and optimistic ideology, elements of Israeli identity that are history-oriented, defensive and pessimistic seem to be often standing behind the contemporary public diplomacy discourse. Remembrance of Holocaust, principle of self-reliance and fear of being rejected by the West make this policy hectic, in particular as Israel's adversaries play at these same sentiments by words and deeds.

Israelis often demonstrate a sense of pessimism about what can be done by public diplomacy in the face of all the hostility and propaganda. When presumption is made that whatever concession Israel would do, it would still not be enough for Israel's opponents—effectively demanding that Israel ceases to exist as a Jewish state—the only chance is seen in presenting a true, complex picture of the nature and activities of Israel, and trusting that this speaks for itself to the world audience. The perceived strength of the pro–Palestinian proponents of one-state solution weakens the Israeli peace movement and discourages a two-state solution. On the other hand, it strengthens those on the Israeli side, who actually would like to see a one-state, binational solution applied. In this regard, it seems that, paradoxically, the agendas of advocates of one-state solution on both sides (including parts of the settler movement and Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions) happen to meet, though their visions of the road towards such a solution (running against the international consensus) differ. Israeli protracted occupation and strength of settler movement limit viability of Palestinian self-government. Calls for application of sovereignty over certain parts of the West Bank (raised during the 2019 and 2020 Knesset elections campaigns, and afterwards) are damaging to the very essence of the nature of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, its appeal and soft power. On the other hand, there are also numerous and vocal calls within the Israeli establishment stating that quick separation from the Palestinian territories (unilateral or cooperative) can save Israel as a Zionist venture.

Israeli development aid is responsive to the overall population's opinions. There is no support for direct cash transfers and Israel does not extend loans. Aid is not large in terms of volumes since the feeling is that resources are more needed at home. On the other hand, public relations’ and financial costs of maintaining security (even if the army is the source of innovations useful for developing countries and educates future civil innovators) and the costs of the occupation of the Palestinian territories are enormous, diminishing investments in certain civil spheres.

Israel was successful in elevating SSA countries’ hopes for more development cooperation. They express true interest and every, even a small-scale project, if successful, is important for their leaders. The gradual build-up of human capital through trainings is also appreciated. Now the question is to which extent the publicity will be matched with actual action. The 2018 official development assistance (ODA) statistics indicate that effort is made.

The engagement of the government and of the third sector—non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and businesses—is a form of expression of the changing level of a general interest of the Israeli populace in African matters and to some extent is correlated with the level of political engagement, although the sectors of the society interested most in African development were not necessarily coming from among the electorate of the ruling parties. Starting with deep, emotional involvement in the 1960s, the interest nosedived after political debacles of the 1970s and has been rising again only since around 2010. These patterns are reflected in the state of the African studies, with formal education institutions catching up with the rise of interest, and informal learning structures compensating for their deficiencies.

On a more general level, in the past, identity, ideology and assessment of the reality were behind a decision to loosen ties with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and a slow move from non-alignment into alliance with the West. The motives were deeply embedded and rational, yet with time and evolution of the policies of many SSA countries towards radicalism, the decision drew Israel away from its African partners. Current pragmatism in foreign policies of SSA states is matched by a foreign policy of the governments of Benjamin Netanyahu that can be paradoxically characterised as an identity-based realism. This allowed for build-up of relations grounded in sharing development solutions, yet extending beyond that, with multidimensional partnerships built. The internal political systems of these partners are not an important consideration. This, in case of autocracies, might put relations in question in the longterm, if a takeover of power by opposition forces, having resentments against Israel for its cooperation (including in the security sphere) with the former regime happens.

Development aid as an expression of soft power

This research confirms that Israel, thanks to its geo-climatic conditions and rapid socio-economic development, has resources that respond to the development needs of SSA countries. These resources are largely intangible (technology, solutions) and also constitute independent components of soft power. Israeli environmental conditions have and its history of political, social and economic development had many points of convergence with the ones of SSA countries, including natural conditions of climate, soil and water; challenges related to society, economy and environment; recourse to solutions recommended by socialist ideologies; and Israeli experiences have been applied to solve SSA problems. These experiences constitute soft power resources per se, as an attractive story, as a carrier of values and in a more material sense—as examples of practical human ingenuity and achievement; they are without adoubt contained in knowledge and know-how that can be best (in terms of aid effectiveness) transferred within technical aid, in particular training the trainers.

The strictly development-oriented projects were highlighted as the most important type of Israeli activity on the African continent. Development assistance programme emerged as Israeli solutions proved to be applicable elsewhere, after adaptations that Israelis willingly made. The projects—related to labour and community organisations, cooperative agriculture (based on voluntarism, women empowerment, boosting social integration and reducing rural poverty) and industry—were designed to carry on the Israeli model with them, due to the underlying layer of moral rules, human rights and individual freedoms seen as indispensable (at least in theory) to the success of projects.² All this represented a unique mix contained in the Israeli identity in the early years, and also in that way, the projects were carriers of Israeli soft power, as defined by Nye. Moreover, development aid constitutes a contribution to realisation of Israeli duties according to the international law.

The philosophy of a constant investment in country's human capital, reflecting Jewish spirit, contributed to address Israel's development challenges and defined Israeli aid, as did lack of natural resources. To an extent, these went together with Israeli strategic culture: realisation that it cannot overpower its enemies, it has to outsmart them. A possibly ongoing change in this approach might be seen as an additional threat to Israeli soft power. Moreover, expiration (and unforeseen costs) of the revolutionary zeal of subsequent Labour Zionist and nationalistic-capitalistic revolutions leaves the country in a moment where there is no certainty if a new, unifying and common narrative will be found to guide future innovation and progress.

Israel had a big advantage, in contrast to SSA states, as its key institutions were created by the Jewish movement already before its modern statehood. Very diversified, it achieved national cohesiveness, although at high human costs oft-times. Transferability of many of these experiences was constrained. Israel favoured centralised solutions, as the SSA countries did; yet, contrary to many SSA countries, from the beginning, it was open to private and foreign initiative and external advice. Complex policies like those related to tackling inequalities profited from strong political will, popular support and—most fundamentally—good functioning of the state, a condition not met in most SSA countries. Integration policies mostly used natural integration modes. Due to cultural, social and economic differences, these modes were not transferable to SSA, just like various forms of labour movements which served as a school of activism and facilitated emergence of organised civil society. Israeli mid-20th century central planning was more rational, less politicised and of overall higher quality than in the majority of SSA countries. Israel suffered from wars, but they had no civil character and, thanks to the security doctrine adopted, they did not affect the core of the country (despite loses of life and damage, especially in 1948 and 1973) in such devastating ways as wars did affect SSA states.

Phrasing it as “comparative advantages”, Israeli aid makes conscious use of its soft power resources, though thinking of aid in terms of soft power is limited. Israeli development aid espouses what best Israel has to share with the developing world. This is soft power in the working, as confirmed overtly or indirectly by some external observers. The direct relation between Israeli aid and its soft power resources is confirmed not only by the choice of the major fields of engagement, but also by (Israeli) Department of International Cooperation (MASHAV) own account³ of how addressing particular priority fields of aid is approached, which shows clearly the connection—and awareness thereof—between Israeli soft power resources and aid extended in a number of fields. More reflections on where Israeli advantages meet particular development challenges might come out from the works of a committee reflecting on strategic framework of Israeli aid.

The weaknesses and threats to Israeli soft power identified in the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats (SWOT) analysis are confirmed to work as such in the realities of development aid to sub-Saharan countries. One exception is the issue of protectionism regarding Israeli agriculture, which was assumed to be an obstacle to the soft power projection. Bearing in mind the latter findings, it can be seen that the majority of the issues regarding African agriculture centre around small-holder agriculture and a desire to turn from a subsistence agriculture model to a one in which products are marketed on a local scale. The growth of exporting potential is a secondary issue. Moreover, Israeli market cannot be deemed to be the main target for African produce due to its limited size and similar kinds of produce. Foremost, destruction of the unique Israeli farming model which would result from abandonment of tariffs could result in dismantling of the actual know-how generation capacity that makes Israeli aid in the sphere so attractive. On the other hand, the SWOT analysis should highlight the weakness of limited possibilities for material and financial assistance.

Certain SSA governments already declare willingness to benefit from Israeli experiences in non-traditional sectors of economy: services and high-tech. The findings show a recognised potential in terms of services related to modern technologies, while potential for sharing knowledge on conserving heritage and developing tourism could be further explored. Could Israeli policies of population dispersal and provision of services be of use to SSA countries with fast population growth remains unsure. Israeli experiences in these fields are already quite old— and often were controversial and contested. Contemporarily, Israeli experiences with solving problems resulting from natural demographic growth, ensuing urbanisation and emergence of megacities are not exemplary. Israel also only now learns how to wisely connect with the modern Diaspora and enhance circularity and investments without risking brain drain.

No indication was found of an in-depth analysis of environmental impacts of Israeli agricultural projects abroad. In the long run, more reflection could be made within the Israeli aid programme on environmentally caution agricultural development, in particular ways of preventing deforestation or compensating it with afforestation—where Israel also has valid experiences, unused so far beyond Kenya and Ethiopia due to limited interest of the recipient governments. Polls show that to SSA nations, issues linked to climate change are far more concerning than global politics. Yet Israeli aid responds to many developmental needs of the countries in question, in the way they are defined by requesting governments rather than the way they are expressed in public opinion polls, in order to stay in line with the national development plans, which is demanded internationally as well. Further, democratisation and professionalisation of SSA administrations will possibly lead to bridge this gap. There seems to be also an unused potential as regards the transfer of Israeli experiences relating to prevention and eradication of malaria. The Israeli framework, in spite of its age, should be appraised for its simplicity and productivity, which could allow for good results in the contemporary context of the limited effectiveness of antimalarial efforts.

The non-governmental sector to some extent mirrors the government, as its activities also mainly concern areas where Israel has most experience, know-how and innovative solutions, such as agriculture, water management and health (in the case of businesses, also infrastructure). Their modes of operation also contribute mainly to capacity-building. On the other hand, they fill the void left by the government in the field of solar energy, going ahead of domestic achievements. The choice of the dominant sectors results not only from Israeli capacities but also overall trends in scope of aid, actual needs of receiving countries and lessons learned during the 1958–73 engagement in Africa. Nation- and state-building projects proved in the long term largely ineffective due to specificity of local conditions.

Israeli focus on East Africa (though not coupled with over-concentration of aid) is in line with its own security needs. Such a political reasoning behind aid distribution is not unique to Israel. In the case of Western countries, the trend oft-times reduced aid effectiveness; new donors, such as China, are steered by their economic and political interests. Israeli aid empowers public institutions and individuals. Yet it does not enhance governments’ capacities through direct general budget support, so it is to a very limited extent tackling the diminishing capacity of the sub-Saharan state to fulfil its public service duties, which results in transfer of vital services (water- or health-related) to NGOs. On the other hand, through its small financial input, Israeli aid is not fungible, that is, it does not relieve the recipient governments from their responsibilities (thus not allowing them to spend on non-developmental aims). Rather, it demands the participation of local authorities. Aware of the value of the expertise granted, Israeli aid expects some form of financial participation, promoting ownership and sustainability. Israeli aid demands recipients’ responsibility through small scale, demonstrative projects, adapted to local conditions, and through the “training the trainers” approach, long-term engagement and a clear phase-out schedule. Regarding effectiveness and sustainability, the approach, centred on human capacity-building, avoids manifold traps to which many Western donors fall, leading to their aid even hampering development. Israeli aid has been also helpful in “Africanisation” of beneficiaries’ economies and public administrations. Importantly, bearing in mind the development needs of SSA, Israel is a notable actor when it comes to research on most urgent sub-Saharan problems, such as tropical diseases and AIDS, desertification, desert agriculture and water management; many of these research projects include the participation of SSA nationals. Israeli aid is in line with all requests (but one: call for more direct budgetary financing) made by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD): it works on women empowerment, agriculture, it has a long-term approach supported by investment in research, it uses public-private partnership model and is beneficiary driven. Notably, Israeli aid is focused on investment in people, one of the main pillars of the IBRD vision for African development. Israeli development aid addresses many of the problems that are specific to Africa and were largely solved in other parts of the world.

It seems too early to conclude that Israel lost its unique character as a donor and now becomes part of the standardised “development industry” of entities supposedly acting in unified ways and distinguishing themselves only by volumes. Qualitatively, Israeli aid still stands apart, and in a positive way, most notably due to being overwhelmingly dominated by technical assistance and because of the way it emanates from the particular resources of the State of Israel. The fact that Israel adopts certain international norms testifies to it being a reliable international actor, but this does not require fundamental changes to the programme. In fact, modern norms regarding aid in many respects recommend modes of operation and good practices which Israel introduced a long time earlier. In terms of quantities, Israel distinguishes itself negatively, with aid volumes far below those of other donors, although the volume grows. On the other hand, Israel's specificity as a donor stems also from the fact that the technical nature of its aid makes it objectively very hard to quantify and evaluate, with ODA methodology not reflecting the actual contribution of MASHAV activities in an appropriate way. Lastly, as a consequence of the nature and scale of its programme, Israel gives project aid only and does not move to programme aid.

Privatisation of relations occurred due to a long period of no government-to-government relations and increasing role of non-state entities in the Israeli economy and social life. Although often having pitiful consequences, this process can bring positive results with regards to development cooperation, as demonstrated by vital and growing engagement of Israeli businesses and NGOs. Philosophy of supporting development through encouragement of private sector's projects, with government's role seen mainly as a facilitator, is growingly becoming the defining feature of Israel's approach to contributing to international development. The mechanisms of support for enterprises do not include major financial measures (some nascent ones exist) and are mostly limited to advice, guidance, assistance and networking. Development of such measures in the case of NGOs is more difficult, due to natural separation of this sector from the government and legal barriers for financing; still, communication is good and practical support in concrete projects extended. While enterprises modify their products and business models to suit SSA customers and find new ways for charity and knowledge transfer, NGOs professionalise while fulfilling their missions. New modes of government-business-NGOs cooperation are explored, generating prospects for innovative solutions for sustainable development. A strategic framework of state's support for businesses and NGOs is worked upon. This is yet another feature which makes Israel in line or even ahead of other donors, increasingly involving business, holding major financial and human capital, in development cooperation.

Israeli development diplomacy

Israeli development aid to SSA countries is a soft power resource; as for its actual leverage, a positive influence on Israel's overall international position, Israeli image gains among audiences that are concerned with development: aid professionals, some politicians and to some extent populace, seeking for apt solutions and appreciating their design and transfer. However, development aid is not considered (neither by Israeli policymakers, academics, nor international rankings) as an important soft power resource in relation to general public opinion, in particular the most influential, Western one, perceived as not only uninterested in development issues in general, but also often having strong, negative pre-convictions on Israel in particular. An indirect track of influence on overall international position can be imagined in the case when developing countries, attracted through development cooperation, change their voting behaviours in the UN, liquidating the automatic anti-Israeli position of the organisation. Nevertheless, development assistance is an important area for Israel's constructive cooperation with UN agencies.

Showing off and sharing what best the country has; its strong human factor, represented by the presence of and interaction with Israeli trainers and experts as well as visiting Israel for training or full programme of studies; unique features of Israeli experts, with their openness, professionalism, engagement and hands-on approach—all these specificities of Israeli technical aid make it a ready-made resource for improved people-to-people relationships. These relationships are reinforced in cases of thorough adaptation of solutions to local conditions and needs and through organisation of ad-hoc, on-request trainings for a group limited to a specific nation. A conclusion could be that thanks to these features Israeli development aid should be treated as a unique and vital resource for public diplomacy, understood as international communications aimed at shaping or supporting positive image of a country and society. To put it otherwise, Israeli aid works even unwillingly as public diplomacy, as it contributes to Israel being recognised for what it is and what it contributes. Development aid is seen in terms indicating soft power approach: in the way in which relationship is built from personal level upwards. People coming for courses in Israel are seen as relevant—having a chance to advance and impact on the situation in their home countries and also become Israeli goodwill ambassadors.⁴

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke frequently on Israeli contribution to other nations and repeatedly highlighted issues related to innovations, technologies, aid and humanitarian action as elements of this contribution. Israel's involvement, including, but by far not limited to, aid, is thus projected as an international role of Israel. Development aid is also recognised as an asset in strategic guidelines for public diplomacy, yet still, it is not used by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) as a public diplomacy tool. Aid constitutes a genuinely vital part of relations with some countries, aligned with their interests, and is an important method of building lasting relationships. Despite enormous public relation needs that could in theory cause temptation to exploit the topic of aid, there is a conscious policy of isolating the two, so as not to spoil the aims of aid by the requests of public diplomacy. There is an understanding that the underlying dynamics and success factors of both policies do not go well together, and forcing them to intermingle would be destructive to the very essence of development aid—the essence which is responsible for actually making it a soft power resource potentially so attractive to public diplomacy narratives. Moreover, it transpires that Israeli development aid is not seen as a resource for public diplomacy content which could be attractive to Western audiences. Indeed, although development-related factors are included in soft power rankings (made by Western analysts), they are not given a major role; Israeli aid is, moreover, small in scale and difficult to market. Therefore, independence of development aid from public diplomacy is additionally guaranteed through these considerations. On the level of motivations, aid is extended “because it is the right thing to do”; and although it is assisted by political or economic goals, these are not aims directly related to public diplomacy. The primary aim is successful application of the knowledge transferred in a receiving country, although there is hope that the alumni would develop a sympathetic attitude to Israel and gain positions of some influence sometime in their future carrier.

These observations paradoxically go hand in hand with a lack of transparency in the way Israel communicates its aid. Any use of development aid as a resource of content for public diplomacy would enforce more clarity on issues such as the share of MASHAV in overall aid budget, nature of ODA make-up, map of beneficiaries and numbers of scholarships. Available datasets on Israeli aid are meagre, with very little detail; evaluation and indicators structure is also modest. While the issue is partly related to the structure of official Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) statistics, it also results from limited information-sharing within the government (or even within the MFA) and the true reasons for this lacking transparency remain unidentified. Large transfers to neighbouring countries mean that the majority of Israeli aid, due to its covert nature, is by definition outside of the scope of any possibility of becoming a source for public diplomacy content. It can be also said that lack of transparency around aid budgets paradoxically serves internal cohesion of the Israeli development diplomacy, in particular in relation to SSA audiences. Its content is unpretentious and highlights activities coordinated by the MASHAV, which are actually directed towards SSA to a large extent.

Having said that, although development aid is not a part of Israeli public diplomacy, neither institutionally nor policy-wise, the way it works in practice has many features typical for the so-called new public diplomacy. Most importantly, it builds long-term relationships. This happens automatically as the projects go, without any public diplomacy-related activities. These relationships matter for pragmatic cooperation, most of the times on the people-to-people level of professionals and businessmen. This usually is related to strengthening bilateral ties but does not translate easily into behaviours at the multilateral forums. Still, positive record of aid projects did build up an image that caused SSA countries to demand more aid and their willingness to bear certain political costs in terms of relations with Arabs to get it. All this goes in line with soft power theory and also with the fact that increase in requests for aid is an informally assumed indicator for development diplomacy success. Formal indicators for public diplomacy do not fit development diplomacy well, further testifying that these two fields tread their own ways on the level of aims, target groups and modes of operation.

As for non-state actors, their role in development activities is at least as important as the state's. The state starts to develop support mechanism for engagement of such actors, based on comparative advantages (soft power resources). Large expectations of SSA countries need to, but for political reasons cannot be, practically matched by current state's capabilities. There are strong limits on what the State of Israel can offer—not only financially, also in terms of human resources. MASHAV budget aside, the diplomatic network of Israel in Africa is meagre and understaffed. Israeli embassies in SSA are usually composed of two diplomats and some local staff to deal with entire spectrum of relations (political, economic, cultural, consular) beyond development.⁵ In such circumstances, non-governmental involvement can be a part of an answer. One example is the Galana Kulalu farming project, recognised in Kenya as a Kenyan idea financed and implemented by Israel, with strong component of Israeli training, though MASHAV financial contribution is very small and the overall budget of the project will not be counted as ODA (the example needs to be treated with caution also due to its collapse under its overambitious size⁶). Enterprises such as NETAFIM, Agrostudies, but also many smaller companies, build a good image of Israeli business being careful for customers. Through the World Bank contracts, Israeli companies also give input to the African infrastructure (as they used to in the 1960s on the basis of bilateral contracts). Two success stories of Israeli NGOs with good record on scale of activities and sustainability should be underlined, Innovation: Africa and IsraAid. To those NGOs that inform openly that part of their mission is to show what Israel has to offer in terms of solving world problems, this is not their primary aim, not even the dominant one within their public affairs. It happens that the issue is raised to trigger donations.

Importantly, in the case of both (state and non-governmental) sectors, part of their success results from effective engagement of local partners. Such an active cooperation not only contributes to enhanced effectiveness and sustainability of projects but also promotes people-to-people relations; therefore, it has certain public diplomacy value.

Within Israeli digital diplomacy, aid features in a way which is proportional to the importance of development cooperation with a given country or region. Stances taken by Israeli officials in international organisations are mostly modest, merits-based, yet they also refer to Israeli achievements. Overall, information on Israeli aid is professionally prepared, spread, accessible and visible through various (also non-governmental) digital channels. Yet it needs to be born in mind that while Israel is very strong on digital communication, this content does not reach vast populations of SSA. Effective use of more traditional measures can thus be constrained by weak physical diplomatic presence on the ground. Nevertheless, the Israeli MFA can be seen as the institution which is best prepared to play public diplomacy functions abroad. Limited funding and apparent lack of clear division of labour with other concerned ministries undermine the extent to which the MFA can play this role effectively.

Historical and current instances of international recognition—most profoundly those emanating from the UN system—of the quality of Israeli experts, projects and trainings, both state-run and non-governmental, testify to the worth of Israeli development solutions and their popularisation which does not go unnoticed. Rewarded on the international forums, aid undoubtedly has a positive image-building impact in the circles interested. Thus, Israeli development aid to SSA countries is used as a source of positive content in international communications in a realistic way, which bears in mind that possible audiences include only groups having particular interest in development and solving global problems more generally. This actually includes a portion of the politically engaged youth—a potentially important target audience, unless already prejudiced against Israel.

Sub-Saharan perceptions of Israeli aid programme

The vast majority of SSA countries gained independence from the European colonial rulers within 20 years since Israel's regained statehood. They admired the achievements of the Jewish state. This resulted from Israel's particular features, departing from circumstances which were in many respects very similar to those in SSA, and from an overall impression made by the story of the “miraculous” emergence and advance. In a short time, Israel, the “older brother” in independence and development, became a development model for them. In this romanticised vision, both sides saw each other as sharing experience of being victims of discrimination, persecution and genocides, willing to build their new, free nations after struggle with external enemies. Israel's first-hand knowledge of decolonisation process allowed it to establish meaningful relationships with new nations even before independencies. Israel was seen for quite a long time as a possible bridge between the blocks, foremost due to its special economic model. Mixing socialism and capitalism, in contrast to other developing countries—including many sub-Saharan—Israel avoided the mistake of overconcentration on industry and neglect of agriculture.

Today Israel is seen as a democracy (maintaining peaceful transition of power, separation of powers, independent judiciary, integrity of the civil service and tackling instances of corruption), a champion of development and a state suffering from Islamic threat which many SSA countries also face. Its society, a blend of people from all over the world, with strong presence of Oriental Jews, is appreciated as a model for coexistence of people of different colour, background and tradition and of opportunities for individual's social advancement. Israel is also able to be an active partner of the UN development efforts. Israel's innovative know-how on farming in extreme environmental conditions has been among the main “foreign aid products” of the state until today. The popularity of Israeli courses and conferences regarding desertification proves that Israeli experience (despite lack of consistent internal policies on the issue) is seen as relevant and brings hope that results of climate change can be tackled. Experiences in combating desertification can be assessed as one of the most important Israeli soft power resources, in particular versus SSA countries.

The growing interest of Israel and SSA countries in bilateral relations did not automatically translate into increased volumes of direct official Israeli development aid to these countries. The overall volume of ODA to SSA as counted by the OECD, in 2010–17, had a downward trend in terms of absolute numbers (volumes received by individual countries) and in particular in terms of share of SSA in Israeli ODA. The drop in SSA allocation was to some extent related to an end of relocation of Ethiopian Jews. However, methodological issues make this overall conclusion vague. It is not easy to establish to what extent the SSA countries do benefit from the recent growth in overall Israeli ODA, including in the multiregional aid category. It also has to be remembered that ODA volumes are not particularly appropriate to describe Israeli development aid. At the same time, however, there are certain phenomena that balance the scale towards convergence with intensified bilateral relations, as “development cooperation” indicates a wider understanding than a limited ODA definition. The role of technology and know-how transfers not qualifying as ODA, in particular those done by private enterprises, is as hard to overestimate, as it is hard to quantify. Moreover, the involvement of Israeli NGOs and companies operating in SSA for development indeed is on the rise. Bearing in mind the above, on the other side of the equation—and most importantly for this work—the overall perception of the recipients seems to be that they actually get increasing aid and have good prospects to sustain the trend.

Overall, Israeli technical assistance is indeed seen as desirable and sought after in African countries because it is perceived as conducive to their development, even if its scale cannot lead to breakthroughs. Israeli-designed solutions are perceived as successful, emerging from similar natural, social and economic conditions, adaptable to local circumstances, replicable through local ownership, in some cases even representing similar values (small-holder, family units in farming). Its very form—technical assistance—gives the beneficiaries their agency, share of responsibility, makes this “aid” more of a genuine “cooperation” between more equal sides, empowering and encouraging the recipient instead of enhancing aid dependence.

From the literature overview and interviews carried out, no serious critique of Israeli development aid emerges. Some bias could result from the fact that African interviewees were based in Israel. However, bearing in mind their straightforwardness in speaking of what they do not like in Israel, it is probable that actually there is no particular concern about aid, aside from its small size. Israeli aid is perceived as being prepared well, in dialogue with recipients, responsive to their needs and to national development plans. Its small-scale nature helps avoiding mistakes. There is also a feeling of responsibility on the African side for the use made with what is received, although the right solutions are not always in place. Overall, SSA attitudes seem to be guided by practical, utilitarian motives. While they are not changing their outlooks on the world affairs as expressed in the UN, they want pragmatic cooperation with Israel, seen as useful in bringing development to their countries. Due to democratisation, governments seek for solutions that work and are ready to invest in them. As in the 1960s, the friendships that Israel had built are mostly anchored in aid cooperation. Many of the countries enjoying the fastest and most sustainable growth (Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria) are among the closest cooperators of Israel, including in the field of aid. Yet Israel helps also aid orphans and the poorest countries, such as Togo and Senegal.

The role of religion emerged as an undervalued factor in the way sub-Saharans approach Israel. Available literature mostly speaks about religion as important for SSA Christian countries fearing radical Islam. It does not speak much about strong and proactive Christian faith as a positive motivator to maintain ties and support Israel. One reason could be that existing research mostly deals with the Cold War times and presents largely Israeli—ergo Jewish—point of view, which does not underline the issue, and for good reasons. The conflation between Judaism and Christianity that appears to often take place in Africa weakens tensions and prevents anti-Semitism, but also can appear as ignorant, offending or even denying Jewish uniqueness and awakening recollections of attempts at conversion. This avoidance of the topic—beyond acknowledgement that being in the Holy Land is an important motive for African course participants, a significant feature of their stay in Israel and benefits their social position back home—might be also due to the novel nature of one particular phenomenon: Evangelical, Pentecostal churches gaining large adherence in many SSA countries. Some of these new religious movements propagate a vision of redemption which leads through geographical growth of Israel and a bloody war against its enemies, in the course of which most of the Jews would die and others would convert to Christianity. Although this is not a mainstream view among these churches, it could potentially lead to very hard-line positions of “support” for Israel, which are actually not good for the reputation and the very future of this country, thus possibly embarrassing or even dangerous. These ideas resonate well with some—marginal so far—far right strands of Jewish messianic movements. Related organisations run a platform comfortable for the Netanjahu governments, though more radical. For example, the International Christian Embassy Jerusalem has a growing position in SSA and boasts having influenced several sub-Saharan governments to take more pro-Israeli stances. Therefore, these organisations receive some support. Still, they are also perceived with suspicion by the Israeli mainstream (and the Chief Rabbinate) and definitely are not the ally that this mainstream looks for.⁷

While it is not within the scope of this work to investigate to which extent the eschatological narrative actually gains ground in SSA—traditional churches are still dominant—it can be said that already the general protestant tradition of reading the Bible, understanding it literally and calls for gathering of personal wealth positively predispose adherents towards Israel seen as the Holy Land and towards getting life-changing trainings, respectively. Pentecostalism encourages radical changes in life and personal empowerment through hard work, taking responsibility for own fate, searching for new development methods and women empowerment (although not necessarily leading communities out of poverty and with mixed record of influence on state accountability).⁸ Interviews show that the vibrant way in which Christianity expresses itself in Africa, with a direct connection between everyday lives and religion and some traditional beliefs penetrating Christianity, leads also to spontaneous references to Israel as a country of miracles or to being in Israel on training as a “blessing”. This, however, should be put in perspective of the overall mindset of the people in question, who use such phrases in their everyday life, also with regards to issues non-related to Israel. Thus, Christian heritage de facto works as a public diplomacy tool—soft power resource of Israel, an attraction factor in relations with SSA countries, attributing to Israel treats of the Holy Land. This soft power resource—most profoundly from the point of view of this work—can in fact be said to be promoting development, through the way it works in the particular case of SSA protestant communities.

Israeli public diplomacy is not much focused on SSA, yet in this context, it is even more visible why historical circumstances, especially thousands of years of Jewish legacy in the Middle East (ME) and origins of the modern state have to be discussed. Israel needs to reclaim the story which has been distorted by its adversaries and inspire discussion on the nature of current armed conflicts, the powers behind them and their interests and impacts on local populations, including incitement. Having said that, Israeli settlement on occupied territories - which, according to international consensus (even if undermined by certain steps taken by Donald Trump's administration), should constitute future Palestinian state - and lack of clear policy as to where Israel sees its future borders is a huge liability for public diplomacy efforts, also in SSA, as it is difficult to be rationally explained (other than by radical Evangelical eschatology).

Beyond that, Israeli public diplomacy could still benefit more from popularisation of the country's soft power resources. The Israeli success story has a potential for creation of a narrative with a power to attract. What could make this power even greater is the story of how these successes are shared and turned into a contribution to the well-being of other nations. More attention could be paid to inclusion, in the remit of public diplomacy towards certain audiences, of facts regarding Israeli international humanitarian and developmental efforts. As the theoretical discussion showed, such an inclusion does not need to and should not be limited to straightforward broadcasting of the news. Development aid can be a conducive platform for launching partnerships and building mutual understanding. Even aid done by nationals working within NGOs, without any governmental support, has a particular public diplomacy dimension as a “side product”. The issue is that any such inclusion has to be done smartly, to let the development work remain a genuine effort, which might be based on political understandings, but should not aim at political gains. While concluding here on an untapped potential, one also needs to reflect on ensuing tensions which so far led to a restraint in policy.

Between bilateral pragmatism and multilateral geopolitics?

As demonstrated, Israel and SSA countries shared a lot in their early development approaches, placed within a similar political framework of calls for national unity for the sake of state- and nation-building, coupled with social and economic integration measures, some instances of consociationalism and search for and development of own ways of social and economic organisation, with strong role played by the state. There are similarities also in their foreign policies, as they aimed at being independent of outside powers, did not want to be embroiled in the Cold War confrontation and were hopeful of the UN as a platform for solving conflicts and developmental cooperation.

African states are perceived in Israel as part of the strategic environment and as essential in the pursuit of active foreign policy. While East Africa is of vital strategic importance, West Africa is vital politically. Paraphrasing the original periphery doctrine, essentiality of the Southern neighbourhood can be seen in tandem with the question of the Northern one: although there is a very close cooperation with Greece and Cyprus, the European Union (EU) as a whole is seen as unaccountable. Modern periphery doctrine can be construed as an Israeli answer to its regional isolation, fragility of alliances with Great Powers, politicisation of the UN and lack of progress of peace process. While not a strategic game-changer, it facilitates inclusion of Israel into international community, giving it legitimacy and agency, posing difficulties for its enemies willing to define what Israel is and how it should be treated. Bringing more equality between the sides, the doctrine can indirectly serve a quest for peace. For this to work, however, Israel needs to treat African states as partners, concentrate on common goals and cooperation, be humble about its contribution and not overly exploit the relationships for immediate gains. Simultaneously, the “betrayal complex” is strong and observable in a resentment, or institutional memory, of the foreign policymakers. Relations are built with pragmatism, caution and straightforwardness as regards Israeli interests. The “betrayal” discourse might be behind cautiousness in relations, despite the publicity of “the big come back”.⁹

Israeli security dilemma—being caught between the need to defend itself and the need to secure international sympathy—seems to be increasingly understood by African partners. Public diplomacy is an important tool for explaining the nature of this dilemma to the outside world. The frames of African understanding of Israel's security situation are as follows: they consider Arab rejections to recognise and negotiate with Israel as illegitimate, they object to the threats to the existence of the State of Israel, they do not support isolation of Israel, they oppose Israeli occupation and they support creation of independent Palestine. These fundamental precepts are behind their current positive predispositions as well as limitations to them.

The Israeli-sub-Saharan relations undoubtedly depend also on various factors beyond the direct influence of interested parties. Overall, history of Israeli relations with SSA confirms the linkage between the effectiveness of Israeli development aid, as a part of Israeli soft power, with the processes of geopolitical changes in the international environment in which Israel pursues its foreign policy objectives. Still, certain nuances undermine such a straightforward approach. Indeed, aid served as a backbone of development of relations with SSA until the Arab pressure, blackmail and bribe, coupled with internal policies’ turnabout in most SSA countries as well as adversely changing perceptions of Israel between the wars of 1967 and 1973, forced them to quit relations (1973); while nowadays, when the Arab states lost their power and arguments and relaxed their attitude towards Israel, the relationship is again blossoming. While generally true, however, this statement does not pay due attention to the fact that the positive image which Israel built through its aid in the course of the 1960s indeed lasted and allowed for restoration of ties based on cooperation for development. Moreover, geopolitical approach does not pay enough attention to the agency of SSA states, in particular in the contemporary context, when their policies are more independent from alliances with powers and very pragmatic, allowing them to benefit from good relations with both Israel and the Arab countries, reciprocating to each side in a different way. Still, some SSA states, in particular in East Africa, are found to be more dependent on geopolitical circumstances. As a result, the gap between their very good bilateral relations with Israel and voting behaviours at the UN is greater. Development aid, thanks to its multilevel scope of operation, generates bonds that transcend hard-core politics which tend to be most affected by geopolitics.

More specifically, Cold War dynamics was one of the particularly influential geopolitical factors, with Israel drawn into the Western orbit and SSA countries into the Soviet one on the grounds of what was their respective elites’ understanding of the guiding values and interests. In the case of Israel, the choice was to a large extent informed by essential identity of the state and growing hostility of the Soviets, while in the case of SSA—by anti-colonial sentiments, views of particular leaders and deepening crises. As a result, despite similar starting point, the two sides grew apart, even if they did not really receive what they hoped for from their allies while paying a heavy price (on Israel's side: growing Soviet support for Arab agenda in Africa, lack of American support for Israeli development programme, Israel's engagement in the Congo, SSA dissolution of ties; on SSA side: failure of Marxist policies, lack of effective financial and developmental aid from Arab countries, penetration by radical Islam). Evolution of Israeli policy is marked by a steady decline in idealism, which manifested itself also in its attitude to the UN. On the other hand, the African states became an important part of the “Third World” block, having power to influence the UN decisions, while they also contributed to the fall of UN General Assembly to ritualised politics—and move away from solving world problems. At the same time, development issues are one of the main fields of engagement of Israel in the UN forums. Israel promotes resolutions, is active in Nairobi offices of HABITAT and UN Environment Program and delegates experts. These contributions can be seen by the developing world as constructive engagement, while it is increasingly difficult for Arab states to torpedo or politicise them. Israel's cooperation with Western organisations, in particular in the area of research, gives it even more credence and attractiveness which can be treated as a soft power resource.

The 1973 is the year of a historical breakthrough which affected manifold internal and external platforms, in a cumulative chain reaction caused by geopolitical factors. It was the year of the Yom Kippur War, initiating fundamental changes in Israeli internal (move towards capitalism) and foreign (move away from idealism) policies, of the end of dynamic Israeli-African cooperation, as well as of dramatic increase in oil prices initiated by politically motivated Arab countries, which got upper hand in their quest for domination over African oil-dependent politics which, due to crises to which also Arab oil embargo contributed, started to be governed by predominantly authoritarian rulers. Each of these events, as demonstrated, had profound, lasting and mostly negative consequences.

Decline of the Soviet power marked the end of the Cold War dynamics as an impact factor. It contributed to the slow renewal of ties between Israel and African states, a process which was further enhanced by the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. To conclude here on the issue of the evolution of Arab states’ foreign policy towards SSA and of Israeli-Arab conflict as a factor influencing the effectiveness of Israeli development diplomacy, there is an only partial positive relation between the two. Israeli development diplomacy, understood as public diplomacy based on development aid, has as its audience populations and elites of the recipient countries and the developed world. The fact that Arab countries increasingly cooperate with Israel, nuance their support for the Palestinian movement and that this movement resorted first to terrorism and then to unrealistic diplomatic unilateralism should serve greater susceptibility to more subtle narratives about Israel, including its aid programme. In both audiences as well, instances of escalation of violence between Israel and the Palestinians damage the Israeli image. Still, these tendencies can be said to be stronger in the developing (SSA) countries which used to suffer from Arab politics themselves and are vitally interested in development. Israeli development diplomacy is much more affected by Arab policies and by the conflict in the case of Western audiences, uninterested in development, over-focused on the conflict issue, while framing it in ways that are often prejudiced against Israel. On a more general level and partly explaining the latter attitude, a meagre development aid programme will never be able to affect public opinion more than pictures of Palestinian suffering, while Israeli governments’ tolerance, if not support for settlements in the West Bank, is a stumbling block for efforts aimed at radical reversal of the way Israel is portrayed and perceived. In the 2010s, the negative impacts of the failure of Oslo on Israeli-African relations are, however, not this direct, as both sides are already in a different place with their development and diplomacy, and most probably due to the image of the Palestinians in the African eyes also evolving.

SSA attitude towards the Israeli nuclear programme, unproblematic as it does not concern SSA nowadays, is an example of pragmatism and understanding for Israeli security considerations. As for Israel's relation with South Africa, the key observations are that it largely intensified only after the majority of SSA countries broke relations and that SSA countries themselves were not consistent in the treatment of countries cooperating with South Africa. The treatment of sub-Saharan refugees in Israel did not resonate much in the course of this research, for reasons which are hard to speculate upon (one could be relatively low scale of the issue, if seen against the overall scale of displacement of African peoples).

New elements add to complexity of Israeli policymaking: the evolving role of China in SSA development, leading to emergence of possibilities for cooperation but also competition or even new block rivalry, and the expansionist policy of Iran, which has clearly anti-Israeli agenda. As said, foreign policy priorities of many SSA countries moved away from ideological struggles and towards pursuit of development. Historically, Israeli MFA preferred to work with democracies, yet aid was not conditioned on internal system; also today there is no such linkage. The Israeli public is divided on the issue; according to the 2016 Foreign Policy Index by the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies (MITVIM) and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 52% of responders stated that Israel shall not consider regime type as a factor when building ties with other countries, while 48% that it should. On the aid-politics’ juncture, it was clear in the 1960s already that inability of enforcing strict conditions on the receiving state without endangering its friendship contributed to the failure of some of the Israeli aid projects.¹⁰ Moreover, distortions to Israeli models introduced in some countries impeded clear judgements on the value of aid and its role in relations.

The question also arises whether nowadays it is realistic to expect that development aid should impact international behaviours, such as the UN voting patterns, of sub-Saharan countries. Increased Israeli trade and technology cooperation with India and China (in significant share also constituted of technical cooperation) was presented as interlinked with cooling of relationship with the EU, but change in international behaviour of such powers towards Israel was not much expected.¹¹ To what extent could this be different in the case of smaller countries? SSA UN voting is not necessarily an expression of sympathy, it results from pressures and is bound to trade-offs which might have nothing to do with the subject of the vote. The UN gives SSA countries a platform where they can show their unity and independence. The people-to-people relations built between Israel and SSA countries in the 1960s contributed an indispensable capital of goodwill which made restoration of relations desired and plausible. The main issue that makes Israeli policymakers disillusioned—that whatever Israel does or does not, it will not influence those who deny its right to exist—is not applicable to SSA countries, generating some enthusiasm despite the “betrayal complex”.

In 1969, Rodin observed that the mutuality of relations between Israel and Africa should be expected on the level of overall relations, in which the African side's share should be a “political friendship towards Israel”. He acknowledged that Israel aid programme was successful in gaining ground for diplomacy in Africa; he even over-optimistically projected that it might be ultimately successful in the larger goal of fostering Israel's relations with Arab neighbours. On the other hand, he concluded that Israel is in no position to demand this friendship in exchange for aid and that the aid programme can work as supportive of positive relations only if it remains as it is—uninterested in direct political benefits. The linkage between aid, political relations and situation in the UN was in a vague way made in 1997—when the MFA Director General put politicisation of the UN to the attention of African countries and called for working together with Israel on this forum, which was to become a sort of an extension of the cooperation taking place on development.¹² Political benefits of Israeli aid can more rationally be expected and pursued in bilateral sphere and vis-a-vis international organisations active in development. SSA countries are at the forefront of the evolving UN voting patterns, with increasing number of them choosing to be absent or abstain at some controversial votes, making adoption of anti-Israeli motions more difficult. While the situation improves from the point of view of Israeli interests, the particular cases of votes display a more nuanced picture, with many instances of positive evolution, but also some unpleasant surprises harmful to Israeli interests. By extrapolating Rodin's observations to the current realities, it might be concluded that a new self-assurance of Israeli diplomacy—resulting from a political platform of Netanjahu's governments (and a “betrayal complex” to some extent), but also from the geopolitical realities in its international environment and increased recognition of the value of its technologies—invalidates Rodin's prescription. At the time of writing, Israel started to openly condition its aid, in rhetoric and practice, on international behaviours of beneficiaries.

This turn towards a clear linkage between aid and friendship was demonstrated by the 2016–17 cancellation of aid programmes for Senegal. Anti-Israeli resolutions triggered also cuts in Israeli funding for the UN: US dollar (USD) 8–9 million were slashed from the Israeli contribution and moved to boost aid for developing countries supportive of Israel, as a part of Israeli and American efforts to tame discrimination by the UN and its agencies against Israel.¹³ Will this trend become an element of a rational and balanced “smart power” strategy? The risk is real that Israel starts to treat its development aid rather as an economic, hard power tool, to the detriment of its current long-term effectiveness in building genuinely positive relations.

Aside from a mid-term goal of changing the SSA UN voting patterns, Israel aims at gaining an observer status in the AU, which would enable it to influence discussions in which Palestinian President participates; moreover, the status is seen as a certificate of belonging, a recognition which opens up new cooperation possibilities.¹⁴ The growing interest of the AU in development issues can be conducive to Israeli efforts. To its detriment, the AU still holds a profound role of foreign policy coordination and external representation of the African continent—in particular at the UN. Moreover, reliability of the global, international legal order remains a valid interest of SSA. Cooperation with regional organisations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), is less demanding since they are rather preoccupied with pragmatic matters. The usefulness of such forums was confirmed when ECOWAS summit served as an occasion for Israeli-Senegalese 2017 rapprochement. Initiatives such as Israel-Africa Summit which Togo proposed to host might also transcend geography of international organisations and lead to the emergence of “a group of willing”, particularly interested in cooperation with Israel.

One more dimension is economic. In the words of Paul Hirschson, the interest in other countries prosperity is linked to hopes for a future cooperation on a different level. In these terms, development aid equals new public diplomacy—building mutually beneficial relations. As explained, Israel and sub-Saharan nations are well predisposed towards such a relation, yet “the innocence has been lost” in 1973, when “persecution complex” was triggered on in the minds of Israelis. There are efforts to rebuild relations, yet things are remembered. This is why the perceived “politicisation” of aid is a natural human reaction. After 1973, it is Africa's due to prove it can be counted upon as a partner. Israel is aware that each USD of its aid is worth much more than the USD of any other donor and that many sub-Saharan countries would like to host an Israeli embassy. Moreover, according to Hirschson, Israel cannot afford having 30 embassies in Africa now.¹⁵ This narrative proves Israeli diplomacy is self-aware, emboldened and seeks concrete results.

The list of priority countries for Israeli aid is stable, as analysis of political relations and development aid displayed, with only small changes. They contain many small- and middle-size countries, alongside some regional powers. They mostly reflect the lists of countries cooperating the closest in other fields (yet not necessarily in trade). Paradoxically, decline in overall aid for SSA led to a situation when even priority countries were not assigned enhanced volumes, except for Burkina Faso and Ghana. Interestingly, friendliness of countries with which Israel has strong security and business ties—such as Ethiopia and Kenya—has certain limits (as measured by voting behaviours), due to their overall geopolitical fragility resulting from geographical proximity of the Arab world. In turn, among those countries with which development issues are the essence of relations and which do not have such constraints, there are examples of reliable friends—such as Ivory Coast or Togo. Rwanda also is among those less dependent on geopolitics, considered unimportant in the early decades, nowadays it is among the closest allies of Israel, pursuing a path of rapid development despite increasingly illiberal political system. A clear case of aid being (at least officially) behind a breakthrough in relations is Guinea, which entered into relations with Israel following aid received during the Ebola outbreak. Interestingly, some countries which receive relatively more Israeli aid are also among main beneficiaries of Arab aid, so to some extent, Israeli and Arab aid compete: in Senegal most profoundly, but also Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Ivory Coast (despite its population being largely pro-Israeli) and Togo, while Ghana, Kenya and Uganda are beneficiaries of Israeli aid where such a competition is not much visible.

Recognition of Israel in the eyes of sub-Saharans can be cautiously assumed (a hypothesis not verified within this research) to strengthen as a result of the 2010s events in the Arab world. By extension from the importance of Christianity for SSA discussed earlier, there can be an easily deduced assumption that what matters to them is that Israel is ostensibly the only ME country where Christians are safe. This is another factor cementing the bond and engaging the Africans in defence of Israel against delegitimisation. This engagement can be counted upon since it is based on strong religious convictions and emotions. Simultaneously, strong position and politicisation of Islam in certain countries should be borne in mind as a factor leading affairs in the contrary direction.

This, however, does not automatically translate into sentiments of the entire populations. While the SSA governments are willing to cooperate with Israel and extract as much technical advice as possible, without necessarily changing their voting behaviours, and Christian populations are usually positively inclined, pro-Palestinian or Islamic sentiments cannot be ignored. Improved state of democracy, wealth, communication and education on the one hand and the growth of radical movements in SSA on the other can both lead to increase in the need for pro-Israeli advocacy explaining the realities of the conflict. As in other regions, this advocacy might yet not be successful due to overall weaknesses of Israeli public diplomacy.

While African states support a “two states for two peoples” formula, calling for creation of the state of Palestine alongside Israel (the “alongside” underlined), it is increasingly palpable that the PA's unilateral path, Hamas intransigence and lack of commitment to finding a durable solution on the Israeli side lead to perpetuation of the state of gradual dismemberment of the framework which was supposed to lead to the emergence of the Palestinian state. Moreover, certain Arab states do not make use of chances for development and stick to political radicalism—from which SSA states run away favouring development. This radicalism, which used to be of Marxist and nationalist provenance, becomes increasingly religious and nationalists. The issue was not part of this research, but it could be provisionally assumed that for some Africans, the state of underdevelopment and civil strife in which many ME Arab nations dwell is a negative point of reference for them and associated with periods in their own past which are considered erroneous; many SSA countries are on the path of growth and increase responsibility for own destiny. This does not change their political support for Palestinian independence, yet Israel, a state preoccupied with own development and security and perceived as uninterested in fighting empty political fights, is supposedly for them a better example to follow and attractive to maintain ties with.

During the late 2010s, Israeli diplomacy was more outspoken as regards the scale of its true relations with Arab countries with which it formally had no relations. It also appeared that Arab states’ representatives were willing to underline the importance of launching cooperation with Israel and did this not only behind closed doors. This was attributed, in the case of the Gulf states most primarily, to the lowering importance of the Palestinian question and disillusionment about the Palestinian political elites, coupled with high importance attached to the Iranian threat. Arguably, Israeli experiences with water management and agriculture could be of particular use to its neighbours as far as Iran, suffering from drought and consequent disturbances, exacerbated by rapid growth of populations. This applies not only to the achievements already in place, but also to lessons constantly learned on the sustainability and unexpected consequences of introduction of modern solutions to the issues in question, as well as tackling these emerging problems (such as new water-energy balance in case of desalination or soil quality issues resulting from the use of recycled water). Forecasts say that if climate change is not mitigated, parts of the ME might become inhabitable due to prolonged draughts, increase in extreme weather phenomena and desertification of semi-arid zones. It might be presumed that for the sub-Saharan side, it might be sometimes difficult to understand why the chance of Israeli technologies for development answering manifold problems affecting the countries all over the ME is not taken by struggling Arab countries. At the time of writing, preceding the September 2020 peace treaties between Israel and United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, development cooperation with Arab countries was mostly covert, while Israeli technologies bought more or less secretly. Chances for use of Israeli history of development as a public diplomacy tool in relations with these countries’ populations seemed limited. Only serious moves towards “warm peace” by both Israel and the Arab states (which could still be conditioned on progress on the Palestinian self-determination) could possibly affect this state of affairs.

Israeli commitments regarding extension of development cooperation to SSA countries, made on the wave of the intensification of cooperation, need to be fulfilled to keep up the momentum in bilateral relations and to expand its effects on multilateral forums. Efforts will most probably be continued to primarily use the potential and interest of private companies in meeting these commitments—here interests of the government, businesses and certain academic and NGO circles converge. The result—increased technology transfer through enterprises—will, however, be hard to verify by outside observers, as it will not be seen in ODA statistics or trade volumes. Another source of enhanced aid could potentially come from finances redirected from Israel's contribution to the UN budget, though Israel would probably not risk being stripped of voting rights as a result of prolonged non-payments.

As for the prospects of influencing the stances taken by sub-Saharan countries in international forums on issues related to Israeli interests, the evolution will be slow and by far not only related to development cooperation. Rationalisation of SSA countries’ external policies includes tiredness with Arab, in particular Palestinian, politics characterised by internal divisions, violence and radicalisation; at the same time, Israeli policies vis-a-vis the Palestinian question, seemingly floating between reactiveness and expansionism, make a radical change of SSA stances difficult. While bilateral level will be characterised by pragmatism and understanding, the conflict will most probably remain a matter of high importance on the multilateral, political level of Israeli-sub-Saharan relations. Aside from more aid, more Israeli diplomatic engagement will be needed to persuade certain countries, unless a positive breakthrough is reached with regard to the Palestinian issue. Political conditionality of aid, as unethical as it might seem, might be needed and in fact maybe even desired by some recipients so that they can justify their abandonment of radical stances inherited from the 1970s. What might, speculatively, tip the balance in favour of voting for Israel in the case of certain countries could be the influence of the religious factor, exerting pressure in particular on the mid-level leadership, but also possibly through convictions of the political elites and socially active citizenry. Certain impacts might also be spearheaded by a process of normalisation of ties with Israel by the UAE and Bahrain.

In the longterm, but not so very distant perspective, processes that affect the very core of Israeli soft power resources—national unity and spirit; quality of life, education, health, environment and agriculture; condition of its democracy—will decide on Israel's future attractiveness as a source of developmental solutions.

Recommendations for future research

On the level of international relations theory, further development of soft power concept is needed, in particular so that it provides a more elaborate and structured framework for studying and in particular measuring the observed phenomena.

When it comes to researching development aid, development of evaluation tools allowing a clearer assessment of the long-term impacts of development aid projects consisting of technical aid is a great challenge. Addressing it would, however, profoundly substantiate the way in which the worth of projects addressing human capital is evaluated. Similarly, development of adequate frameworks that would allow for an appropriate study of the new phenomena of the growing involvement of enterprises in global development efforts would contribute to the study of development cooperation as a part of international relations in which non-governmental entities play an increasing role—on their own initiative and upon active encouragement by established national and intergovernmental donors.

On a more empirical level, launching of a structured, due diligence project which would study the image of Israeli development aid in local, national and regional media of the SSA countries emerged as a research agenda which could enrich the knowledge of the SSA perception of Israeli aid enormously. Such a study, to be reliable, would need to be based on an in-depth knowledge of the relevant media markets (including new media) and be structured in a way which would take into account such factors as given article's visibility, readership, authorship, nature of content (press agency vs. original), nature and affiliation of the medium etc. The study could be enlarged towards a comparative perspective, including also a study of images of particular Arab states and Iran. More in-depth public opinion polls, however difficult to obtain, would also be helpful.

And lastly, an interdisciplinary, well-structured project is needed to study interlinkages between the new phenomena in SSA Christianity and the image of Israel. While contributing to analyses solidly grounded in political sciences, such a research project would need to have due regard for the theological fundaments and anthropological analyses of the true meanings of particular beliefs and practices and their influence on perceptions, predispositions—and have the ability to link these observations with political decision-making processes in particular polities.

Notes

1 Laufer 1967: 214–217.

2 Rodin 1969: 104–128, 136.

3 MASHAV Guiding Principles.

4 Interviews with: Noam Katz, Adam Levene.

5 Interview with Leo Vinovezky.

6 Alushula 2017.

7 Bühler 2017.

8 Obadare 2016.

9 Interview with Lynn Schler.

10 Laufer 1967: 95.

11 Sales 2015.

12 Rodin 1969:8, 183–185, 190–191; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1997.

13 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017b.

14 Interview with Leo Vinovezky.

15 Interview with Paul Hirschson.

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List of Interviews

Dr. Yael Abessira, The Tamar Golan Africa Center, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, 11.09.2015.

Adi Arbel, Project Manager, the Institute for Zionist Strategies (phone conversation), 01.12.2016.

Danny Ariel, Africa Commercial Project Manager at NETAFIM, 15.06.2015.

Kwasi Asante, Minister Counsellor, Embassy of Ghana in Israel, 29.05.2017.

Ornit Avidar, WaterWays Solutions Ltd., founder and managing director, 20.03.2017.

Shlomo Avital, Chairman, Israel-Africa Friendship Association, former Ambassador to Rwanda, Zaire (CAR), Senegal and non-resident Ambassador to Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone (phone conversation), 21.05.2017.

Dr. Tal Azran and Dr. Moran Yarchi, School of Communication, Interdisciplinary Centre Herzliya, 02.02.2017.

Arielle Baruch, Project10 volunteer in Ghana, 22.01.2017.

Dr. Aliza Belman-Inbal, Hartog School of Government and Policy – The Pears Program for Innovation for International Development, Tel Aviv University, 15.06.2015.

Genna Brand, Director of Communications, Innovation: Africa, 30.04.2017.

Prof. Naomi Chazan, Head of the School of Government and Society, Academic College of Tel-Aviv-Yaffo, 15.06.2015.

Jonathan McClory, author of The New Persuaders reports (electronic correspondence), 19.06.2012.

Dr. Yaakov Garb, Bona Terra Department of Man in the Desert, the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 09.06.2015.

Prof. Eytan Gilboa, School of Communication, Bar Ilan University, 18.01.2017.

Emmanuel Edugwo, political attaché, Embassy of Nigeria in Israel (phone conversation), 18.05.2017.

Paul Hirschson, Ambassador of the State of Israel to Senegal, MASHAV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23.04.2017.

Dr. Paula Kabalo, Research Institute for the Study of Israel and Zionism, the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 09.06.2015.

Hava Karrie, Deputy Director, Golda Meir Mount Carmel International Training Center for Community Development, 17.06.2015.

Noam Katz, former Ambassador to Nigeria, Deputy Director General, Media and Public Affairs, Public Diplomacy Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25.05.2017.

Shulamit Kurzon van Gelder, Director, Planning and Evaluation Unit, MASHAV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 08.05.2017.

Prof. Noam Lemelshtrich Latar, Dean of School of Communication, Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, 22.01.2017.

Adam Levene, Policy and International Relations Department, MASHAV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 08.05.2017.

Dr. Zach Levey, Head of the Division of International Relations, University of Haifa, 16.06.2015.

Dana Manor, Deputy Director, Society for International Development (SID) – Israel branch, 19.04.2017.

Anthony T. Mathenge, First Secretary (Political), Embassy of Kenya in Israel, 29.05.2017.

Yoram Morad, Head of Culture Media & Public Relations, Division of Cultural & Scientific Affairs, Public Diplomacy Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23.04.2017.

Martin Mwanambale, Ambassador of Zambia in Israel, 17.05.2017.

Ophelie Namiech, Senior Director for Institutional Effectiveness and Organizational Learning, IsraAid, 18.05.2017.

Prof. Arye Oded, Head of the African Unit, The Harry S. Truman Research Institute for The Advancement of Peace, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 26.04.2017.

Benny Omer, former Ambassador of the State of Israel to Cameroon (2003-07: covering also Central African Republic, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville and Equatorial Guinea) and to Ivory Coast (2009–2013, covering also Benin, Burkina Faso, Liberia and Togo), MASHAV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 03.04., 23.04., 08.05.2017.

Michael Ordman, initiator of the Good News from Israel blog (electronic correspondence) 30.11.2016.

Shahar Re’em, Programme Coordinator, Golda Meir Mount Carmel International Training Center for Community Development, 17–18.06.2015.

Dikla Rom, former Secretary of the Israeli Embassy in Ghana (phone conversation), 18.05.2017.

Yudith Rosenthal, Director, Aharon Ofri International Training Centre, 23.04.2017.

James Alau Sabasio, Senior Capacity Development Manager/PC-South Sudan, IsraAID (electronic correspondence), 28.05.2017.

Dr. Lynn Schler, Director, The Tamar Golan Africa Center, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, 14.06.2015, 15.03.2017.

Simon Clement Seroussi, graduate of Ben Gurion University of the Negev, 18.06.2015.

Prof. Zachi Shalom, the Institute for National Security Studies, 14.06.2015.

Students coming from Sub-Saharan Africa countries, Midreshet Ben Gurion – Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Campus in Sde Boker, 09.12.2016.

Students coming from Sub-Saharan Africa countries, The Robert H. Smith Faculty of Agriculture, Food and Environment, Rehovot campus of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 27.03.2017.

Leo Vinovezky, former Head of Mission to Ethiopia, Projects Department, MASHAV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 08.05.2017.

Prof. Gadi Wolfsfeld, Interdisciplinary Centre Herzliya, School of Communication (Skype conversation), 05.02.2017.

Index

Locators in italics represent figures and bold indicate tables in the text.

1967 (6 day) war 18, 21, 23, 25–6, 31, 32, 38–9, 41, 50n16, 67, 156, 159, 164–5, 182, 191–2, 202–3, 211–2, 224–7, 234, 237–9, 259, 280

1973 (Yom Kippur) war, oil crises 21–3, 25, 27, 35, 39, 41, 55, 60, 63, 67, 101, 116, 156–7, 160, 198, 202–3, 206–7, 211, 217, 224, 226–30, 234, 241–3, 259, 268, 280–1, 285

abd el-Nasser Gamal 25, 50n16, 198, 202–3, 224–5

Accra 40, 129–30

Addis Ababa 40, 68, 130, 142, 150, 200, 215, 234

African Union (AU) 46–7, 52n89, 135, 195, 200–1, 206, 209, 213, 216, 236–7, 245, 248, 264, 284

AgroStudies 108–9, 250, 252, 255, 274

Aharon Ofri International Training Centre 103, 107, 122

aid effectiveness 3–4, 102, 112–14, 121–2, 131–2, 175, 182, 217, 223, 267, 270, 275

aid orphans 137, 146, 247, 277

Algeria 20, 24, 97n29, 198, 201, 207, 210, 215, 226, 234, 241

al-Qaddafi Muammar 198–200, 217, 226, 232

Amin Idi 52n72, 199, 206, 223, 225, 231, 242–3

Angola 6n1, 44, 48, 56, 134, 140, 142, 144, 177, 192, 215, 228, 237, 244–5, 247

Arab League (AL) 20, 50n16, 89, 197, 201, 207, 216

Arab Spring 21, 30, 164, 200

Arafat Yassir 28, 56n16, 204–5, 242

Ben-Gurion David 17, 22–3, 31, 66–7, 78, 82, 90, 100, 159

Ben Gurion University of the Negev (BGU) 45, 90, 92, 107, 111, 134, 139, 144–5, 255

Benin (Dahomey) 6n1, 127–8, 130, 133, 138, 151, 191, 215, 221, 224, 226–8, 238, 243–5, 247

Blaustein Institutes for Desert Research 107, 181

Botswana 6n1, 56, 73, 137, 142, 242, 244–5, 247–8

Burkina Faso 6n1, 38, 63, 106, 109, 132, 136, 138, 149, 197, 207, 217, 221, 228, 242–5, 247, 285

Burundi 6n1, 42, 59, 106, 133, 140, 144, 226, 228, 239, 243–5, 248

Cameroon 6n1, 42–4, 46, 48, 106, 109, 127, 130, 133, 135–7, 140, 144, 149, 151, 175, 177, 208, 210, 215, 228–9, 231, 238, 240, 242, 244–7

Central African Republic (CAR) 6n1, 42–3, 127–8, 130, 132–3, 136, 175, 215, 224, 228, 233, 238, 242, 244, 247

Centre for International Agricultural Development Cooperation (CINADCO) 85, 103, 105–6, 137, 180

Chad 6n1, 38, 42, 44, 127–8, 133, 197, 199, 206, 210, 215, 220, 226, 229–30, 232, 241, 243–5

China 30, 38–40, 63, 106, 133, 148, 156, 186, 193, 195–6, 218, 232, 239, 241, 257, 270, 282–3

Christianity 6n2, 20, 22, 30, 32, 36, 64, 68, 165, 183, 192–3, 210, 213, 221, 232–4, 236, 239, 241, 246–7, 250–2, 254, 258–60, 277–8, 285–6, 289

Cold War 1, 13, 19, 22, 31, 36, 44, 56, 121, 191–2, 197, 200, 214–16, 230, 259, 277, 279, 281–2

companies (state-owned, private, joint) see enterprises

Congo (Republic of Congo, Congo-Brazzaville) 6n1, 42, 56, 128, 136, 139, 191, 205, 215, 224, 226, 228, 238–9, 244, 247, 259

Dahomey (Republic) see Benin

Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) 6n1, 37–40, 42–3, 48, 127–8, 132–3, 136, 191, 194, 201–2, 208, 215, 221, 224–6, 228–31, 235, 239–40, 242–3, 244–5, 247, 259, 281

Department of International Cooperation (MASHAV) 5, 64, 93, 99–109, 111–12, 115–24, 126–34, 136, 138, 140, 143–6, 151, 170, 172–8, 181–2, 188, 192, 221, 236, 247, 250, 252, 257, 269, 271, 273–4

desertification 34, 46, 59, 66, 86–7, 91, 95, 107, 124, 135, 145, 230, 251, 265, 271, 276, 287

Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 33, 115–16, 120, 123, 146, 153n61

Djibouti 44, 192, 195, 232, 235, 244

East Africa 30, 39–40, 44, 46–7, 62, 141, 151, 170–1, 193–4, 196, 200–1, 214, 229, 232–3, 245, 247, 270, 279, 281

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 46, 133, 138, 201, 216, 237, 245–6, 284

Egypt 18, 20–1, 23, 25–8, 30, 32–3, 36–7, 39–40, 43, 49, 51n42, 132, 141, 156, 164, 170–1, 185, 192–4, 197–200, 202–4, 207–9, 214, 217, 220–1, 224–5, 227–30, 232, 234, 237–43, 259

enterprises (companies) in development 3, 11–12, 40, 42, 48, 55, 66, 74, 76, 78–9, 88–9, 96, 103, 105, 108–9, 111, 115, 117, 129, 132, 139–42, 146, 170, 173, 180, 196, 198, 203, 207, 224, 250, 257, 260, 271–2, 274, 276, 287–8

Equatorial Guinea 6n1, 42, 48, 56, 142, 162, 197, 239, 244, 247,

Eritrea 6n1, 20, 25, 49, 134, 136–7, 148, 194, 199, 201, 203, 205, 208, 214, 231, 234–5, 248, 285

Eshkol, Levi 17, 39, 46, 159

Ethiopia 5, 6n1, 6n2, 19–20, 21, 25, 30, 36, 39–40, 42, 44–7, 56, 58–9, 62, 68, 71, 78, 94, 103–4, 106, 108, 119–20, 124, 127, 128–42, 144, 146, 148, 149–51, 161, 171, 174–5, 177, 179, 191, 194–5, 198–201, 203, 208, 210, 220–1, 224, 227–8, 231–5, 238–45, 247, 253–5, 257–8, 269, 276–7, 285

Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) 106, 115, 123–4, 137, 151

France 13, 24, 26, 38–9, 43, 73, 80, 141, 149, 178, 192–3, 201, 206, 212, 216, 224, 226, 230, 236, 257

Gabon 6n1, 42–3, 47, 56, 127, 133, 215, 224, 226–8, 231, 238–9, 242–4, 247

Gadna 80–1, 83, 104, 114, 127, 133

Galana Kulalu 140, 250, 274

Gambia 6n1, 36, 42, 94, 131, 133, 205, 208, 225, 227–8, 239, 243, 244–5, 247

Germany 19, 74, 106, 133, 138, 149, 156, 176

Ghana 5, 6n1, 35, 37–8, 41–2, 44–5, 47–8, 70n51, 54–6, 62–3, 73, 100–1, 106, 109, 120, 124, 127–33, 135–8, 141, 144, 146, 148, 149–50, 171, 174–5, 177–8, 191–2, 194–5, 197–8, 201–2, 205, 214–5, 220–2, 224–5, 227–8, 230, 231–3, 239–45, 247–50, 254–5, 257–9, 277, 285

Golda Meir Mount Carmel International Training Center (MCTC) 100, 103–5, 122, 132, 136–7, 150, 175, 177, 180, 253

Great Britain 16–7, 23–4, 38–40, 87, 97n29, 144, 165, 192–3, 203, 224, 230, 248

Guinea 6n1, 36, 42, 44, 48, 123, 127, 130–1, 135, 191, 194, 202, 205, 214–5, 221, 225–6, 231, 238–9, 243–5, 285

Guinea-Bissau 6n1, 191, 197, 199, 205, 228, 243–5

Hadassah 40, 80, 128, 135, 144, 150

Hebrew University of Jerusalem (HUJ) 43, 45–7, 78, 110, 118, 128, 144, 255

Hezbollah 27, 29–30, 32, 194

Histadrut 37, 42, 74, 76, 80, 103, 105–6, 115–16, 129, 132, 157, 212

India 13, 148, 170, 172, 183, 196–7, 218, 283

Innovation: Africa 142–3, 179, 181, 254, 274

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 32, 123, 245

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 56, 141, 271

Iran 20–1, 25, 27, 29–31, 44, 48, 50n30, 63, 141, 158, 161, 163, 168, 193–4, 197, 201–2, 210, 212–13, 217, 232, 237, 258, 283, 286–7, 289

IsraAid 109, 143, 181–2, 254, 274

Ivory Coast 6n1, 38, 40–6, 56, 62, 109, 124, 127–9, 131–3, 135–7, 139, 171, 177–8, 192, 197, 205, 208, 215, 220–1, 224, 226, 228–9, 230, 238, 240, 242–5, 247, 257–8, 277, 285

Jerusalem 26, 32–3, 86, 165, 168, 183, 209, 224, 231, 233–4, 244–7, 259

Kenya 5, 6n1, 25, 30, 37–42, 44–8, 51n54, 56, 59, 62–3, 94, 103–4,106, 108, 122, 128–43, 146, 149–51, 171, 173, 175–67, 193–4, 198, 206, 210, 212, 220–3, 226–8, 230–3, 238–45, 247–8, 250–1, 255, 257–60, 269, 274, 277, 285

Kuwait 20, 141, 207–9

Lesotho 6n1, 41, 136, 227, 239, 242, 244

Liberia 6n1, 42–3, 46, 113, 127–8, 131, 132–3, 135–6, 138, 162, 199, 203, 220–2, 224, 227–33, 237–42, 244–7, 259

Liberman, Avigdor 45, 232

Libya 20, 43, 52n89, 193, 197–200, 202–3, 206–7, 209, 213, 215, 217, 226–7, 229–30, 232, 234, 241

Madagascar 6n1, 40, 42, 131, 133, 135–6, 140, 215, 220–1, 224, 239, 243–4, 247, 259

Malawi 6n1, 41, 43, 103, 106, 109, 127–8, 131, 133, 137, 142–3, 149, 212, 227–8, 231, 239, 241–2, 244, 247, 259

Mali 6n1, 38, 42, 44, 62, 130–1, 133, 191–2, 197, 20, 205, 207–8, 214–5, 224–6, 228, 232, 239, 243–5, 258

MASHAV see Department of International Cooperation

Mauritania 4, 6n1, 38, 44, 171, 198, 208, 240

Mauritius 6n1, 132–3, 227–8, 242, 244–5

Meir Golda 17, 24, 37, 39, 74, 100–1, 104, 211, 253

Mekorot 40, 88, 115, 129

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 64, 122–3, 134, 146, 149–50, 196

Ministry of Defence (MoD) 37, 39, 44, 104, 212

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 4, 5, 22, 27, 34, 36–41, 43–7, 99, 102, 120, 115, 117–18, 137, 156, 158–63, 167–8, 170, 172–4, 181–2, 212–13, 255, 273, 275, 283

Morocco 20–1, 25–6, 97n29, 161, 171, 198–9, 201–2, 209, 226

Mozambique 6n1, 134, 14, 191, 205, 215, 228, 231, 244,

Nahal 80–1, 104, 114, 127, 133, 22

Namibia 6n1, 56, 73, 212, 244–5, 247

New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) 101, 138, 216

NETAFIM 89, 108, 139, 145, 257, 274

Netanyahu Benjamin 30, 44–6, 74, 102, 167, 169, 171, 206, 232, 237, 246, 267, 273, 284

Niger 6n1, 38, 42, 44, 127, 129–30, 133, 139–40, 195, 209, 210, 215, 220, 225–6, 228, 231, 238, 241, 244–5

Nigeria 5, 6n1, 37, 40, 42, 44–5, 47–8, 56, 60–1, 106, 108, 120, 127–31, 133–4, 136–7, 140–2, 177–8, 183, 194, 198, 200, 206, 210, 220, 225, 227–8, 230–2, 238–49, 251–2, 255, 258–9, 277

Nkrumah Kwame 55, 100, 129, 225

non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 3, 5, 11, 47, 49, 59, 67, 71, 74, 81, 93, 105, 109–10, 117–35, 140, 142–5, 156–7, 162–3, 170, 173, 179, 181, 188, 235, 246, 251–2, 266, 270–2, 274–6, 279, 287

Official Development Assistance (ODA) 11, 116–17, 119–20, 136, 146, 147, 148, 176, 184, 186, 188, 195, 266, 271, 273–4, 276, 287

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 4, 10–11, 33–4, 56, 68, 74, 77–8, 80, 107, 115–17, 119–20, 122–5, 141, 146, 153n61, 176–7, 194, 206, 208–9, 235, 273, 276

Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 41, 52n89, 197–200, 202, 204, 207, 211, 213, 215–16, 223–4, 227, 229, 231–2, 234, 236, 238, 240–5

Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 31, 44, 206–10, 237

Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) 27, 50n16, 156, 197, 204–6, 228, 231

Palestinian Authority (PA) 18, 20, 28–30, 32, 85, 89, 94, 161, 171, 176, 206, 213, 259, 286

periphery doctrine 25, 30–1, 36–7, 49, 212, 264, 280

Prime Minister's Office (PMO) 22, 39, 48, 109, 160–1, 171–2

Red Sea 85, 89, 193, 195, 201, 220, 235

Rhodesia 37, 202, 211, 215

Russia 16, 23, 30, 63, 191–3

Saudi Arabia 20, 23, 30, 194, 198–9, 201–2, 207–10, 217, 222–3, 226–7, 229, 232

Save a Child's Heart (SaCH) 93–4, 144, 182, 251–2

Senegal 6n1, 36–8, 42–4, 62–3, 73, 106, 109, 124, 127, 136–41, 145–6, 151, 177, 193–4, 197, 206–8, 210, 215, 222, 225–9, 231, 236–7, 239–40, 242–5, 248–9, 258, 277, 284–5

Shalom Clubs 114, 174–5, 177, 188

Sharett Moshe 17, 22–3, 31, 51n47

Sierra Leone 6n1, 36, 40, 42, 128–33, 135–7, 143, 175, 199, 205, 221, 227–8, 231, 233, 238–9, 242–5, 247, 259

Sinai Peninsula 18, 21, 25, 27, 32, 41, 49, 156, 200, 202–3, 215, 225, 227, 229, 239

Society for International Development (SID) 45, 110–1

Solel Boneh 40, 42, 48, 74, 76, 129, 134

Somalia 4, 6n1, 20, 38, 44, 118, 195, 198–9, 205, 208, 232, 234, 238, 243

South African Republic 4, 6n1, 6n2, 38, 41, 44, 170, 185, 198, 200, 202, 204–5, 210–3, 215–6, 218, 226–30, 233, 238, 241–3, 258–60, 282

South Sudan 6n1, 20–1, 25, 30, 40, 44, 46, 48, 106, 136, 140, 143, 146, 163, 182, 210, 214, 233, 247, 254

Sudan 4, 6n1, 20–1, 25, 40, 44, 49, 68, 136, 140, 148, 193–5, 199–200, 206, 208, 210, 232, 243–4

Suez Canal 198, 202–3, 225

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 122, 126, 146

Swaziland 6n1, 41, 132, 144, 227, 239, 242, 244, 247

Tahal 40, 115, 132, 141–2

Tanganyika see Tanzania

Tanzania (Tanganyika) 6n1, 37, 38, 40, 42, 44–8, 52n72, 56, 62, 94, 103–4, 106, 120, 127–33, 136–7, 139, 141–4, 162, 191, 194–5, 200, 205–6, 214, 220–1, 222–4, 228–33, 239–41, 244–5, 247, 249, 254, 257–8

Technion 78, 140, 144, 170

Techno-agricultural Innovation for Poverty Alleviation TIPA 145, 149, 237

Tel Aviv University (TAU) 43, 78, 93–4, 109–10, 144

Tikkun Olam 92–4, 144, 165, 167, 169, 188, 264

Tipat Halav 80, 150

Togo 6n1, 41–3, 46, 106, 109, 127, 130, 132–3, 136–7, 146, 192, 205, 208, 224, 226, 228–9, 231, 233, 238–9, 242, 244–7, 277, 284–5

Tunisia 20–1, 97n29, 171, 226, 234

Turkey 20–1, 25, 31, 50n30, 85, 97n29, 119, 141, 148, 185–6, 194–5, 200

Uganda 6n1, 25, 30, 37, 39–40, 42, 44–6, 49, 51n54, 52n72, 56, 62–3, 103–4, 109, 127, 133–6, 141–3, 146, 148, 171–2, 174–5, 193–4, 199, 205–6, 209, 220, 223, 225–6, 231–3, 238–9, 241, 243–5, 247, 254, 257–9, 285

UN Human Settlement Program UN-Habitat 33, 41, 103, 105

UN Women 105, 133, 151, 174

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, Soviets) 19, 23–5, 28, 31, 38–40, 43, 50n16, 61, 68, 71, 116, 119, 133, 191–3, 199, 212, 214–15, 217, 220, 226, 229, 230–1, 238, 240, 244, 257, 281–2

United Arab Emirates (UAE) 20, 30, 202, 207–8, 287–8

United Nations (UN) 2, 12, 22–5, 29, 31–4, 37, 39, 41, 45, 47, 50n16, 51n51, 61, 87, 90, 102, 104–5, 107, 109, 111, 113, 117–18, 120, 123–4, 127, 132, 137, 139, 142–4, 157, 159, 162, 167–8, 173, 176–82, 185–6, 187–8, 194–5, 197–8, 200, 202, 205, 210–11, 214–15, 217, 223, 227, 235–45, 248, 258–60, 264–5, 272, 275–7, 279–81, 283–4, 287

United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 6n1, 33, 56, 104, 106, 116, 124, 130, 133, 137, 6n1, 151

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 32, 105–7, 123–4, 130, 137–8, 150–1, 180, 233, 244–5, 248

United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 33, 41, 103, 106, 124, 151, 181

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 14, 32–4, 37, 43, 51n51, 101, 124, 157, 167, 171–2, 181, 205, 208, 216, 234, 238, 240, 242–6, 248

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) 51n51, 105, 123, 143, 182

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 23, 31–3, 195–6, 203, 231, 234–8, 240, 244–5, 248

United States (US, Americans) 16, 20, 23–8, 30, 32, 38–9, 43, 67, 74, 78, 88–90, 92, 140, 142, 163–5, 168, 176, 178–9, 182, 191–3, 197, 203, 212, 217, 225, 227, 230–1, 234–5, 238, 240, 242, 244, 247, 257–8, 281, 284

United States Agency for International Development (USAID, American aid) 13, 106–7, 131, 134–5, 138, 143, 149–50, 170, 175

Upper Volta see Burkina Faso

West Africa 36, 39–40, 46–7, 60, 101, 138, 149, 188, 192–4, 201, 207, 209, 216, 233, 257, 279, 284

World Health Organisation 93, 123–4, 128, 137, 143

Zaire see Democratic Republic of Congo

Zambia 5, 6n1, 42, 45, 56, 61, 73, 109, 127, 135–6, 200, 210, 221, 224, 227–9, 231–3, 239, 242, 244, 247, 249, 252–3, 259

Zanzibar see Tanzania

Zimbabwe 6n1, 132–3, 193–4, 212, 228, 231, 244–5